1. अखण्डार्थत्वलक्षणभङ्गः तत्राखण्डार्थत्वलक्षणोपपत्तिः- हेयं निरूप्य बन्धाख्यं तन्निवृत्तेर्निबन्धनम्। यज्ज्ञानं तदखण्डार्थमादेयमधुनोच्यते।। तच्चाखण्डार्थं द्विविधम्- एवं पदार्थनिष्ठम्, अपरं वाक्यार्थनिष्ठम्। एकैकं च पुनर्वैदिकलौकिकभेदेन द्विविधम्। पदार्थनिष्ठं वैदिकमपि द्विविधम्- तत्पदार्थनिष्ठं त्वं पदार्थनिष्ठं च। तत्र सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमित्यादि तत्पदार्थनिष्ठम्। `योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुष' इत्यादि त्वं पदार्थनिष्ठम्। `प्रकृष्टप्रकाश' इत्यादि तु लौकिकं पदार्थनिष्ठम्। वाक्यार्थनिष्ठमपि वैदिकं `तत्त्वमस्या'दिवाक्यम्, `सोऽयं देवदत्त' इत्यादि तु लौकिकम्। अत्राहुः- किमखण्डार्थत्वम् ? न तावन्निर्भेदार्थत्वम्, यतो निर्भेदार्थत्वस्य शब्दबोध्यत्वे विशेषणतायामुपलक्षणतायां च निर्घटं भूतलमितिवत् सखण्डार्थतैव स्यात् शब्दाबोध्यत्वे तु वस्तुगत्या यन्निर्भेदं ब्रह्म तद्बोधकसगुणवाक्यानामपि अखण्डार्थत्वापत्तिः। अथ यन्निर्भेदं वस्तुगत्या तन्मात्रपरत्वम् न। प्रकृष्टप्रकाशादिवाक्येऽव्याप्तेः, तेषां धर्मिसमसत्ताकभेदवद्वस्तुपरत्वेन वस्तुगत्या निर्भेदार्थे निष्ठत्वाभावात्। अत एव निर्विशेषार्थत्वमपि न। नाप्यपर्यायशब्दानां प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपर्यवसायित्वम् शीतोष्णस्पर्शवन्तौ पयः पावकावित्यादावनेकप्रातिपदिकार्थपरेऽतिव्याप्तेः। न च संभूयार्थपरत्वमत्र नास्त्येव, प्रत्येकं त्वेकैकार्थपरत्वं लक्षणवाक्यत्वादिति नातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तथापि ब्रह्मण्यभावाद्, अभिधया लक्षणया वा वेदान्तवाक्यानां निःसम्बन्धे ब्रह्मणि पर्यवसानानुपपचेः। अत एव नैकविशेष्यपरत्वमपि, तद्विशिष्टैकविशेष्यबोधकनीलोत्पलादिवाक्ये अतिव्याप्तेरिष्टापत्तेश्च। यत्तु- अपर्यायशब्दानां संसर्गागोचरप्रमितिजनकत्वं वा तेषामेकप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपर्यवसायित्वं वा अखण्डार्थत्वम्। तदुक्तं पञ्चपादिकाकृद्भिः- `पदानां परस्परानवच्छिन्नार्थानाम् अनन्याकाङ्क्षाणाम् अव्यतिरिक्तैकरसप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रान्वयः' इति। उक्तञ्च तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकृद्भिः- संसर्गासङ्गिसम्यग्धीहेतुता या गिरामियम्। उक्ताऽखण्डार्थता यद्वा तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थता।। इति । तन्न, आद्ये `अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोग' इत्यादौ संयोगलक्षणवाक्येऽव्याप्तेः। अथ पदस्मारितपदार्थसंसर्गाप्रमापकत्वं विवक्षितम्, तत्रापि `द्विषदन्नं न भोक्तव्य' मित्येतत्परे `विषं भुङ्क्ष्वेति वाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिः। न च- `द्विषदन्नं न भोक्तव्य'मिति शास्त्रमूलत्वेन शास्त्रीयपदस्मारितपदार्थसंसर्गप्रमापकत्वादत्र नातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्, युक्तिमूलत्वेनास्य शास्त्रमूलत्वासिद्धेः। अथ प्रतिपिपादयिषितपदार्थसंसर्गाप्रमापकत्वमत्र विवक्षितम्, तत्राप्यसंभवः, चन्द्रब्रह्मादिशब्दार्थानां स्वरूपतो ज्ञाततयाऽप्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वेन संसर्ग विशेषप्रतियोगित्वेनैव प्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वात्। अत एव न द्वितीयलक्षणमपि, तथा च लक्षणासम्भवात् प्रमाणमप्यसंभवि, अलक्षिते प्रमाणस्योपन्यसितुमशक्यत्वाद् इति। अत्रोच्यते- पदवृत्तिस्मारितातिरिक्तमत्र संसर्गपदेन विवक्षितम्। तथा चापर्यायशब्दानां पदवृत्तिस्मारितातिरिक्तागोचरप्रमाजनकत्वमाद्यलक्षणं पर्यवसितम्। तथा च न संयोगलक्षणे अव्याप्तिः, तस्य पदवृत्तिस्मारितत्वात्। नापि द्विषन्नभोजननिषेधके अतिव्याप्तिः, तत्रानिष्टसाधनत्वसंसर्गस्य पदवृत्त्यस्मारितस्य प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्। `शीतोष्णस्पर्शवन्तौ पयः पावका' वित्यत्र त्वखण्डार्थत्वमिष्टमेव। न च - धर्मधर्मिभावासहमखण्डार्थत्वं कथं धर्मिभेदं सहतामिति- वाच्यम्, एकत्रासहिष्णुतायाः सर्वत्रा सहिष्णुतायामहेतुत्वात्, शीतस्पर्शवत् पयः, उष्णस्पर्शवान् पावक इति वाक्यार्थभेदाच्च। असंभवस्तु तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वादिति हेत्वसिद्ध्युद्धारे निरसिष्यते। अत्र च `घटः कलश'इत्यादौ संसर्गाप्रमापके एकार्थपरेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणायापर्यायशब्दानामिति। तत्रापि बहुवचनेन संभूयैकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वस्य लाभान्न`धवखदिरपलाशा' इत्यादावतिव्याप्तिः। पदज्ञाप्येत्युक्ते अर्थापत्त्या पदज्ञाप्यमनिष्टसाधनत्वमादाय `विषं भुङ्क्ष्वेति वाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिः स्यात्तद्वारणाय वृत्तीति। तथाप्यन्विताभिधानवादिमते शक्त्याऽभिहितान्वयवादिमते च लक्षणया वाक्यार्थभूतसंसर्गस्य वृत्तिज्ञाप्यत्वात् सर्वत्र प्रमाणवाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिः स्यात्तद्वारणाय उक्तं स्मारितेति। आद्यपक्षे कुब्जशक्त्यङ्गीकाराद्, द्वितीयपक्षे चाज्ञाताया एव पदार्थनिष्ठाया लक्षणाया वृत्तित्वाङ्गीकारात् न संसर्गस्य पदस्मारितत्वम्, किंत्वनुभाव्यत्वमित्यतिव्याप्तिपरिहारः। एवं द्वितीयमपि लक्षणं सम्यगेव। तत्राप्येकत्वं प्रातिपदिकार्थस्यैकधर्मावच्छेदेन वृत्तिविषयत्वम्, न त्वेकमात्र व्यक्तित्वम्। अतो यौगिकार्थौपगवादिप्रश्नोत्तरे `श्यामो दीर्घः लोहिताक्ष औपगव' इत्यादौ अनेकार्थात्मके वनसेनादिप्रश्नोत्तरे एकदेशस्था वृक्षा वनमित्यादौ च नाव्याप्तिः। `शीतोष्णस्पर्शवन्तौ पयःपावका'विति तु प्रत्येकमेकैकार्थपरत्वात् सङ्ग्राह्यमेव। तदुक्तं कल्पतरुकृद्भिः- अविशिष्टपर्यायानेकशब्दप्रकाशितम्। एवं वेदान्तनिष्णाता अखण्डं प्रतिपेदिरे।। इति । ननु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदे अपर्यायत्वम्, स चानन्तादिपदेषु न संभवति, शुद्धब्रह्ममात्रनिष्ठत्वाद्, अतो वेदान्तेषु लक्षणाव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदं स्वीकृत्यैव लक्षणयाऽनन्तादिपदानां शुद्धब्रह्मपरत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। न च शुद्धे संबन्धाभावान्न लक्षणापीति वाच्यम्। अतात्विकसंबन्धेनैव लक्षणोपपत्तेः। भ्रमप्रतीतरजतत्वेन संबन्धेन शुक्तौ रजत पदलक्षणावत्। शुद्धस्यैव सर्वकल्पनास्पदत्वेन शुद्धे न कल्पितसंबन्धानुपपत्तिः। यथा चानन्तादिपदानां लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणि नान्तवत्त्वादिप्रसङ्गः तथा वक्ष्यते। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ अखण्डार्थलक्षणोपपत्तिः।। 1 ।। 2. सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यानामखण्डार्थत्वानुमानभङ्गः एवं लक्षणसंभवे प्रमाणसंभवोऽपि तथा हि- सत्यादिवाक्यमखण्डार्थनिष्ठं, ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थनिष्ठं वा, लक्षणवाक्यत्वात् तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वाद्वा, प्रकृष्ट प्रकाशश्चन्द्र इति वाक्यवदिति पदार्थविषयाखण्डार्थत्वानुमानम्। तत्त्वमस्यादि वाक्यमखण्डार्थनिष्ठमात्मस्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठं वा, अकार्यकारणद्रव्यमात्रनिष्ठत्वे सति समानाधिकरणत्वात्, तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वाद्वा, सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्यवदिति वाक्यार्थविषयाखण्डार्थत्वानुमानम्, न च सत्यादिवाक्ये तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वमसिद्धम्; `ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमिति ब्रह्मवेदनस्यैवेष्टसाधनतया तन्मात्र एव बुभुत्सातः तन्मात्रस्यैव प्रश्नविषयत्वात्। न च प्रकृष्टादिवाक्ये साध्यवैकल्यम्; तद्वाक्यं पक्षीकृत्य तन्मात्र प्रश्नोत्तरत्वेन चन्द्रमात्रनिष्ठतायाः सामान्यव्याप्तिमवलम्ब्य साधनात्। एवं `तत्त्वमस्या'दिवाक्येऽपि तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वं नासिद्धम्, `कोऽह'मित्यात्मस्वरूपस्यैव प्रश्नविषयत्वेन तदधिकप्रत्युक्तेरयुक्तेः। नाप्यत्र दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः, देवदत्तस्वरूपमात्रे पृष्टे अस्य प्रवृत्तेः। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः, विपक्षबाधकतर्कस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। न च- संसर्गागोचरप्रमितिजनकत्वं साध्यमप्रसिद्धम्, प्रत्यक्षादिनापि इदमित्थमिति विशेषसंसर्गगोचराया एव प्रमितेर्जननादिति वाच्यम्, निर्विकल्पकस्वीकर्तॄणां तस्मिन्नेव प्रसिद्धेः, इतरेषां तु प्रमात्वं संसर्गागोचरवृत्ति, सकलप्रमावृत्तित्वादभिधेयत्ववदिति सामान्यतस्तत्प्रसिद्धेः। यद्यप्यत्रापि अप्रयोजकत्वं संभाव्यते तथापि सन्देहरूपा साध्यप्रसिद्धिर्न दुर्लभा। वस्तुतस्तु प्रकृष्टादिवाक्य एव तत्प्रसिद्धिर्दर्शिता। न च- लक्षणवाक्यत्वं सत्यादिवाक्येष्वसिद्धम्, सत्यत्वादेः परापरजातितया तस्याश्चान्यत्रापि विद्यमानत्वेनासाधारण्याभावात्, न च- तात्त्विकं तद् ब्रह्मणि, अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधाद्, आतत्त्विकं त्वन्यत्रापि तुल्यमिति- वाच्यम्, परमार्थसत्यादिरूपतायाः ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणत्वात्। अस्मन्मते यद्यपि सत्याद्यन्यतमपदं स्वरूपलक्षणपरम्, ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य तदभासत्वात्, तथापि परैरपि सत्यत्वस्य सत्यत्वे सति ज्ञानत्वस्य सत्यत्वे सत्यानन्दत्वस्य शून्यवादिभिरपि सत्त्वरहितज्ञानान्दात्मकत्वस्य ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्राङ्गीकारान्मिलितं विना न निर्विचिकित्सब्रह्मसिद्धिरिति मिलितं लक्षणम्। न चैवं विशिष्टस्य लक्षणत्वे सखण्डार्थत्वप्रसङ्गः, वाच्यस्य सखण्डार्थत्वेऽपि लक्ष्यस्याखम्डत्वात्। यद्यपि सर्वेषां सत्यादिपदानां लक्ष्यमेकमेव निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म, तथापि निवर्तनीयांशाधिक्येन न पदान्तरवैयर्थ्यम्। अतो वाच्यार्थ वैशिष्ट्यस्याखण्डसिद्धावुपायत्वात् न तद्विरोधिता। ननु इदं विरुद्धम् असाधारणधर्मरूपलक्षणपरवाक्यस्य सखण्डार्थत्वनियमादिति- चेत्, न, सर्वलक्षणवाक्यानां स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसायित्वेन नियमासिद्धेः धर्मलक्षणस्याखण्डत्वविरोधित्वेऽपि स्वरूपलक्षणस्य तदविरोधित्वाच्च। न चाभेदे लक्ष्यलक्षणभावायोगः, अन्तःकरणवृत्तिनिबन्धनाकारभेदेन उभयोपपत्तेः, आवृतत्त्वानावृतत्ववद्, अन्यथा स्वरूपलक्षणतटस्थलक्षणविभागो न स्यात्। न च यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वाभावित्वाभ्यां व्यवस्था, तावता हि स्थायित्वास्थायित्वव्यवस्था स्यात्, न तु स्वरूपादिरूपा, तव मते पार्थिवरूपादौ स्वरूपलक्षणे अव्याप्तेश्च, ब्रह्मणि यावद्द्रव्यभाविधर्मविरहाच्च। वस्तुतस्तु- द्वारत्वेन लक्षणे तात्पर्यं न द्वारिणोऽखण्डार्थत्वं विरुणद्धि। न च- स्वरूपज्ञानस्य प्रागेव सामान्यतो जातत्वात् तज्ज्ञाने नैतद्द्वारापेक्षेति वाच्यम्, ज्ञानमात्रेऽस्य द्वारत्वाभावेऽपि संशयादिनिवर्तकैतज्ज्ञाने तद्द्बारापेक्षणात्। न च सखण्डवनादिलक्षणवाक्ये व्यभिचारः, तत्रापि साध्यसत्त्वस्य व्युत्पादनात्। न च किं चन्द्रलक्षणमित्यसाधारणधर्मप्रश्नोत्तरे प्रकृष्टप्रकाशादिवाक्ये व्यभिचारः। तत्र हि न चन्द्रस्वरूपपरत्वम्, किन्तु प्रकर्षाश्रयो यः प्रकाशः, तत्स्वरूपपरत्वम्, तथा च प्रकर्षोपलक्षितप्रकाशव्यक्तिस्वरूपमात्रप्रतिपादकत्वेन तत्राप्यखण्डार्थत्वाविरोधात्। अत एव- धर्मे पृष्टे चन्द्रस्वरूपं वक्तुं नोचितमिति-निरस्तम्, धर्मस्यैव स्वरूपत उक्तत्वाद्, अन्यथा प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः। ननु- इदं बाधितम्, धर्मिज्ञानाधीनसप्रकारकसंशयादिनिवर्तकं मोक्षहेतुं सप्रकारकज्ञानं प्रति साधनत्वेन वेदान्तविचारविधानान्यथानुपपत्त्या वेदान्तवाक्ये साध्याभावनिश्चयादिति चेन्न, अनृतादिप्रतिषेधकव्यावृत्ताकारज्ञानेनैव अनृतादिसंशयादिनिवृत्त्युपपत्तेरन्यथासिद्धत्वात्। न हि सप्रकारकत्वमात्रं तत्र तन्त्रम्। भ्रमकालीनानुवृत्ताकारज्ञानस्य सप्रकारकत्वेन संशयादिनिवर्तकत्वे भ्रमकथैवोच्छिद्येत। ज्ञानस्याज्ञानसमविषयत्वेनैव तन्निवर्तकत्वम्, न तु समानप्रकारकत्वेनापि गौरवात्। अज्ञानविषयश्चशुद्धं ब्रह्म अज्ञानकल्पितस्य तदितरस्य अज्ञान विषयत्वायोगात्। तथा च शुद्ध ब्रह्माकारा चित्तवृत्तिः निष्प्रकारिकैवाज्ञाननिवर्तिकाप्रकारमात्रस्याविद्याकल्पितत्वेन तद्विषयतायां वृत्तेरविद्यासमविषयत्वाभावात्। यथा चाविद्यातत्कार्यविषयं ज्ञानं तदनिवर्तकं तथा व्युत्पादितं प्राक्। द्रव्याद्याकारज्ञानानां च घटाद्याकारत्वस्यानुभवनिरस्तत्वान्न द्रव्याद्याकारज्ञानेन घटाद्याकाराज्ञाननिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, द्रव्यत्वघटत्वयोर्भेदेन विषयभेदाच्च। यथा च समानप्रकारकत्वमादायापि न निस्तारः, तथा प्रतिपादितमस्माभिर्वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामिति दिक्। ननु- अस्तु सत्प्रतिपक्षः, तथा हि- सत्यादिवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयः संसृष्टरूपः संसर्गरूपो वा, प्रमाणवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयत्वात्, संमतवत्, सत्यादिवाक्यं, स्वतात्पर्यविषयज्ञानाबाध्यसंसर्गपरं, स्वतात्पर्यविषयज्ञानाबाध्यस्वकरण प्रमाविषयपदार्थनिरूप्यसंसर्गपरं वा, प्रमाणवाक्यत्वादग्निहोत्रादिवाक्यवत्। `विषं भुङ्क्ष्वे' त्यादौ वाच्यार्थसंसर्गपरत्वाभावेऽपि स्वकरणकप्रमाविषयपदार्थसंसर्गपरत्वान्न व्यभिचारः, `खं छिद्रं कोकिलः पिक' इत्यादौ चानतिभिन्नार्थत्वे सामानाधिकरण्यायोगेन छिद्रकोकिलादीनां खपिकादिशब्दवाच्यत्वसंसर्ग परत्वाच्च व्यभिचार इति चेन्न आद्यानुमाने संसृष्टरूप इति साध्ये संसर्गे, संसर्गरूप इति साध्ये च संसृष्टरूपे पदार्थे व्यभिचारात्। तयोरुभयोरपि प्रमाणवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयत्वात्। द्वितीयानुमाने प्रमाणवाक्यत्वस्याबाध्यपरत्वमात्रेण प्रमितिविषयपरत्वमात्रेण वोपपत्तौ विशिष्टसाध्यस्य तत्रातन्त्रत्वेनाप्रयोजकत्वाद्, अलक्षणवाक्यत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च। नापि वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यप्रमा, सप्रकारिका, विचारजन्यत्वात्, संशयनिवर्तकत्वाद्वा, कर्मकाण्डजन्यज्ञानवद्। वेदान्तजन्या प्रमा, ब्रह्मप्रकारविषया, ब्रह्मधर्मिकसंशयविरोधित्वाद् ब्रह्मविचारजन्यत्वाद्वा, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा कर्मकाण्डजन्यो निश्चय इति प्रतिसाधनमस्त्विति वाच्यम्, तव मते ज्ञानमात्रस्य सप्रकारकत्वेन विचारजन्यत्वसंशयविरोधित्वयोर्व्यर्थत्वाद्, अप्रयोजकत्वात्, निष्प्रकारकज्ञानादपि संशयादि निवृत्तिसंभवात्, लक्षणवाक्याजन्यत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च। अत एव- द्वितीयानुमानमपि-अपास्तम्, ब्रह्मनिष्ठप्रकारविषयत्वसाधने दृष्टान्ताभावाच्च। सर्वेषु च प्रतिसाधनेषु प्रश्नोत्तरयोः वैयधिकरण्यापत्तिः प्रतिकूलतर्कोऽवसेयः। ननु- दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यम्, तथा हि- प्रकृष्टप्रकाशादिवाक्यं न तावदभिधया अखण्डार्थनिष्ठम्, प्रकृष्टादिपदस्याखण्डे अभिधाया अभावात्, त्वयानङ्गीकाराच्च, नापि लक्षणया, प्रकृष्टप्रकाशस्य द्रव्यस्य गुणस्य वा चन्द्रे अन्वयोपपत्तेः अन्वयानुपपत्तिरूपलक्षणाबीजाभावादिति- चेन्न, `यष्टीः प्रवेशये'त्यादौ लोके `तरसमयाः पुरोडाशा भवन्तीत्यादौ वेदे च यथाश्रुतान्वयसंभवेऽपि यथा तात्पर्यविषयीभूतान्वयानुपपत्त्या यष्टिधरपुरुषेषु सवनीयहविर्मात्रे च यष्टिपुरोडाशशब्दयोर्लक्षणाऽऽश्रिता, तथैवेह तात्पर्यविषयीभूतान्वयानुपपत्तिनिमित्तया लक्षणया अखण्डार्थपरत्वोपपत्तेः कश्चन्द्र इति चन्द्रस्वरूपे पृष्टे तन्मात्रपरस्यवोत्तरस्योचितत्वात्। ननु- चन्द्रस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातत्वे तत्र प्रश्नो न युज्यते, अज्ञातत्वे धर्मिज्ञानसाध्यबुभुत्सासंदेहयोश्चन्द्र इत्यनूद्य क इति प्रश्नस्य चन्द्रशब्दस्यार्थवत्त्वाज्ञानेनाप्रातिपदिकतया तदुत्तरसुब्विभक्तेश्चायुक्तत्वप्रसङ्गात्। चन्द्रस्वरूपे ज्ञातेऽपि तस्यासङ्कीर्णं स्वरूपं न ज्ञातमिति न युक्तम्, तस्मिन् रूपद्वयाभावात्। असङ्कीर्णत्वेन न ज्ञातमिति चेत्, असङ्कीर्णत्वप्रकारकप्रतीतिपरत्वं पर्यवसितम्, तच्च व्यावर्तकवैशिष्ट्यं वा व्यावृत्तिवैशिष्ट्यं वा, उभयथाप्यखण्डार्थत्वभङ्ग इति- चेन्न, भावानवबोधात्। तथा हि- चन्द्रस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातत्वाभ्युपगमादेव तदज्ञातत्वनिबन्धनदोषानवकाशः। ज्ञातत्वेऽपि च विपर्ययविरोधिज्ञानानुदयदशायां तदुदयार्थं प्रश्नो युज्यत एव अन्यथा सर्वत्र प्रश्नमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः। अथानभ्यासदशापन्नं ज्ञानं न विपर्ययविरोधि, प्रकृतेऽपि समम्, विषयतुल्यत्वेऽपि ज्ञानविशेषस्यैव विपर्ययनिवर्तकत्वस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तत्वात्। `शङ्खः श्वेतो न पीत' इत्यादिपरोक्षज्ञाने भासते यादृशं श्वैत्यस्वरूपं पीताभावस्वरूपं वा, तादृशमेवापरोक्षज्ञानविषयतादशायां विपर्ययविरोधीति विपर्ययविरोधिफलोपहितमेवासङ्कीर्णमित्युच्यते। फलोपधानतदभावौ च दोषविशेषतदभावयोर्वैपरीत्येनेत्यन्यदेतत्। तथा च एकमेव स्वरूपं दशाविशेषभेदेन सङ्कीर्णमसंकीर्णं चेति सङ्कीर्णतादशायां युगपत् ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरुपपत्तिः। अत एव- व्यावृत्तिवैशिष्ट्यं व्यावर्तकवैशिष्ट्यं वा असङ्कीर्णत्वमिति- अपास्तम्, `शङ्खः श्वेतो न पीत' इत्यत्रोभय सद्भावेऽपि विपर्ययाविरोधित्वरूपसङ्कीर्णताया दर्शनात्। `यद्यपि यश्चन्द्रः, तत्र चन्द्रत्वं तमोनक्षत्रादिव्यावृत्तिश्चास्तीति मया ज्ञायत एव, तथापि चन्द्रस्वरूपं परं न ज्ञायत' इत्यनुभवेन व्यावर्तकव्यावृत्तिवैशिष्ट्यस्याजिज्ञासितत्वेन जिज्ञासितं चन्द्रस्वरूपमेव विपर्ययविरोधिज्ञानविशेषं जनयता `प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र' इति वाक्येन बोध्यत इति किमनुपपन्नम् ? व्यावृत्तेः शाब्दबोधफलत्वेऽपि तदविषयत्वान्नाखण्डार्थत्वव्याघातः, तद्बोधकपदाभावाच्च। अथ लक्षणया व्यावृत्तेः शाब्दबोधे भानम्, न; वैयर्थ्यात्तत्र तात्पर्याभावेन लक्षणाया अयोगात्। तथा हि- चन्द्रे व्यावृत्तिर्बोध्यते व्यक्तिविशेषे वा, नाद्यः, `या शुक्तिः सा रजतादिभिन्ने'ति ज्ञानेऽपि शुक्तिस्वरूपाज्ञानतत्कार्यविपर्ययदर्शनवत् `यश्चन्द्रः, स तमआदिविलक्षण' इति ज्ञानेऽपि चन्द्रस्वरूपाज्ञानतत्कार्यविपर्ययादिदर्शनात्। द्वितीये त्वावश्यकत्वाद्व्यक्तिविशेष एव बोध्यताम्, किं व्यावृत्त्या शब्दानुपस्थितया ? व्यक्तिविशेषबोधादेव तत्सिद्धेः। न हि `धूमोऽस्ती'ति वाक्ये वह्नौ लक्षणा। अत एव विनैव लक्षणां व्यावृत्तिः शाब्दबोधे भासते, `घटेन जलमाहरे त्यत्र छिद्रेतरत्ववदिति निरस्तम्, छिद्रेतरत्वस्यानन्यलभ्यत्वेन शब्दतात्पर्यविषयत्वेऽपि न व्यावृत्तेस्तथात्वम्; हानोपादानादिवत् फलत्वेनान्यलभ्यत्वात्। छिद्रेतरत्वमपि लक्षणां विना न शाब्दबोधविषयः, अन्यथा लक्षणोच्छेदापत्तेः किं तु शाब्दबोधविषये जलाहरणसाधने वस्तुगत्याऽस्तीत्यन्यत्र विस्तरः। अत एवोक्तमाकरे- अन्यतो व्यावृत्तिरर्थात् न शब्दा'दिति। न च कश्चन्द्र इति धर्मप्रश्नोऽयम्, कश्चन्द्रधर्म इति स्वाधीने शब्दप्रयोगे निष्प्रयोजनलक्षणाया अन्याय्यत्वात्, तद्बोधनेऽप्यखण्डार्थत्वस्योपपादित्वाच्च। ननु- सर्वलक्षणवाक्यानां वस्तुगत्या परस्परभिन्नतत्तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्र विषयज्ञानजनकत्वेन सप्रकारकज्ञानजनकत्वाभावात् प्रश्नवाक्यस्थं विशेष्यमात्रसमर्पकं चन्द्रादिपदमेव प्रयोक्तव्यमुत्तरवादिना, किं प्रकृष्टप्रकाशादिपदेनेति चेन्न, स्वरूपमात्रस्य ज्ञेयत्वेऽपि स्वरूपज्ञानस्य तावत्पदार्थाधीनत्वे सत्येव तावत्पदार्थेतरव्यावृत्तिफलत्वेन सर्वपदानां सफलत्वात्, अन्यथा संशयाद्यनुवृत्तेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात्। ननु- उत्तरस्य प्रकृष्टत्वादिविशिष्टबोधपरत्वाभावे तात्पर्यतो यः कश्चिच्चन्द्र इत्येवावबोधनाद्वस्तुतो यस्य कस्यापि चन्द्रत्वं स्यात्, तात्पर्यविषये चायं चन्द्र इति लक्ष्यलक्षणरूपोद्देश्यविधेयविभागाभावेन चन्द्रबुभुत्साया अनिवृत्तिः, कश्चन्द्र इति प्रश्नस्योत्तरं च न स्यादिति- चेन्नः यथा गङ्गासंबन्धित्वविशिष्टे तात्पर्याभावेऽपि वस्तुगत्या गङ्गासंबध्येव तीरं गङ्गापदेन लक्ष्यते, यथा वा `व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षती'त्यादौ ब्रीह्यादिस्वरूपे प्रोक्षणादिविधानवैयर्थ्याद् व्रीहिभिर्यजेतेत्यादिवाक्यसिद्धापूर्वसंबन्धित्वलक्षणायामपि वस्तुगत्या व्रीहित्वाद्याश्रयीभूता एव व्यक्तयो व्रीह्यादिपदैर्लक्ष्यन्ते, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि प्रकृष्टप्रकाशपदाभ्यां वस्तुगत्या स्वाश्रयीभूतैव व्यक्तिर्लक्ष्यते, न तु या काचिदिति विशिष्टतात्पर्याभावेऽपि न पूर्वोक्तदोषः। अयं चन्द्र इति लक्ष्यलक्षणभावाभावेऽपि तदुभयप्रतिपादकपदाभ्यामुपस्थितस्यैकस्वरूपस्यैव उद्द्देश्यविधेयभावसंभवेन बुभुत्सानिवृत्तेरुत्तरत्वस्य च संभवात्। निष्प्रकारकस्यापि ज्ञानस्य संशयादिनिवर्तकत्वं प्रागुपपादितमेव। तदेतन्निष्कृष्टम्- प्रश्नोत्तरे तावत् चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्र विषये, चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकार्थश्च प्रकृष्टप्रकाशाश्रयीभूतासाधारणी विशेष्यभूता व्यक्तिः, न तु प्रकृष्टप्रकाशविशिष्टा, प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इति सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः, विशेष्यव्यक्तिश्चाखण्डेत्यखण्डार्थतैव। ननु- गामानयेत्यत्र गामुद्दिश्यानयनविधानाद् यथा गोत्वस्य उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वादानयनेनानन्वयेऽपि प्रकारत्वं, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि प्रकृष्टप्रकाशस्य चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकार्थत्वेनानन्वयेऽप्युद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वात्, प्रकारत्वं दुर्वारम्, न हि गामानयेत्यत्र गोत्वं विनाऽन्वय इति- चेन्न, प्रातिपदिकार्थतावच्छेदकत्वस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वनियतत्वेनाप्रातिपदिकार्थे तदवच्छेदकत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। तथा च प्रकृष्टप्रकाशस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थतावच्छेदकत्वे प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वं दुर्वारमेव। ननु- पृथिवीत्ववती पृथिवीत्यादौ पृथिवीत्वस्य विधेयेन पृथिवीप्रातिपदिकार्थत्वेन नानन्वयः, पृथिवीत्वस्य पृथिवीप्रातिपदिकार्थत्वात्, सहप्रयोगस्तु पृथिवीशब्दस्य तद्व्यवहर्तव्यतापरतयेति तत्र व्यभिचार इति- चेत्, न, पृथिवीशब्दार्थत्वेन पृथिवीत्वजातिविशिष्टमजानतः पृथिवीत्वपदेन जातेरुपस्थित्यभावाद् अनन्वय एव स्यादिति पृथिवीत्वजातिविशिष्टे पृथिवीशब्दार्थत्वग्रहोऽवश्यं प्रागेव श्रोतुर्वक्तव्यः। तथा च वचनवैफल्यमित्यनन्यगत्या जलादिव्यावृत्तगन्धसमानाधिकरणजातिमती पृथिवीत्याद्यर्थे पर्यवसितमुत्तरम्। गन्धसमानाधिकरणजातिमत्त्वादिकं च न पृथिवीपदवाच्यमिति कथं नान्वयः ? व्यवहर्तव्यतालक्षणया सहप्रयोगोपपादनं चायुक्तम्, व्यवहर्तव्यतायां हि जहल्लक्षणा, तत्र च स्वार्थहानिः, स्वरूपे तु जहदजहल्लक्षणा, तत्र स्वार्थान्वय इति स्वरूपे जहदजहल्लक्षणाया एवोचितत्वात्। तदुक्तं `व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जस'मित्यधिकरणे भाष्यकृद्भिः `लक्षणायामपि सन्निकर्षविप्रकर्षौ भवत' इति। ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीते'त्यत्र किमोङ्कारसदृशमुद्गीथमित्यर्थः, किं वोद्गीथावयवमोङ्कारमिति विवक्षायां गौण्यां वृत्तौ स्वार्थहानेरवयवलक्षणेव ज्यायसी। सन्निकृष्टत्वादिति तत्र निर्धारितम्। एतेन- धर्मिणश्चन्द्रस्य सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वात् नक्षत्रादिभ्यो व्यावर्तकधर्मस्य व्यावृत्तेश्च घटादौ प्रागेव ज्ञातत्वाद्विशिष्टविषये एव प्रश्नोत्तरे, तत्र यदि व्यावृत्ति वैशिष्ट्यमेव प्रष्टुः साक्षाद् बुभित्सितं, तदापि तत्तद्व्यावृत्तेः समासहस्रेणापि वक्तुमशक्यतया वह्निबुभुत्सायां धूममिव व्यावर्तकधर्मवैशिष्ट्यमेवाभिधत्ते, न हि वह्निबोधार्थस्य धूमोऽस्तीति वाक्यस्य न धूमे तात्पर्यम्, न वा यागाक्षेपकस्य `यदाग्नेय' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य द्रव्यदेवतासंबन्धे। यदा तु तत्तद्व्यावृत्तेर्वक्तुमशक्यतामवगम्य व्यावर्तकधर्मवैशिष्ट्यमेव पृच्छति, तदा सुतरां प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्विशिष्टपरत्वमिति निरस्तम्, प्रथमे प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः, द्वितीये श्रुतार्थपरित्यागापत्तेः। प्रथमेऽपि श्रुतार्थपरित्यागः स्थित एव। न चानन्यगत्या श्रुतार्थपरित्यागाभ्युपगमः, गत्यन्तरस्योक्तत्वात्। ननु- प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः यदि स्वरूपे लक्षणा, तदा वह्निप्रश्ने धूमोऽस्तीत्युत्तरे वह्नौ लक्षणास्त्विति- चेन्न, धूमोऽस्तीति वाक्येनाहत्य शक्त्या लिङ्गे बोधिते तत एव वह्निबोधोपपत्तौ तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिकल्प्यलक्षणाया अयोगात्, श्रुतिलिङ्गाधिकरणन्यायेन वाक्यापेक्षया लिङ्गस्य बलवत्त्वाच्च, प्रकृते चासङ्कीर्णचन्द्रस्वरूपसिद्धौ वाक्यातिरिक्तप्रमाणाभावेन वैषम्याच्च। ननु- किं लक्षणश्चन्द्रः ? इत्यस्यासाधारणधर्मविषयकस्य, कतमश्चनद्रः ? इत्यस्य जातिविषयकस्य, अनयोः कतरश्चन्द्रः ? इत्यस्य जातिगुणक्रियाभिः पृथक्करणरूपनिर्धारणविषयकस्य प्रश्नस्योत्तर इवात्रापि प्रतिवचने लक्षणोक्तेः प्रश्नेऽपि प्रकृष्ट प्रकाशो अप्रकृष्टप्रकाशो वेति धर्मवाचकं पदं कल्पनीयं तत्सूचक किंशब्दप्रयोगाच्चेति- चेन्न, वह्निप्रश्ने धूमोऽस्तीति प्रतिवचनदर्शनेन प्रतिवचनोक्तत्वस्य प्रष्टुर्बुभुत्सितत्वेऽतन्त्रत्वात्। अथ तत्र बुभुत्सितबोधोपयुक्तत्वात्तदुक्तिः, प्रकृतेऽपि नोपयोग इति केन तुभ्यमभ्यधायि ? किं लक्षण इत्यादिप्रश्न तथात्वे तद्वाचकपदवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात्, क्वचिद्दर्शनमात्रस्याप्रयोजकत्वाच्च, किं शब्दस्य बुभुत्सा सूचकत्वेन तस्य धर्मबुभुत्सानियतत्वाभावाच्च। एवं च प्रश्ने धर्मवाचिपदाभावात्तदनुरोधिन्युत्तरे धर्मवाचकं पदं स्वरूपपरमेव। स्वरूपबुभुत्साया उपपादितत्वेन लक्षणाबीजाभावात् न प्रश्नवाक्यस्थं चन्द्रपदं तदसाधारणधर्मलक्षकम्। यत्तु- लक्षणवाक्यं चन्द्रव्यवहारकर्तव्यतावैशिष्ट्यपरम्, अतो नाखण्डार्थता। चन्द्रव्यवहारस्तु चन्द्रपदविशेषितो व्यवहारः, न तु चन्द्ररूपार्थविशेषित इति तज्ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां वैयर्थ्यबोधनाशक्यतादोषौ न भवतः। न च वृद्ध व्यवहार एव शक्तिग्राहकोऽस्तु किं लक्षणवाक्येनेति वाच्यम्, उपायस्य उपायान्तरादूषकत्वाद् इति, तन्न, प्रश्नोत्तरवैयधिकरण्यापत्तेरुक्तत्वात्, प्रश्नवाक्यस्थचन्द्रशब्दे लक्षणाबीजाभावात्। असाधारणं चन्द्रस्वरूपमज्ञात्वा तत्र चन्द्रशब्दविशेषितव्यवहारवैशिष्ट्यस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् तज्ज्ञानस्यावश्यकत्वेन तेनैव वाक्यप्रामाण्योपपत्तेर्व्यवहारकर्तव्यतापरत्वे मानाभावात्। अत एवोक्तं- `मानान्तरसिद्धं प्रकृष्टप्रकाशवैशिष्ट्यमखण्डार्थसिद्धावुपायमात्र'मिति। अस्मिन् ज्योतिर्मण्डले कश्चन्द्र इति प्रश्नसमये प्रत्यक्षेणेव अन्यदापि प्रकारान्तरेणैव तस्य ज्ञातत्वाद्, अन्यथा तस्यानुवाद्यत्वानुपपत्तेः, चन्द्रस्वरूपे तु ज्ञातेऽप्यसङ्कीर्णज्ञानाभावात्। बुभुत्सोपपादितैवेति प्रथमानुमानमनाविलम्। द्वितीयानुमानेऽपि नाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वबाधसत्प्रतिपक्षसाध्यवैकल्यादयो दोषाः। तथा हि- साध्यं तावत् ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यनिष्ठत्वम्, अन्यथा ब्रह्मपदस्य यौगिकत्वेन सखण्डार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात्। प्रकृष्टप्रकाशादिवाक्यं च प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यमात्रपरं भवतीति सामान्यव्याप्तो दृष्टान्ते न साध्यवैकल्यमपि। ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यमात्रनिष्ठत्वं हि अखण्डार्थत्वमेव। तत्प्रश्नोत्तरत्वहेतुव्युत्पादनमपि पूर्वोक्तप्रकृष्टादिवाक्यन्यायेनैवेति नासिद्धिबाधौ। प्रश्नोत्तरवैयधिकरण्यापत्तिरूपविपक्षबाधकसध्रीचीनतया सत्प्रतिपक्षाप्रयोजकत्वोपाधीनामनमवकाशः। न च- सत्यादिरूपप्रतिवचने प्रश्नस्य कश्चन्द्र इतिवदश्रवणात्तदुत्तरानुसारेण प्रश्नवाक्ये कल्पनीये धर्मविषयकमेव तत् कल्प्यते, बाधकाभावात्, तथा चासिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, `ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य मित्यादिवाक्यबलात्सत्यत्वादि वैशिष्ट्याविषयकस्यैव ब्रह्मविषयकवेदनस्य मोक्षजनकत्वात् तदतिरिक्तबुभुत्साविरहेण तद्विषयकप्रश्नवाक्यस्य कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वेन कश्चन्द्र इतीव किं ब्रह्मेत्येव वाक्यं कल्प्यत इति नासिद्धिः। ननु- कतम आत्मेत्यत्र कतरः स आत्मेत्यत्र च त्वं पदार्थप्रश्ने `वा बहूनां जातिपरिप्रश्ने डतमच्' `द्वयोरेकस्य निर्धारणे डतरच्' इति सूत्राभ्यां निर्णीतजात्याद्यर्थकतमादिपदप्रयोगात् तत्प्रतिवचने `योऽयं विज्ञानमय' इत्यादौ पक्षे त्वदभिमतहेतोरसिद्धिः। न च- यद्यत्प्रश्नोत्तरं तत्तदखण्डार्थमिति न ब्रूमः, किन्तु यद् यत्प्रश्नोत्तरं तत्तदर्थकमिति वाच्यम्, एवं सामान्यव्याप्त्याऽव्यभिचारेऽपि तद्बलादेतत् पक्षीकृत्याखण्डार्थत्वसाधनेऽखण्डार्थप्रश्नोत्तरत्वादिति पर्यवसितहेतावसिद्धेरनुद्धारादितिचेत्, नैष दोषः, तात्पर्यविषयस्यैवार्थत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात्, तथाहि धर्मवाचकपदसत्त्वेपि उत्तरस्य धर्मे न मुख्यतात्पर्यं तथा प्रश्नेऽपि तद्वाचकतमादिप्रत्ययसत्त्वेऽपि न मुख्यतस्तत्परत्वम्, असाधारणात्मस्वरूपस्य मुख्यतो बुभुत्सितस्योपायत्वेन तदुपयोगाद्, आत्मस्वरूपबोधस्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात्। न च सर्वस्याप्युत्तरस्य प्रश्न प्रष्टृनिर्धारितधर्मिनिष्ठानिर्धारितैकधर्मपरत्वाद्विरुद्धो हेतुरिति वाच्यम्, अनिर्धारितनिर्धारणत्वेनैवोत्तरतोपपत्तौ तादृग्धर्मपरत्वस्योत्तरत्वाप्रयोजकत्वेन नियमासिद्धेः। ननु- कथं स्वरूपमात्रपरस्य निर्धारकत्वम् ? लक्षणवाक्यत्वादिति गृहाण। न च- एवमुत्तरजन्यज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारकतया कथं सप्रकारकसंशयनिवर्तकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, निष्प्रकारकत्वेऽपि संशयनिवर्तकताया उपपादितत्वात्। ननु- यदि प्रश्नादुत्तरमन्धिकविषयं न स्याद्, उत्तरमेव न स्यात्, प्रश्न एवोत्तरं स्यादिति चेन्न, प्रश्नादनधिकविषयत्वेऽपि असाधारणधर्मवाचकपदवत्त्वेन निर्विचिकित्संधर्मि प्रतिपादकत्वेन वा उत्तरत्वसम्भवात्। अत एव प्रश्नोत्तरम्। तत्प्रयोजकरूपविरहात्। न च- किं करोति किमानेयमित्यादिप्रश्नोत्तरे अध्ययनं करोति गामानयेत्यादौ व्यभिचारः, न हि तत्राध्ययनत्वगोत्वादित्यागेन लक्षणया कर्मादिमात्रपरत्वमिति वाच्यम्, अत्र हि न कृत्यानयनयोः प्रश्नः, किन्तु कृतिकर्मानयनकर्मणोः, अन्यथा किं करणं किमानयनमित्येव पृच्छेत्। तथा च प्रश्नोत्तरयोरध्ययनत्वादिविशिष्टकर्माविषयत्वाद्, यद् यत्प्रश्नोत्तरं तत्तदर्थकमिति सामान्यव्याप्तौ व्यभिचाराभावात्। एवं सति- सत्यादिवाक्यार्थो ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रं तन्मात्रप्रश्नोत्तरवाक्यार्थत्वादित्यादि न्यायदीपावलीस्थमप्यनुमानं साधु। ननु- एकप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रप्रश्नोत्तरत्वेन एकप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपरत्वेऽपि कथमखण्डार्थत्वम् ? पञ्चकस्य त्रिकस्य वा वैयाकरणमते प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वात्। तदुक्तम्- स्वार्थो द्रव्यं तथा लिङ्गं संख्या कर्मादयोऽपि च। नामार्थपञ्चकं प्राहुराद्यं त्रिकमथापरे।। इति । प्राभाकरमतेऽस्मदेकदेशिमते चान्वितस्यैव प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वाच्च, अभिहितान्वयवादिमतेऽपि जातिविशिष्टाया एव व्यक्तेः प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वपक्षे प्रातिपदिकार्थस्यैव विशिष्टत्वाच्च। जातावेव शक्तिः व्यक्तिस्त्वाक्षेपलभ्येति मते प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपरत्वेन विशेष्यचन्द्रादिव्यक्तिपरत्वं न स्यात्। ब्रह्मपदस्य यौगिकत्वेन सुतरामस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य विशिष्टत्वादिति- चेन्न, ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यांशमात्रपरत्वस्य साध्यत्वात्। तथा च प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य विशिष्टत्वेऽप्यखण्डार्थत्वसिद्धिः, `प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्र' इत्यत्र लिङ्गादेरपि प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वेन तद्ग्रहणवैयर्थ्यमाशङ्क्य प्रातिपदिकार्थपदस्य लिङ्गाद्यविशिष्टस्वरूपमात्राभिधायकतया समाधानस्याभियुक्तैरुक्तेश्च। यत्तु पञ्चकत्वादिकं प्रातिपदिकार्थस्योक्तं, तदनङ्गीकारपराहतं युक्तिविरुद्धं च, द्रव्यादिप्रातिपदिकाद्, गुणकर्मणोरप्राप्तेः। अन्यथा द्रव्यमित्युक्ते `नीलं पीतं वा ? चलति न वा ?' इति सन्देहो न स्यात्। न च- जिज्ञासान्यथानुपपत्त्या सामान्यतस्तदुक्तावपि विशिष्यानभिधानात् सन्देह इति- वाच्यम्, द्रव्यत्वाद्याक्षिप्तसामान्यज्ञानादेव जिज्ञासोपपत्तेः, सङ्क्याकर्मत्वादीनां च वचनविभक्त्यादिनैव प्राप्तेश्च। अन्विताभिधानरूपैकदेशिमतमपि न युक्तिसहम्, अन्वयस्याकाङ्क्षादिसहकारिवशात् पदार्थमात्रशक्तादेव सिद्धेः। न च प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपरस्य कथमेकदेशपरत्वम् ? विशेषणस्यानाकाङ्क्षितत्वेन प्रागेव तदुपपादनात्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, स्वरूपमात्रबुभुत्साप्रवृत्तत्वरूपविपक्षबाधकस्योक्तत्वात्। ननु- सत्यादिवाक्ये सत्सु विशेषणेषु सस्तुतिकविधिवाक्ये प्राशस्त्य इव विशेषणार्थेऽपि रक्तपटन्यायेनाकाङ्क्षोत्थापनीया, उक्तं हि- `आकाङ्क्षणीयाभाव आकांक्षाया अभाव' इतीति- चेन्न, सत्यादिवाक्ये विशेषणे सत्यपि न तद्गोचराकाङ्क्षाकल्पनम्, प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इत्यत्र विशेषणे सत्यपि कश्चन्द्र इति स्वरूपमात्राकाङ्क्षादर्शनात्। न च तत्रापि तत्कल्पनम्, तत्कल्पनं विनापि व्यावृत्तिबोधमात्रेणैव तत्सार्थकत्वोपपत्तेः। व्यावृत्तिविशेषबोधश्च विशेषणपरत्वाभावेऽपि तद्द्वारकस्वरूपमात्रज्ञानमात्रेणैवोपपद्यते। ननु- सप्रकारकज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षहेतुतया `ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परामित्यर्थेन `य एवं विद्वानमृत इह भवती'ति श्रुत्या `यो वेद निहितं गुहाया' मित्युत्तरवाक्येन च मुमुक्षोः सप्रकारक एव धर्मिज्ञाने साध्ये बुभुत्सोचितेति- चेन्न, निष्प्रकारकज्ञानस्यैव स्वरूपोपलक्षणोपलक्षिताधिष्ठानज्ञानत्वेन भ्रमादिनिवृत्त्या मोक्षहेतुताया उपपादितत्वेन तदनुरोधाद् ब्रह्मविदित्यादेः सप्रकारकब्रह्मज्ञानपरतायां मानाभावात्। य एवं विद्वानित्यस्यार्थे इतरप्रकारत्वं नार्थः, किं तु एवंप्रकारोपलक्षितत्वम्, एकधैवेत्याद्यनुसारात्। न च- एवं सगुणवाक्यस्यापि ब्रह्मबुभुत्सायां कर्मकाण्डस्यापि कर्मबुभुत्सायां वैद्यकादिशास्त्रस्यापि औषधादिबुभुत्सायामखण्डब्रह्माखण्डकर्माखण्डौषधादि परत्वं स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, नहि वयं बुभुत्साप्रवृत्तवाक्यत्वमात्रेणाखण्डार्थत्वं ब्रूमः, किन्तु स्वरूपमात्रबुभुत्साप्रवृत्तवाक्यत्वेन। न च तत्रापि स्वरूपमात्रबुभत्सा, विशिष्टपरत्वे बाधकाभावात्। तत्रापि चेल्लक्षणवाक्यादौ तथा, तदेष्टापत्तेश्च। न च तर्हि सगुणवाक्यानां सत्यशुद्धान्यमिथ्याविशिष्टार्थपरत्वेन प्रामाण्यायोगः, कर्मकाण्डवद्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्याविरोधात्। ननु- ब्रह्मणि कर्म इवालक्षणवाक्यमस्ति, तदप्यखण्डार्थं स्यादिति- चेन्न, अवान्तरतात्पर्यमादाय चेत्, तदा ब्रह्मपरत्वस्यैवाभावात् महातात्पर्यमादाय चेत्तदेष्टापत्तेः। किञ्च `एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यमित्याद्यनेकाकारनिषेधकवाक्यम् `उदरमन्तरं कुरुत' इत्यादिभेदनिषेधकवाक्यं `केवलो निर्गुणश्चेति गुणनिषेधकम् `एकमेवाद्वितीय'मिति द्वितीयमात्रनिषेधकवाक्यं च बाधकं, तथा सर्वतोऽनवच्छिन्नवस्तुपरानन्तशब्दब्रह्मशब्दौ च। न च- तेषामैक्यभेदाभावादिविशिष्टार्थपरत्वे वेदान्तमात्रस्याखण्डार्थत्वासिद्धिः, सत्यशुद्धान्यमिथ्याविशिष्टार्थपरत्वे प्रामाण्यायोग इति वाच्यम्, ऐक्यभेदाभावादीनां स्वरूपत्वेन विशिष्टपरत्वस्यैवाभावाद्, भेदाभावादेः कल्पितप्रतियोगिकतया कल्पितत्वे तु सत्यादिपदवद्विशिष्टार्थाभिधानद्वारा स्वरूपपरत्वेन प्रामाण्योपपत्तेश्च। न च- एवं तेषां लक्षणयाऽखण्डार्थत्वेन तद्विरोधेन विशिष्टार्थस्य सत्यापि वाक्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्यागः, विशेष्यपरस्य विशिष्टपरेणाविरोधादिति- वाच्यम्, द्वारतयोपस्थितस्याप्यैक्यभेदाभावादेर्विशिष्टार्थविरोधितया मुख्यार्थत्यागसंभवात्। न च- द्वारतयोपस्थितैक्यादेः मिथ्यात्वेन सत्यत्वादिधर्मपरत्वविरोधिता, सत्यत्वे चापसिद्धान्त इति वाच्यम्, भिन्नत्वे सति सत्यतायामेवापसिद्धान्तात्। न चाभेदे द्वारत्वानुपपत्तिः, कल्पितधर्मताकत्वेन द्वारत्वसंभवात्। न च- अत्र सत्यत्वादेर्द्वारत्वेनोपादानात्तेषामेवैतद्विरोध इति वाच्यम्, सत्यत्वादेः कल्पितजातिरूपस्य द्वारतया स्वरूपेणोपादानेऽपि पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधकानामविरोधात्। एतेन ब्रह्मानन्तपदयोरपि बाधकत्वं व्याख्यातम्। ननु- `अथ कस्मादुच्यते ब्रह्मेति बृहन्तो ह्यस्मिन्गुणा' इत्यादि श्रउत्या `महद्गुणत्वाद्यमनन्तमाहु'रित्यादिस्मृत्या च ब्रह्मानन्तपदयोः सगुणवाचित्वेन निर्वचनात् कथं न ताभ्यां विरोधः ? इति- चेन्न; उक्तश्रुतिस्मृत्योः सगुणप्रकरणस्थितब्रह्मानन्तशब्दार्थविषयत्वेन लक्षणवाक्यस्थितब्रह्मानन्तशब्दार्थनिर्वचनपरत्वायोगात्। ननु- इमे हेतवः प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहताः। तथा हि- पक्षदृष्टान्तलक्षणमैक्यपरवाक्यं यदि संसृष्टार्थं न स्यात्, वाक्यमेव न स्याद्; आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिमत्त्वाभावात्। आकाङ्क्षा हि अभिधानापर्यवसानम्, तच्च येन विना यस्य न स्वार्थान्वयानुभावकत्वम्, तदेव तस्यापर्यवसानम्। सन्निधिस्त्वव्यवधानेनान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितिः योग्यता च एक पदार्थसंसर्गे अपरपदार्थनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिताच्छेदकधर्मशून्यत्वम्, नैतत् त्रयं संसर्गाविषये संभवति इति नैष दोषः, अखण्डार्थेऽप्येतत्त्त्रितयसंभवात्, तथा हि- निराकाङ्क्षयोरपि यत्किञ्चिदन्वयानुभावकतया तात्पर्यविषयाननुभावकत्वमेवाकाङ्क्षा वाच्या। तथा चान्वयांशो व्यर्थः, येन विना यस्य तात्पर्यविषयाननुभावकत्वमित्येतावन्मात्रस्यैव सामञ्जस्यात्। तात्पर्यविषयश्च क्वचित्संसृष्टः क्वचिदखण्ड इति न विशेषः। अतः सा तात्पर्यविषयाखण्डार्थानुभवजननात् प्राग्वेदान्तवाक्येऽप्यस्त्येव आसत्तिरप्यव्यवधानेन शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थितिमात्रम्, न त्वन्वयप्रतियोगित्वविशेषितपदार्थोपस्थितिः, गौरवात्। सा च संसर्गाबोधकेऽप्यस्त्येव। योग्यतापि तात्पर्यविषयाबाध एव, न त्वेकपदार्थसंसर्ग इत्यादिस्वरूपा, यत्र बाधिताबाधितसंसर्गद्वयसंभवः, तंत्र बाधिततात्पर्यविषयकेऽतिव्याप्तेः। तात्पर्यविषयाबाधश्चाखण्डार्थेऽपि सुलभः। अथवा- अन्वयस्य भेदघटितत्वनियमाभावेनाभेदसंसर्गमादायाकाङ्क्षादिनिर्वाहः कर्तव्यः। एकपदार्थस्याखण्डस्य तात्पर्यविषयत्वमपि नानुपपन्नम्। यत्र ह्यसाधारणस्वरूपेणैकः पदार्थो ज्ञातः, तत्र पदार्थान्तरविशिष्टः स प्रतिपाद्यते। यत्र तु न तथा ज्ञातः, तत्र स न शक्यः पदार्थान्तरैर्विशेष्टुमिति स एव प्रतिपाद्यः, तत्रैव वाक्यपरिसमाप्तेः। प्रकृष्टत्वसत्यत्वादेस्तत्तद्द्वारकत्वरूपबोधेन व्यावृत्तिभेद उपयोगादिति न वाक्यत्वानुपपत्तिलक्षणप्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतिः। ननु- संसृष्टार्थत्वं न चेत्, तदा वेदान्तानां निर्विषयत्वापत्तिः, अखण्डवाक्यार्थस्य स्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रस्याविद्याद्यध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वेन तत्साक्षित्वेन च नित्यसिद्धत्वादिति चेन्न, अनाद्यविद्योपहितत्वेनादोषात्, स्वतः सिद्धस्यापि प्रमाणवृत्तिमन्तरेणाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वाभावात्। प्रमाणवृत्तेश्चाविद्यानिवृत्तिफलोपहितत्वात् न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। न च- बाधकं विना मुख्यार्थत्यागायोगः प्रतिकूलतर्कः, एकरसत्वादिप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनामप्यखण्डार्थपरत्वेन बाधकत्वाभावादिति वाच्यम्; द्वारतयोपस्थितस्यापि बाधकताया उक्तत्वात्। ननु- वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यज्ञानं निष्प्रकारकं चेत्, ज्ञानमेव न स्यात्, ज्ञानस्येच्छादितुल्यतया सविषयकत्ववत्सप्रकारकत्वस्यापि नियमात्, कञ्चित्प्रकारं विना वस्तुनो बुद्धावनारोहाच्चेति चेन्न, व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः तार्किकादिभिरपि निर्विकल्पकज्ञानाभ्युपगमात्। शब्दवाच्यत्वं तु कञ्चित्प्रकारमन्तरेण संभवति न वेति वादिनो विवदन्ते। तच्चास्माभिर्ब्रह्मणो नाभ्युपेयते। आकाशादिपदवत् किञ्चित्प्रयोगोपाधिमादाय तदपि संभवत्येव। न च शब्दत्वेन सविकल्पकत्वसाधनम्, स्वरूपोपलक्षणज्ञानाजन्यत्वस्य स्वरूपपरवाक्याजन्यज्ञानत्वस्य चोपाधित्वात्, ज्ञानत्वस्येव शाब्दत्वस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वव्याप्यत्वग्रहे मानाभावाच्च। न च- वेदान्तानामबुभुत्सितार्थत्वापत्तिः, धर्मिणः प्रागेव ज्ञानात्। तत्र बुभुत्साविरहादिति वाच्यम्, स्वरूपस्य ज्ञातत्वेऽप्यसाधारणस्वरूपबुभुत्साया उपपादितत्वात्। नापि विचारविध्यनुपपत्तिः। विचारस्य वेदान्ततात्पर्यनिश्चयादिफलकतया निष्प्रत्यूहनिष्प्रकारकब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वोपपत्तेः, आपातदर्शनस्य प्रतिबद्धत्वेनाज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वात्। शुद्धब्रह्मविषयाणामप्यधिकरणानामप्यारम्भो नानुपपन्नः, विषयादिपञ्चकसंभवात्। व्यावृत्ताकारेणाज्ञातो हि विषयः, ब्रह्म च तथा भवत्येव। विषयस्वरूपनिर्धारणाधीनं च प्रयोजनं न निर्धारणे सप्रकारकत्वमपेक्षते। निष्प्रकारके वस्तुनि स्वरूपनिर्धारणत्वाव्याघातात्। अद्वैताद्युपलक्षिताखण्डार्थज्ञानं च निर्धारणम्। तदधीनं प्रयोजनं मुक्तिरेव पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तौ च कल्पितप्रकारावलम्बिनौ। संशयोऽपि कल्पितसमानधर्मधीजन्मैवेति नानुपपत्तिः। अत एव- प्रथमाध्यायतृतीयपादीयाधिकरणानामनारम्भ एव प्राप्तः, विषयादिपञ्चकाभावाद्, विशिष्याज्ञातो हि विषयः, साधारणधर्मधीजन्यश्च संशयः मिथ्यासत्यैकप्रकारावलम्बिनौ च पूर्वपक्षंसिद्धान्तौ, एकप्रकारेण निर्धारणाधीनं च प्रयोजनम्, तच्च पञ्चकं निर्विशेषे कथं स्यादिति परास्तम्, उक्तरीत्योपपत्तेः। न च `ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्'- इति सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वात् सत्यादिवाक्यवैयर्थ्यापत्तिः, असाधारणस्वरूपज्ञानार्थत्वेन साफल्यात्। न च- सत्यत्वादिविशिष्टे तात्पर्याभावे तात्पर्यतो यत्किञ्चिद्ब्रह्मेत्येव बोधनाद् यस्य कस्यापि ब्रह्मत्वं स्याद्, इदं ब्रह्मेति लक्ष्यलक्षणरूपोद्देश्यविधेयविभागाभावाच्चेति वाच्यम्, लक्षणस्वभाव्याद्वस्तुगत्या तत्स्वरूपलाभस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वाद्, एकस्मिन्नपि कल्पितोद्देश्यविधेयभावसंभवात्। अप्राप्तविधेयमात्रपरत्वाद्वाक्यस्य नाखण्डार्थत्वव्याघातः। ननु स्वरूपेण ज्ञातस्य विधेयस्योद्देश्यसंसृष्टतयैव बोधनीयत्वं वाच्यम्। तथा च सखण्डार्थतैव। उक्तं हि- किञ्चिद्विधीयतेऽनूद्य वाक्येनेति सतां स्थितिः। सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्येन कथ्यतां किं विधीयते।। इति नैष दोषः, असाधारणस्वरूपस्य प्रमेयतया विधेयत्वात्, सत्यत्वादिद्वारकस्वरूपज्ञानेनासाधारणज्ञापनपर्यवसानाद्, द्वारफलाभ्यामप्राप्तप्रापणसंभवात्। तथा चोद्देश्यता च विधेयता च स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसन्नैव। ननु- एवं सत्यादिपदानां लक्षणा न स्याद्, अशक्यासदृशान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितिरूपायास्तस्या असंभवात्तद्बीजस्यान्वयानुपपत्तेश्चात्राभावादिति- चेन्न, वृत्त्या हि पदार्थोपस्थितिः, न तु सैव वृत्तिः, अतो नोक्तरूपा लक्षणा, किन्तु शक्यसंबन्धः स च प्रकृतेऽप्यस्त्येव। उपस्थितरूपत्वेऽपि लक्षणायास्तात्पर्यविषयानुकूलोपस्थितिरेव सा, नोक्तोपस्थितिरूपा, अतात्पर्यविषयतादृगुपस्थितौ गतत्वात्। नापि बीजानुपपत्तिः, तात्पर्यानुपपत्तेरेव बीजत्वात्। नापि सत्यादिपदानां पर्यायतापत्तिः, वाच्यार्थभेदात्। सत्यत्वं ह्यस्मन्मते त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वम्, परमते कुम्भादिसाधारणी परजातिः सत्यपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्। ज्ञानपदानन्दपदयोरप्यस्मन्मतेऽन्तः करणवृत्त्युपधानलब्धभेदचिदानन्दविशेषानुगते ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वे, परमते तु स्वभावलब्धभेदज्ञानानन्दनिष्ठे अपरजाती प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ते। तथा च लक्ष्यार्थाभेदेऽपि न पर्यायताशङ्का। ननु- कुम्भाद्यनुगतसत्ताया ब्रह्मलक्षणत्वायोगः, मिथ्यासत्यानुगतसामान्याभावात्, तथा चानृताद् व्यावृत्त्यसिद्धिः, त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वं ब्रह्मणि श्रौतमिति त्वन्मतहानापत्तिश्चेति- चेन्न, ब्रह्मणः सर्वाधिष्ठानतया तद्रूपसत्तायाः सर्वानुस्यूतत्वेन जातित्वव्यपदेशात्, कल्पितधर्मत्वमादाय ब्रह्मव्यक्तिकत्वाच्च। तच्च सत्त्वं त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वमेवेति न तस्य श्रौतत्वहानिः, तस्यानृतं प्रत्यधिष्ठानत्वेऽपि अनृताश्रितत्वाभावेन तद्व्यावर्तकत्वसंभवात्। आनन्दत्वादिकल्पितजातिसाहित्येन लक्षणोक्तिः पररीत्या। न च- धर्मिसमानसत्ताकभेदं विनैवौपाधिकभेदमात्रेणाकाशत्वादेरिव ज्ञानत्वादेरपि जातित्वायोग इति- वाच्यम्, ज्ञानत्वादीनां धर्मिसमसत्ताकभेदवदुपहितवृत्तित्वात्। तर्हि शुद्धस्य कथं ज्ञानत्वादि लक्षणम् ? नहि गन्धो जलस्य लक्षणमिति चेन्न, उपहितवृत्तित्वेऽप्युपधेयवृत्तित्वानपायात्। तदुक्तं- `सत्यत्वादिविशिष्टशबलब्रह्मवाचिनां सत्यादिपदानां शुद्धे ब्रह्मणि लक्षणे'ति। न च- अनृतस्वरूपे शबले सत्यत्वायोगः, योगे वा ततो नानृतव्यावृत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, शबले हि सत्यता एषैव यत् परमार्थसंसर्गेण प्रतीयमाने तस्मिन् सत्यशब्दसङ्गतिग्रहः। तदुक्तं संक्षेपशारीरके- आकाशादौ सत्यता तावदेका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे सत्यता काचिदन्या। तत्संपर्कात्सत्यता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं सत्यशब्दस्तु तत्र।। इति। एवमानन्दादिपदेष्वपि द्रष्टव्यम्। तथा च कथं तेषां नानृतादिव्यावर्तकत्वम् ? एतेन शुद्धादन्यत्र सत्यत्वाद्यसंभवात् सत्यादिवाक्यस्य लक्षणया अखण्डार्थत्वे शुद्धे सत्यत्वादेरभानात् पर्यायत्वं दुर्वारमिति परास्तम्। स्वरूपमात्रपरत्वेऽपि न पदान्तरवैयर्थ्यं व्यावृत्तिभेदबोधनेन साफल्यादिति चोक्तमेव। न च व्यावर्तकस्य सत्यत्वादेस्तात्पर्यतोऽसमर्पणे व्यावृत्त्यसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, `गम्भीरायां नद्यां घोषः प्रतिवसती' त्यत्र यथा तीरे तात्पर्येऽपि नद्यामगम्भीरव्यावृत्तिरभिधाबलाल्लभ्यते, तात्पर्यविषयागम्भीरनदीतिरव्यावृत्ततीरबुद्धावुपायत्वात्, तथात्राप्यभिधाबलात् सत्यत्वादिविशिष्टे तात्पर्याभावेऽप्यापाततस्तत्प्रतीतिमात्रेणैव व्यावृत्तिसिद्धिः, तात्पर्यविषयानृतादिव्यावृत्तस्वरूपबुद्धावुपायत्वस्य तुल्यत्वात्। न च नद्यादिपदलक्ष्ये तीरादावनदीत्वादिवत् सत्यत्वादिपदलक्ष्येऽपि ब्रह्मण्यसत्यत्वाद्यापत्तिः, जहल्लक्षणानभ्युपगमात्। यदि हि तीरादौ नदीत्वादीवत् ब्रह्मण्यपि सत्यत्वादिकमभिधाबलात् न प्रतीयेत, तदैवं स्यात्, न त्वेवमस्ति, नद्यादौ नदीत्वादिवत् सत्यत्वादेर्ब्रह्मण्येव प्रतीतेः। न चैवं निर्धर्मकत्वव्याकोपः, व्यावहारिकस्य धर्मस्य सत्त्वेऽपि स्वसमानसत्ताकधर्मविरहेण तदुपपत्तेः। वाचकानामपि लक्षकत्वमन्यानुपरक्तस्वरूपभानायेत्यन्यत्। तदुक्तं कल्पतरुकृद्भिः- सत्तादीनां तु जातीनां व्यक्तितादात्म्यकारणात्। लक्ष्यव्यक्तिरपि ब्रह्म सत्तादि न जहाति नः।। इति । गौर्नित्यो गौरनित्य इत्युभयत्रापि एकदेशान्वयार्थं लक्षणाभ्युपगमेऽपि जाति व्यक्त्योरुभयोरपि तार्किकैर्गोपदार्थत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च। ननु- औपनिषदे पुरुषे धर्मा न प्रत्यक्षेण प्राप्ताः, किन्तु तत्त्वावेदकेन वेदेन, तथा च कथं व्यावहारिका इति चेन्न वेदादापाततः प्रतीतानामपि वेदातात्पर्यविषयत्वाभावादतात्त्विकत्वोपपत्तेः। तात्पर्यविषये हि वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम्, यत्र च तस्य प्रामाण्यं, तदेव तात्त्विकमिति नियमात्। न च- वेदस्यातत्परत्वमात्रेण कथं व्यावहारिकत्वम् ? बाध्यत्वेन चेत्, प्रस्तरेऽपि यजमानत्वं व्यावहारिकं स्यात्। यजमानत्वस्य तत्रानध्यासात् अव्यावहारिकत्वे शुक्तिरूप्यादेर्व्यावहारिकत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, वेदतात्पर्याविषयत्वेनातात्त्विकत्वे सिद्धे तत्त्वावेदकबाध्यत्वव्यावहारिकावेदकबाध्यत्वाभ्यां व्यावहारिकप्रातिभासिकव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। न च तत्त्वावेदकस्य विशेष्यमात्रपरत्वान्न बाधकत्वं, विशेषणबुद्धिद्वारकत्वेन तन्मात्रपरस्यापि बाधकत्वसंभवाद्, विशेषणेऽप्यवान्तरतात्पर्याभ्युपगमाद्वा। `यजमानः प्रस्तर' इत्यादौ तु न विशेषणे अवान्तरतात्पर्यं, तात्पर्यविषयसिद्धावनुपायत्वात्। महातात्पर्यविषयसिद्ध्युपाये हि अवान्तरतात्पर्यमिति सर्वमतसिद्धम्। ननु- व्यावृत्तयः सत्याः मिथ्या वा ? नाद्यः, व्यावर्तकानामपि सत्यत्वापत्तेर्व्यावहारिकाणां पारमार्थिकव्यावृत्त्यसाधकत्वात्। नान्त्यः शुक्तेः शुक्तितो व्यावृत्तेर्मिथ्यात्वे शुक्तित्वस्य शुक्तिसमसत्ताकत्ववदनृतव्यावृत्तेः ब्रह्मणि मिथ्यात्वे अनृतत्वस्य ब्रह्मसमसत्ताकत्वापत्तेरितिचेन्न, उभयथाप्यदोषात्। तथा हि- (1) व्यावृत्तेर्ब्रह्माभिन्नतया पारमार्थिकत्वेऽपि व्यावर्तकं पारमार्थिकमिति कुतः ? न हि यत् पारमार्थिकबोधकं, तत् पारमार्थिकमिति नियमोऽस्ति, बोध्यबोधकयोः समसत्ताकत्वस्य पदतदर्थादौ व्यभिचारेण प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात्, दोषाप्रयुक्तभानत्वस्य सत्त्वप्रयोजकत्वात्। नापि व्यावृत्तिबोधकं व्यावृत्तिसमसत्ताकमिति नियमः, स्वाप्नाङ्गनादेरपि स्वजन्यसुखापेक्षया सुखान्तरव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिजनकत्वात्, कारणस्य कार्यव्यावर्तकत्वात्। सा च व्यावृत्तिः तव मते पारमार्थिक्येव। मम तु मते व्यावहारिकी। सर्वथापि प्रातिभासिकव्यावर्तकापेक्षयाधिकसत्ताकैव। न च व्यावृत्ते ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वे ब्रह्मपदेनैव तल्लाभादितरपदवैयर्थ्यम्, सामान्यतस्तत्सिद्धावप्यनृतादिव्यावृत्त्याकारेण तत्सिद्धौ साफल्यात्। एवमज्ञानादि व्यावृत्तीनामन्योन्याभेदे सत्यपदेनैव चारितार्थ्यमिति अपास्तं, तत्तदाकारेण सिद्धेस्तत्तत्पदं विनानुपपत्तेः। न च- एवं सत्यत्वज्ञानत्वादिधर्माणामपि व्यावृत्तिवद् ब्रह्माभिन्नतया पारमार्थिकत्वमस्त्विति वाच्यम्, इष्टापत्तेः। तदेवं व्यावृत्तेः सत्यत्वे न कोऽपि दोषः। (2) व्यावृत्तेर्मिथ्यात्वपक्षेऽपि नानृतत्वस्य ब्रह्मसमसत्ताकत्वापत्तिः, एकबाधकबाध्यत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वाद्, व्यावृत्तिबाधकबाध्यस्यैव प्रतियोगिनो व्यावृत्त्यधिकसत्ताकत्वम्, न त्वेकबाधकबाध्यस्यापि, कल्पितरजतव्यावृत्तेः कल्पितरजते मिथ्यात्वेऽपि तदपेक्षया तस्याधिकसत्ताकत्वाभावाद्, अधिकं मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वोपपादने द्रष्टव्यम्। ननु- तत्त्वजिज्ञासुं मुमुक्षुं प्रति मिथ्याबोधनायोगः, न चानृतत्वादिभ्रान्तिनिवृत्त्यर्थं तद्, अधिष्ठानब्रह्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेणैव तन्निवृत्तिसंभवे भ्रान्त्यन्तरोत्पादनायोगात्, न हि वल्मीके स्थाणुरयमिति भ्राम्यतः पुरुषोऽयमित्युपदिश्यत इति- चेन्न, निवर्तकाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कार एव तस्योपायत्वात्, स्थूलारुन्धतीन्यायेन पूर्वपूर्वभ्रमनिवृत्तये काल्पनिकोपदेशस्य पञ्चकोशस्थले दर्शनाच्च। यथा चात्मनि कल्पितेन ब्राह्मण्येनाशङ्किता ब्राह्मण्यभ्रान्तिर्निवर्तते तथा व्यावहारिक्या व्यावृत्त्या प्रातिभासिक्यनृतादिभ्रान्तिर्निवर्तते। न चासद्व्यावृत्तेर्व्यावहारिकत्वेऽनपोदितप्रामाण्येन `असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दिति वाक्येनासत्त्वस्य पारमार्थिकत्वप्रसङ्गः, `नेह नाने'त्यनेन तस्य निषेधाद्, असद्वा इत्यादेरन्यपरत्वस्य प्रागेव दर्शितत्वाच्च। तथा च मीमांसकमते अनृतस्याप्यर्थवादार्थस्य सत्ये प्राशस्त्य इव मिथ्याभूतानामपि व्यावृत्तीनां सत्ये ब्रह्मणि द्वारत्वेन बोधनं युक्तम्। उक्तं हि- `सत्ये ब्रह्मणि सत्यादिशब्दा व्यावृत्तिद्वारा पर्यवस्यन्ती'ति। न च व्यावृत्तिज्ञानस्य धर्मिधीसाध्यत्वेन वैपरीत्यापातः, धर्मविशिष्टधर्मिज्ञानसाध्याया व्यावृत्तेः शुद्धधर्मिज्ञाने द्वारत्वाङ्गीकारात्। न च- शाब्दे अर्थे आर्थिकस्य द्वारत्वमनुपपन्नम्, अन्यथा नीलमुत्पमित्यादेरनीलव्यावृत्तिद्वारा स्वरूपमात्रपरत्वं स्यादिति वाच्यम्, नीलमुत्पलमित्यादौ स्वरूपमात्रबोधे तात्पर्याभावान्न शाब्देऽर्थे आर्थिकार्थापेक्षा, विशिष्टार्थतात्पर्यात्। अत्र तु स्वरूपमात्रे तात्पर्यम्, तच्चार्थिकार्थस्य द्वारत्वं विनाऽनुपपन्नम्। न च विशेषस्य त्वन्मतेऽभावात् किं प्रागज्ञातं व्यावृत्त्या ज्ञापनीयमिति वाच्यम्, अन्याविषयकस्य स्वरूपज्ञानस्य भ्रमविरोधिनः साध्यत्वात्। न चैवमन्याज्ञाने द्वारत्वम्, अन्यज्ञानप्रतिबन्धद्वारेण शुद्धज्ञान एव द्वारत्वसंभवात्। न च व्यावृत्तिज्ञान एव स्वरूपज्ञानं द्वारमस्तु, तस्याभिधाबललब्धविशिष्टज्ञानादेवोपपत्तेः। न च- प्राचीने ब्रह्माज्ञाननिवर्तकब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञाने तदज्ञानकार्यस्यान्यस्य भानायोगः, ब्रह्मप्रातिपदिकार्थबुभुत्सायामेव एतद्वाक्यप्रवृत्तिरिति स्वप्रक्रियाविरोधश्चेति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञानं हि तत्स्वरूपं वा ? वृत्तिरूपं वा ? आद्ये नान्यभानानुपपत्तिः, तस्याविद्यानिवर्तकत्वाभावात्। वृत्तिरूपमप्यापातदर्शनं नाविद्यानिवर्तकम्, तस्यासाक्षात्कारत्वाद्वा, साक्षात्कारत्वेऽपि प्रतिबद्धत्वाद्वा। विचारजन्यं तु फलीभूतं भवत्यविद्यानिवर्तकम्, न तु तत्प्राचीनमिति किमनुपपन्नम् ? ननु- सत्यशब्देनासद्व्यावृत्तिद्वारा यद्बोधितम्, तदेव ज्ञानादिपदैरज्ञानादिव्यावृत्तिद्वारा बोध्यमिति पदान्तरवैफल्यम्। न च द्वारविकल्पः, सत्यादिपदानां नित्यवच्छ्रवणाद् एकस्मिन् प्रयोगे व्रीहियवयोरिवैकस्मिन् वाक्ये सत्याद्यनेकपदोपादानायोगाद्, अनृतत्वादिभ्रान्तिनिवृत्तिरूपदृष्टकार्याणां भिन्नत्वेन ब्रीहियवादिवद् विकल्पप्रयोजकस्यैककार्यत्वस्याप्यभावाच्चेति चेन्न, समुच्चितानां द्वारत्वेन सफलत्वात्। प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपत्त्युपयोगिनामानन्दादीनां भावरूपाणां `आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्ये'त्यनेनास्थूलत्वादीनामभावरूपाणाम् `अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्त'मित्यनेन च सूत्रेण निर्गुणब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तावेव सर्वशाखोपसंहारस्य प्रतिपादितत्वेन द्वारसमुच्चयस्यैवेष्टत्वात्। ननु- सगुणे ब्रह्मण्युपासनार्थं भवतु शाखान्तरीयगुणोपसंहारः, निर्गुणब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तौ तु किं शाखान्तरीयगुणोपसंहारेण ? सत्यादिपदानां प्रत्येकं लक्षकत्वेन लक्ष्यब्रह्मबोधने प्रत्येकमेव समर्थत्वात्, सत्यत्वादेश्च प्रत्येकं लक्षणत्वात्। न हि प्रकृष्टत्वादिकमिव सत्यत्वादिकमतिव्याप्तमिति चेत्, न। प्रकृष्टप्रकाशपदयोरिव सत्यादिपदानामपि कुमतप्राप्तातिव्याप्तिनिवृत्त्यर्थं समुच्चयापेक्षणात्। न ह्यनृतव्यावृत्तिबोधनं विना `विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मे' त्यत्र सून्यवादव्यावृत्तब्रह्मसिद्धिः। एवमेकैकपदाभावे सर्वत्रातिव्याप्तिरूहनीया। तथा च सत्यत्वादिकमनृतादिव्यावृत्तिद्वारा शून्यवादादिव्यावृत्तब्रह्मसिद्धेरुपायः। न च- व्यावृत्तिः, किं ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेन बोध्या ? स्वतन्त्रा वा ? आद्ये सखण्डार्थत्वम्, द्वितीये ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुं प्रति तदुपदेशोऽसङ्गत इति वाच्यम्, व्यावृत्तिर्यद्यपि विशेषणतयैवार्थिकबोधे भासते, तथापि न शाब्दबोधे सखण्डार्थत्वम्। यश्चार्थादर्थो न स चोदनार्थ इति न्यायात्। तदुक्तं वार्तिककारैः- `मानान्तरादपोहस्तु न शाब्दस्तेन स स्मृतः' इति । न चार्थिकैनापि विशेषणेन ब्रह्मणः सखण्डत्वापत्तिः, निर्धर्मकत्वादिश्रुतेर्विशेषणस्य धर्म्यसमानसत्ताकत्वेन सखण्डत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात्। न च- अनन्तशब्देनान्तवद्व्यावृत्तेस्साक्षादेव बोधनान्न तस्य आर्थिकत्वम्, तथा चानन्तपदस्य सखण्डार्थत्वं स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, यद्यपि- तत्रानन्तोऽन्तवद्वस्तुव्यावृत्त्यैव विशेषणम्। स्वार्थार्पणप्राणाड्या तु परिशिष्टौ विशेषणम्।। इति । तैत्तिरीयवार्तिकोक्तदिशा विधिपदानां स्वार्थार्पणप्रणाडिकया अर्थादितरनिवृत्ति बोधकत्वम्, निषेधपदानां तु साक्षादिति स्थितम्, तथापि द्वारभूते ज्ञाने सखण्डार्थत्वेऽपि परमतात्पर्यविषयज्ञानेनाखण्डार्थत्वव्याघात इत्यसकृदुक्तम्। एतदेवोक्तमानन्दबोधाचार्यैः- लक्ष्यार्थभेदाभावेऽपि व्यवच्छेद्यविभेदतः। विज्ञानानन्दपदयोः पर्यायव्यर्थते न हि।। इति । (1) एवं पदे लक्षणेति पक्षे समाहितम्। केचित्त्वत्र वाक्ये लक्षणामाहुः, न पदे। तथा हि- यथा `गम्भीरायां नद्यां घोष' इत्यत्र गम्भीरनद्योः परस्परमन्वयबोधानन्तरं विशिष्टार्थसंबन्धि तीरं लक्ष्यते, तथा प्रकृते परस्परविशिष्टार्थबोधानन्तरं तत्सम्बन्ध्यखण्डं लक्ष्यते। तथा च न पदवैयर्थ्यम्। न च तत्रापि प्रत्येकं लक्षणा, तथा सति गम्भीरनदीतीरादिलाभेन विशिष्टतीरबुद्धिर्न स्यात्। न चं तत्र गम्भीरनदीपदयोरिव इह सत्यादिपदानां परस्परमन्वयबोधकत्वं त्वन्मते नास्तीति- वाच्यम्, एकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि द्वारीभूतस्य परस्परार्थान्वयबोधस्य सत्यादिपदैः मिलित्वा जननाद्, उत्तरकाल एव लक्षणया अखण्डबोधस्याभ्युपगमात्। न च- `सत्यं ज्ञानं' `विज्ञानमानन्द'मित्यादौ अन्योन्यानपेक्षाणां सत्यादिपदानां ब्रह्मलक्षकत्वादर्शनात् कथं गम्भीरायामित्यादितुल्यन्यायतेति वाच्यम्, यत्र वस्तुगत्या गम्भीरनद्यभिप्रायेणैव नद्यां घोष इत्युक्तम्, तत्र परस्परनिरपेक्षलक्षकत्वस्य गम्भीरायामित्युक्तौ च मिलितलक्षकत्वस्य दर्शनाद्, गुणोपसंहारन्यायेन द्वारसमुच्चयस्य स्थापितत्वाच्च। न च- परस्परपदसाहित्येन तत्र गम्भीरनदीसंबन्धि तीरं लक्ष्यते, अन्यथा त्वेकैकसंबन्धि, प्रकृते त्वधिकलाभो न पदान्तरेणापीति वाच्यम्, तत्रापि युगपद्वृत्तिद्वयविरोधापत्त्या गम्भीरनदीतीरत्वेन लक्षणानभ्युपगमाद्, वस्तुगत्या विशिष्टसंबन्धिनः प्रत्येकपदादपि लाभात्। अथ विशिष्टबुद्धिद्वारत्वाद्वारत्वाभ्यां विशेषः, प्रकृतेऽपि स तुल्य एव। ननु- गम्भीरायामित्यत्रापि न मिलिते लक्षणा, किन्तु नदीपद एव, परस्पर साहित्येन विशिष्टबोधानन्तरं स्वज्ञाप्यविशिष्टसंबन्धिनि लक्षणासंभवात्, स्वज्ञाप्यसंबन्ध एव हि लक्षणा, लाघवात्, न तु तद्विशेषः शक्यसंबन्धः, गौरवात्। तथा च पदद्वये लक्षणा, लक्षणाद्वयं वा न युक्तम्। एवं च वृत्तेः पदवृत्तित्वनियमोऽपि सङ्गच्छत इति चेत्, नैतत्सारम्, स्वज्ञाप्यसंबन्धो हि लक्षणेति त्वयोच्यते, तच्च ज्ञाप्यं प्रकृते विशिष्टम्, तज्ज्ञापकत्वं चोभयोः साधारणमिति कथं नदीपद एव लक्षणा ? न गम्भीरपदे, विनिगमकाभावात्। न च गाम्भीर्येण सह तीरस्य परम्परया संबन्धः नद्याः साक्षात्संबन्ध एव विनिगमक इति वाच्यम्, `निम्नं गभीरं गम्भीर'मिति कोशाद् गम्भीरपदस्य निम्नरूपनदीद्रव्यवाचित्वेन साक्षात्संबन्धस्यापि साधारणत्वात्। न च विशेषणविभक्तेः साधुत्वार्थकत्वाद् गम्भीरपदलक्षणायां विभक्त्यर्थानन्वय इति- वाच्यम्, विशिष्टबोधसमये गम्भीरपदस्य विशेषणपदत्वेऽपि विशिष्टसंबन्धिलक्षणासमये विशेष्यपदत्वात्। विशेषणविभक्तेः साधुत्वार्थकत्वमित्यप्यसंबद्धम्, अभेदार्थकत्वस्य नैयायिकैः प्रत्येकमन्वयस्य च मीमांसकैररुणाधिकरणसिद्धस्य चाभ्युपगमात्। (2-3) एवमन्यदपि वाक्यलक्षणोदाहरणमनुसन्धेयम्- `गच्छ गच्छसि चेत् कान्त' इत्यादि, विषं भुङ्क्ष्वेत्यादि च। ननु- अत्र जन्मना मरणानुमानम्, तेन च तत्साधनीभूतायाः गतेरकर्तव्यतानुमानमित्यनुमानपरम्परैव, न लक्षणा, अनन्यलभ्यस्यैव शब्दार्थत्वात्, न हि धूमोऽस्तीति वाक्यं वह्निलक्षकम्। विषमित्यादावपि विषभोजनस्येष्टसाधनतोक्त्या शत्रुगृहान्नभोजनस्यानिष्टसाधनत्वमाक्षिप्यते। यद्वा- आप्तस्य प्रमाणविरुद्धोपदेष्टृत्वेन कोपोऽनुमीयते। तत्र च प्रलसक्तशत्रुगृहान्नभोजनस्य हेतुत्वं कल्पयित्वा तत्राकर्तव्यतानुमानम्, न लक्षणेति चेत्, नैतत्साधु, जन्मना मरणाक्षेपेऽपि तन्मरणे गमनस्य हेतुत्वानाक्षेपात्, शतवर्षानन्तरं जरादिनापि तदुपपत्तेः। तथा च प्रियामरणे हेतुत्वं गमनस्य न लक्षणां विनाऽवगन्तुं शक्यम्। नापि प्रियामरणहेतुत्वेन गमनस्याकर्तव्यत्वानुमानम्, प्रियामरणहेतोरपि तत्त्वेनाज्ञानदशायां गुरुनिदेशाद्वा आत्मत्राणार्थं वा कुलापकीर्तिपरिहारार्थं वा कर्तव्यत्वदर्शनेन व्यभिचारात्। तथा च गमनस्य प्रियामरणहेतुत्वं तादृशस्य चाकर्तव्यत्वमित्युभयमपि लक्षणाधीनम्, जन्मनिर्देशस्य च प्रकृतेऽनुपयोगात् तेन प्रकृतोपयोगिन्यगमने तात्पर्यं ज्ञाप्यते समुदायस्य। तथा च समुदाय एव लक्षणा। न प्रत्येकपदे, प्रत्येकं तात्पर्यज्ञापकाभावात्। तथा च नात्रानुमिति परम्परा, न वा प्रत्येकपदे, लक्षणा। एवं `विषं भुङ्क्ष्वे'त्यत्रापि विषभोजनेष्टसाधनत्वेन शत्रुगृहान्नभोजनानिष्टसाधनत्वं नाक्षेप्तुं शक्यते, व्यधिकरणत्वात्। तेन विनाप्युभयोरपीष्टसाधनतयोपपत्तिसंभवाच्च। न हि येन केनचिद्यत्किञ्चिदाक्षिप्यते, किंत्वनुपपद्यमानेनोपपादकम्। नाप्याप्तत्वे सति प्रमाणविरुद्धोपदेष्टृत्वेन कोपानुमानं कोपेन च तद्धेतौ शत्रुगृहान्नभोजने अकर्तव्यतानुमानम्, आप्तस्यापि पित्रादेर्भ्रमादिना विनापि कोपं प्रमाणविरुद्धोपदेष्टृत्वदर्शनेन व्यभिचारादाप्तकोपहेतोरपि भ्रमादिना प्रियामरणहेतोरिव कर्तव्यत्वदर्शनेन तत्रापि व्यभिचाराच्च। तथा चाप्रसक्तप्रतिपादनेन प्रसक्तवारणे तात्पर्यं ज्ञात्वा तेनाकल्पितपदविभागे समुदाय एव लक्षणां कल्पयति, न तु प्रत्येकपदे, तत्र तत्र विशिष्य तात्पर्यज्ञापकाभावात्। तथा च पदार्थेतात्पर्यान्वयानुपपत्तिभ्यां लक्षणा पदे। वाक्यार्थे तद्द्बयानुपपत्त्या लक्षणा वाक्ये। वाक्यार्थानुपपत्त्यनिबन्धनत्वं च लक्षणाया पदवृत्तित्वसाधने उपाधिरित्यवधेयम्। (4) एवमेवार्धमन्तरर्धं बहिरित्यादौ लोके अर्धमन्तर्वेद्यर्धं बहिर्वेदीति वेदेऽपि वाक्य एव लक्षणा। न च- तत्राप्यर्धस्यान्तस्त्वे सत्यर्धस्य बहिष्ट्वेनान्तरालानुमानम्, न लक्षणेति वाच्यम्, छिन्ने गृहे अन्तरालराहित्येऽपि तद्द्वयदर्शनेन व्यभिचाराद् यथाकथंचिदनुमानसंभवे वा सर्वत्र शब्दप्रमाणोच्छेदापाताच्च। (5-6) एवं च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदेन विचारो लक्ष्यत इति विवरणकारोक्तं यज्ञायुधिपदेन यजमानो लक्ष्यत इति संक्षेपशारीरकोक्तं च वाक्यलक्षणयोपपन्नम्, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा यज्ञायुधिशब्दयोः सुबन्तत्वलक्षणपदत्वेऽपि शक्तत्वलक्षणपदत्वाभावेन शक्यसंबन्धरूपाया लक्षणाया अयोगात्, स्वज्ञाप्यसंबन्धरूपा तु लक्षणा यौगिकपदसमुदायेऽपि वाक्यस्थानीये नानुपपन्ना। (7) एवं `वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते' त्यादौ अर्थवादेऽपि प्राशस्त्यप्रतिपत्तये वाक्य एव लणणाऽङ्गीकार्या, प्रत्येकपदात्तदनुपपत्तेः। न च- तत्र कर्मणि क्षिप्रदेवताप्रसादहेतुत्वरूपतत्पदार्थसंबन्धबोधकत्वमेव, न तु तदन्यप्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, पदार्थमात्रसंसर्गबोधे वायुः शीघ्रतम इत्येव धीः स्यात्, न कर्मप्राशस्त्यविषया सा स्यात्। न च- लिङ्गाद्यभिधेयकार्यस्यान्वयानुपपत्तिस्तत्र लक्षणाबीजमस्ति, प्रकृते च सर्वपदानां लक्षकत्वादभिधेयान्वयानुपपत्तिर्नास्तीति वाच्यम्, केन तुभ्यमभाण्यभिधेयानुपपत्त्या लक्षणेति ? किन्तु तात्पर्यानुपपत्त्या। तच्च तात्पर्यमभिधेयान्वयविषयमन्वयसामान्यविषयं स्वरूपमात्रविषयं वेति न कश्चिद्विशेषः। अन्यथा यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यत्र लक्षणा न स्यात्। न च- भोजनप्रयोजनकप्रवेशनस्य यष्टिष्वन्वयानुपपत्तिरेवास्तीति वाच्यम्, एवमपि प्रवेशनविशेषे तात्पर्यग्रह एवोपजीव्य इति तदनुपपत्तिरेव लक्षणाबीजमस्तु। विनिगमनाविरहेण द्वयोरपि व्यवस्थितविकल्पेऽप्यस्माकं न क्षतिरित्यवधेयम्। ननु- सर्वपदानां लाक्षणिकत्वे वाक्यार्थानुभवो न स्यात्, लाक्षणिकस्याननु भावकत्वादिति चेन्न, लाक्षणिकत्वेऽप्यनुभावकत्वोपपत्तेः। शक्तत्वेन ह्यनुभावकत्वम्, न तु तच्छक्तत्वेन, गौरवात्। लाक्षणिकमपि क्वचिच्छक्तमेव, भट्टाचार्यैर्वाक्यार्थस्य सर्वपदलक्ष्यत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च। तथा हि- अभिहितान्वयवादे पदैः स्वशक्तिवशात् पदार्था अभिधीयन्ते; न तु स्मार्यन्ते, स्मार्यस्मारकसंबन्धातिरिक्तमूलसंबन्धकल्पनापत्तेः। एकसंबन्धिज्ञानं ह्यपरसंबन्धिस्मारकम्, न तु स्मारकत्वमेव संबन्धः, हस्तिपकादिषु तथा दर्शनात्। अत एवोक्तं- `पदमभ्यधिकाभावात् स्मारकान्न विशिष्यते।। इति । अज्ञातज्ञापकत्वाभावान्नानुभावकम्, संबन्धान्तराभावाच्च न स्मारकम्, किन्तु शक्त्या ज्ञातज्ञापकमिति स्मारकसदृशमित्यर्थः स्मृत्यनुभवातिरिक्तं च ज्ञानं प्रमाणबलादायातमङ्गीकार्यमेव, पदार्थज्ञाने तत्तानुल्लेखाच्च, तत्तोल्लेखनियमभङ्गेनात्र तत्प्रमोषकल्पने चातिगौरवात्। तथा च पदजन्यस्मृत्यनुभवविलक्षणज्ञानविषयीभूताः पदार्थाः अभिहिता इत्युच्यते। तादृशाश्चाकाङ्काद्यनुसारेण स्वान्वयमनुभावयन्तीति वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्य इत्युच्यते, पदेन यद् बोध्यते तच्छक्यम् पदार्थेन यद् बोध्यते, तल्लक्ष्यमिति नियमात्। अत एवोक्तं `वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्यमाणो हि सर्वत्रैवेति नः स्थितम्' इति। यद्यपि पदाभिहितपदार्थस्मार्यत्वं तीरादौ लक्ष्यत्वम्, वाक्यार्थे तु तदनुभाव्यत्वमिति विशेषः, तथापि पदार्थबोध्यत्वमादाय लक्ष्यत्वव्यपदेशः। अत एव पदार्थेन पदार्थलक्षणायां पूर्वसंबन्धज्ञानापेक्षा, तस्य स्मार्यत्वाद्, वाक्यर्थलक्षणायां तु न तदपेक्षा, तस्यानुभाव्यत्वेन पूर्वसंबन्धज्ञानानपेक्षत्वात्। पदार्थलक्षणायां पूर्वसंबन्धज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थलक्षणायामाकाङ्क्षादिकमेवेति परस्परनिरपेक्षमुभयं नियामकम्। अतोऽपूर्वे वाक्यार्थे शक्यसंबन्धितया ज्ञातुमशक्ये कथं लक्षणेत्यपास्तम्, पदार्थलक्षणाया एव तथात्वात्। एवं च पदशक्तेः पदार्थोपस्थितावेवोपक्षयादुपस्थितानां च पदार्थानामन्वयानुभावकत्वात् सर्वपदलक्षणिकत्वेऽपि न वेदान्तवाक्यानामन्वयानुभावकत्वानुपपत्तिः। स्यादेतत्- अभिहितान्वयवादे मा भूदनुपपत्तिः, अन्विताभिधाने तु भवति, तथा हि पदानामन्वयानुभवजननसामर्थ्यमेव शक्तिरित्युच्यते, एकैकपदार्थोपस्थितिस्तु स्मृतिरूपा, न शक्तिसाध्या, एकसंबन्धिज्ञानादपरसंबन्धिस्मरणस्य हस्तिपकादिसाधारणत्वाद्, अन्वयानुभवजननसामर्थ्यरूपस्य च मूलसंबन्धस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। अत एव पदशक्त्यसाध्यत्वात् पदार्थोपस्थितेः स्मृत्यन्तरसाधारणायास्तद्वैजात्यकल्पने च मानाभावादर्थाध्याहार एवासति बाधके, न पदाध्याहारः, पुष्पेभ्य इत्यत्र साधुत्वार्थं स्पृहयतिपदस्य `विश्वजिता यजेतेत्यत्र नियोज्यलाभार्थं स्वर्गकामपदस्य' सौर्ये चरावतिदेशप्राप्ते `अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामी'ति मन्त्रे प्रकृतौ वाचकपदवत्तया क्लृप्तोपकारे अग्निपदबाधेन वाचकपदलाभाय सूर्यपदस्य चाध्याहारेऽपि पदार्थस्मरणाय वाक्यार्थानुभवाय वा तदनपेक्षणात्। शाब्दत्वं च पदजन्यान्वयानुभवत्वेनैव, न पदजन्योपस्थितिजन्यान्वयानुभवत्वेन, गौरवात्। अत एव योग्यतावच्छेदकस्य छिद्रेतरत्वादेः पदादनुपस्थितस्यापि पदजन्यान्वयानुभवविषयत्वाच्छाब्दत्वम्, अन्यैरप्यनुकूलत्वप्रतियोगित्वादीनां तथात्वाभ्युपगमात्। एवं च चैत्रोऽयमित्यादौ लोके `उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम' इत्यादौ च वेदे प्रत्यक्षोपस्थितानामेव चैत्रोद्भिदादिपदानां नामत्वेनान्वयः, अन्यथा चैत्रपदवाच्योऽयम् उद्भित्पदवाच्येन यागेनेत्यादिकल्पने लक्षणाप्रसङ्गात्, अगृहीतसङ्गतिके पदे तदयोगात्। `घटः पटो ने'त्यत्र नञन्वय इव चैत्रोऽयमित्यादिनामधेयान्वयेऽपि विभक्त्यर्थद्वारत्वानपेक्षणेन व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनात् नञन्वये विभक्त्यर्थापेक्षायां जितमद्वैतवादिभिः नीलं सुगन्धिमहदुत्पलमितिवत् घटपटनञर्थानामभेदान्वयोपपत्तेः। नामधेये विभक्त्यर्थापेक्षायां वेदे नामधेयत्वं न सिध्येदिति जितं पूर्वपक्षिणा। `सोमेन यजेते'त्यत्रेव मत्वर्थलक्षणयोद्भिदा यजेतेत्यादावपि विशिष्टविधित्वोपपत्तेः, उभयत्र लक्षणायास्तुल्यत्वेऽपि प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वेन विधित्वस्यैवोचितत्वात्। वार्तिककाराणां तु पदार्थोपस्थितेः पदशक्तिसाध्यत्वात्तदर्थं सर्वत्र पदाध्याहाराङ्गीकारेऽपि नामधेयान्वये व्युत्पत्त्यन्तराश्रयणमस्त्येव। तथा च स्वयमेव व्युत्पादितं नामदेयाधिकरण इत्यलं प्रसक्तानुप्रसक्त्या। प्रकृतमनुसरामः- एवं स्थिते लाक्षणिकमप्यन्वयानुभावकं चेदन्वयानुभवजननसामर्थ्यमेव शक्तिरिति लाक्षणिकस्यापि तद्वत्त्वान्मुख्यजघन्यविभागो न स्यात्। तथा च लिङ्गाधिकरणविरोधः। तत्र हि `बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामी'त्यादिमन्त्राणां मुख्ये जघन्ये चार्थे लिङ्गाद्विनियोगः उत मुख्य एवेति संशय्य उभयोरपि शाब्दत्वादुभयत्रापि विनियोग इति प्राप्ते, मुख्य एवेति सिद्धान्तितम्। `अर्थाभिधानसंयोगान्मन्त्रेषु शेषभावः स्यात्तस्मादुत्पत्तिसंबन्धोऽर्थेन नित्यसंयोगा'दिति। अर्थाभिधानसामर्थ्यरूपाल्लिङ्गात् श्रुत्यविनियुक्तेषु बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामीत्यादिमन्त्रेषु शेषभावो विनियोगः स्यात्। तच्च सामर्थ्यं मुख्ये, न जघन्ये शब्दसामर्थ्यादुपस्थितो ह्यर्थो मुखमिवाव्यवहितो भवतीति मुख्य उच्यते। मुख्यार्थसंबन्धादुपस्थितस्तु जघनमिव व्यवहितो भवतीति जघन्य उच्यते। तथा च जघन्येऽर्थे विनियोगं ब्रुवतापि तदुपस्थितये मुख्योपस्थितिर्वक्तव्या। तथा चोत्पत्तिसंबन्धः स्वबावसंबन्धोऽर्थाभिधानसंबन्ध एव विनियोजकः स्यात्, तस्यार्थनियतत्वात्, तावतैवस्वाध्यायविधेश्चरितार्थत्वात्। मुख्यसंबन्धस्तु न लिङ्गम्, अनेकेषां मुख्यसंबन्धित्वेनार्थानियमाच्चरमत्वाच्चेति सूत्रार्थः। अत एव मुख्यसंभवे लक्षणा नोपादेयेति सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः। पदवृत्तिर्हि शक्तिः पदार्थवृत्तिश्च लक्षणा। सा च बहुप्रकारेत्यन्यत्। लाक्षणिकपदेनान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितौ कृतायां यदवशिष्टं शक्तं, तदेवान्वयानुभावकम्। अर्थवादपदानां सर्वेषां लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि तदेकवाक्यतापन्नं विधिपदमेवानुभावकम्, विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्यु'रिति न्यायात्। तथा च सत्यादिपदानां सर्वेषामपि लाक्षणिकत्वे कथमन्वयानुभवोपपत्तिरिति चेत्, नैष दोषः, शक्यस्यैवान्वयानुभवाभ्युपगमात्, लक्षणात्वेकदेशत्यागमात्रस्य, न त्वशक्यार्थोपस्थितये गौर्नित्य इत्यादिवत्। अत एव वाचकानामेव स्वार्थे लक्षणेयमित्युक्तं प्राक्। ननु जहल्लक्षणाभ्युपगमे कथमन्वयानुभवः ? शक्यैकदेशस्यापि तत्राभावात्। तथा चोक्तं संक्षेपशारीरके- साभासाज्ञानवाची यदि भवति पुनर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्तथाऽ हंशब्दोऽहङ्कारवाची भवति तु जहती लक्षणा तत्र पक्षे ।। इति । अस्मिन् पक्षे अन्विताभिधानवादानभ्युपगमान्न दोषः। पक्षद्वयाश्रयणं तु जहदजहल्लक्षणापक्ष एव। तथा च दर्शितं तत्रैव- अभिहितघटना यदा तदानीं स्मृतिसमबुद्धियुगं पदे विधत्तः। परदृशि पुनरन्विताभिधाने पदयुगलात् स्मृतियुगमेव पूर्वम्।। इति । तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकृदादयस्तु अभिहितान्वयपक्षमेवोररीचक्रुः, सर्वथापि सिद्धान्तानुकूलत्वादिति न किंचिदवद्यम्। तार्किकमतस्योभयपक्षबहिर्भावादिकं च वेदान्तकल्पतायां व्युत्पादितमित्युपरम्यते। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ सत्याद्यवान्तरवाक्याखण्डार्थतोपत्तिः।। 2 ।। 3. तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्याखण्डार्थत्वानुमानभङ्गः एवं तत्त्वमस्यादिमहावाक्यपक्षकानुमानमपि निर्दोषम्। न च सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्ययं दृष्टान्तः साध्यबिकलः, विशिष्टाभेदस्य बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्। तथा हि- किमत्र तद्देशकालविशिष्ट एतद्देशकालवैशिष्ट्यं प्रतिपाद्यते ? एतद्देशकालविशिष्टे वा तद्देशकालवैशिष्ट्यम् ? तद्विशेषणयोरैक्यं वा ? तद्विशिष्टयोरैक्यं वा ? नाद्यः, तद्देशकालवैशिष्ट्यस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वेनानुद्देश्यत्वात्, तत्कालादेरिदानीं सत्त्वापत्तेश्च। न द्वितीयः, एतत्कालादेरन्यदा सत्त्वापत्तेः, न तृतीयः बाधात्। अत एव न चतुर्थोऽपि, विशेषणमस्य भिन्नत्वेन विशेषणविशेष्यतत्संबन्धात्मकस्य विशिष्टस्य भिन्नत्वात्, अतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्यभेदेन च तद्भेदनियमात्। तथा चोभयविशेषणपरित्यागेन विशेष्यमात्रमभिन्नं बोध्यत इति सिद्धमखण्डार्थत्वम्। तदुक्तम्- `अविरुद्धविशेषणद्वयप्रभवत्वेऽपि विशिष्टयोर्द्वयोः। घटते न यदैकता तदा नतरां तद्विपरीतरूपयोः।।' इति यदा हि `दण्डी कुण्डली'त्यादौ दण्डकुण्डलोदेरेकदेशकालावस्थितत्वेनाविरोधेऽपि न तद्विशिष्टयोरैक्यम्, विशेषणयोरप्यैक्यापत्तेः, तदा कैव कथा सोऽयमित्यत्र तत्तेदन्तयोरेककालानवस्थाननियमेन परस्परविरुद्धत्वात्तद्विशिष्टयोरैक्यस्य। लक्षणयैक्यबोधन तूभयत्रापि समानम्। लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि दण्डी कुण्डलीत्यादौ विशिष्टतात्पर्यान्नाखण्डार्थत्वव्यवहारः, सोऽयमित्यत्र तु `अयं स न वा ? अयं नैव स' इत्यादिसंशयविपर्ययज्ञानविषयीभूताभेदमात्रस्य बुभुत्सितत्वेन तत्रैव तात्पर्यादखण्डार्थत्वं न ह्यन्यस्मिन् बुभुत्सिते अन्यत् प्रतिपादयितुमुचितमित्युक्तम। प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षस्याप्यभिज्ञाद्वयोपस्थितस्वरूपातिरिक्ताविषयत्वेऽपि उभयोपस्थितिद्वारकाभेद बोधनेन भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वम्, तत्समानार्थकं च वाक्यमेतदिति न विशिष्टपरम्। यथा चाभिज्ञाद्वयात् प्रत्यभिज्ञाया विषयवैलक्षण्याभावेऽपि द्वारविशेषनिबन्धनज्ञानगतवैलक्षण्यादेव फलभेदः, तथा स्मृतिरूपायास्तदिदम्पदार्थोपस्थितेरनुभवरूपस्य वाक्यार्थबोधस्य। एवं च `भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तयोरेकार्थबोधपरत्वं सामानाधिकरण्य'मिति प्राचां वचोऽपि निष्प्रकारके सुतरामुपपद्यते। ननु- सोऽयमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञा तावन्नाखण्डार्थविषया, तत्र प्रत्यक्षे शब्दवृत्तेर्लक्षणाया अभावात्, तत्तेदन्तोल्लेखित्वेन तत्र निष्प्रकारकत्वस्यानुभवपरास्तत्वात्, तदनुल्लेखे त्वभिज्ञातो विषयवैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः। तथा च शाब्दप्रत्यभिज्ञाऽपि तथा, स्वप्रत्यभिज्ञावगतस्य परं प्रति बोधनादिति- चेन्न, वृत्त्यनपेक्षत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षस्य विशिष्टाभेदविषयत्वे बाधस्य प्रतिबन्धकतया स्वरूपाभेदमात्रविषयत्वात्। अभेदश्च न प्रकारः स्वरूपतया प्राधान्याद्। तत्तेदन्तयोरपि न प्रकारता, भासमानाभेदरूपवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वाभावात्। अत एव न तस्यास्तत्तेदन्तोल्लेखिता, तदभिलाषे तु निरन्तरोत्पन्नाभिज्ञाद्वयादेव तथोल्लेखव्यवहारात्, तत्र च लक्षणा लब्धपदैव। सर्वत्र निर्विकल्पकाभिलाप इयं गतिः। न चाभिज्ञाया अविशेषः, सप्रकारकत्वनिष्प्रकारकत्वाभ्यामेव विशेषात्। फलवैलक्षण्यं तूक्तमेव। अत एव तत्तोपलक्षितप्रतियोगिकभेदरहित इदन्तोपलक्षितदेवदत्तस्वरूपतेतात्पर्याद् यथाज्ञानमुपदेशोऽप्युपपद्यते। भेदविरहश्च न कश्चिद्धर्मः, किन्तु स्वरूपमेव। तदेव चैक्यमित्युच्यते। न चायमस्ति नियमः स्वेन यथावगतः परं प्रति तथैव वाच्यमिति, समूहज्ञानेनापि श्रोतृबुभुत्सितैकदेशोपदेशदर्शनात्, ज्ञानमात्रसाध्यत्वात् बुभुत्सानुसारित्वाच्चोपदेशस्य। एवं च विशिष्ट विषयादपि ज्ञानादखण्डोपदेशोपपत्तिः। विशेषणोपलक्षणादिविवेकश्चान्यत्र स्पष्ट इति नेह प्रतन्यते। यथा च न दृष्टान्तः साध्यविकलः। एवं तत्त्वमस्यादिमहावाक्येऽपि बोद्धव्यम्। ननु- चिन्मात्रस्य चिन्मात्रेण सहाभेदबोधने इष्टापत्तिः, अप्रसक्तनिषेधश्च अभेदश्चेत्स्वरूपमेव तस्य स्वप्रकाशतया नित्यसिद्धत्वेनोपदेशवैयर्थ्यम्, तदस्फुरणे च तद्बुभुत्साद्यनिवृत्तिश्च तत्त्वम्पदार्थशोधकेनावान्तरवाक्येनैवोपपत्त्या महावाक्यवैफल्यं च एकपदेनैवोपपत्तेः पदान्तरवैयर्थ्यं च, भ्रमकालज्ञाताधिकाप्रतिपत्तेर्महावाक्यात् भेदभ्रमनिवृत्तिश्च न स्यादिति- चेन्न चैतन्यस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वेऽपि सार्वज्ञ्याद्युपलक्षितस्वरूपज्ञान स्याज्ञानादिनिवर्तकस्य साध्यत्वात्। न च सप्रकारता, तत्तादिवत् सार्वज्ञ्यादीनामन्वयबोधाप्रकारत्वाद् उपायान्तरेणैतादृशज्ञानासंभवाच्च नोपदेशवैयर्थ्यादयो दोषाः। भ्रमप्रतीतभेदाश्रयतावच्छेदकप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकद्वयोपलक्षितस्वरूपमात्रज्ञानस्य भेदभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वेन विषयावैलक्षण्येऽपि फलवैलक्षण्यात्, शङ्खश्वैत्यविषयत्वे तुल्येऽपि तदनुमानानिवर्त्यपीतभ्रमस्य तत्प्रत्यक्षनिवर्त्यत्वदर्शनात्। अत एवोक्तं विवरणे- `अभिज्ञातः प्रत्यभिज्ञायास्तावन्न प्रमेयतो विशेषः, अभिज्ञया ज्ञातस्यैव देवदत्तैक्यस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञयापि ग्रहणात्। न हि देवदत्तस्य स्वेनैक्यमभिज्ञायां न भाति। न च तस्यैक्यान्तरमस्ति यदनभिज्ञातं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते। एकस्य कालद्वयसंबन्धः प्रत्यभिज्ञागोचर इति चेन्न, ऐक्ये कालद्वयंसम्बन्धस्याभिज्ञाद्वयादेव सिद्धेः। तस्मात् कालद्वयसंबन्धिपदार्थैक्यविषयत्वे द्वयोरप्यविशिष्टे प्रत्यभिज्ञाया एव कालद्वयपरामर्शित्वेन पदार्थभेदभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वम्, नाभिज्ञायाः। एवं तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यस्य सत्यादि वाक्यात्तत्पदाच्च प्रमेयावैलक्षण्येऽपि धर्मद्वयपरामर्शित्वेन भेदभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात्। प्रामाण्यम्। उक्तं च कात्यायनेन `सिद्धं तु निवर्तकत्वा'दिति। स्यादेतत्- अभिज्ञया वस्तुत एकस्मिन् कालद्वयसंबन्धस्य देवदत्ताभेदस्य च ग्रहणेऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञया एकस्मिन् कालद्वयंसबन्ध इति वा, कालद्वयसंबन्ध्येक इति वा ग्रहणेन प्रमेयत एव भेदः। न हीदमिति ज्ञानं वस्तुतः शुक्तौ शुक्त्यभेदग्राह्यपि इयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानवदिदं त्वशुक्तित्वाधार एव इत्याकारम्, अन्यथा तु फलतोऽपि विशेषो न स्यात्, कालद्वयपरामर्शस्य भेदभ्रमेऽपि सत्त्वात्। एवं तत्त्वमसीत्यत्रापीति। उच्यते- न हि प्रत्यभिज्ञायामैक्यं प्रकार इति कस्यचिन्मतम्, तस्य स्वरूपत्वेन विशेष्यत्वात्। अभेदस्वरूपविषयत्वे तुल्ये तत्तेदन्तोभयप्रकारिका सेति तव मतम्, निष्प्रकारिकैवेति मम। एकत्वं च नैकत्वसङ्ख्या, गुणादाभावात्, तज्ज्ञानस्य भेदभ्रमाविरोधित्वाच्च, किन्तु भेदविरहरूपं स्वरूपमित्युक्तम्। अन्यथा तदभिलापक वाक्यमपि सोऽयमेक इति स्यात्, न तु सोऽयमिति। सोऽयमिति वाक्ये त्वैक्यस्य प्रकारत्वं तत्प्रतिपादकपदाभावादेव दूरनिरस्तम्। भेदभ्रमे कालद्वयपरामर्शेऽपि भ्रमप्रतीतभेदाश्रयतावच्छेदकेत्यादि निरुक्तफलवैलक्षण्यमुपपन्नमेव। अत एव `उपाधिभेदभिन्नार्थो येनैकः प्रतिपाद्यते। तदपि स्यादखण्डार्थं महत् खं कुम्भखं यथा।।' इत्यादि कल्पतरूक्तम्। `घटाकाशो महाकाश इत्युक्तेश्चैक्यधीर्यथे'ति वार्तिकं च निरवद्यम्। तथा च तत्त्वमसिवाक्यमखण्डार्थम्, उपाधिभेदभिन्नेऽर्थे ऐक्यप्रतिपादकत्वाद्, घटखं महाखमिति वाक्यवदित्युक्तं भवति। एवं च- सत्यज्ञानादिरेतत्संसर्गव्यरेकिणि अर्थे प्रमाणम्, मानत्वात्, `नयनादिप्रमाणव'दिति चित्सुखाचार्योक्तमपि- साधु। सत्यादिवाक्यमेतत्पदार्थसंसर्गव्यतिरिक्त एवार्थे प्रमाणमिति सावधारणं साध्यं विवक्षितम्, तेन संसर्गातिरिक्तसंसर्गिण्यपि प्रामाण्याङ्गीकारात् न सिद्धसाधनम्। कण्टकोद्धारस्तु पूर्ववत्। एवमन्येषामपि प्रयोगाः यथा यथमुपपादनीयाः। तस्मात् वृथा रोदिषि मन्दबुद्धे तव भ्रमादेव हि दुःखमेतत्। तस्यापनोदो विहितः प्रमाणैस्तुभ्यं तु रोचेत स नेति चित्रम्।। मानं वेदान्तवाक्यानि निर्गुणाखण्डबोधनात्। निर्गुणत्वं च तस्योक्तं श्रुत्या युक्तिसहायया।। 2 ।। इह कुमतिरतत्त्वे तत्त्ववादी वराकः प्रलपति यदकाण्डे खण्डनाभासमुच्चैः। प्रतिवचनममुष्मै तस्य को वस्तु विद्वान् न हि रुतमनुरौति ग्रामसिंहस्य सिंहः।। 3 ।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ तत्त्वमस्यादिमहावाक्याखण्डार्थत्वोपपत्तिः।। 4. ब्रह्मणो निर्गुणत्वभङ्गः कैवल्यश्रुत्या तावदात्मा निर्गुणः। ननु- `बृहन्तोऽस्य धर्मा' इति श्रुत्या `ब्रह्मेशानादिभिर्देवैः समेतैर्यद्गुणांशकः। नावसाययितुं शक्यो व्याचक्षाणैश्च सर्वदा।।' इति स्मृत्या च ब्रह्म, धर्मवत्, पदार्थत्वाद्'- इत्याद्यनुमानेन च स्वसमानसत्ताकधर्मवद् ब्रह्मेति चेत्, मैवम्, न तावत् श्रुत्या सगुणत्वसिद्धिः, सगुणप्रकरणस्थाया उपास्तिविधिविषयविशेषणसमर्पकत्वेन तत्परत्वाभावात्। न चापूर्वत्वात् सत्यकामादौ विशेषणे तात्पर्यम्। अपूर्वत्वेऽप्यन्यशेषस्यातत्परत्वदर्शनाद्, यथा हि `जर्त्तिलयवाग्वा वा जुहुयाद् गवीधुकयवाग्वा वा जुहुया'दित्यादौ जर्त्तिलयवाग्वादेर्होमसाधनत्वस्य `अनाहुतिवै जर्त्तिलाश्च गवीधुकाश्चे'पि निन्दायाश्च `अजक्षीरेण जुहोती'ति विध्येकवाक्यतया अतत्परत्वं, तथैवात्राप्युपपत्तेः। निर्गुणप्रकरणस्थायास्तु अद्वितीयब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलनिषेधापेक्षितविषयसमर्पकतया अन्यथासिद्धेः। न च `किञ्चने'त्यादिसामान्यवाचकपदेनैव ब्रह्मातिरिक्तसर्वनिषेध्योपस्थितौ विशेषग्रहणमनर्थकमिति वाच्यम्, अलौकिकतया वाक्यप्रमेयत्वभ्रमव्युदासार्थत्वात्। अत एव श्रुतिप्राप्तस्य श्रुत्या निषेधे अहिंसावाक्यम् अग्निषोमीयहिंसाया, अग्रहणवाक्यं च षोडशिग्रहणस्य, असद्वेत्यादिवाक्यं ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्य भेदवाक्यं चैक्यस्य निषेधकं स्यादिति निरस्तम्, प्रकृते श्रुतिप्राप्तस्यैवाभावात्। श्रुतिप्राप्तत्वं हि न तत्प्रसक्तत्वम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्, तत्प्रमितत्वस्य च प्रकृते अभावात्। अहिंसावाक्यस्यावैधहिंसाविषयत्वेन समानविषयत्वाभावात्, समानविषयत्वे ग्रहणाग्रहणवद्विकल्पापत्तेः। ग्रहणाग्रहणवाक्ययोस्तु सत्यपि समानविषयत्वे एकस्याधिकबलत्वाभावेन बाध्यबाधकभावस्यासंभावितत्वाद्, अन्यथा विकल्पानाश्रयणप्रसङ्गात्। असद्वाक्यभेदवाक्ययोस्तु न ब्रह्मसत्त्वैक्यनिषेधकता, सत्त्यैक्यबोधकयोरेव तत्परत्वेन प्राबल्यात्। नाप्यनुमानं ब्रह्मणि तात्त्विकधर्मसाधनायालम्। तथा हि- (1) ब्रह्म धर्मि सत्तासमानसत्ताकधर्मवद्, उक्तसत्ताकभावरूपधर्मवद्वा, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानधर्मवद्वा, तादृशभावरूपधर्मवद्वा, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यधर्मवद्वा, तादृशभावरूपधर्मवद्वा, धर्मैर्भावरूपधर्मैर्वा हीनं नावतिष्ठते वा, पदार्थत्वाद्, अथवा भावत्वाद्, घटवत्। (2) ब्रह्म, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यप्रकारवत्, स्वारो पितव्यावर्तकस्वज्ञानाबाध्यप्रकारवद्वा, अधिष्ठानत्वात्, शुक्तिवत्। (3) ब्रह्म स्वज्ञानाबाध्यदुःखव्यावर्तकधर्मवद्, दुःखानात्मकत्वात्, घटवत्। (4) ब्रह्म, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यप्रकारविशेष्यम्, सन्दिग्धत्वात्, विचार्यत्वात्, निर्णेतव्यत्वाद्वा स्थाणुवत्। (5) ब्र्हम, वेदान्ततात्पर्यगोचरप्रकारवत्, वेदान्तविचारविषयत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा कर्मकाण्डविचारविषयो धर्मः। (6) ईश्वरः, सदावाप्तसमस्तकल्याणगुणः, सदा प्रेप्सुत्वे सति तत्र शक्तत्वात्, यो यदा यत्प्रेप्सुर्यत्र शक्तः स तदा तद्वान्, यथा चैत्रः। (7) ईश्वरः, सदा त्यक्तसमस्तदोषः, सदा तज्जिहासुत्वे सति तत्त्यागे शक्तत्वात्, यश्चैवं स तथा, यथा चैत्रः इत्याद्यनुमानेषु धर्मिपदस्वपदयोर्यत्किञ्चिद्धर्मियत्किञ्चित्संबन्धिपरत्वे घटादिसमसत्ताककल्पितधर्मवत्त्वेन सिद्धसाधनम्, ब्रह्मपरत्वे साध्याप्रसिद्धिः, घटादिधर्मं ब्रह्मसमान सत्ताकत्वादेरप्रसिद्धेः। न च- दृष्टान्ते साध्यनिरूपणे तदेव धर्मि, पक्षे तन्निरूपणे ब्रह्मैव धर्मि, धर्मिपदस्वपदादीनां समभिव्याहृतपरत्वादिति वाच्यम्, शब्दस्वभावोपन्यासस्यानुमानं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वात्। स्वरूपपदस्याप्येवमेव ब्रह्मपरत्वे साध्याप्रसिद्धिः, घथटादिपरत्वे सिद्धसाधनम्। समभिव्याहृतपरत्वस्य शब्दस्वभावस्यानुमानं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वमिति दूषणं पूर्ववत्। धर्मैर्विना नावतिष्ठत इत्यस्य ब्रह्म धर्मव्याप्तमित्यर्थः। तथा च सिद्धसाधनम्, यस्मिन् काले देशे वा ब्रह्म, तत्र, धर्मा सत्येव। न हि कालो देशो वा धर्मरहितः, मायाचित्संबन्धस्य कालस्य मुक्त्यसहवृत्तित्वात्। स्वज्ञानाबाध्येत्यत्रापि पूर्ववत् स्वपदार्थविकल्पः। अत एव- स्वारोपितव्यावर्तकस्वज्ञानाबाध्यधर्मवदिति निरस्तम्, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यदुःखव्यावर्तकधर्मवदित्यत्रापि स्वपदार्थविकल्पः पूर्ववत्। दुःखव्यावर्तकधर्मवत्त्वेन सिद्धसाधनम्। वेदान्ततात्पर्यगोचरेत्यत्रावान्तरतात्पर्यमादाय सिद्धसाधनम्। मुख्यतस्तात्पर्योक्तौ च वेदान्तवाक्यमुख्यतात्पर्यविषयप्रकारा प्रसिद्ध्या साध्याप्रसिद्धिः। न च यत्तद्भ्यामनुगमय्य साध्यप्रसिद्धिः, तथा शब्दानुगमस्यानुमानं प्रत्यनुपयोगात्। ईश्वरः सदावाप्तसमस्तकल्याणगुण इत्यत्र कालं व्याप्य आप्तगुणत्वस्यास्माभिरप्यङ्गीकारात्। न हि निर्धर्मकतायां सत्यां कालसंबन्धोऽस्ति। किं च शुद्धस्य पक्षीकरणे हेत्वसिद्धिः, उपहितस्य पक्षीकरणे अर्थान्तरम्, स्वाभिन्नाप्तसमस्तकल्याणगुणत्वेन सधर्मकत्वायोगाच्च, सिद्धसाधनाच्च कल्याणगुणानामानन्दादीनां नित्यत्वेन तत्प्रेप्सायास्तत्र सामर्थ्यस्य च त्वयापि वक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च। अत एव प्रेप्सादिकं प्रज्ञानघनत्वादिति- निरस्तम्। सदा त्यक्तसमस्त दोषत्वे साध्ये चरमवृत्तिपर्यन्तत्यागे सामर्थ्याभावेन हेत्वसिद्धेः। यदा तु तत्सामर्थ्यम्, तदा त्यक्तदोषत्वमिष्टमेव। प्रकारवत्त्वादौ साध्ये अप्रयोजकत्वमपि। न च अधिष्ठानत्व सन्दिग्धत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिरेवानुकूलस्तर्कः, अधिष्ठानत्वे हि स्वारोपितव्यावर्तकवत्त्वं तन्त्रं कल्पिताकल्पितसाधारणमित्युक्तत्वात्, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यत्वविशिष्टधर्मं विना तस्यानुपपत्त्यभावात्। सन्दिग्धत्वमपि व्यावर्तकेन कल्पितेनाकल्पितेन वा रूपेणानिश्चिततयैवोपपद्यत इति तस्यापि नानिश्चितसाध्यधर्मं विनानुपपत्तिः। एवं दुःखानात्मकत्वं दुःखव्यावर्तकस्वरूपतयैवोपपन्नं कदाचिद्वक्तव्यम्, अन्यथा अनवस्थानापत्तेः। न हि व्यावर्तकधर्मोऽपि केवलान्वयी, येन स्ववृत्तिः स्यात्। तथा च तदपि व्यावर्तकधर्मं विनाप्युपपन्नं न तत्साधनायालम्। अनवस्थाभिया क्वचिद्धर्मे विश्रान्तौ पदार्थत्वमपि व्यभिचार्येव। न च स्वस्यैव स्ववृत्तित्वान्न व्यभिचारः, आत्माश्रयात्। न चैवं दृश्यत्वस्यापि स्वस्मिन्नवृत्त्या भागासिद्धिः, स्ववृत्तित्वाभावेऽपि स्वनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य तत्रासिद्धताप्रयोजकस्याभावात्। तस्मान्नानुमानं ब्रह्मसमसत्ताकधर्मे प्रमाणम्। किं च श्रुतिः अपरब्रह्मविषया, निर्धर्मकश्रुतिविरोधेन विषयभेदस्यावश्यकत्वात्। न च सगुणातिरिक्तस्य परब्रह्मणोऽद्याप्यसिद्धिः, त्वत्पक्षे तात्त्विकगुणवद्व्यक्यन्तरस्याभावात्, किं विषयत्वं च सगुणश्रुतेरिति वाच्यम्, तात्त्विकत्वपर्यन्तस्य सगुणश्रुत्या अविषयीकरणात्, निर्धर्मकत्वश्रुत्या शुद्धब्रह्मसिद्धेश्च। तदुक्तमन्तरधिकरणे कल्पतरुकृद्भिः- निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः। ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकम्प्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः।। वशीकृते मनस्येषां सगुणब्रह्मशीलनात्। तदेवाविर्भवेत् साक्षात् अपेतोपाधिकल्पनम्।। इति । अत एव स्मृतिसूत्राभ्यां न विरोधः। न च सगुणे `परः पराणा'मित्यादिस्मृत्या परादपि परत्वं स्मर्यते, तथा च कथं सगुणवाक्यानामपरब्रह्मविषयत्वमिति वाच्यं, जडापेक्षया परः किञ्चिज्ज्ञः तदपेक्षया सर्वज्ञस्य शुद्धापेक्षयाऽपरस्यापि परत्वात्। न च सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदसद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दिति श्रुती अपि परापरब्रह्मविषये स्यातामिति वाच्यम्, अत्रेदमिति प्रपञ्चस्य प्रकृतत्वेन ब्रह्मपरत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यतया प्रपञ्चस्यैव पूर्वं कारणात्मना सत्त्वं कार्यात्मना असत्त्वं विषयीकुरुतः। नापि ग्रहणाग्रहणवाक्ये अपि परापरयागविषये, `ऐन्द्रवायवं ग्रहं गृह्णातीत्यादिवत् षोडशिग्रहणवाक्यस्य यागपरत्वेऽपि अग्रहणवाक्यस्य तदभावबोधकतया यागविषयत्वाभावात्। ननु- एवमसन्नेव स भवति असद् ब्रह्मेति वेदचेदिति श्रुतिरपि नासत्त्वसिद्धार्था, किन्तु शून्यतापत्तिरूपपरममोक्षपरेति स्यादिति- चेन्न, शून्यताया अपुरुषार्थत्वाद्, आनन्दावाप्तिरूपमुक्तिप्रतिपादकविरोधाच्च। यद्वा- इदानीं सगुणं दशान्तरे निर्गुणमिति वाक्याविरोधः। न च एतावता अनित्यत्वमात्रं गुणानां न त्वदभिमतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, त्वदभिमततात्त्विकत्वस्याप्यसिद्धेः। उपायान्तरानुसरणं च समानम्। यत्तु ब्रह्मेदानीं सत् दशान्तरेत्वसदित्यप्यापद्येत इति, तन्न, दशान्तरे निर्गुणत्ववद् असत्त्वस्याबोधनेनाप्रसङ्गात्। न च- `ज्ञानं नित्यं क्रिया नित्या बलं नित्यं परात्मनः।' `एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्ये'त्यादिश्रुत्या ब्रह्मज्ञानादीनां नित्यत्व प्रतिपादनात् सगुणत्वमिति वाच्यम्, ज्ञानादीनां स्वरूपतया गुणत्वासिद्धेः। स्वरूपातिरिक्तानां तु चरमसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तस्थायितया नित्यत्वोपचाराद्, `अपाम सोमममृता अभूमे'त्यादौ अमृतशब्दस्याभूतसम्प्लवस्थान ममृतत्वं हि भाष्यत इति पौराणिकोक्तामृतत्ववत्। अत एव- `एष नित्यो महिमेत्यादिवाक्यस्य तैत्तिरीयशाखागतस्य नित्यगुणपरत्वमिति निरस्तम्, बृहदारण्यकगतस्य तु `स एष नेति नेती'ति वाक्यं प्रतिषिद्धसर्वोपाधिकरूपस्य महिम्नः त्यक्तसर्वेषणपुरुषगतस्य प्रतिपादनेन ब्रह्मगतगुणपरत्वाभावात्। न च `सर्वस्य वशी'त्यादौ ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतत्वेन तद्गतगुणपरत्वमिति शङ्क्यम्, `योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेष्वि'त्यादिवाक्योक्तजीवस्वरूपानुवादेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपताबोधनपरत्वेन ब्रह्मगतगुणपरत्वाभावाद्, ब्राह्मणपदस्य `तदधीते तद्वेदेति सूत्रविहिताणन्तस्य ब्रह्मवित्प्रतिपादकतया ब्रह्मपरत्वे लक्षणापत्तेश्च। किं च सगुणवाक्यानामौपाधिगुणविषयत्वेन स्वाभाविकनिर्धर्मकत्वश्रुतेर्न विरोधः। न चौपाधिकत्वस्य सोपाधिकाध्यस्तरूपत्वे श्रुत्यप्रामाण्यापत्तिः, वक्ष्यमाणसत्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधः, उपाधिकल्पितरूपत्वे तूक्तनित्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधः, अन्तःकरणादिरूपोपाधिसृष्टेः प्रागेव ईक्षितृत्वादिश्रुतेरुपाध्यसंभवश्चेति वाच्यम्, मायाविदर्शितमायानुवादिवाक्यवत् स्वतो भ्रमजनकत्वाभावेनाप्रामाण्यानापत्तेः, सत्यत्वश्रुतेरन्यथा नेष्यमाणत्वात्, नित्यत्वश्रुतेरन्यथार्थस्योक्तेः, सृष्टेः पूर्वमन्तःकरणाभावेऽपि अविद्याया उपाधेः सत्त्वाच्च। न चौपाधिकत्वे `स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया चेत्यनेन विरोधः, अस्मदादाविव भौतिकोपाधिकत्वाभावेन योगिष्विव योगार्जितत्वाभावेन स्वाभाविकत्वोक्तेः। न च सङ्कोचकाभावः, निर्गुणवाक्यस्यैव सङ्कोचकत्वात्। न च- स्वाभाविकज्ञानसमभिव्याहारविरोधः, सार्वज्ञ्यादिरूपाविद्यापरिणतस्यैव ज्ञानपदेन विवक्षितत्वाद्वाधकसत्त्वा सत्त्वाभ्यां समभिव्याहारेऽपि वैरूप्याङ्गीकरणात् पावको ब्राह्मण इतिवत्। किं च सगुणवाक्यानां न गुणसत्यत्वबोधकत्वम्, सत्यत्वस्यापदार्थत्वात्। न च नित्यत्वोक्तिसामर्थ्याद्विषयाबाधलक्षणस्य प्रामाण्यस्यौत्सर्गिकत्वात् `सत्यः सोऽस्य महिमे'त्यादिश्रुतेः स्वरूपतश्च तत्सिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, प्रथमस्यान्यथासिद्धेरुक्तत्वादुत्सर्गाख्यतर्कस्य व्यवहाराबाधमादायैवोपपादितत्वात्सत्यः सोऽस्य महिमे'त्यादौ महिम्नः स्वरूपरूपत्वादविरोधाद्, धर्मत्वे तु ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारेतरानिवर्त्यत्वगुणयोगेन सत्यपदप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः। न च एवं `सत्यं ज्ञानं' `तत्त्वमसी'त्यादिश्रुत्युक्तब्रह्मसत्यत्वैक्यादिकमपि तात्त्विकं न स्यादिति वाच्यम्। निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधस्य तत्रेवात्राभावात्। ननु- श्रुत्योर्विरोधे नैकस्या अतात्त्विकविषयत्वम्, शास्त्राविरोधे सङ्कोचविकल्पादिना उभयप्रामाण्यस्य पूर्वतन्त्रे व्याकरणे च निर्णीतत्वात्। तथा हि- दशमाध्यायस्थे `प्राप्तबाधे प्रकृतिवत् कुर्या'दित्यादिरूपक्लृप्तस्य चोदकस्य कृष्णलादाववघातवर्जमित्यादिरूपः सङ्कोच एव। एवं तार्तीयीकेऽपि अप्राप्तबाधे गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्यनुसारेण इन्द्रशब्दयुक्तमन्त्रलिङ्गस्य गार्हपत्ये गौणत्वादिकमेव। व्याकरणेऽपि यत्र परेण पूर्वस्य नित्येनानित्यस्येत्यादिबाध उक्तः, तत्रापि सङ्कोच एव। दशमे विकृतिभूतमहापितृयज्ञप्रकरणस्थे `नार्षेयं वृणीते' इत्यादिवाक्ये प्रकृतिवत्कुर्यादार्षेयवरणवर्जमिति महापितृयज्ञीयप्रकृतिवच्छब्दैकवाक्यतया पर्युदासार्थत्वमेवेत्युक्तम्। यत्र तु प्रकृतिभूतदर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणस्थाज्यभागविधायकवाक्यसन्निहिते `न तौ पशौ करोती'त्यादौ पाशुकप्रकृतिवच्छब्दैकवाक्यताऽयोगेन पर्युदासार्थत्वासंभवात् `प्रकृतिवत्कुर्यादाज्यभागौ तु न कुर्या'दिति वाक्यभेदेन प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधार्थकत्वमेवेत्युक्तम्, तत्र पशावाज्यभागयोरन्येनाप्रसक्तेः शास्त्रप्रसक्तस्य सर्वथा बाधायोगाद्विकल्प इत्युक्तम्। तथा चोक्तं- को हि मीमांसको ब्रूयाद्विरोधे शास्त्रयोर्मिथः। एकं प्रमाणमितरत् त्वप्रमाणं भवेदिति।। इति चेन्न, तत्र शास्त्रयोः प्रामाण्ये समानकक्ष्यतया एकतरस्यात्यन्तिकबाधायोगात्सङ्कोचेन विकल्पेन वा पाक्षिकप्रामाण्यमाश्रितम्, इह त्वेकतरस्य तत्परतया प्रबलत्वादितरस्य चातत्परत्वेन दुर्बलतया वैषम्यात्। यत्तु `न तौ पशौ करोती'त्यादौ विकल्प उक्तः, तन्न, पशुप्रकरणस्थस्य पाशुकप्रकृतिवच्छब्दैकवाक्यतया पर्युदासार्थत्वाद्, दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणस्थस्य तु `पशावाज्यभागौ न स्तः, अत्र तौ स्त' इति स्तुत्यर्थत्वाद्, वार्त्तिककारैर्विकल्पे स्वीकृतेऽपि न दोषः, उभयत्र तात्पर्यसत्त्वेन विशेषात्। यत्तु- अत्रापि `विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्याद्' `उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात्' गौण्यसंभवा'दित्यादौ शास्त्रयोर्विरोधे तात्त्विकार्थान्तरपरतोक्ता न त्वारोपितार्थता, अन्यथेक्षत्याद्यधिकरणेषु सिद्धान्तसाधकानामीक्षणादीनां साङ्ख्याद्यभिमतप्रधानादावारोपसंभवेन प्रधाननिराकरणादि न सिद्ध्येदिति, तन्न। विकार शब्दादित्यादौ न विरोधेन तात्त्विकार्थान्तरपरत्वमर्थः, किन्तु स्वप्रधाने ब्रह्मणि अवयवत्वासंभवेन पुच्छपदमुचरितमित्यर्थः। तदुक्तं टीकायां- पुच्छेऽधिकरण इति। गौण्यसंभवादिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रेऽपि `आत्मन आकाशः संभूत' इति श्रुतिस्तु गौणी। आकाशोत्पत्तिकारणासंभवादित्यर्थः, न तु तात्त्विकार्थान्तरविषयत्वम्। `उपदेशभेदादि'त्यादौ दिविदिव इति सप्तमीपञ्चमीभ्यामाधारत्वावधित्वयोः प्रतीतेरुपदेशभेदेन पूर्वनिर्दिष्टब्रह्मणः प्रत्यभिज्ञानमस्तीति प्राप्ते एकस्मिन्नपि श्येने `वृक्षाग्रे श्येनः वृक्षाग्राच्छ्येन' इति निर्देशदर्शनाद् एकस्मिन्नेव ब्रह्मणि उभयरूपाविरोध इत्यर्थः, न तु तात्त्विकार्थान्तरपरत्वम्। न चारोपितमीक्षणं प्रधाने संभवति, योग्यतामादायैवारोपदर्शनात्। न हि राजामात्ये राजत्वारोप इति स्तम्भादावपि तदारोपः। तथा च चेतन एव ईक्षितृत्वदर्शनाच्चेतने ब्रह्मणि तदारोपो युज्यते नाचेतन इति न सिद्धान्तक्षतिः। किं च निषेध्यसमर्पकतयैकवाक्यतयैव प्रामाण्यसंभवे न वाक्यभेदेन गुणप्रापकता युक्ता। अत एव न को हि मीमांसक इत्यादिना विरोधः। ननु- मृडमृदेत्यादेर्यथा `न क्त्वा सेडि'ति निषेधनिषेधकत्वं, तद्वत् सगुणवाक्यानामपि निर्गुणवाक्यबाधकत्वं किं न स्यादिति चेन्न, दृष्टान्ते पर्युदासाधिकरणन्यायेन मृडमृदेत्याद्युत्तरविहिताप्यसेट्कत्वाप्रत्यकित्त्वनिषेधपरत्वेनैकवाक्यतायां वाक्यभेदेन निषेधनिषेधकत्वाकल्पनात्। न च प्रकृतेऽपि पर्युदासार्थकत्वम्, नेति नेतीति वीप्सायाः प्रसक्तसर्वनिषेधकतया विशेषपरिशेषायोगेन पर्युदासस्याश्रयितुमशक्यत्वात्। यत्तु जगत्कर्तृत्वेनाक्षिप्तसार्वज्ञ्यादेर्निषेधायानुवादे श्रुतेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वेन जगदारोपाधिष्ठानत्वेन `स एवेदं सर्वमात्मैवेदं सर्वमि'ति श्रुतेन जीवब्रह्मणोः सार्वात्म्येन चाक्षिप्तं विश्वमिथ्यात्वं ब्रह्मसत्त्वं जीवब्रह्मैक्यं च विश्वं सत्यमित्यनेन असद्वा इत्यनेन `द्वा सुपर्णे'त्यनेन च निषेद्धुं `नेह नानेत्यनेन' सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यनेन' तत्त्वमसीत्यनेन चानूद्यत इति स्यादिति, तन्न, `विश्वं सत्यं' `द्वा सुपर्णे'त्यत्र च निषेधद्योतकपदाभावेन निषेधकत्वासंभवाद्, असद्वा इत्यत्र तु नञ्सत्त्वेऽपि नामपदसमभिव्याहृतत्वेन निषेधकत्वासम्भवाद्, `द्वा सुपर्णे'त्यस्य पैङ्गिरहस्य ब्राह्मणे बुद्धिजीवपरतया व्याकृतत्वेन जीवब्रह्मभेदाबोधकत्वात्, फलतो निषेधत्वोपपादने दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यात्। तथा हि- सार्वज्ञ्यस्य निषेधप्रतियोगितया मिथ्याभूतत्वेऽपि नाक्षेपानुपपत्तिः, आरोपिनेनाप्याक्षेपकजगत्कर्तृत्वनिर्वाहाद्, आक्षिप्तविश्वमिथ्यात्वब्रह्म सत्त्वजीवब्रह्मैक्यानां निषेधे तु ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वादीनां त्रयाणामाक्षेपकाणामसंभवः स्यात्, सत्यस्य ज्ञानादनिवृत्तेः, असत्यस्य अधिष्ठानत्वायोगाद्, भेदे सार्वात्म्यायोगाच्च। एतेन अद्वैतश्रुतेर्निर्गुणश्रुत्यन्तरस्य वा तात्पर्यपरिज्ञानप्राप्तनिर्गुणत्वमेव सगुणवाक्येन निषेद्धुं निर्गुणवाक्येनानूद्यत इति निरस्तम्, तात्पर्यपरिज्ञानप्राप्तत्वे निषेधार्थमनुवादायोगात्। ननु `साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्चेत्यादिना द्रष्टृत्वादिगुणविधानात् न तेन तन्निषेधः, तदर्थं च सगुणवाक्यं नानुवादकम्, अन्यथा सार्वज्ञ्यादेर्व्यावहारिकत्वमपि न स्यात्, न हि निषिद्धे ब्रह्महननादाववान्तरतात्पर्यम्। न च औपनिषदस्य ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञ्यादिकमनुमानादिसिद्धमिति चेन्न, अविद्यासिद्धसाक्षित्वाद्यनुवादेन तटस्थलक्षणद्वारा ब्रह्मपरतया गुणपरत्वाभावाद् गुणनिषेधकतोपपत्तेः। न च निषिद्धे ब्रह्महननादाववान्तरतात्पर्याभाववदत्रापि तदभावे सार्वज्ञ्यं व्यावहारिकमपि न स्यादिति वाच्यम्, देवताविग्रहादौ विधिस्तुतिद्वारतयोपात्ते प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तिविरोधयोरभावात्, तदत्यागमात्रेण तित्सिद्धिवदत्रापि निषेधौपयिकतयोपात्तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यादेर्मानान्तरादप्राप्तस्य व्यावहारिकप्रमाणानिषिद्धतया व्यावहारदशायामत्यागमात्रेण व्यावहारिकत्वोपपत्तेः। ब्रह्महननादिकं तु मानान्तरप्राप्तमिति विशेषः। न च तद्बोधकत्वं तत्तात्पर्यनियतम्, विशिष्टविधेर्विशेषणबोधकत्वेऽपि विशेषणे अतात्पर्याद्, विशिष्टस्यातिरेकाद्, अन्यशेषतयोपात्तेऽपि सार्वज्ञ्यादौ तात्पर्ये वाक्यभेदापत्तेः। न च तर्हि उपासनायाः कार्यत्वे विष्णोरात्मत्व एव च। उभयत्रापि तात्पर्यमात्मोपासादिके विधौ।। इति स्मृतिविरोध इति वाच्यम्, देवताधिकरणन्यायेनोभयसिद्धिपरत्वाद् उभयत्र तात्पर्यं। स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वात्, यः सर्वज्ञ इत्यादावुपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वाभावेऽपि तटस्थलक्षणद्वारा ब्रह्मप्रतिपादने तात्पर्येण विशेषणे अतात्पर्याद्, अन्यथा एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञाविरोधापत्तेः। न च- `आत्मेत्येवोपासीते'त्यत्राद्वैतस्याप्युपास्यत्वेन उपासनाशेषतया अद्वैतासिद्धिः स्यादिति वाच्यम्, अनेन ह्येतत्सर्वं वेदे'त्युत्तर वाक्यस्थविदिसमानार्थतया उपास्तिशब्दस्य क्रियावाचकत्वाभावात्। न च ज्ञाने विधिः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात्। न च विधिश्रुत्यानर्थक्यम्, बाह्यविषयात् परावृत्त्य चित्तस्य प्रत्यगात्मप्रवणतासम्पादकत्वात्। अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्त' इत्यादेर्न स वेदेत्युत्तरवाक्यपर्यालोचनया भेददर्शननिन्दापरतया उपास्तिपरताशङ्कैव नास्ति। न चोपक्रमानुसारेण उपसंहारनयनम्, अनेन ह्येतत्सर्वं वेदेत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञाविरोधेनोपसंहारस्यैव प्राबल्यात्। यत्तु गुणोपसंहारपादे `आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्ये'ति सूत्रे `आनन्दं ब्रह्मे'त्यादिश्रुतानामानन्दादीनां `व्यतिहार' इति सूत्रे `तद्योऽहमिति श्रुत्युक्तस्य जीवे ईश्वरत्वस्य ईश्वरे वा जीवत्वस्य उपास्यतयोक्तत्वादुत्तरतापनीयादौ निर्गुणोपास्तेरुक्तत्वेऽपि यथानन्दादेरैक्यस्य निर्गुणस्य च सिद्धिः, तथा सत्यकामत्वादेरपि तात्त्विकतास्त्विति, तन्न, आनन्दादय' इति सूत्रेण लक्ष्याखण्डवाक्यार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं वाच्यवाक्यार्थोपसंहारस्य क्रियमाणत्वेन उपास्यत्वानुक्तेः। व्यतिहारसूत्रे च `तद्योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽह'मित्युक्तस्य जीवे ईश्वराभेदध्यानस्येश्वरे वा जीवाभेदध्यानस्योपासना प्रकरणपठितश्रुत्युक्तस्य जीवेश्वराभेदः सगुणोपासनरूपेणापि दृढीकर्तव्य इत्येवं परतया ऐक्यस्य उपासनाविषयत्वेऽपि न सत्यकामत्वादिवदतात्त्विकत्वम्। न चैक्यवत् सत्यकामत्वादीनां तात्त्विकता, अनुपासनाप्रकरणस्थतत्परवाक्यबोधितत्वाबोधितत्वाभ्यां विशेषाद्, उत्तरतापनीयादौ श्रुतोपास्तेर्ज्ञानपरत्वात्, उपास्तेर्विशिष्टविषयत्वेन निर्विशेषविषयत्वाभावात्। यत्तु यथा ध्यानार्थेऽपि सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशे तद्गुण ईश्वरः प्रसिध्यति, तद्वदैक्यमिति भाष्यपर्यालोचनया ऐक्यवत्सत्यकामत्वादिसिद्धिरिति। तन्न । तत्र सगुणो यः स ईश्वरः प्रसिध्यतीत्यर्थः, न तु गुणस्यापि प्रसिद्धिः, निर्गुणश्रुत्यनुसारेणातद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुव्रीहावेव तात्पर्यात्। तथा चैक्यसिद्धावीश्वरस्य निदर्शनत्वम्, न तु गुणस्य। एवमेवार्थसिद्धं भवन्नोपेक्षामहे। `सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशात् तद्गुणेश्वरादिसिद्धः' इति टीका नेया। ननु- आनन्दादिवाक्यसत्यकामादिवाक्ययोर्मानान्तराविरोधे तदप्राप्तौ उपासनाविध्यश्रवणे निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधे च तुल्येऽपि आनन्दादयस्तात्त्विकाः, सत्यकामत्वादयस्त्वतात्त्विका इति कथं व्यवस्थेति- चेन्न, आनन्दादीनां ब्रह्मरूपत्वेन निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधाभावस्य व्यवस्थापकत्वात्। न च एवं बलशक्त्यादीनामपि `ज्ञानात्मको भगवान् बलात्मको भगवानिति श्रुतेः समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मक इति श्रुतेश्च ब्रह्माभेद इति वाच्यम्, अस्माकमपि ब्रह्मातिरिक्तगुणसद्भाव प्रद्वेषाद्, अभेदे गुणगुणिभावाङ्गीकारस्य पारिभाषिकत्वात्। यत्तु सगुणोपास्तेर्भ्रमत्वे निर्गुणोपास्तेरपि भ्रमतया सम्यक्फलासिद्धिर्ब्रह्मासिद्धिश्च स्यात्। न च- निर्गुणोपासनं यद्यपि भ्रमस्तथापि मणिप्रभायां मणिभ्रम इव सम्यक्फलप्रदम्। तदुक्तं- स्वयं भ्रमोऽपि संवादी यथा सम्यक्फलप्रदः। ब्रह्मतत्त्वोपासनापि तथा मुक्तिफलप्रदा।। इति । नापि ब्रह्मासिद्धिः, उपासनस्य भ्रमत्वेऽपि शब्दाज्जायमानस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वादितिवाच्यम्, प्रकृतेऽपि तथात्वापत्तेः, मणिप्रभायां मणित्वस्यैव ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वाभावेन ध्यानस्यापि सत्यब्रह्मविषयत्वाच्चेति। तन्न। सगुणोपास्तेर्विशिष्टविषयत्वेन भ्रमत्वेऽपि निर्गुणाद्युपास्तेर्निर्विशेषविषयतया भ्रमत्वाभावात्। एवमेव शाब्दसगुणनिर्गुणज्ञानयोरपि, सगुणवाक्यस्य विशेष्यांशसत्यविषयत्वेऽपि विशेषणांशासत्यविषयत्वात्। अत एव ब्रह्मविषयशाब्दधीजन्यस्य तदपरोक्षधीजनकस्य ब्रह्मध्यानस्याब्रह्मविषयत्वे श्रवणादीनामपि तथात्वापत्तिरिति निरस्तम्, तेषां विशिष्टाविषयत्वाद्, उपास्तेश्च विशिष्टविषयत्वात्। न च ईक्षतिकर्मेतिसूत्रे ईक्षतिध्यानयोरेकः कार्यकारणभूतयोः। अर्थ औत्सर्गिकं तत्त्वविषयत्वं तथेक्षतेः।। इति भामत्यां `परात् परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते इतीक्षतिकर्मणः परब्रह्मण एव परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीतेति अभिध्यातव्यत्वेनोक्त्या तद्विरोध इति वाच्यम्, त्रिमात्रोङ्कारावलम्बनोपाधिविशिष्टस्यैव ध्येयत्वोक्त्या शुद्धविषयत्वाभावेन विरोधाभावाद्, विशेष्यांशमादाय ईक्षतिसमानविषयत्वोपपत्तेश्च। यत्तु ऐक्याद्युपासनस्य अप्रमाप्रवाहरूपत्वमाशङ्क्य सगुणोपासनसमत्वमुक्तम्, तदयुक्तम्, सगुणप्रकरणस्थैक्यवाक्यजन्यैक्यज्ञानस्य सगुणोपास्त्यन्तर्गततया विशिष्टविषयत्वात्, स्वतन्त्रैक्यजन्यैक्यज्ञानस्य निर्विशेषविषयत्वेन विशिष्टविषयसगुणोपास्तिवैषम्यात्। न च- ऐक्यादेर्विध्यविधिरूपवाक्यद्वयबोधितत्वेन ध्येयत्वज्ञेयत्ववत्सार्वज्ञ्यादेरुपास्ति- विधिविषयस्यापि अविधिरूपवस्तुतत्त्वविषयः सर्वज्ञ इत्यादिवाक्यबोधितत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वमप्यस्तीति वाच्यम्; तस्य तटस्थलक्षणद्वारा परब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्युपायत्वेन तत्त्वमसीत्यादेरिव तत्परत्वाभावात्। अत एव- ब्रह्मणि कर्तृत्वादीनामारोप्यापोस्यत्वे नाम्नि ब्रह्मवाक्यानामिव ब्रह्मण्यपि कारणवाक्यानां समन्वयस्यावक्तव्यत्वेन समन्वयाद्याध्यायानारम्भापात इति- अपास्तम्; नाम्नो ब्रह्मविकारतया असमन्वयेऽपि ब्रह्मणोऽविकारतया मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्वेन कारणवाक्यानां तटस्थलक्षणकर्तृत्वादिबोधनद्वारा तत्रैव तात्पर्यसंभवेन समन्वयादेरावश्यकतया तदध्यायारम्भसंभवात्। न च - य आत्माऽपहतपाप्मेत्यारभ्य सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः सो न्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्य' सति सत्यकामत्वादीनामपहतपाप्मत्वादिभिः सह जिज्ञास्यत्वश्रवणात् ज्ञेयत्वमिति वाच्यम्; अपहतपाप्मत्वादीनां स्वरूपतया जिज्ञास्यकोटिप्रवेशेऽपि सत्यकामत्वादीनां स्वरूपबहिर्भावेन जिज्ञास्यत्वायोगात् तच्छब्देन तेषामपरामर्शाद् अस्वरूपत्वे तेषामप्यपरामर्शे विशेष्यां शमात्रपरामर्शः यश्चित्रगुर्बहुधनस्तमानयेत्यादिवत्। अत एव `एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपति'रित्यादिधर्मानुक्त्वा तेषां `तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ती'त्यादौ मुमुक्षज्ञेयत्वेनोक्तेः `यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्यैष महिमा भुवीत्युक्त्वा `तद्विज्ञानेन परिपश्यन्ति धीरा' इत्यपरोक्षप्रमाविषयत्वस्योक्तेः `तुरीयं सर्वदृक्सदे'ति तुरीयसार्वज्ञ्यश्रुतेश्च सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां सत्यत्वादिसिद्धिरिति- निरस्तम्। यत्त्वपहतपाप्मत्वादीनामुपास्यत्वे तेषां भूताकाशेऽपि सम्भवेन दहराकाशस्य ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादकदहराधिकरणविरोध इति, तन्न; चेतनधर्मात्यन्ताभावस्य पाप्मादिविरहस्याचेतने सम्भवेऽपि कामसङ्कल्पादेरचेतने संभावयितुमशक्यत्वेन विरोधाभावात्। यत्तु `सत्यः सोऽस्य महीमे'त्यत्र होममात्रानुवादेनाहवनीयस्येव स इति श्रुत्युक्तमहिममात्रानुवादेन सत्यत्वविधानात् सार्वज्ञ्यादिकमपि सत्यम्। `सत्यः सोऽस्य महिमे'त्यादेरैन्द्रसूक्तस्थत्वेऽपि `तत्त्वायामि सुवीर्य तद् ब्रह्म पूर्वचित्तय' इति ब्रह्मश्रुत्या `इन्द्रः सूर्यमरोचयत्। इन्द्रे हि विश्वा भुवनानि येमिर' इत्यादिसूर्यप्रकाशकत्वलिङ्गेन च ज्योतिरधिकरणन्यायेन सूक्तस्य परमेश्वरपरत्वव्यवस्थितेरिति, तन्न, निर्गुणत्वश्रुतिविरोधेन स्वरूपमहत्त्वस्यैव सत्यत्वोक्तेः, षष्ठ्या उपचरितत्वाद्, धर्माणामपि व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वोक्तेः। न च ब्रह्मसत्त्वमपि तथा; सत्यस्य सत्यमिति निरतिशयसत्त्वप्रतिपादनविरोधाद्, अधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेश्च। न च तत एव सविशेषत्वम्; निर्विशेषत्वेऽपि तत्त्वस्योपपादितत्वात्। न च- `पृथगात्मान'मित्यादि श्रुतिषु- यो मामशेषदोषोज्झं गुणसर्वस्वबृंहितम्। जानात्यस्मै प्रसन्नोऽहं दद्यां मुक्तिं न चान्यथा।। भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां सर्वलोकमहेश्वरम्। सुहृदं सर्वभूतानां ज्ञात्वा मां शान्तिमृच्छति।। इत्यादिस्मृतिषु च सविशेषज्ञानादेव मोक्षोक्तेः सप्रकारकज्ञानस्यैव मोचकत्वमिति- वाच्यम्; परममुक्तिहेतुनिर्गुणसाक्षात्कारोपयोगिसत्त्वशुद्व्युपायसगुणोपासना विध्यर्थवादतया साक्षान्मुक्तिहेतुत्वाप्रतिपादकत्वात्। न च निर्गुणज्ञानान्मुक्तिश्रुतिरपि तथा; तत्परत्वातत्परत्वाभ्यां वैषम्यात्, सगुणज्ञानस्य फलान्तरश्रवणाच्च। यद्यपि "नास्या ब्रह्मवित्कुले भवती'त्यादिफलान्तरश्रवणं निर्गुणज्ञानेऽपि, स्तुत्यर्थतयोपपादनमपि समानम्, संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायेन उभयफलत्वोक्तिरपि समाना; तथापि अधिष्ठानतत्त्वावगाहित्वानवगाहित्वाभ्यां निर्गुणसगुणज्ञानयोर्विशेषात्, सगुणज्ञानजन्यमुक्तेरवान्तरमुक्तित्वाच्च। न च- पुण्यपापे विधूये'ति सर्वकर्मनिवृत्युक्तेः परममुक्तित्वमेवेति- वाच्यम्; अस्य ब्रह्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारहेत्वतिरिक्तकर्मपरत्वात्, अविद्यानाशाभावाच्च परममुक्तित्वासिद्धेः। न च- निर्गुणज्ञानजन्याया अपि मुक्तेरवान्तरत्वम्, `असन्नेवेति श्रुत्युक्तशून्यतायाः परममुक्तित्वमिति- वाच्यम्; शून्यताया असुखरूपत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वात्, असन्नेवेत्यादिवाक्यस्य शून्यत्वाप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च। यत्तु गुणविशेषविधिसन्निहितस्य सामान्यनिषेधकस्य निष्प्रपञ्चवाक्यस्य विहितगुणनिषेधकत्वं नास्तीति, तन्न; बाधकस्य निषेधकप्रामाण्यसमकक्ष्यत्व एव सङ्कोचादत्र तदभावात्। यत्तूपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वमात्रेण उपास्यत्वे उद्गीथोपासनास्थस्य `स एषोऽनन्त' इति श्रुतानन्तत्वादेर्भूताकाश उपासनामात्रमिति सुववचत्वेनाकाशाद्यधिकरणे अनन्तत्वादिलिङ्गैर्ब्रह्मत्वोक्त्ययोग इति, तन्न; उपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वेऽपि निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधाभावेन तात्त्विकत्वाङ्गीकारात्, तस्य चाकाशादावसंभवेन तदधिकरणारम्भसंभवात्। यत्तु सत्यकामत्वादेरनुपास्तिप्रकरणे श्रवणमिति तन्न; पूषाद्यनुमन्त्रणमन्त्रवत् प्रकरणादुत्कृष्टत्वस्य द्वादशोपसत्तावाक्यवत् स्तावकत्वस्य वा सम्भवात्। यत्तु वेधाद्यर्थभेदादित्यत्र `सर्वं प्रविध्ये'त्यादिमन्त्राणामुपासनाप्रकरणादुत्कर्षस्योक्तत्वेन तन्न्यायेनानन्तादिवाक्यस्योत्कर्षः स्यात्, तस्य वाक्यस्योपास्तिपरत्वे वस्तुतत्त्वपरत्वे च सगुणवाक्यस्यापि तथा स्यादिति, तन्न; स्वरूपपरसत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमित्यादिवाक्ये अनन्तत्वादेः स्वत एव सत्त्वेन उत्कर्षे प्रयोजनाभावात्, तस्य वस्तु तत्त्वमात्रपरत्वेन उभयपरत्वाभावाच्च, उपास्तिप्रकरणस्थानन्तवाक्यस्य उभयपरत्वेऽपि निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधेन सगुणवाक्यस्योभयपरत्वाभावात्। न चैवं सार्वज्ञ्यादीनां वाग्धेनुत्वादिवत् प्रातीतिकत्वापत्तिः, वाग्धेनुत्वादेर्बुद्धिपूर्वकारोपविषयतया प्रातीतिकत्वेऽपि सत्यकामत्वादेरीश्वरादन्यत्रासंभवेन बुद्धिपूर्वकारोपविषयत्वाभावात्। ननु- असदुपासना न घटते, `नाविद्यमानं ब्रुवते वेदा ध्यातुं न वैदिकाः। न चरमन्त्यहो असदुपासनयात्महन' इत्यादिस्मृत्या `अचेतनासत्यायोग्यान्यनुपास्यान्य फलत्वविपर्ययाभ्या'मिति सङ्कर्षणसूत्रेणापि निषेधादिति चेन्न, स्मृतिसूत्रयोरत्यन्तासदुपास्तिनिषेधपरतया तद्विरोधाभावाद्, `वाचं धेनुमुपासीते'त्यादौ प्रातीतिकस्याप्युपास्यत्वदर्शनाच्च। न च तत्र `रात्रिं धेनुमिवायतीमिति श्रुत्यन्तराद्धेनुशब्दो गौणः, `योषितमग्निं ध्यायीते'त्यात्रापि `रेतो जुह्वती'ति श्रुतेः रेतोरूपाहुत्याधारत्वेनाग्निशब्दो गौणाः, भाष्योक्तरीत्या यौगिको वा, न त्वारोप इति वाच्यम्, आरोपेण मुख्यत्वसंभवे गौणताया अन्याय्यत्वात्। न च गौण्युच्छेदः, यत्रोपसनाया अश्रवणं तत्रारोपस्य निष्प्रयोजनत्वेन गोण्युपपत्तेः, रूढार्थस्य कथमपि संभवे यौगिकार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वाच्च। एतेन- `नाम ब्रह्मे'त्यत्र `नामाभिमानिनी चोषाः तस्याः ब्रह्म हरिं स्मरे'दिति स्मृत्यैव ब्रह्माधिष्ठाने नामादौ गौणो ब्रह्मशब्दः, नामेति प्रथमवचनं वसन्तो मारुत इतिवत् सप्तम्यर्थे, ब्रह्मेति प्रथमा वा पञ्चम्यर्थे, `ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासी'दितिवत्, सुपां सुलुगि'ति सूत्राद्, अन्यथा `श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मवि'दिति पृष्टवन्तं नारदं प्रति नामोपास्त्युक्तिरयुक्ता स्यात्, प्रतिमायामपि देवतातत्त्वबुद्धित एव फलम्, न तु देवताऽतत्त्वबुद्धितः, `शिला देवते'ति ज्ञानस्य भौम इज्यधीरित्यादिना निषेधादिति निरस्तम्, आरोपेण मुख्यत्वसंभवे गौणत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वात्, समानविभक्तिकत्वाभावे इति शब्दानन्वयप्रसङ्गात्। एवं प्रतिमादावपि देवतात्वारोपेण मुख्यत्वे गौणत्वमन्याय्यमेव। न च भौम इज्यधीरिति निषेधान्न तथा, तस्य भौमातिरिक्तश्चेतनो देवो नास्तीति भ्रमव्युदासपरत्वेनारोपानिषेधकत्वाद्, अनात्मोपास्तेस्तु मुख्यं ब्रह्मोपदेष्टुमेव शाखाचन्द्रन्यायेनावतारितत्वात्, `तदेव ब्रह्मत्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इति गुणविशिष्टस्य उपास्यस्य ब्रह्मत्वनिषेधाच्च। न च `अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधी'ति श्रुतौ अश्रौतज्ञानस्याकार्त्स्न्येन ज्ञानस्य वा निषेध इति `तदेव ब्रह्मे'त्यादावपि अश्रौतध्यानस्याकार्त्स्येन ध्यानस्य वा निषेधेन नोपास्यस्य ब्रह्मत्वनिषेधः, अन्यथा `तस्याभिध्यानादि'ति श्रुतिविरोध इति वाच्यम्, अन्यदेवेत्यादौ विदितात् प्रमेयाद् घटादेरप्रमेयाच्छशविषणादेवैंलक्षण्येन स्वप्रकाशत्वप्रतिपादनपरतया त्वदुक्तार्थादृष्टान्तत्वात्। उपास्ये ब्रह्मत्वनिषेधेऽपि न "तस्याभिध्याना'दिति श्रुतिविरोधः, अभिध्यानशब्दस्य निदिध्यासनवाचकत्वाद्, ध्यानपरत्वेऽपि क्रममुक्त्यर्थत्वेन विरोधाभावात्। तस्मात् साधकाभावान्निर्गुणं ब्रह्म, सगुणत्वे बाधकसद्भावाच्च। न चासिद्धिः, मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेर्निर्गुणश्रुतेश्च बाधकत्वात्, मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेरबाधकत्वप्रकारस्य मिथ्यात्ववादे अखण्डार्थवादे च निरासात्। ननु- निर्गुणवाक्यं सगुणवाक्यं बाधते, न तु सगुणवाक्यं तदिति किमत्र नियाकम् ? न च निषेधकतया निर्गुणवाक्यं प्रबलम्, `असद्वा' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य सदेवेत्यादिवाक्यात् प्राबल्यापत्तेरिति- चेन्न, अपच्छेदन्यायेन प्राबल्यस्य प्रागेवोक्तेः। निषेधत्वाच्च प्राबल्यम्, `असद्वा' इत्यत्रासच्छब्दस्यानभिव्यक्तपरत्वेनानिषेधत्वाच्च नैतन्न्यायेन प्राबल्यम्। निर्गुणवाक्यस्य पुरुषार्थपर्यवसायितया तत्परत्वेन प्राबल्यात् सगुणवाक्यस्य तत्सन्निधिपठितस्य `फलवत्सन्निधा'विति न्यायेन तदनुगुणतया नेयत्वात्। न च सगुणज्ञानस्य मोचकत्वम्, तस्य प्रागेव निरासात्। अत एव- सगुणत्वनिर्गुणत्वयोर्विरोधेन समुच्चयायोगाद्, अनुष्ठान इव च वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगाद् एकस्य प्रतीतार्थत्यागरूपे बाधे वक्तव्ये निर्गुणवाक्यस्यैव स युक्तः, न तु प्रबलस्य सगुणवाक्यस्येति निरस्तम्, प्राबल्यासिद्धेः। न च- उपक्रमाधिकरणन्यायेनानुपजातविरोधत्वात् निर्गुणश्रुतेः प्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षतया विलम्बितत्वेन लिङ्गात् श्रुतेरिव शीघ्रगामित्वात् पदे जुहोतीतिवद्विशेषविषयत्वाच्च सगुणवाक्यस्य प्राबल्यमिति वाच्यम्, उपक्रमाधिकरणन्यायस्यान्यथासिद्धोपसंहारविषयत्वात्, प्रकृते च तदभावात्। सगुणवाक्यस्य प्रतियोग्युपस्थापकतया शीघ्रगामित्वेन प्राबल्ये ग्रहणवाक्यस्यापि प्राबल्यापत्त्या विकल्पाभावप्रसङ्गात्, सामान्यविषयप्रमाणसमकक्ष्यस्यैव विशेषविषयस्य प्राबल्यात्, प्रकृते च तदभावात्। एतेन `दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूया'दितिवत् निरवकाशत्वेन प्राबल्यम्, निर्गुणश्रुतिर्हि'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढां `दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी' त्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिष्विव सत्त्वादिगुणे सावकाशेति निरस्तम्, सावकाशनिरवकाशन्यायस्य समकक्ष्यविषयत्वाच्च। अत एव बहुत्वादपि न प्राबल्यम्, `शतमप्यन्धानां न पश्यती'ति न्यायाच्च। न च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तापेक्षैः ब्रह्मादिशब्दैर्धर्मिणं निर्दिश्य क्रियमाणं धर्मनिषेधं प्रत्युपजीव्यतया गुणसमर्पकाणां प्राबल्यम्, ग्रहैकत्ववदुद्देश्यविशेषणतया प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानामविवक्षितत्वात्। न च ग्रहैकत्वन्याये उद्देश्यस्वरूपे लब्धे यदधिकं तस्यैवाविवक्षेति स्थितिः, अन्यथा ग्रहत्वस्याप्यविवक्षा स्यात्। अत एवोक्तं हविरार्तिनये `मृष्यामहे हविषा विशेषणम्, उभयत्वं तु न मृष्यामह' इतीति वाच्यम्। यच्छब्दो यत्र प्रवृत्ति निमित्तमर्पयन् धर्मिणमुपस्थापयति तत्रायं न्यायः, यस्तु लक्षणयोपस्थापयति, तत्र नायं प्रवर्तते। न च- लक्षकेणापि शब्देन इतरव्यावृत्तमसङ्कोर्णमेव वस्तुस्वरूपमुद्देष्टव्यम्, अन्यथा यत्र क्वचन धर्मनिषेधः स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, गङ्गायामित्यादावितरनदीतिरव्यावृत्ततीरलाभवदत्रापि स्वतो व्यावृत्तवस्तुन एवोद्देश्यत्वसंभवात् किं धर्मसमर्पणेन ? न च- निर्गुणवाक्यस्य छागपशुन्यायेन `त्रैगुण्यवर्जितं' `विना हेयैर्गुणादिभि'रित्यादिविशेषोपसंहार इति वाच्यम्, `नेति नेती'त्यादिवीप्साबलेन प्रसक्तसर्वनिषेधे प्रतीते कतिपयविशेषपरिशेषस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अत एव `काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यता'मितिवत् त्रैगुण्यादिनिषेधस्यैव सामान्यविषयत्वम्, सार्वज्ञ्यादौ श्रुतेरमानत्वेनाविरोधादत्रापि काकपद इवि मानान्तरानुग्रहस्य तुल्यत्वात्, तथापि विशेषोपसंहारे `न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी'त्यस्य `ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्य' इत्यत्रोपसंहारापातात्, व्यर्थहिंसायां विध्यभाववत् सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणेष्वपि विध्यभावस्य समानत्वात् निषेध साम्योपपत्तेः। अत एव- `धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन्'- इत्यादिश्रुतेः `सविशेषणे ही'ति न्यायेन गुणानां पार्थक्यस्यैव निषेधात् तत्सामान्यादन्यत्रापि तथैव निषेधो युक्त इति निरस्तम्; सविशेषणे हीति न्यायस्य विशेष्यबाधकावतार एव प्रवृत्तेः, प्रकृते च बाधकाभावात्, सार्वज्ञ्यश्रुतेः बाधकत्वनिरासात्, पार्थक्यनिषेधे ब्रह्ममात्रपरिशेषात् नामान्तरेणाद्वैतवादस्यैवोक्तेश्च। यत्तु ज्ञानानन्दयोरभेदे एकतरपरिशेषाभावादत्रापि धर्मधर्मिणोः नैकतरपरिशेषः, अन्यथा आनन्दस्फुरणयोरन्यतराभावात् मुक्तिरपुमर्थः स्यादिति, तन्न; ज्ञानानन्दव्यक्त्योरस्ति भेदगर्भेकतरशब्दस्याप्रवृत्तिः। एवमेव त्वन्नये गुणगुणिव्यक्त्योरभेदसम्भवाद् अस्य परिभाषामात्रत्वात्। यत्तु साक्षी चेतेत्यस्य पूर्वं पश्चादपि गुणोक्तेस्तन्मध्यस्थं निर्गुणवाक्यमपि उपांशुयाजन्यायेन तदनुगणतया नेयमिति, तन्न; गुणान् तटस्थीकृत्य तेषां ब्रह्मपरत्वेन गुणे तात्पर्याभावात्। अत एव- निर्गुणशब्देन गुणमात्रनिषेधो न युक्तः, साक्ष्यादिपदेन द्रष्ट्रत्वादिविधानव्याघातात् सङ्कोच एवेति निरस्तम्। द्रष्ट्रत्वादावत्रापि अतात्पर्यात्। तथाच द्रष्टृत्वादिद्वारकब्रह्मरूपयुक्तार्थतैषा। आगमस्य तत्रैव प्रामाण्यसंभवात्। एवं च `युक्तोऽयुक्तश्च यत्रार्थः आगमस्य प्रतीयते। स्यात्तत्र युक्त एवार्थ' इत्याद्यस्मन्मत एवोपपन्नतरम्। तस्मादुपक्रमादिन्यायानामन्यविषयत्वात् न तद्बलेन सगुणत्वसिद्धिः। यत्तु `अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशाद्', `अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशा'दित्यादि सूत्रेषु धर्माणां तत्तदधिकरणसिद्धान्तसाधकतया आदृतत्वात् सगुणत्वसिद्धिरिति, तन्न; आरोपितब्रह्ममात्रसंबन्धिगुणोपादानेन सिद्धान्तसिद्ध्युपपत्तेर्गुणतात्त्विकत्वे औदासीन्यात्। यच्च अहिंसाग्नीषोमीयवाक्ययोरिव सगुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोरपि भिन्नविषयतयाऽविरोधे संभवत्यपि सगुणवाक्यस्यामानत्वाभिधानं सौगतसौहृदादिति, तन्न; निर्गुणवाक्यस्य तत्परत्वेन प्रबलतया बाधस्यावश्यकत्वेऽपि मानत्वाभिधानस्य ब्रह्मवादिविद्वेषमात्रत्वात्। तस्मान्निर्गुणवाक्यबाधात् सगुणवाक्यमतत्परम्। अनुभूतिः; निर्विशेषा, अनुभूतित्वादिति व्यतिरेक्यनुमानमपि बाधकम्। न चात्रा प्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम्; यद्व्यतिरेकेऽसमीहितप्रसक्तिः तत् मानयोग्यमिति सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धेः। विशेषत्वमभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकम्, अभावप्रतियोगिमात्रवृत्तित्वाद्, घटत्ववदिति विशिष्यापि सत्त्वात् नापि स्वव्याघातः निर्विशेषत्वस्य स्वरूपत्वेन विशेषत्वानङ्गीकारात्। न च स्वरूपस्य प्रागेव सिद्धेः स्यादनुमितेर्वैयर्थ्यम्, तेन रूपेण ज्ञानस्योद्देश्यत्वात्। नापि श्रुतिबाधः, प्रागेव निरासात्, प्रत्युत बहुतरश्रुत्यनुग्रहः। अत एव नाभाससाम्यम्। नाप्यप्रयोजकत्वम्, भिन्नत्वे अभिन्नत्वे संबन्धत्वे चातिप्रसङ्गानवस्थाभ्यां धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तेरेव विपक्षबाधकत्वात्। न च संबन्धस्य मिथ्यात्ववत् स्वनिर्वाहकत्वान्नानवस्था, अभेदवादे अतिरिक्तस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। न च- धर्माभावरूपधर्मभावत्वाभावाभ्यां व्याघातेन कुतर्कतास्येति वाच्यम्, धर्माभावस्य स्वरूपतयैव सत्त्वाङ्गीकारेण व्याघाताभावाद्, अभेदेऽपि भेदकल्पनया धर्मधर्मिभावव्यवहारस्य त्वयापीष्टत्वात्। न च- एवमानन्दस्य ज्ञानमात्रत्वे दुःखज्ञानमप्यानन्दः स्याद्, भिन्नत्वे अखण्डत्वहानिः, एवमेव ब्रह्मणो जगदभिन्नत्वे मिथ्यात्वापत्तिः भिन्नत्वे भेदसत्यत्वमित्यादितर्कबाधात् त्वदभिमतं ब्रह्मापि न सिध्येदिति श्रुतिबाधात्तर्काणामाभासत्वं मन्मते समानमिति- वाच्यम्, दुःखज्ञानस्य वृत्तिरूपतया आनन्दस्य नित्यचिन्मात्रानतिरेके अतिप्रसङ्गाभावाद्; आरम्भणाधिकरणन्यायेन ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण जगतः अभावाद् भेदाभेदविकल्पस्यानवकाशात् सगुणश्रुतेरतत्परतया श्रुतिबाधसाम्योक्तेरयुक्तेः, निर्गुणश्रुतेस्तु तत्परतया तदनुगृहीततर्के शुष्कत्वाभावाच्च। यत्तु निर्विशेषत्वस्य भावाभावाभ्यां मूकोऽहमितिवत् स्वव्याघातः, यदि निर्विशेषत्वरूपविशेषोऽप्यनेनैव निषिध्यते; तर्हीयमपि वचनक्रिया मूकोऽहमित्यनेनैव निषिध्यत इति सममिति। तन्न। निर्विशेषत्वस्य विशेषरूपत्वे विशेषत्वेनैव रूपेण तन्निषेधस्याद्वितीयवाक्ये द्वितीयाभावरूपद्वितीयनिषेधस्येवोपपत्तेः। अन्यथा विशेषत्वावच्छिन्ननिषेधप्रतीतेरनुपपत्तेः। अभावानतिरेके तु स्वरूपानतिरेकितया मूकोऽहमितिवत्स्ववचनव्याघाताभावस्यैवोक्तत्वाच्च। मूकोऽहमित्यत्र वक्तृत्वतदभावयोरेकरूपेण निषेधाभावाद् व्याघातोपपत्तेः। ननु- ब्रह्मणः शून्यानिर्वाच्यव्यावर्तकविशेषाभावे तुच्छत्वमिथ्यात्वाद्यापत्तेः तत्सत्त्वे सविशेषत्वमिति चेत्, व्यावर्त्त्यसमानसत्ताकविशेषाभावेऽपि व्यावृत्तिबोधसमानसत्ताकधर्मेण भिन्नत्वनिर्विशेषत्वयोरुपपत्तेः। अत एव ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वे विचारविषयत्वानुपपत्तिः। इदमित्थमिति ज्ञानं जिज्ञासायाः प्रयोजनम्। इत्थंभावो हि धर्मोऽस्य न चेन्न प्रतियोगिता।। इति निरस्तम्, विचारकाले आरोपितधर्मसंभवात्। विचारोत्तरकाले च इत्थमिति व्यवहारस्य स्वरूपव्यावृत्त्यादेश्च कल्पितपार्थक्यमादायोपपत्तेः। ननु- धर्मारोपार्थमपि केचन धर्माः सत्याः स्वीकर्तव्याः, इदं त्वादिना ज्ञात एव रूप्याद्यारोपदर्शनात्। तदुक्तम्- धर्मारोपोऽपि सामान्यधर्मादीनां हि दर्शने। सर्वधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोपः क्व दृश्यते।। इति चेन्न, इदन्त्वादेरपि सत्यत्वासंप्रतिपत्तेः, शुद्धेऽप्यध्यासस्योपपादितत्वाच्च, आरोप्यविलक्षणधर्मवत्त्वस्यानाद्यविद्यासंबंधेनैवोपपत्तेः। अत एव अभावरूपधर्माङ्गीकारे भावोऽप्यस्तु, प्रामाणिकत्वाविशेषादिति निरस्तम्; स्वरूपातिरेकिणोऽभावस्याप्यनङ्गीकाराद्, धर्ममात्रे प्रामाणिकत्वस्य निराकृतत्वाच्च। तस्मान्निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वनिर्गुणत्वोपपत्तिः।। 4 ।। 5. निर्गुणे प्रमाणभङ्गः ननु- निर्विशेषे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, स्फूर्त्यर्थं वा अज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थं वा प्रमाणप्रश्नः। आद्ये स्वप्रकाशतया प्रमाणवैयर्थ्यम्। न च विप्रतिपन्ने स्वतःसिद्धेर्वक्तुं शक्यतया अतिप्रसङ्गः, अभावव्यावृत्तिबोधकप्रमाणसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषाद्; द्वितीये उपनिषद एव प्रमाणत्वात्। अत एव प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वेत्यादिविकल्पस्य नावकाशः। ननु- कथं तत्रोपनिषत् मानम् ? जातिगुणक्रियादिरूपनिमित्ताभावेन मुख्यवृत्तेरयोगाद् अस्वीकाराच्च, आरोपितनिमित्तविषयप्रतीतेनिर्विशेषे प्रामाण्यायोगाद्, गौण्याश्च मुख्यार्थगुणयुक्ततयैव लक्षणायाश्च शक्यार्थसंबन्धितावच्छेदक रूपवत्तयैव स्वार्थोपस्थापकत्वात्, पदस्यान्वयितावच्छेदकरूपेण स्वार्थोपस्थापकतया निर्विशेषे वृत्तिमात्रायोगात्, पदविधया वाक्यविधया चोपनिषद् मानं न निर्विशेषे, संसर्गागोचरत्वाच्चेति- चेन्न, मुख्यगौण्यसंभवेऽपि लक्षणायाः संभवात्। न च लक्षकपदे शक्यार्थसम्बन्धित्वावच्छेदकरूपवत्तया पदमात्रेऽन्वयितावच्छेदकरूपवत्तया च उपस्थितिनियमः, संसर्गबोधकवाक्यस्थपदानामेव तथात्वम्। न च संसर्गागोचरत्वे प्रमाणवाक्यत्वानुपपत्तिः, असन्दिग्धाविपर्यस्तबोधकतया निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यस्याकाङ्क्षादिमत्तया वाक्यत्वस्य चोपपत्तेर्वृत्तिमन्तरेणापि सुप्तोत्थापकवाक्यस्येव वेदान्तवाक्यस्य निर्विशेषे प्रामाण्यस्य वार्तिककृद्भिरुपपादितत्वाच्च। तथा हि- अगृहीत्वैव सम्बन्धमभिधानाभिधेययोः। हित्वा निद्रां प्रबुध्यन्ते सुषुप्ते बोधिताः परैः।। जाग्रद्वन्न हि सम्बन्धं सुषुप्ते वेत्ति कश्चन।। इत्यादिना ग्रन्थेन विनापि सम्बन्धं वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपादितम्। लक्षणापक्षेऽपि तात्पर्यविशेषाग्रहेणैवातिप्रसङ्गभङ्गो वाच्यः। शक्यसम्बन्धस्यानेकत्र संभवात्, तात्पर्यविशेषग्रहश्च पुरुषविशेषस्य भवति, न सर्वस्य, पुरुषगतो विशेषः अन्तःकरणशुद्धिरूपः प्रतिबन्धाभावः। अन्तःकरणशुद्धिरूपस्य पापस्य च प्रतिबन्धकत्वं `ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते पुंसां क्षयात् पापस्य कर्मण' इत्यादिशास्त्रसिद्धम्। तथाच प्रतिबन्धक्षये विनापि संबन्धं शूद्बादात्मसाक्षात्कारः इति निरवद्यम्। विस्तृतमिदमस्माभिःगीता निबन्धने। न च- अनिर्धारितैककोटिप्रकारकनिश्चयं प्रत्येव धर्मिज्ञानाधीनविचारस्य जनकत्वात् कथं विचारसघ्रीचीनवेदान्तवाक्यज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वमिति वाच्यम्। संशयनिवृत्तिक्षमज्ञानस्यैव विचारफलत्वात्। तस्याश्च विरोधिकोटिप्रतिक्षेपकोपलक्षितधर्मिज्ञानादप्युपपत्तेर्नतदर्थं सप्रमाणकत्वनियमः। न च गौरवम्, प्रमाणवतो गौरवस्य न्याय्यत्वात्। न च- निर्विशेषविषयकस्य ज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वे निर्विशेषत्वासिद्ध्या तत्सिद्ध्या तत्सिद्ध्यर्थं विशेषाभावरूपविशेषविषयत्वस्यावश्यकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, विशेषाभावस्य स्वरूपतया तत्स्फूर्तौ प्रमाणानपेक्षत्वात्, अखण्डार्थसिद्ध्यनुकूलपृथग्जात पदार्थोपस्थिति विषयत्वमात्रेण विशिष्टव्यवहारोपपत्तेः। तस्मात्सगुणत्वे साधकाभावाद् बाधकसद्भावाच्च निर्गुणत्वे तदभावात् निर्गुणमेव ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्। इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो निर्गुणत्वे प्रमाणोपपत्तिः।। 5 ।। 6. ब्रह्मणो निराकारत्वभङ्गः एवं निराकारमपि। ननु- `आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्ताद्', `यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णम्, `ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम्', `विश्वतश्चक्षुः,' सहस्रशीर्षा'- इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः `पश्य मे पार्थ रूपाणि', `सर्वतः पाणिपादं तद्- इत्यादिस्मृतिभिः ब्रह्म, सविग्रहम्, स्रष्टृत्वात्, पालयितृत्वादुपदेष्टृत्वादित्याद्यनुमानैश्च विग्रहसिद्धिरिति- चेन्न, आदित्यवर्णमित्यस्याविद्याविलक्षणस्वप्रकाशस्वरूप प्रतिपादनपरतया उपास्यपरतया चोपपत्तेः। न च तमसः परत्वोक्योपासनापरत्वानुपपत्तिः, उपास्यविग्रहोपलक्षितस्य तमसः परत्वोक्तेः न तु रूपविशिष्टस्य। न च- `एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दृश्यत' इत्यत्र वर्तमानत्वेनापरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वोक्तेरनारोप्यत्वम्, न हि योषितोऽग्नित्वं दृश्यत इत्युच्यत इति वाच्यम्, प्रतीकोपासने उपास्यसाक्षात्कारनियमाभावेऽपि सगुणोपासने उपास्यसाक्षात्कारस्य तस्य स्यादद्धेति श्रुतिसिद्धस्य नियतत्वेन तस्यैव दर्शनशब्देनाभिधानाद्, विश्वतश्चक्षुरित्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतीनां सर्वात्मकतया सर्वान्तर्यामितया च नियम्यजीवशरीरचक्षुः पाणिशिरःप्रभृत्यनुवादित्वोपपत्तेः, सर्वतः पाणिपादत्वादेस्तु असंभवात्, त्वयाप्येवमेव वक्तव्यत्वात्। अन्यथा देशविशेषावच्छेदेन परममुक्तिप्रतिपादनं गम्यत्वप्रवेष्टृत्वाद्युपपादनं च त्वदीयमसङ्गतं स्यात्। अनुमानेऽप्येवमेव सिद्धसाधनम्। `विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्त'मिति सूत्रे अविद्यापरिणामस्य करणस्थानीयस्याङ्गीकारादविरोधात्। यत्तु- `तदेवानुप्राविशद् ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति पर'मित्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धं सर्वगतस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रवेष्टृत्वं गम्यत्वं च विग्रहं विना न युज्यते इति, तन्न; स्वसृष्टकार्याभिव्यक्तत्वस्यैवानुप्रवेशशब्दार्थतया व्यापकस्य मुख्यप्रवेशासंभवात्, स्वतः प्राप्तस्यापि अविद्यातिरोधाननिवृत्त्यपेक्षया प्राप्यत्वोपचारेण विग्रहानाक्षेपकत्वात्। यत्तु `तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति यदा पश्य इत्यादिश्रुतौ सर्वनाम्ना सविग्रहस्यैव परामर्शात् तज्ज्ञानस्यैव मोचकत्वे सविग्रहत्वमिति, तन्न; सगुणविद्यायाः क्रममुक्त्यर्थत्वेनान्यथासिद्धेः, साक्षान्मुक्तिजनकत्वपक्षे तदुपलक्षितात्मज्ञानस्यैव मोचकत्वात्। अत एव - देवा अप्यस्य रुपस्य नित्यं दर्शनकाङ्क्षिणः' - इत्यादिस्मृतिरपि व्याख्याता। किं च विग्रहः किं भौतिकः ? अभौतिको वा ? अभौतिकोऽपि मायिकः ? अमायिको वा ? अमायिकोऽपि ब्रह्मभइन्न ? अभिन्नो वा ? भौतिकमायिकावपि कर्मार्जितौ ? परकर्मर्जितौ वा ? आद्ये संसारित्वापत्तिः, द्वितीये इष्टापत्तिः। ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वे तवापसिद्धान्तः नेति नेतीतित्रुतिविरोधः, `अपाणिपाद' इत्यादि श्रुतिविरोधश्च। अभौतिकामायिकब्रह्माभिन्नदेहाङ्गीकारे उक्तश्रुतिविरोधः, चार्वाकमतप्रवेशश्च, प्रमाणाभावश्च, प्रमाणाभावश्च। न च `नाभ्या आसीदन्तरिक्ष'मिति भूतकारणत्वोक्त्या अभौतिकत्वासिद्धिः, अग्निर्मूर्द्धे'त्यादिश्रुतिपर्यालोचनयान्तरिक्षादीनां नाभित्वादिपरिकल्पनया विराड्देहप्रतिपादकतया शरीरस्य भूतकारणत्वाप्रतिपादकत्वात्, तमसः परस्तादित्यादेश्च विराड्देहोपलक्षितब्रह्मपरतया विग्रहस्य तमसः परत्वाप्रतिपादकत्वात्। न च `एको नारायण आसीत् न ब्रह्मा न च शङ्कर' इति श्रुत्या महाप्रलये नारायणस्थित्युक्या नित्यविग्रहसिद्धिः नारायणशब्दस्य `सदेव सोम्येमग्र आसी'दिति श्रुत्यनुसारेण मायोपहितब्रह्मपरत्वेन विग्रहपरत्वाभावात्। न चैतावता चेतनान्तरसाधारण्यम्; अखण्डमायोपहितत्वस्यैव व्यावर्तकत्वात्। न च `नित्योनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनाना'मिति विग्रहनित्यत्वाभावे विशेषोक्तिविरोधः, विग्रहानङ्गीकारेऽपि स्वरूपचैतन्यमादायोपपत्तेः। नापि `पुराकल्पापाये स्वकृतमुदरीकृत्य विकृत'मित्यादौ महाप्रलये देहस्य साक्षात्स्थित्युक्त्या नित्यविग्रहसिद्धिः, सर्वविकारमूलकारणाविद्यायाः संस्कारात्मनावस्थानस्य उदरीकरणशब्दार्थत्वात्। न च मुख्यार्थत्यागः, त्वयाप्यस्यार्थस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वाद्, अन्यथा सकलस्य ब्रह्माण्डस्य तदनुप्रवेशमात्रेण प्रलयासिद्धेः। यत्तु- सर्वे नित्याः शाश्वताश्च देहास्तस्य महात्मनः। परमानन्दसन्दोहा ज्ञानमात्राश्च सर्वदा।। इत्यादौ साक्षान्नित्यत्वोक्तिविरोधः इति, तन्न, प्रलयपर्यन्तस्थायिदुःखभोगानायतन ज्ञानमात्रप्रधानदेहपरतया त्वद्विवक्षितपरत्वाभावात्। अत एव जडस्ततो भिन्नश्च। न च "आनन्दरूपममृतं यद्विभाति", "आप्रणखात् सर्व एवानन्दः", "मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः," "तदात्मको भगवान् यदात्मिका व्यक्तिः, किमात्मको भगवान् ? ज्ञानात्मक ऐश्वर्यात्मक" इत्यादिश्रुतेर्भेदाभावेऽपि अहिकुण्डलन्यायेन विशेषबलाद्विग्रहवत्त्वोपपत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, आत्मनो ज्ञानानन्दरूपत्वप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन विग्रहाप्रतिपादकत्वात्। `विचित्रशक्तिः पुरुषः पुराण' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य `आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च ही'ति सूत्रस्य च मायाशक्तिवैचित्र्यप्रतिपादकत्वेनात्मशक्त्यप्रतिपादकत्वाद्, आप्रणखादित्यादेश्च लीलाविग्रहावच्छेदेन दुःखाद्यभोक्तृतयोपपत्तेः। मोदो दक्षिण इत्यादेरानन्दमय कोशप्रतिपादकतया ब्रह्मपरत्वाभावात्। न हि श्रुत्युक्तत्वमात्रेण ब्रह्मणो विग्रहरूपता, `ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं पुरुष एवेदं सर्व'मित्यादि श्रुत्या प्रपञ्चरूपतापि ब्रह्मण्यापद्येत। स्वरूपानन्द एव नित्यत्ववदपराधीनत्ववच्च विग्रहत्वकल्पनस्य परिभाषामात्रत्वात्। मन्मतेऽपि ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य ब्रह्मसत्तासमानसत्ताकत्वाभिमतस्य ब्रह्मणि निषेधाङ्गीकारात्। न च- नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेये'ति तर्कागम्यत्वोक्त्या आत्मन एव विग्रहवत्त्वमिति वाच्यम्, निर्विशेषात्मन एव तर्कागम्यत्वोक्त्या आत्मनो विग्रहवत्त्वस्य तर्कागम्यत्वानुक्तेररूपत्वेन चाक्षुषत्वाप्रसक्त्या पिशाचादिवदन्तर्धानशक्त्यानुपलम्भसमर्थनस्याप्रसक्तसमर्थनत्वाद्, विग्रहपक्षे `अपाणिपाद' इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधस्योक्तत्वाच्च। न च- `अदुःखमसुख'मित्यादौ प्राकृतसुखनिषेधवदत्रापि प्राकृतावयवनिषेधपरता, अन्यथा `शृणोति पश्यती'ति वाक्यशेषविरोधः स्यादिति वाच्यम्, आनन्दादिरूपताप्रतिपादकश्रुतिविरोधेन तत्र सङ्कोचवदत्र सङ्कोचकारणाभावात्, श्रवणदर्शनयोः शब्दरूपसाक्षित्वमात्रेण उपपत्तेर्न तद्विरोधः। अन्यथा त्वन्मतेऽपि ब्रह्मणि चक्षुरादिसाध्यज्ञानानङ्गीकारेण तद्विरोधो दुष्परिहरः स्यात्। अत एव- `अरूपोऽप्राकृतश्चे'ति स्मृत्यैवारूपश्रुतिगत्युक्तेः नारूपमित्यनेन रूपमात्रनिषेध इति- निरस्तम्, स्मृतेरुपास्यपरत्वेन ज्ञेयब्रह्मप्रतिपादिकायाः श्रुतेः सङ्कोचे कारणाभावात्, श्रुतिस्मृत्योरतुल्यबलत्वाच्च, प्रत्युत `यत्तदद्रेश्य'मित्यादिना परविद्याविषयस्य विग्रहवत्त्वप्रति पादनविरोधाच्च। किञ्च भगवद्विग्रहो न नित्यः, महत्त्वे सति रूपवत्त्वाद्, विग्रहत्वाद्वा, नित्यताबोधकत्वाभिमतश्रुतेरन्यथासिद्धेरुक्तत्वाच्च। न च प्राकृतत्वमुपाधिः, साधनव्यापकत्वात्। सावयवत्वादपि न नित्यत्वम्। न च श्रुतिबलात् क्वचित् सावयवोऽपि नित्यः, श्रुत्यन्यथासिद्धेरुक्तत्वात्। ननु- अवयव उपादानं चेत्, ब्रह्मविग्रहे नास्त्येव; एकदेशमात्रं चेद्, गगनात्मादौ व्यभिचारः, तयोरप्येकदेशसत्त्वात्। न चोपादानातिरिक्तस्यैकदेशस्यैवाभावः, उपादानतन्त्वन्यहस्तवितस्त्यादि परिमाणस्यैकदेशस्य पाटादावनुभवादिति- चेन्न, उपादानतन्तूनामेव हस्तवितस्त्यादिपरिमाणवतामनुभवात्। गगनादौ संयोगित्वादिना यदेकदेशसाधनं तदिष्टमेव, अस्माभिस्तत्र सावयवत्वानित्यत्वयोरङ्गीकारात्। यत्तु आत्मनि सुखदुःखयोर्देशभेदेन प्रतीतेरेकदेशसाधनम्, तन्न, सुखदुःखयोरन्तः करणगततया तद्गतत्वाभावात्। न च- "गौरनाद्यन्तवतीत्यादि" श्रुत्या अनादिनित्या अपि प्रकृतेः सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपैकदेशदर्शनाद् व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम्, प्रकृतौ नित्यत्वाभावादविद्यातिरिक्तप्रकृतेरभावाच्च। न चाविद्यायामेव व्यभिचारः, तस्या अप्यनित्यत्वेन व्यभिचाराभावात्। न च- जीवानामपि `द्रोणं बृहस्पतेर्भागं द्रौणिं रुद्रांशसंभवम्। दुर्वासाः शङ्करस्यांश' इत्यादिनांशोक्तेः, यस्यायुतायुतांशेऽपि विश्वशक्तिरवस्थिता। परब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य प्रणमामि तमव्ययम्।। विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेन स्थितो जगत्। इत्यादिना ईश्वरस्याप्यंशोक्तेर्जीवेशयोर्व्यभिचार इति- वाच्यम्, आत्मनोंऽशस्यौपाधिकतया स्वाभाविकत्वाभावात्, त्वन्मते जीवानामणुरूपतया स्वाभाविकांशाभावेन काल्पनिकांशस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वात्। एतेन भगवल्लोकादेरपि नित्यत्वमपास्तम्। न च- `अतो हि वैष्णवा लोका नित्यास्ते चेतनात्मकाः। मत्प्रसादात्परां शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम्।। इत्याद्यागमविरोधः, तस्यावान्तरप्रलयस्थत्वपरत्वात्। तस्मान्निर्गुणं निराकारं ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो निराकारत्वसिद्धिः।। 6 ।। 7. परमते ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वाद्वितीयत्वनित्यत्व-साक्षित्वभङ्गः वंशीविभूषितकरान्नवनीरदाभात् पीताम्बरादरुणबिम्बफलाधरोष्ठात्। पूर्णेन्दुसुन्दरमुखादरविन्दनेत्रात् कृष्णात्परं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने।। (1) ननु- निर्विशेषं चेद् ब्रह्म, तर्हि ब्रह्मैवेकं ज्ञानात्मकमानन्दात्मकमद्वितीयं नित्यं साक्षि चेति नोपपद्यते। तथा हि- तत्र तावत् ज्ञानत्वं किं जातिविशेषो वा ? साक्षाद्व्यवहारजनकत्वं वा ? जडविरोधित्वं वा ? जडान्यत्वं वा ? अज्ञानविरोधित्वं वा ? अर्थप्रकाशात्मकत्वं वा ? पराङ्गीकृतं वा ? नाद्यः, वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बतज्ञानाभासेषु तत्सम्भवेऽप्यखण्डरूपब्रह्मज्ञाने तदयोगात्। न द्वितीयः, फलोपधानस्य सुषुप्त्यादावभावात्, शक्त्यादिरूपस्वरूपयोग्यताया अपि मुक्तावभावात्। न तृतीयः, स्वरूपज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तद्विरुद्धस्य जडस्य नित्यनिवृत्त्यापातात्। न चतुर्थः, `सत्यं ज्ञान'मित्यादौ अनृतव्यावृत्तेरार्थिकत्वोक्तिविरोधात्। न च पञ्चमः, अज्ञानस्य नित्यनिवृत्त्यापातात्। न षष्ठः मोक्षे अन्यार्थोल्लेखाभावात्, स्वरूपोल्लेखे च स्वविषयत्वापातात्। न सप्तमः, पराङ्गीकृतजातेर्व्यवहारहेतुत्वादेर्वा त्वन्मते असंभवादिति चेन्न, अर्थप्रकाशत्वमेव ज्ञानत्वम्। मुक्तावर्थाभावेऽपि तत्संसृष्टप्रकाशत्वस्य कदाचिदर्थ संबन्धेनाप्यनपायात्, अत एव- `अर्थप्रकाशरूपत्वं ज्ञानत्वं ब्रह्मणः कथम्। अन्यार्थाभावतो मोक्षे स्वेन स्वस्याप्यवेदनात्।।' इति निरस्तम्। (2) यत्तु- आनन्दत्वं जातिविशेषो वा ? अनुकूलतया वेदनीयत्वं वा ? अनुकूलवेदनत्वं वा ? अनुकूलत्वमात्रं वा ? ज्ञानात्मकत्वमेव वा ? दुःखविरोधित्वं वा ? दुःखाभावोपलक्षितस्वरूपत्वं वा ? पराङ्गीकृतं वा ? नाद्यः, अखण्डस्वरूपानन्दे तदभावात्। न द्वितीयः, मोक्षे वेदितुरभावाद्, आत्मनोऽवेद्यत्वाच्च। किं च आनुकूल्यं किञ्चित्सापेक्षम्, न चान्यं प्रति तद्युक्तमिति स्वं प्रत्येव वक्तव्यत्वेन सविशेषत्वापातात्। अत एव न तृतीयः। किं च वेदनस्वभावादधिकस्यानुकूलस्य स्वाभाविकत्वे सखण्डत्वापातः, औपाधिकत्वे कदाचिदानन्दनिवृत्त्यापातः, न चतुर्थः, उक्तरीत्या आनुकूल्यासम्भवात्। अत एव- निरुपाधीष्टत्वमानन्दत्वमिति- निरस्तम्। न पञ्चमः, दुःखादिज्ञानस्यापि आनन्दत्वापातात्। विषयानुल्लेखिज्ञानं तथेति चेन्न, ज्ञानस्य सविषयत्वनियमाद्, `विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेत्यादौ विज्ञानपदेनैव दुःखव्यावृत्तिसिद्धावानन्दपदवैयर्थ्यापाताच्च। न षष्ठः, विरोधस्य निवर्तकत्वादिरूपत्वे दुःखस्य नित्यनिवृत्त्यापत्तेः तादात्म्यायोग्यत्वरूपत्वे घटादावप्यानन्दत्वापाताद्, `विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ दुःखव्यावृत्तेरार्थिकत्वोक्त्ययोगाच्च। न सप्तमः, वैशेषिकमोक्षवत् त्वदुक्तस्य दुःखस्याभावे सत्यपि आनन्दाभावेनापुमर्थत्वस्य त्वन्मोक्षेऽप्यापातात्। नाष्टमः, पराङ्गीकृतस्य निरुपाध्यनुकूलवेदनीयत्वादेस्त्वन्मते असंभवात्। यदि चानन्दत्वादेर्दुर्निरूपत्वेऽपि तदधिकरणं ब्रह्माबाध्यमानन्दाद्यात्मकं च, तर्हि सत्यत्वादेर्दुर्निरूपत्वेऽपि तदधिकरणं जगदबाध्यं सदात्मकं च स्यादिति चेन्न, आनन्दत्वस्य निरुपाधिकेष्टत्वरूपत्वात्। न च दुःखाभावे अतिव्याप्तिः, दुःखाभावस्यापि सुखशेषत्वाद्, अभावस्य विरोधिभावान्तरत्वाभ्युपगमात्। न च मुक्ताविच्छापाये आनन्दापायापत्तिः इष्टत्वोपलक्षितस्य स्वरूपस्यानपायाद्, उपलक्ष्ये च तदवच्छेदकसत्त्वस्यातन्त्रत्वात्। न च- निरुपाधिकेष्टत्वं स्वाभाविकमौपाधिकं वा, नान्त्यः, ब्रह्मणः आनन्दरूपत्वापत्तेः, आद्ये ज्ञानातिरेकि, तदनतिरेकि वा, आद्ये सखण्डत्वापत्तिः, द्वितीये आनन्दपदवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्, ज्ञानानन्दयोरभेदेऽपि कल्पितजातिभेदनिबन्धनप्रवृत्तिकतया पदद्वयप्रयोगस्य व्यावृत्तिभेदेन साफल्यात्। एतेन विषयानुल्लेखिज्ञानमेवानन्द इत्यपि युक्तम्, ज्ञाने विषयोल्लेखनियमस्य प्रागेव निरासात्। एवं चानन्दत्वस्य सुनिरूपतया न तन्न्यायेन जगतश्च सदात्मकत्वापादनमिति। किं च जगति सदाद्यात्मकत्वे बाधकं दृश्यत्वादिकम्, न त्वानन्दे, तस्य दृगनतिरेकात्। एतेन- `निरुपाध्यनुकूलत्ववेदनीयं सुखं मतम्। निर्विशेषमवेद्यं च कथं ब्रह्म सुखात्मकम्।।' इति- निरस्तम्, परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन वेद्यत्वात्, सुखवेदनभेदाभावात्, वेदनाभावेनासुखत्वापादनानुपपत्तेः। (3) ननु- अद्वितीयत्वं द्वितीयाभावविशिष्टत्वम् ? तदुपलक्षितत्वं वा ? उभयथापि विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा द्वितीयाभावः प्रामाणिकश्चेत्, तदा तेन सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिः अप्रामाणिकश्चेत्, तदा द्वितीयेन सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिः। न चाभावे द्वितीयेऽपि न भावाद्वैतहानिः, अभाववद् दृश्यस्य धर्मादेरप्येवं प्रामाणिकत्वे बाधकाभावादिति चेन्न, प्राभाकररीत्या द्वितीयाभावस्याधिकरणानतिरिक्तत्वेन प्रामाणिकत्वेऽपि तेन सद्वितीयत्वाभावात्। न च- एवमनुपलब्धेः पार्थक्येन प्रमाणत्वोक्तिरयुक्ता, प्रमेयानतिरेकादिति- वाच्यम्, अतिरिक्ताभाववादिमत एव तदुक्तेः, अतिरिक्ताभावानभ्युपमेऽपि अभावत्वप्रकारकज्ञाने तत्प्रामाण्योपपत्तेश्च। न चामृतव्यावृत्तेरपि ब्रह्ममात्रतया भेदसत्यत्वापत्तिः, इष्टापत्तेः अनृतनिरूपितत्वं परमनृतमिथ्यात्वान्मिथ्या। भेदो ब्रह्माभिन्नतया सत्य एवेति। न च प्राभाकरमते प्रतियोगिमदधिकरणव्यावृत्त्यर्थं कैवल्यादिविशेषोऽवश्यमधिकरणे वक्तव्यः, तथा च स एवाभावः, अन्यथा तेषामप्यनुपपत्तिरेवेति वाच्यम्, यस्मिन् कदापि न प्रतियोगिसम्बन्धः, तस्मिन् स्वरूपरूपोऽभेद एव कैवल्यम्। यस्मिंश्च कदाचित् सोऽपि, तदा तस्मिन् प्रतियोगिमदधिकरणकालभिन्न कालावच्छिन्नमधिकरणमिति न कैवल्यस्याधिकरणातिरेकः, न वानुपपत्तिरिति। न च एवं गुणगुण्यभेदवादिमते शौक्ल्यादेरिव शक्त्यादेरपि भावरूपधर्मस्य ब्रह्माभेदोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम्, शक्त्यादिना सहाभेदग्राहकमानाभावात्। अस्तु वा द्वितीयाभावपलक्षितस्वरूपत्वम् अद्वितीयत्वम्, तस्य च प्रामाणिकत्वेऽपि तत्प्रतियोगिनो द्वितीयस्य स्वप्नोपभुक्तनिगरणादाविव प्रामाणिकत्वानापत्तेः। एतेन- द्वितीयाभावस्य प्रागभावादित्वे द्वितीयस्यानित्यत्वमात्रं स्यात्, न तु मिथ्यात्वम्, अत्यन्ताभावत्वे तूपलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तिः, सदातनत्वात्, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वादिकार्यानन्वयित्वेन उपलक्षणत्वे अत्यन्ताभावासिद्धिः। एवं च- `द्वैताभावस्तात्त्विकश्चेत् तेन स्यात् सद्वितीयता। अतात्त्विकश्चेद् द्वैतेन सद्वितीयत्वमापतेत्।' इति परास्तम्, स्वरूपातिरेकितया तत्प्रमाया अनुद्देश्यत्वात्, तद्वोधस्यावान्तरतात्पर्येण यथाकथञ्चित्संभवात्, तात्त्विकत्वे ब्रह्मानतिरेकात्, अतात्त्विकत्वे स्वप्ननिगरणन्यायस्योक्तत्वात्। उपपादितं चैतद्विस्तरेण प्रागिति शिवम्। (4) ननु- ब्रह्मण एव यन्नित्यत्वमभिमतम्, तत् किं सर्वकालसम्बन्धत्वं वा ? कालावच्छेदराहित्यं वा ? ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वं वा ? उभयावधिराहित्यं वा ? नाद्यौ, अविद्यायां काले चातिव्याप्तेः, अविद्यायाः सर्वकालोपादानत्वेन तत्संबन्धनियमादिदानीमेव नान्यदेत्येवं रूपतदवच्छेदरहितत्वाच्च। न तृतीयः, ध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तेः। न च ध्वंसोऽपि ध्वंसप्रतियोगी, प्रतियोग्यनुन्मज्जनं तु प्रागभावनिवृत्तिरूपस्य घटस्य निवृत्तावपि प्रागभावानुन्मज्जनवद्युक्तमिति वाच्यम्, एवं सति मोक्षेऽप्यात्मान्यस्य कस्यचिद् ध्वंसस्य वक्तव्यतया लाघवार्थमाद्यध्वंसनित्यताया एव युक्तत्वात्। न च- ध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वेऽपि भावेषु ब्रह्मैव नित्यमिति- वाच्यम्, निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वेन भावस्य ध्वंसत्वादेरपि नित्यत्वावश्यं भावात्। न चतुर्थः, एवं परिभाषायामपि ब्रह्मण एव नित्यत्वमित्येतत्फलस्य मुक्तावन्याभावस्यासिद्धिरिति चेन्न, चतुर्थपक्षस्य क्षोदसहत्वात्। न च- अन्त्यावधिरहितस्य ब्रह्मान्यस्य मुक्तावसत्त्वं न सिद्धमिति- वाच्यम्, विशेषणान्तरस्यैव सिद्धेः। अत एव- काले कालापरिच्छेन्ने ध्वंसे चाध्वंसयोगिनि। नित्ये सति कथं नित्यं ब्रह्मैवेति मतं तव।। इति- निरस्तम्, कालस्याप्याविद्यकत्वेनान्त्यावधिमत्त्वाद्, ध्वंसस्याध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि आद्यावधिमत्त्वाच्च। न च तावता सद्वितीयत्वम्, तात्त्विकस्य द्वितीयस्यैवमप्यभावात्। न चैवमतात्त्विकत्वे ध्वंसनिवृत्तिः, इष्टत्वात्। न च प्रतियोग्युन्मज्जनम्, तादृग्ध्वंसोपलक्षितस्वरूपस्यैव विरोधित्वात् प्रागभावस्य प्रतियोगिध्वंसादाविव। (5) ननु- कथं दृग्ग्रूपस्य ब्रह्मणः साक्षाद् दृष्टृत्वरूपं साक्षित्वम् ? `साक्षाद् द्रष्टरिसंज्ञाया'मित्यानुशासनादिति चेत्, अविद्यातत्कार्यान्यतरप्रतिफलितचैतन्यस्यैव साक्षित्वात्। तथा च दृग्रूपस्यापि उपाधिना द्रष्टृत्वम्। नचोपाधेरपि साक्ष्यधीनसिद्धिकप्रातीतिकाविद्याकार्यत्वेन चक्रकाद्यापत्तिः, उत्पत्तिज्ञप्तिप्रतिबन्धस्याभावादविद्यातदुपाधिक द्रष्टृत्वयोरुभयोरप्यनादित्वात्। ननु- साक्षी जीवकोटिर्वा, ब्रह्मकोटिर्वा, उभयानुगतं चिन्मात्रं वा ? नाद्यः, जीवो बुद्ध्युपाधिकोऽणुरिति पक्षे इदमंशावच्छित्र चिद्वेद्यस्य शुक्तिरूप्यस्य साक्षिवेद्यत्वायोगाच्चक्रकाद्यापातात्। अज्ञानोपाधिकः सर्वगत इति पक्षेऽप्यज्ञानस्यापि साक्ष्यधीनसिद्धिकत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात्। न द्वितीयः, ब्रह्मण एव साक्षिवेद्यदुःखादिधीः, न जीवस्येति वैपरीत्यापाताद्, अन्यथा अनवच्छिन्नानन्दधीरपि जीवस्येति स्यात्। ब्रह्मचैतन्यं घटादिप्रकाशकमिति मते अज्ञानाभिभवद्वारा तस्य जीवचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यञ्जकान्तःकरणवृत्ति वत्तादृशवृत्त्यभावाच्च। न तृतीयः, ईश्वरेणेव चिन्मात्रेणापि संसारिदुःखस्य तद्गतत्वेना ग्रहणेऽपि यद्भागो मुक्तस्तस्य चिन्मात्रस्य दुःखाद्युल्लेखरूपोपप्लवापायात्। सुप्तमैत्रं प्रति मैत्रीयाज्ञानादेर्मैत्रीयतयेव जाग्रच्चैत्रीयदुःखादेरपि चैत्रीयतया सुप्तमैत्रं प्रति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गेण मैत्रेणैतावन्तं कालं दुःखं नावेदिषमिति परामर्शायोगादिति चेन्न, शुद्धब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य बुद्ध्युपाधिकजीवातिरिक्तस्य साक्षिणोऽङ्गीकृतत्वेन तत्पक्षोक्तदोषाभावात्। तथा चाविद्यावृत्तिप्रतिफलितं चैतन्यं साक्षि, सुषुप्तावप्यविद्यावृत्तिस्वीकारस्य प्रागुक्तेः। न चान्योन्याश्रयः, प्रागेव निरासात्, शुद्धस्य साक्षित्वाभावेन मुक्तोपप्लवापाताभावात्। यस्तु सुप्तमैत्रे चैत्रः दुःखग्रहणापत्त्या एतावन्तं कालं दुःखं नावेदिषमिति परामर्शावरोध उक्तः तन्न, साक्षिणः सर्वजीवसाधारण्येऽपि तत्तज्जीवचैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यक्तस्य तत्तद्दुःखादिभासकतया अतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्। यच्च सुखादेः स्वानन्तरभाव्यविद्यावृत्तिप्रति फलितचिद्वेद्यत्वे ज्ञातैकसत्त्वायोग इति, तन्न, मानसत्ववादिमतेऽप्यस्य समानत्वात्। न हि तन्मते ज्ञातैकस्थितिकत्वातिरिक्तं ज्ञातैकसत्त्वमस्ति, दुःखादिसमसमयोत्पन्नवृत्त्यापि ज्ञातैकसत्त्वोपपत्तेश्च। तस्मात् ज्ञानानन्दैकरूपमद्वितीयं नित्यं साक्षि च ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वाद्वितीयत्वनित्यत्वसाक्षित्वोपपत्तिः।। 7 ।। 8. ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वभङ्गः ननु- निर्विशेषं चेद् ब्रह्म, कथं तदेव निमित्तमुपादानमिति अभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकत्वं जगतः ? विकारवत्कारणस्यैवोपादानत्वाद्, ब्रह्मणोऽविकारत्वाद्, अन्यथा `निर्विकारोऽक्षरः शुद्ध' इत्यादि श्रुतिविरोधापत्तेरिति चेन्न। परिणामितयोपादानत्वाभावेऽपि विवर्ताधिष्ठानतयोपादानत्वसंभवात्। विवर्ताधिष्ठानत्वं च विवर्तकारणाज्ञानविषयत्वमेव। तदुक्तं वार्तिककृद्भिः- अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम्। अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते।। इति । न चोपादानलक्षणाभावः, आत्मनि कार्यजनिहेतुत्वस्यैव उपादानलक्षणत्वात्, तस्य च परिणाम्यपरिणाम्युभयसाधारणत्वात्। ननु- ब्रह्मैवोपादानम् ? उताज्ञानमपि ? आद्ये सत्योपादानत्वे सत्यत्वापत्त्या अज्ञानोपादानकत्वकल्पनविरोधः, द्वितीये सूत्रद्वयस्य रज्जुं प्रतीव ब्रह्माज्ञानयोः समप्राधान्येन वा उपादानत्वम्, निर्विकारश्रुतिस्तु केवलब्रह्मपरेति विवक्षितम् ? उत मायाशक्तिमद् ब्रह्म उपादानम्, निर्विकार श्रुतिस्तु तदनुपरक्तब्रह्मविषयेति विवक्षितम् ? उत मायाद्वारा ब्रह्म कारणम्, अंशुरिव तन्तुद्वारा पटं प्रति। निर्विकारश्रुतिस्तु अद्वारकविकारनिषेधिकेति विवक्षितम् ? नाद्यः, उभयोः समतयैव विकारित्वेन ब्रह्मणो विशिष्य निर्विकारत्वोक्त्ययोगात्, सितासितसूत्रारब्धपटे सितासितत्ववज्जगति पारमार्थिकत्वानिर्वचनीयत्वयोरापाताद्, ब्रह्मस्वभावस्य पारमार्थिकत्वस्य उपादेयधीमात्रस्थत्वे अविद्यास्वभावस्यानिर्वाच्यस्यापि धीमात्रस्थत्वापातात्, तन्मात्रोपादानकत्वस्य तत्तत्सत्त्वप्रयोजकत्वे अनिर्वाच्यत्वस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गात्, तन्मात्रोपादानकत्वाभावात्। द्वितीये ब्रह्मणो मायाख्यहेतूपरागमपेक्ष्य विकारित्वे मृदादिवत् परिणामित्वापत्तिः, विशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मत्वे निर्विकार श्रुतिविरोधः। अब्रह्मत्वे ब्रह्मणः कार्यत्वा सिद्धिः। विशिष्टस्य मृदादिवद्धर्मिसमसत्ताकरूपान्तरा पत्तिरूपपरिणामाद्विवर्तमतहानिश्च। न च- विशिष्टापेक्षया परिणामत्वं शुद्धापेक्षया विवर्तत्वमिति- वाच्यम्, शुद्धेऽपि विवर्तार्थमारोपितविकारस्यावश्यकत्वेन निर्विकारश्रुतेः तत्परत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्। तस्या विशेष्ये तात्त्विकविकाराभावपरत्वे विशिष्टे विकारोक्त्ययोगः, तत्त्वतो निर्विकारे आरोपितविकाराविरोधात्। न तृतीयः, अंशोस्तन्तुं प्रतीव ब्रह्मणो मायां प्रत्युपादानत्वाभावादिति चेन्न, उभयापरिणामित्वेन तयोः कारणत्वाङ्गीकारात्। न च तत्पक्षोक्तदोषावकाशः, उभयोः परिणामितया कारणत्वानङ्गीकारात्, किंत्वज्ञानस्यैव। अत एवासाधारण्येन निर्विकारत्वमपि। न ह्यविद्यासाहित्येऽपि ब्रह्म परिणमते, किन्तु विवर्तत इति। न चाविद्यापरिणामत्वेऽपि सत्यत्वापत्तिः, परिणाम्युपादानसमसत्ताकत्वरूपस्य सत्यत्वस्य परिणामत्वनिर्वाहकत्वाद्, ब्रह्मसमसत्ताकत्वाभावेन तदपेक्षया परिणामत्वाभावात्, स्वसमानसत्ताकविकाराहेतुतया निर्विकारत्वोपपत्तेश्च। न च सत्योपादानत्वे सत्यत्वापत्तिः, परिणाम्युपादानधर्माणामेव मृत्त्वसुवर्णत्वादीनां कार्येऽन्वयदर्शनात् सत्योपादानत्वेऽप्यसत्यत्वोपपत्तेः। न च- सत्यासत्यधूमानुगतधूमत्वस्येव सत्यासत्यानुगतोपादानत्वस्यैकस्याभाव इति- वाच्यम्, स्वनिष्ठकार्यजनिहेतुत्वस्योक्तत्वात्। न हि सत्यासत्यत्ववैधर्म्यंसाधर्म्यविरोधि, अन्यथा किञ्चिद्वैधर्म्यस्यैव साधर्म्यविरोधित्वे साधर्म्यकथोच्छेदापत्तेः, अनाभासविषयसंस्कारजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वादेराभासा नाभाससाधारणस्य दृष्टान्तेऽपि सत्त्वाच्च। ननु- अविद्योपादानत्वकल्पना न युक्ता, ब्रह्मण एव रूप्याकाशाद्युपादानत्वसंभवाद्, अविद्यान्वयव्यतिरेकस्य निमित्ततामात्रेणान्यथासिद्धेरिति- चेन्न, घटकुण्डलादेः परिणाम्यपेक्षादर्शनेन गगनादावप्यविद्यायाः परिणाम्युपादानत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्। न च- असत्यस्य रूप्यादेः सत्यरूपापत्तिमत्परिणाम्यपेक्षा नास्तीति न सर्वत्रोपादेये तदपेक्षानियम इति वाच्यम्, स्वविषयकाज्ञानानपेक्षस्य तद्भाव इत्येव सत्यरूपापपत्तिपदेन विवक्षितत्वात्। न हि ब्रह्माज्ञानस्य रूप्यादिभावापत्तौ स्वविषयकाज्ञानं व्यवधायकमस्ति। किञ्च विकारित्वेनाप्यविद्याया उपादानत्वकल्पनम्। न च- ब्रह्मण एवातात्त्विकविकारसंभवात्, न तत्कल्पनमिति वाच्यम्, तद्विषयकाज्ञानपरिणामत्वव्यतिरेकेण विकारे अतात्त्विकत्वानिर्वाहात्। किं च कार्यापेक्षितस्वसमानसत्ताकोपादानत्वेनाप्य विद्योपादानत्वम्। समानसत्ताकत्वं च रूप्यस्थले सत्त्वद्वैविध्येन वा ब्रह्मज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वरूपप्रातिभासिकत्वमादाय वोपपद्यते। तस्माद्रूप्यतत्तादात्म्ययोरविद्याविकारत्वेऽपि इदमो रूप्यरूपापत्तिरूपो विकारः कथम्? इदं रूप्यरूपमापन्नमित्यप्रतीतेः, आरोपितस्यारोपं विना अयोगादिति निरस्तम्। रूप्याकारपरिणताज्ञानाधिष्ठानचैतन्यावच्छेदकमात्रतयेदमोरूप्यापत्तेरनङ्गीकारात्। यत्तु किमिदमुपादानत्वम् ? रूपान्तरापत्तिप्रतीतिं प्रति विषयत्वं वा ? रूपान्तराभेदधीविषयत्वं वा ? कार्याभेदधीविषयत्वं वा ? नाद्यः, असिद्धेः, `शुक्ती रूप्यभावमापन्ना ब्रह्माकाशभावमापन्न'मित्यप्रतीतेः। न द्वितीयः, तत्त्वं पदार्थयोः क्षीरनीरयोर्मुण्डगोत्वयोश्चोपादानौपादेयतापत्तेः। न तृतीयः, सदृशे सन्निहिते निमित्तेऽपि कार्याभेदभ्रमसंभवेनातिव्याप्तेरिति, तदनुक्तोपालम्भनतया अपास्तम्। यदपि भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन ब्रह्मणो नोपादानत्वम्, अतीतासतोरनुपादानयोरपि भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वदर्शनाद्, भ्रमाधिष्ठानेऽपि शुक्त्यादावुपादानत्वाव्यवहाराच्चेति, तन्न, चैतन्यस्यैवाधिष्ठानत्वेनातीतादेरनधिष्ठानत्वात्। किं च न हि व्यवहाराभावमात्रेण वस्तुव्यतिरेकः वृक्षादिषु पृथिवीति व्यवहाराभावेऽपि पृथिवीत्वसत्त्वात्। यत्तु मायोपादानमीश्वरो निमित्तं शुद्धं ब्रह्माधिष्ठानमिति पक्षे अभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानत्वाभावेन त्वन्मते तदर्थस्य प्रकृत्यधिकरणादेरनुपपत्तिरिति, तन्न, एकस्यैवाविद्योपहितत्वेनोपादानत्वस्याविद्यापरिणामेच्छाकृत्याद्याश्रयत्वेन निमित्तत्त्वस्यापि संभवात्। इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वोपपत्तिः।। 8 ।। 9. ब्रह्मणो निमित्तत्वभङ्गः ननु- एवं कुलालादिवदुपादानगोचरप्रयत्नादिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वमुक्तं स्यात्, तच्च कार्यस्य कल्पितत्वे न घटते, कुलालादेरकल्पितं प्रत्येव कर्तृत्वृदर्शनात्, कल्पितं च रूप्यादिकं प्रति भ्रान्तस्यान्यस्य वा कर्तृत्वादर्शनाच्चेति चेन्न, कुलालकार्यघटादावप्यकल्पितत्वस्या सम्प्रतिपत्तेः, रूप्यादेरप्यकर्तृत्वासिद्धेश्च, तत्रापि साक्षिण एव कर्तृत्वात्, न ह्यदर्शनमात्रेण कर्त्रपलापः, त्वन्मतेऽपि सर्वज्ञकर्तुरसिद्ध्यापत्तेः। एतेनाधिष्टानत्वं न कर्तृत्वम्, एवं सत्यतिरिक्तोपादानत्वाभावेन कर्तृत्वोपादानत्वयोः सामानाधिकरण्योक्त्ययोगात्, नापि भ्रान्तवदध्यासद्रष्टत्वम्, भ्रान्तस्य प्रेक्षापूर्वकमारोपितकर्तृत्वस्याभावात्। नापि भ्रान्तवदध्यासद्रष्टृत्वम्, भ्रान्तस्य प्रेक्षापूर्वकमारोपितकर्तृत्वस्याभावात्। नापि मायाविवद्व्यामोहकत्वमेव कर्तृत्वम्, व्यामोहनीयजीवादर्शने व्यामोहकत्वाभावात्, तद्दर्शने भ्रान्त्यापत्तेः, व्यामोहकत्वस्याप्यारोपितत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयाच्च, `नामरूपे व्याकरवाणी'ति श्रुत्यनुपपत्तेश्च। न हि मायावी जगदादिकं करवाणीति सङ्कल्प्य करोति, किन्तु दर्शयानीति सङ्कल्प्य दर्शयति। पक्षत्रयेऽपि जन्मादि सूत्रेऽर्थलब्धसार्वज्ञ्यादिस्फुरणार्थं `शास्त्रयोनित्वा'दिति सूत्रमिति यत् परमतं, तद्भङ्गः स्याद्, भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वादिना सार्वज्ञ्यालाभात्। नाप्युपादानगोचरप्रयत्नादिमत्त्वम्, कल्पितं प्रति तदयोगात्। तस्मात्- अधिष्ठाने तथा भ्रान्ते भ्रामके च न कर्तृता। लौकिकी कृतिमत्ता तु न दृष्टा कल्पितं प्रति।। इति निरस्तम्, अभिमतचतुर्थपक्षस्य समर्थितत्वात्। यत्तूक्तं तृतीयपक्षे व्यामुग्धजीवद्रष्टृत्वे भ्रान्तत्वापत्तिरिति, तद् भूषणमेव, भ्रान्तिज्ञस्याभ्रान्तत्वात्। यदपि मायाविनः सङ्कल्पपूर्वककर्तृत्वादर्शनेन व्याकरवाणीति श्रुत्यनुपपत्तिरिति, तन्न, तादृशसङ्कल्पादर्शनस्य मायाविन्यसंप्रतिपत्तेः। यदप्युक्तं जन्मादिसूत्रार्थसिद्धसार्वज्ञ्यस्फोरकं `शास्त्रयोनित्वा'दिति सूत्रमिति परमतभङ्गः स्यादिति, तन्न, मायावित्वेऽपि स्रक्ष्यमाणमायिकविश्वाकारमाया सत्त्वांशपरिणामाधारतया सार्वज्ञ्यलाभात्। तस्माद् ब्रह्मणो निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं च। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो विश्वकर्तृतोपपत्तिः।। 9 ।। 10. ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वे प्रमाणभङ्गः `यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त' इति `जनिकर्तुः प्रकृति'रिति सूत्रप्रकृत्यर्थविहितपञ्चमीश्रुत्या `यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ती'ति स्थितिलयाधारत्वलिङ्गाच्चोपादानत्वसिद्धिः, `तदैक्षत व्याकरवाणी'ति ईक्षणाद्याधारतया कर्तृत्वसिद्धिश्च। अथ- वृत्तौ `पुत्रात् प्रमोदो जायत' इत्यादावनुपादानेऽपि पञ्चमीदर्शनात् प्रकृतिपदं हेतुमात्रपरमित्युक्तम्, न्यासेऽपि इदमेवाश्रित्य `असति प्रकृतिग्रहणे उपादानस्यैवापादानसंज्ञा स्यात्, प्रत्यासत्तेः, नेतरस्य। प्रकृतिग्रहणात् कारणमात्रस्य भवतीति प्रकृतिपदमनुपादानेऽपि अपादानसंज्ञासिद्ध्यर्थ'मित्युक्तम्, महाभाष्येऽपि `अयमपि योगः शक्योऽवक्तुम् गोलोमाजलोमाविलोमभ्यो दूर्वा जायन्ते अपक्रामन्ति तास्तेभ्य' इत्यादिना लोमादीनां दूर्वादीन् प्रत्यवधित्वाद् `ध्रुवमपायेऽपादान'मित्यनेनैवापादानसंज्ञासिद्धेः इदं सूत्रमनारम्भणीयमिति सूत्रं प्रत्याख्यातम्। कैयटेऽपि अपक्रमणावधित्वे लोमादिषु कार्यस्य प्रतीतिर्न संभवतीति आशङ्क्य बिलान्निष्क्रामतो दीर्घभोगस्य भोगिनः अवच्छिन्नतया तत्रोपलब्धिवत् कार्यस्यापि दूर्वादेस्तत्रोपलब्धिरित्यवधित्वमेव तत्रोपपादितम्। ततश्च मतद्वयेऽपि `जनिकर्तुः प्रकृति'रित्यनेन उपादान एव पञ्चमीति नियमो न सिध्यतीति चेत्, मैवम्, पशुना यजेते'त्यादौ पशुशब्दस्य पशुमात्रवाचकत्वेऽपि `छागस्य वपाया' इति वाक्यशेषानुसारेण पशुविशेषपरत्ववदत्रापि कारणमात्रार्थत्वेऽपि उपादानपरत्वोपपत्तेः। अवधिपञ्चमीपक्षे `शृङ्गाच्छर' इत्यादौ शृङ्गादिपदस्य नियामकाभावात् निमित्तपरत्वेऽपि प्रकृते नियामकसत्त्वेन निमित्तपरत्वाभावात्। अत एव `आत्मन आकाशः संभूत' इत्यादावपि प्रकृतिपञ्चमी। `सच्च त्यच्चाभव'दिति वाक्यशेषेण `सोऽकामयतेत्येतच्छाखान्तरस्थितवाक्येन च प्रतीतिसामानाधिकरण्यस्य नियामकत्वात्। न च- `स तपोऽतप्यत, स तपस्तप्त्वा इदं सर्वमसृजत, तत्सृष्ट्वा, तदेवानुप्राविशत्, तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभव'दित्यादिश्रुत्या सदादिभवनस्य जगत्सृष्टितदनुप्रवेशानन्तरभावित्वेन जगत्सृष्टित्वानुपपत्तौ परमेश्वरस्य सत्त्वादिगुणाभिव्यक्तिपरत्वेन ब्रह्मोपादानत्वे नास्य प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यथा कथमभवदित्युक्तं स्यात् ? न हि शुक्तिः रूप्यमभवदित्युच्यत इति वाच्यम्, सदादिभवनस्यैव जगत्सृष्टिरूपतया तदानन्तर्याभावात्, तदनुप्रविश्येत्यस्य मुखं व्यादायेतिवदुपपत्तेः। न चेदं सर्वमसृजतेत्यनेन पौनरुक्त्यम्, निमित्तत्वमात्रभ्रान्तिव्युदासपरत्वात्। यच्च शुक्तिः रूप्यमभवदित्यनुभवादर्शनमुक्तम्, तच्छुक्तेरनुपादानत्वप्रयुक्तमिति तददर्शनस्यानुदाहरणत्वात्। न च मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चस्य सत्त्यत्पदाभ्यामेवोक्तत्वेन निरुक्तादिपदवैयर्थ्यमिति शङ्क्यम्, सङ्ग्रहविवरणरूपतयोपपत्तेः। ननु- `सोऽकामत बहुस्या'मिति वाक्यं न सृज्यसाहचर्यमाह येन तत्समानाधिकरण्यमीश्वरस्य प्रतीयते किन्तु परमेश्वरस्य `अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते यदेकमव्यक्त'मित्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धतत्तदनन्तपदार्थप्रेरकानन्तरूपैर्बहुभावसङ्कल्पमाह। नच स्वस्यानन्तरूपैर्बहुभावं सङ्कल्प्य `इदं सर्वमसृजते'ति जगत्सर्जनानुपपत्तिः, नियामकरूपबहुभावस्य नियम्यसापेक्षत्वात्, नियम्यं सर्वं सृष्ट्वा नियामकरूपैः प्रवेशोक्त्युपपत्तेः। अन्यथा स्यामिति सत्त्वोक्तिर्न स्यात्, सृष्टेः प्रागन्तःकरणाभावेन तद्विशिष्टाहमर्थाभावेन उत्तमपुरुषानुपपत्तिश्च स्यादिति चेन्न, स्यामित्यनेन सुखी स्यामित्यादिवद् भाविसत्त्वोक्तौ तदनुपपत्त्यसंभवात्। अन्यथा सङ्कल्पविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः, सिद्धे इच्छाविरहात्। इदमेव च बहुपदस्य सृज्यपरत्वे विनिगमकम्, नियामकरूपाणां च तवापि मते ईश्वराभिन्नतया सिद्धत्वात्। तथा चेच्छाया नियम्य एव त्वन्मतेऽपि पर्यवसानात्। तथाचेच्छायास्तेजःप्रभृतिविषयत्वेन बहु स्यामिति सङ्कल्प्य तेजःप्रभृतिसर्जनं गुरुः स्यामिति सङ्कल्प्य शिष्यसम्पादनादिवदिति निरस्तम्। यच्चोक्तमुत्तमपुरुषानुपपत्तिरिति, तन्न, तादृशाविद्यापरिणामविशिष्टे अहमिति प्रयोगसंभवेन उत्तमपुरुषोपपत्तेः। एवमेव `तदैक्षत बहुस्या'मित्याद्यत्रमानं बोध्यम्। ननु च- यत्तेजःप्रभृति सृज्यं, तदात्मना हि त्वया बहुभावो वाच्यः। तेषां तु तेजआदीनामीक्षितृत्वस्रष्टृत्वदेवतात्मत्वश्रवणात्तानि चेतनानि। न च चेतनं प्रत्युपादानं नामेति चेत्, सत्यम्, सृज्यानामीक्षितृत्वाद्यसंभवेन ईक्षणादिकर्तृप्रतिपादकतेजआदिपदैस्तेज आद्यवच्छिन्न आत्मा बोध्यते। पूर्वपूर्वकार्यवच्छिन्नस्य तस्यैवोत्तरोत्तरकार्यनिमित्तत्वात्। तथा चावच्छेदके तेज आदौ न चैतन्यनिबन्धनदोषावकाशः। `असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। ततो वै सदजायत। तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुते'त्याद्यप्युक्तार्थे प्रमाणम्। न चात्मनः करणे अकुरुतेति सत्त्वोक्त्यनुपपत्तिः, आकाशाद्यात्मना क्रियमाणत्वेऽपि स्वरूपेण सत्त्वोपपत्तेः। एतदर्थमेवात्मानमाकाशाद्यात्मना अकुरुतेत्यश्रूयमाणोऽप्यर्थः कल्प्यते। एवं तदात्मानं सृजाम्यह'मित्यादिस्मृतिषु धर्मस्थापकशरीराद्यात्मनेति व्याख्येयम्। न च- `ततो वै सदजायते'ति तच्छब्दोपात्तब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चोत्पत्तेः प्राक् सिद्धत्वात्तदात्मानमिति व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम्, निमित्तत्वे पूर्ववाक्येन लब्धेऽपि उपादानत्वबोधनेनास्यापि सफलत्वात्। ननु- यदुक्तं ब्रह्मण्येव सृष्टिलयश्रवणाद् ब्रह्मोपादानमिति, तन्न, ऊर्णनाभौ तन्तुनिमित्ते तन्तुलयस्य दर्शनात्, तत्र हि यथा पुत्रं प्रति पितृदेहधातोरुपादानत्वेऽपि न पिता तदुपादानम्, किन्तु निमित्तमात्रं, तथा ऊर्णनाभिधातोस्तदुपादानत्वेऽपि तस्य निमित्तत्वमेव, ब्रह्मणोऽपि ऊर्णनाभिवदेव संहर्तृत्वस्य यथोर्णनाभिरित्यादिना श्रवणाच्चेति चेन्न। यद्यप्यूर्णनाभेर्न तन्तूपादानत्वम्, तस्मिन्नष्टेऽपि तन्तूपलम्भात्, किन्तु भुक्ताहारस्यैव, तथापि तत्र न तन्तोर्लयः, किन्तु बहिष्ठस्यान्तःप्रवेशमात्रम्। अत एव `यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते चे'त्युक्तम्। न च- ब्रह्मणस्तन्न्यायेन संहर्तृत्वोक्त्या तद्वदेव तदस्त्विति वाच्यम्। `तज्जलानित्यादिना तत्र लयश्रवणात्, तिरोभावमात्रे च तस्य निदर्शनत्वात्, सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्तत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात्। `तद्भूतयोनि'मिति योनि श्रुत्या चोपादानत्वम्। न च `योनिष्ट इन्द्र सदने'त्यादौ निमित्तेऽपि योनिशब्दप्रयोगात् न तेनोपादानतासिद्धिः, `मुख्यस्तु शब्दस्वरसा'दिति न्यायेन कदाचिदन्यत्र कथञ्चिन्निमित्ते प्रयोगेऽपि औत्सर्गिकमुख्यार्थत्यागस्य प्रकृतेऽयोगात्। एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानश्रुतिरप्युपादानत्वे मानम्। यथा च न सादृश्यप्राधान्याभ्यामुपपत्तिः तथोक्तं प्राक्। `सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'ति सामानाधिकरण्यश्रुतिरपि तत्र मानम्। न च- `सर्वंसमाप्नोषि ततोऽसि सर्व' इति स्मृत्याऽन्यथाव्याख्यातत्वान्न तत्र मानतेति वाच्यम्, अधिष्ठानतया सर्वव्यापित्वस्य सर्वशब्दप्रयोगनिमित्तत्वाद्, अन्यथा आकाशेऽपि सर्वपदप्रयोगापत्तेः। अनुपादानत्वे प्रकृत्यधिकरणविरोधापत्तेश्च उपादानत्वम्। श्रुत्यनुगृहीतानुमानमप्यत्र विवरणोक्तमध्यवसेयम्। तथा हि- `महाभूतानि, सद्वस्तुप्रकृतिकानि, सत्स्वभावानुरक्तत्वे सति विविधविकारत्वात्, मृदनुस्यूतघटादिदवदि'ति। न च विवर्तमते उपादानत्वानुपपत्तिः, सत्प्रधानप्रकृतिकत्वेनार्थान्तरता वा, आदावेव तदुपादानत्वस्य स्थापितत्वात्। प्रकृतेः सत्त्वाभावस्य प्रसाधितत्वेनार्थान्तरता वा, आदावेव तदुपादानत्वस्य स्थापितत्वात्। प्रकृतेः सत्त्वाभावस्य प्रसाधितत्वेनार्थान्तरानवकाशाच्च। न च `खण्डो गौर्मुण्डो गौ'रिति गोत्वानुरक्तखण्डादौ व्यभिचारः तदनुरक्तत्वे सति सद्विकारत्वादित्यत्र तात्पर्यात्, सदतिरिक्तगोत्वाद्यनभ्युपगमाच्च। अत एव- `सन् घट' इति वदत्रेदानीमसन् घटः असन्नृशृङ्गमित्यादिप्रतीत्यनुसारेण घटनृशृङ्गादेरसदुपादानत्वापत्तिरिति निरस्तम्। नापि, ब्रह्म न द्रव्योपादानम्, चेतनत्वाच्चैत्रवत्, जगन्नानन्दप्रकृतिकम्, तत्स्वभावानुरक्तत्वात्, यद् यत्स्वभावाननुरक्तं तत् न तत्प्रकृतिकं, यथा घटस्वभावाननुरक्तं पटादि न घटोपादानकमित्यादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्, व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोरापातप्रतीत्या साम्येऽपि श्रुत्यनुग्रहेण स्थापनाया बलवत्त्वात्। द्वितीयानुमाने कपालस्वभावाननुरक्ते घटे व्यभिचारः, `कपालं घट' इत्यप्रतीतेः। न च- मृत्त्वेन तदनुरक्तत्वमस्तीति- वाच्यम्, सत्त्वेनात्राप्यनुरक्तत्वस्य समानत्वात्। एवं च जगदभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकम्, प्रेक्षापूर्वकजनितकार्यत्वात्सुखदुःखादिवदित्यभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानं ब्रह्म सिध्यति। न च व्यर्थविशेषणत्वम्, प्रेक्षापूर्वकत्वात् कार्यत्वादिति हेतुद्वये तात्पर्यात्। न च- त्वन्मते दुःखादीनामन्तःकरणोपादानकत्वेन साध्यवैकल्यमिति वाच्यम्, अस्मन्मते अन्तःकरणस्य परिणाम्युपादानत्वेऽपि अन्तःकरणरूपेण परिणताज्ञानाधारतया विवर्तोपादानत्वस्यानपायात्, कार्यत्वादिति हेतौ सर्वकार्यनिमित्तकालघटसंयोगस्य उभयवादिसम्प्रतिपन्नस्य दृष्टान्तस्य लाभाच्च। न च जगदुपादानं, न कर्तृ, द्रव्योपादानत्वात्, मृद्वत्, जगत्कर्ता वा न द्रव्योपादानम्, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालादिवदित्यादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्, श्रुतिविरोधेन हीनबलत्वात्, आद्येऽनुमाने जडत्वस्य द्वितीयानुमाने सर्वानन्तर्यामित्वस्य चोपाधित्वात्, बाधोन्नीततया पक्षेतरत्वेऽपि दोषत्वात्। तस्माज्जगदुपादानं ब्रह्म कर्तृ चेति सिद्धम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणो जगदभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानत्वे प्रमाणोपपत्तिः।। 10 ।। 11. स्वप्रकाशत्वलक्षणभङ्गः ननु- परिणममानाविद्याधिष्ठानत्वेनोपादानत्वं वाच्यम्, अधिष्ठानत्वं तु नावेद्यस्य, तद्वेदनार्थं प्रमाणापेक्षायामन्योन्याश्रयात्। न च- स्वप्रकाशतदपेक्षमेवाधिष्ठानत्वमितिवाच्यम्, स्वप्रकाशताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। तथा हि- किमिदं स्वप्रकाशत्वं ? वृत्त्यव्याप्यत्वं वा ? फलाव्याप्यत्वं वा ? अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वं वा ? तद्योग्यत्वं वा ? तद्योग्यत्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वं वा ? नाद्यः, ब्रह्मणोऽप्यावरणभङ्गाय चरमवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वात्। न द्वितीयः, अतीतादौ नित्यातीन्द्रये चातिव्याप्तेः। न तृतीयः, सुषुप्त्यादौ व्यवहाराभावेनाव्याप्तेः। न चतुर्थः, योग्यत्वरूपधर्मस्य मोक्षकालेऽभावेन तदा ब्रह्मण्यव्याप्तेः। नापि पञ्चमः, अनधिकरणत्वस्यापि धर्मत्वेन मोक्षदशायां तस्याप्यभावेनाव्याप्तेः। अत एव न तादृगनधिकरणत्वोपलक्षितमपि तत्, तस्यापि धर्मत्वे मुक्तावभावादिति चेन्न, पञ्चमपक्षस्यैव क्षोदसहत्वात्। न च मोक्षेऽव्याप्तिः, अनधिकरणत्वस्य स्वरूपतया तदापि सत्त्वात्। न च स्वरूपत्वे लक्षणत्वानुपपत्तिः, त्वन्नये ब्रह्माभिन्नानन्दादौ गुणत्वव्यवहारवत् स्वरूपभूतेऽप्यनधिकरणत्वे लक्षणत्वव्यवहारात्। न च- त्वन्मते योग्यत्वमपि ब्रह्मणि मिथ्येति तदत्यन्ताभावोऽपि वाच्यः, तथा च कथं तदत्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वमितिवाच्यम्, योग्यत्वविरोध्यत्यन्ताभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, स्वाश्रयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रयोजकस्य स्वाश्रयनिष्ठत्वेनैवाविरोधित्वात्। यद्वा- व्यावहारिकात्यन्ताभावो विवक्षितः, ब्रह्मणि च योग्यतात्यन्ताभावस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वेन तात्त्विकत्वात्। नाप्यवेद्यत्वानिरुक्तिः, फलाव्याप्यत्वस्यैव तत्त्वात्, आवरणभङ्गे चित एव फलत्वात्। न च- एवं घटादेरपि वृत्तिवेद्यतया फलविषयत्वाभावाद् रूप्यसुखादेरपि अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यतया विशिष्टलक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्, घटादौ फलव्याप्यत्वस्य समर्थितत्वाद्रूप्यसुखादौ साक्षिभास्यतयाऽपरोक्षव्यवहारेऽपि प्रमाणजन्यापरोक्ष वृत्तिविषयत्वाभावात्। तथा च फलाव्याप्यत्वसमानाधिकरणतद्वत्त्वस्य पर्यवसिततया सकलदोषनिरासात्। न च ब्रह्मणोऽपि वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचिद्रूपफलभास्यत्वेनासंभवः, तस्य फलरूपत्वेन तद्विषयत्वाभावात्। न च चित्सुखाचार्यैः तत्स्वभावस्यापि स्फुरणस्य तद्विषयत्वमित्युक्तेरसंभवः, तस्याचार्यवचसस्तत्प्रयुक्तव्यवहारविषयतया तद्विषयत्वोपचारनिबन्धनत्वात्। अयमत्र निष्कर्षः-वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचिज्जन्यातिशययोगित्वं वृत्त्या तत्प्रतिफलितचिता वा अभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचिद्विषयत्वं वा फलव्याप्यत्वम्। चिज्जन्यातिशयश्च नावरणभङ्गः, नापि व्यवहारो विवक्षितः, किन्तु भग्नावरणचित्संबन्धः। स च घटादावस्ति, नात्मनि, संबन्धस्य भेदगर्भत्वात्। एवमुक्तचिद्विषयत्वमपि भेदघटितं घटादावस्ति, नात्मनीति स्थितं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायाम्। नाप्यपरोक्ष व्यावहारो दुर्वचः अपरोक्ष इति शब्दप्रयोगस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्। न चालौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषयधर्माधर्मादौ तादृशव्यवहारयोगितया अतिव्याप्तिः, योगजधर्मातिरिक्तालौकिकप्रत्यासत्तेरनङ्गीकारात्, तस्यापि स्वयोग्यव्यवहित एव सामर्थ्यापादकत्वात्, न तु धर्मादौ। तदुक्तं `यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्ट' इत्यादि। एतेन- कश्चायमपरोक्षव्यवहारो नाम ? अपरोक्षज्ञानजन्यो वा ? अपरोक्षवस्तुविषयो वा ? अपरोक्ष इत्याकारो वा ? नाद्यः, धर्मादावप्यपरोक्षयोगिज्ञानानुव्यवसायव्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यव्यवहारसत्त्वेनातिव्याप्तेः, न द्वितीयः, वस्तुन आपरोक्ष्यम् अपरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वं चेत्, आत्मनोऽपि घटादिवद् वेद्यत्वापातात्। अपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वं चेत्, वस्तुव्यवहारयोरापरोक्ष्ये अन्योन्यसापेक्षतयाऽन्योन्याश्रयात्। न तृतीयः, निराकारशुद्धब्रह्मविषयस्याखण्डार्थनिष्ठवेदान्त जन्यव्यवहारस्यापरोक्ष इत्याकारायोगादितिनिरस्तम्, व्यवहारपदेनाभिवदनस्य विवक्षितत्वेन चरमवृत्तेस्तदनाकारत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्। न चानुपलब्धिगम्यतया अवेद्ये अपरोक्षे लोकव्यवहारसत्त्वेनाभावेऽतिव्याप्तिः, प्रामाणिकव्यवहारस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। ननु- अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं न तावत्सर्वान् प्रति, चैत्राज्ञाने मैत्रस्य तदभावात्। नापि ज्ञानं प्रति, तस्याव्यवहर्तृत्वात्। नापि ज्ञानाश्रयं प्रति, ज्ञानस्य चितोऽनाश्रितत्वादिति- चेन्न, प्रमातारं यं कञ्चित् प्रत्येवापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं विवक्षितम्। प्रमाता चाहमर्थ एव सर्वसंमतः। यत्तूक्तं चैत्रस्य ज्ञाने मैत्रस्याव्यवहार इति, तस्य चैत्रज्ञाननिमित्तको मैत्रस्याव्यवहार इति वार्थः ? चैत्रज्ञानविषयको मैत्रस्याव्यवहार इति वार्थः ? आद्ये चैत्रज्ञानेन मैत्रस्याव्यवहारेऽपि स्वज्ञानेनैव घटे ब्रह्मणि चापरोक्षव्यवहारसंभवेन व्यर्थविशेषणत्वासंभवयोरभावात्। द्वितीये चैत्रज्ञाने तादृग्व्यवहाराभावेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्। अस्माकमपि हि चितिरेव स्वप्रकाशा, न तु चैत्र ज्ञानत्वेन व्यपदिश्यमानवृत्त्युपहितचिदपि, वृत्तेरस्वप्रकाशत्वात्। एवं च सर्वप्रमातॄन् प्रति तादृग्व्यवहारविषयतायोग्यत्वमपि सङ्गच्छत एव। ननु- अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्ष व्यवहारविषयत्वं तद्योग्यत्वं च व्याहतम्, तदपरोक्षव्यवहारे तद्विषयकस्फुरणस्य हेतुत्वादिति चेन्न, अन्यत्र तद्विषयस्य तद्व्यवहारजनकत्वेऽपि स्फुरणस्य स्वाविषयस्य स्वस्मिन् व्यवहारजनकत्वम्, स्वभावभेदात्। न च घटादावपि तथैवास्तु, तेषामस्फुरणरूपत्वेन तद्विषयत्वं विना नियामकान्तराभावात्, तार्किककल्पितस्यानुव्यवसायस्यापि घटज्ञानज्ञानत्वापेक्षया लघुना घटज्ञानत्वेनैव घटज्ञानव्यवहारहेतुत्वकल्पनाच्च। ननु- अनवस्थाभिया स्फुरणान्तरानङ्गीकारात् स्वस्यस्वविषयत्वमस्तु, अन्यत्र क्लृप्तस्य तद्विषयत्वस्य नियामकस्य त्यक्तुमयुक्तत्वाद्, अन्यथा प्रमेयत्वस्य स्ववृत्तित्वं विनैव स्वत एव प्रमेयमिति व्यवहारजनकत्वोपपत्त्या केवलान्वयित्वभङ्गप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, अनवस्थया स्फुरणान्तरत्यागवदभेदे भेदनियतस्य विषयिविषयभावस्याप्ययुक्ततया त्यागोपपत्तेः, प्रमेयत्वादौ केवलान्वयित्वभङ्गस्येष्टत्वात्। न च- एवं गतिरपि ग्राम इव स्वस्मिन्नपि स्वकार्यं करोत्विति वाच्यम्, भेदाविशेषात्तन्तुरिव मृदपि पटं करोत्वित्यस्याप्यापत्तेः। स्वभावभेदेन परिहारश्च सर्वत्र समानः। यद्वा- चिदविषयस्वरूपत्वमेव स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, चिदन्यस्य सर्वस्य चिद्विषयत्वात्तुच्छस्य नि, स्वरूपत्वेन नातिव्याप्तिशङ्का। नाप्यसंभवः, स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधेन छिदाया अच्छेद्यत्ववत् स्वस्य स्ववेद्यत्वायोगात्। न च- एवं मिथ्यात्वानुमितेरपि अस्वविषयत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, स्वपरसाधारणस्यैकस्य विषयतानियामकस्य तत्र सत्त्वेन विशेषात्। अत एव यथा छिदादौ परशुसंयोगो न स्वपरसाधारण इति स्वस्मिन् वृत्तिविरोधः, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि। न च तर्हि छिदाकार्यस्य छिदायामिव चिज्जन्यव्यवहारस्य चित्यनापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, फलदर्शनस्यैव छिदापेक्षया स्वभावभेदनियामकत्वात्। यद्वा- स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदनपेक्षत्वं स्वावच्छिन्नसंविदनपेक्षत्वं वा स्वप्रकाशत्वम्। न च स्ववेद्यत्वेऽप्युपपत्त्या स्वाभिमतप्रकाशत्वानुपपत्तिः, स्ववेद्यत्वस्य बाधितत्वेन तदादायोपपत्त्यसंभवात्। ननु स्वप्रकाशत्वधर्मस्य तात्त्विकत्वे अद्वैतव्याघातः, अतात्त्विकत्वे अस्वप्रकाशत्वस्यैव तात्त्विकत्वापत्त्या तत्साधकानुमानादेर्बाध इति- चेन्न, स्वरूपत्वस्योक्तत्वात्। न च- परोषामिदमिष्टम्, वेद्यत्वविरोधिस्वरूपस्य परैरनङ्गीकारात्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मस्वप्रकाशत्वलक्षणोपपत्तिः।। 11 ।। 12. आत्मनः पराभिमतस्वप्रकाशत्वभङ्गः न च प्रमाणाभावः, अनुभूतित्वहेतोर्व्यतिरेकिण एव प्रमाणत्वात्। ननु- अत्र साध्याप्रसिद्धिः, न च- वेद्यत्वं किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, धर्मत्वादित्यनुमानेन सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, अवेद्यत्वप्रसिद्धावपि विशिष्टसाध्याप्रसिद्धेः तदवस्थत्वात्। न चानुभूतित्वेनापि तावदेव साध्यम्, वेद्यत्वस्य वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वरूपत्वे तदभावस्य चरमवृत्तिव्याप्यानुभूतौ बाधात्, फलव्याप्यत्वरूपत्वे तु तदभावस्य मम घटादौ, तव धर्मादौ शुक्तिरूप्यादौ, च पक्षभिन्ने प्रसिद्धत्वेनासाधारणानेकान्तिकतापत्तेः अस्वप्रकाशत्वरूपत्वे प्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्ध्याऽप्रसिद्धिरेव। किञ्चात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं कुतश्चिद्व्यावर्तते चेत्, तत्रैव व्यभिचारः, न चेदत्र व्यभिचार इति चेन्न, चिदविषयस्वरूपत्वरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वमनुभूतित्वेन यदा साध्यते, तदा वेद्यत्वं चिद्विषयत्वमेव चिदन्यमात्रवृत्ति पक्षः, अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिस्वरूपत्वं साध्यम्। यथा च वृत्तिप्रतिफलितचिद्विषयता घटादौ न ब्रह्मणि, तथोपपादितमिति नासाधारण्यबाधौ। नाप्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वस्यात्यन्ताभाव प्रतियोगित्वे व्यभिचारः, अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेनात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिन्येव अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया यन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य केवलान्वयित्वाभावात्। न च एवं ब्रह्मणि चिद्विषयत्वेऽपि तदत्यन्ताभावोपपत्त्याऽर्थान्तरं घटादावप्येवं साध्यसत्त्वेनासाधारण्यं चेति वाच्यम्, चिद्विषयत्वविरोध्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्य साध्यत्वान्नार्थान्तरासाधारण्ये, घटादौ तयोः सहावस्थित्या अविरोधाद्, ब्रह्मणि विरोधात्। न च तर्हि विरोधित्वांशमादाय पुनरप्रसिद्धिः। वेद्यत्वं, विरोध्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाद्, घटवदिति प्रसिद्धिसंभवात्। यदा तु अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहार योग्यत्वरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वं पूर्वानुमाने साध्यम्, तदा फलव्याप्यत्वरूपं वेद्यत्वं पक्षः, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यकिञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यम्। तथा चापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वसमानाधिकरणा वेद्यत्वस्य सामान्यतः प्रसिद्ध्या नाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वासाधारण्ये। अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगोत्यादि विकल्पनिबन्धनदोषः परिहृत एव। एतेन- अयं घटः, एतद्घटान्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वानधिकरणान्यः, पदार्थत्वादित्यादिमहाविद्ययापि साध्यप्रसिद्धिः। न च वेद्यत्वानिरुक्तिः, चिदविषयत्वमात्रस्य स्वप्रकाशरूपत्वे चिद्विषयत्वस्यैव वेद्यत्वरूपता, प्रथमपक्षे तु फलव्याप्यत्वमेव वेद्यत्वम्। न च तर्ह्यतीन्द्रियान्यत्वेनार्थान्तरं सिद्धसाधनं वा, अपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्व समानाधिकरणस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्। न चायं घटः, एतद्धटत्वे सति वेद्यत्वानधिकरणान्यत्वानधिकरणम्, पदार्थत्वादिति प्रकरणसमता, श्रुत्यादि रूपानुकूलतर्कसद्भावेन स्थापनाया अधिकबलत्वात्, प्रतिपक्षनिबन्धनसाध्यसन्देहेऽपि संशयरूपसाध्यप्रसिद्धेरनिवारणाच्च। नाप्यसिद्धिः, अनुभूतित्वजातेः कल्पितव्यक्तिभेदमादाय शुद्धेऽपि सत्त्वात्। न च जातेर्धर्मिसमसत्ताकभेदवद्व्यक्तिसापेक्षत्वनियमः, जात्यन्यूनसत्ताकभेदवद्व्यक्तिसापेक्षतयैवातिप्रसङ्गनिरासे धर्मिसमसत्ताकभेदवद्व्यक्ति सापेक्षत्वस्य गौरवकरत्वात्, समत्वस्यान्यूनानतिरिक्तार्थकत्वात्। न चानुभाव्याभावे अनुभूतित्वायोगः, कदाचिदनुभाव्यसत्त्वेनैव तदुपपत्तेः, अन्यथा आसीदित्यादिवाक्य जन्यज्ञानस्याननुभूतित्वापत्तेः। न च- अनुभूतित्वं विपक्षादव्यावृत्तम्, अनुभूति शब्दवाच्यानात्मनि सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम्, अनात्मनि अनुभूतिशब्दवाच्यत्वस्यैवाभावात्, वृत्तौ ज्ञानपदस्येवानुभूतिपदस्य गौणत्वात्। अत एव परोक्षानुभवस्य पक्षत्वे बाधः, अपरोक्षस्य पक्षत्वे तत्र व्यभिचार इति- निरस्तम्, चित्त्वरूपानुभूतित्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, श्रुत्यनुग्रहसत्त्वात्। न च- अपरोक्षानुभवमप्यपरोक्षतो जानामीत्यात्मनो वेद्यत्वग्राहिणा प्रत्यक्षेण तदात्मानमेवावेदिति श्रुत्या च बाध इति वाच्यम्, आद्यस्य साक्ष्यनुभवस्य वृत्तिरूपगुणानुभवविषयत्वात्। न च- `जानामी'ति ज्ञप्तिविषयत्वमेवानुभूयत इति वाच्यम्, अहमर्थस्य ज्ञप्त्याश्रयत्वायोगेन ज्ञानपदस्य वृत्तौ गौणत्वाद्, `दुःखं जानामी'त्यादावपि दुःखाद्याकाराविद्यावृत्तेरेव विवक्षितत्वाच्च, द्वितीयस्य चाहमर्थविषयत्वात्तदनात्मत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, श्रुतेश्चोपनिषज्जन्यवृत्तिरूप वित्तिविषयत्वावगाहितया चिद्विषयत्वस्य फलव्याप्यत्वस्याविषयीकरणात्। नाप्यनुभूतिः स्फुरणविषयः अपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वाद् घटवत्, चैत्रीयानुभूतिः, चैत्रापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यापरोक्षज्ञप्तिविषयः चैत्रापरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वाद्, घटवत्, चैत्रीयानुभूतिश्चैत्रापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यापरोक्षज्ञप्त्यविषयो नावतिष्ठते, चैत्रं प्रत्यप्रकाशमानत्वरहितत्वात्, चैत्रेच्छावदिति सप्रतिपक्षत्वम्। स्फुरणप्रयुक्तव्यवहारशालित्वरूपस्य विषयत्वस्य मयाप्यङ्गीकारेण सिद्धसाधनात्, तदन्यस्य स्वस्मिन्वृत्तिविरोधेन बाधात्, जडत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च, परवेद्यत्वे अनवस्थानात् स्ववेद्यत्वस्य विरुद्धत्वात्। ननु- स्वस्मिन् स्ववेद्यत्वं कथं विरुद्धम् ? न तावत्स्वजनकेन्द्रियासन्निकृष्टत्वात्, स्वाजनकत्वाद्वा; नित्यचिद्विषयत्वस्य तद्द्वयं विनैव घटादौ सत्त्वात्। नापि विषयविषयिभावसंबन्धस्य द्विष्ठत्वात्, अतीतारोपितात्यन्तासतां ज्ञानदर्शनेन तस्य उभयानिष्ठत्वात्। नापि क्रियात्वकर्मत्वयोर्विरोधात्, कृत्यादिविशेषस्य कार्यत्वादिदर्शनात्। नापि विषयिणो विषयत्वे कर्तुः कर्मतापातात्, मिथ्यात्वानुमित्यादेर्विषयिण्या एव विषयत्वदर्शनात्। मामहं जानामीत्यनुभवदर्शनेन च `तदात्मानमेवावे'दिति श्रुत्या च कर्तुः कर्मत्वाविरोधात्। एवं च परसमवेतक्रियाफलशालित्वं न कर्मत्वम्, किन्तु क्रियाविषयत्वादिकम्, तच्चाभेदेऽप्युपपाद्यमिति चेत्। मैवम्। विषयविषयिभावस्य संबन्धत्वेन भेदनियततया स्वस्मिन् स्ववेद्यत्वस्य विरुद्धत्वात्। न ह्युक्तातीतादिस्थले भेदो नास्ति। अत एव कृतिः कृत्यन्तरं प्रति, इच्छा इच्छान्तरं प्रति, व्यवहृतिः व्यवहृत्यन्तरं प्रति, अभिधा अभिधान्तरं प्रत्येव विषयः, न तु स्वात्मानं प्रतीति न स्वविषयत्वे किञ्चिदुदाहरणमस्ति। ननु- गत्यादौ गत्यन्तराविषयत्वेऽपि वस्तूनां विचित्रस्वभावत्वात् कृत्यादौ कृत्यन्तरादिविषयत्ववद् अनुभूतेरपि स्वविषयत्वमस्तु। अन्यथा स्वस्मिन् व्यवहारजनकत्वमपि न स्यात्, व्याप्तिज्ञानानुमित्यादेः स्वाविषयत्वे सर्वोपसंहारवती व्याप्तिरनुमितिमिथ्यात्वं च न स्यादिति चेन्न। व्यवहारोपपादनार्थं स्वविषयत्वस्वभावकल्पनापेक्षया स्वाविषयत्वेऽपि स्वव्यवहारजनकत्वस्वभावत्वमेव कल्प्यताम्, लाघवात्, तावतैव तदुपपत्तेः व्याप्त्यनुमित्यादेस्तु अवच्छेदकैक्यलाभात्तथात्वमित्युक्तत्वाच्च। एवं च क्रियाकर्मत्वविरोधादपि न स्वस्मिन् स्ववेद्यत्वम्। मिथ्यात्वानुमितेश्च न स्वकर्मता, परोक्षस्याकर्मत्वात्। यदुक्तं कर्तुरेव कर्मत्वं, तदयुक्तम्, उदाहृतमिथ्यात्वानुमित्यादेरकर्मत्वात्, मामहं जानामीत्यादौ साक्षिणः कर्तृत्वादहमर्थस्य कर्मत्वात् तदात्मानमित्यादौ चाहमर्थस्य कर्तृत्वाच्चित् कर्म अभेदे तद्द्वयादर्शनात्। अत एव न भेदघटितकर्मलक्षणपरित्यागः, क्रियाविषयत्वं तु न कर्मत्वम्, आसनादिक्रियाया अपि आधारादिविषयत्वेन सकर्मकत्वापत्तेः। अथ- अवेद्यत्वेऽवेद्यत्वसाधकप्रमाणवेद्यत्वावेद्यत्वाभ्यां व्याघातः, वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यायोगः, ब्रह्मविचारविधिवैयर्थ्यं, ब्रह्माज्ञाननिवृत्त्ययोगः इत्यादिप्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतिरिति चेन्न, चिदविषयत्वं फलाव्याप्यत्वं वा अवेद्यत्वम्, तस्य तत्साधकप्रमाणजन्यवृत्तिवेद्यत्वेन व्याहत्यभावाद्, वृत्तिविषयत्वमात्रेणैव वेदान्तप्रामाण्यविचारविध्यज्ञाननिवृत्तीनां संभवाच्च। एतेन- अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमात्रेण वेदान्तप्रामाण्ये आत्मनोऽसिद्धिप्रसङ्ग इति निरस्तम्, आत्मनः स्वतः सिद्धत्वात्। ननु स्वत इत्यस्य स्वेनैवेत्यर्थे स्वविषयकत्वापत्तिः, प्रमाणं विनेत्यर्थ उपायान्तरस्यानुपन्यासेनासिद्ध्यापत्तिः, अन्यथा नृशृङ्गादेरपि सिद्ध्यापात इति चेन्न, मानानपेक्षसिद्धेरेव स्वतः सिद्धिशब्दार्थत्वात्। न च नृशृङ्गादावेवं प्रसङ्गः, तदसत्त्वव्यावृत्तिफलकप्रमाणाभावात्, प्रकृते च वृत्तिविषयतामात्रेण तत्सत्त्वात्, सिद्धिरूपात्मनि सिद्ध इति व्यवहारस्य सिद्धिप्रयुक्तव्यवहारविषयतया गौणत्वात्। न चैवं मुक्तौ वेद्याभावे वित्तित्वानुपपत्तिः, अनुभूतिन्यायस्यात्रापि सुलभत्वात्। न च स्वाविषयत्वे स्वविषयकसंशयनिवर्तकत्वायोगः, स्वमहिम्नैव स्वधर्मिणि व्यवहारवत् संशयादिविरोधित्वोपपत्तेः। न चाननुगमः, तव विषयतायामिवाननुगतस्यैव नियामकत्वात्स्वकर्मत्वाभावेऽपि स्वनिर्वाहकतया स्वस्मिन् व्यवहाराद्युपपत्तेश्च। न च स्वनिर्वाहकपदेन निर्वहणक्रियाकर्तृत्वकर्मत्वोक्त्या विरोधः, स्वातिरिक्तनिर्वाहकानपेक्षत्वमात्रेण स्वनिर्वाहकत्वोपचारात्। `स्वयं दासास्तपस्विन' इत्यादौ स्वातिरिक्तदासाभावमात्रेण स्वदासत्वव्यपदेशवत्। न च- स्वनिर्वाहकाध्ययनविधिदीपप्रभादौ स्वस्मिन् कार्यकरत्वं स्वविषयत्वेन व्याप्तमित्यत्रापि तथेति वाच्यम्, अध्ययनविधावेकावच्छेदक मात्रेणात्माश्रयानवकाशात्, दीपप्रभादौ स्वविषयत्वासिद्धेः। तदुक्तं खण्डने- `गाङ्कुटादिभ्य' इत्यत्र बहुव्रीहिः स्वाविषये कुटेऽपि स्वकार्यं करोति। तथेहापी'ति। न च- `उद्भूतावयवभेदः समुदायः समासार्थ' इति कैयटोक्तरीत्या कुटघटितसमुदाय एव बहुव्रीहिविषयः स च वैयाकरणानां मीमांसकानां च शक्त्या अन्येषां लक्षणयेत्यन्यदेतत्, यथा `चैत्रशालीया आनीयन्ता'मित्यत्र उपलक्षणस्यापि चैत्रस्य स्वशालास्थस्य तच्छब्दविषयत्वं, तथा कुटस्यापि कुटादिवदन्यपदार्थभूतसमुदायान्तर्गतस्य बहुव्रीहिविषयत्वोपपत्तेः। तथा च दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, स्वाविषय इत्यस्य औत्सर्गिकविषयान्यपदार्थभिन्न इत्यर्थकत्वम्। तथा च स्वपदार्थसंबन्धादनन्यत्रेव स्वपदार्थेऽपि यथा तत्र फलम्, तथा स्वसंबन्धादन्यत्रेव स्वस्मिन्नपि चित्फलमित्यत्र दृष्टान्तपर्यवसानात्। स्वविषयव्यतिरेकेण समुदायप्रयोजकरूपेण विषयत्वेऽपि समुदायिताप्रयोजकरूपेणाविषयत्वात् स्वाविषयत्वोक्तेर्वा। ननु- एतावता स्वस्मादन्यत्र व्यवहारजनने तद्विषयत्वं स्वस्मिन् स्वाभेद एवेति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः स चायुक्तः, पक्षादन्यत्रैवायं नियम इत्यस्य सर्वत्र सुवचत्वात्, स्वाभेदे सत्यपि स्वविषय इव स्वस्मिन्विषयत्वव्यतिरेकेण द्वेष इच्छाविरोधित्वस्याज्ञाने स्वावारकत्वस्य स्मृत्यादिरूपे परोक्षज्ञाने स्वव्यवहारजनकत्वस्य मैत्रचैतन्ये सुषुप्तौ चैत्रचैतन्येन पारमार्थिककाल्पनिकभेदयोः राहित्येऽपि तद्व्यवहारजनकत्वस्यादर्शनाच्च। आत्मानं जानामीत्यात्माभिन्नज्ञाने स्वविषयत्वानुभवाच्चेति चेन्न, तर्हि द्वेषादौ स्वाभेदेऽपि स्वविषयत्वादर्शनात् प्रकृतेऽपि तथा स्यात्। अथ- व्यवहाररूपफलदर्शनात् प्रकृत एव स्वाभेदस्यान्यत्रादृष्टमपि स्वविषयतानियामकत्वं कल्प्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि स्वव्यवहारूपफलदर्शनादत्रैव स्वाभेदस्य स्वकार्यजनकतानियामकत्वम्, न द्वेषादौ, तथा फलादर्शनादिति समः समाधिः। न च- अत्र गृहीततद्विषयत्वस्य तूष्णीं त्यागे सर्वत्रैवं प्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्, तद्विषयत्वत्यागबीजस्य बाधकस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वात्, सर्वत्र तस्याभावात्। यत्तूक्तं मैत्रचैतन्य इत्यादि, तन्न, तदैकविरहकाले मैत्रचैतन्य इत्यस्यैवाभावात्, साक्षिचैतन्येन व्यवहारापादनस्येष्टत्वात्। यदि च संस्कारात्मनाऽवस्थिताः न्तकरणं तदापि भेदकम्, तदा भेदस्यैव सत्त्वाच्च। यत्तूक्तमात्मानमित्यादि, तदपि न, अहमर्थाश्रितवृत्तिरूपज्ञानविषयत्वस्यैव तत्रानुभवात्। न च घटः स्वप्रकाशः, घटत्वादित्याभाससाम्यम्, प्रयोजकत्वपरिहारेण परिहृतत्वाद्, घटे स्फुरणाभेदतद्विषयत्वयोरभावे व्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गेन साम्याभावाच्च। ननु- अनुभूतिपदेन वृत्तेः पक्षत्वे बाधः, तदन्यस्याश्रयासिद्धिरिति चेन्न, वृत्तेर्जडतया अप्रकाशत्वे प्रकाशत्वं यत्र विश्राम्यति तस्यैव पक्षत्वात्, प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायामेव वृत्त्यतिरिक्तानुभवस्य साधनाच्च। एवं च- त्वदीयापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वज्ञानं, त्वदीयापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वानधिकरणं, ज्ञानत्वात्, मदीयज्ञानवत्। विवादपदानि ज्ञानानि, घटज्ञानान्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वानधिकरणानि, ज्ञानत्वाद्, घटज्ञानवदित्यपि साधु। न च- त्वज्ज्ञानं, त्वदपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वे सति अवेद्यत्वानधिकरणं, ज्ञानत्वात्, मदीयज्ञानवत्। घटज्ञानं, पटज्ञानान्यत्वे सति चिदविषयत्वानधिकरणं, ज्ञानत्वात्, पटज्ञानवदिति। च यथायोग्यं प्रकरणसमतेति वाच्यम्, विपक्षे बाधकस्योक्तत्वेन स्थापनाया अधिकबलत्वात्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धावनुभूतेः स्वप्रकाशत्वोपपत्तिः। एवं च चिदभिन्नस्यात्मनोऽपि स्वप्रकाशत्वं चिद्रूपत्वात् साधनीयम्। यथा च नात्मनि चिद्रूपत्वासिद्धिः, तथोपपादितम्। उपपादयिष्यते च श्रुत्या। न च `विज्ञाता प्रज्ञाते'ति श्रुतिवविरोध, वक्ष्यमाणानेक श्रुतिविरोधेन तस्याः वृत्तिरूपज्ञानाश्रयत्वपरत्वात्। यत्तु विद्यसागरोक्तं `विमतं ज्ञानं भिन्नाश्रयविषयकं ज्ञानत्वात्, ज्ञानान्तरवत्। विमतं, न स्वाश्रयविषयकं, गुणत्वात्, अग्न्यौष्ण्यादिवदि'ति स्वप्रकाशत्वसाधनं, तत् पररीत्या। अस्मन्मते स्वप्रकाशे ज्ञानत्वस्यात्मन्यभावात् तादृग्ज्ञाने गुणत्वाभावाच्च, `मामहं जानामी'ति प्रत्यक्षस्य वृत्तिविषयतयोपपादितत्वेन विरोधाभावात्। न च- अज्ञान इव स्वाश्रयविषयत्वोपपत्त्या अप्रयोजकमिति वाच्यम्, वेद्यत्वे आत्मनो वेदनाभावादज्ञानदशायामात्मनि संशयविपर्ययव्यतिरेकनिर्णयप्रसङ्गात्। न चात्मन्यहमनहं वेति कश्चित्सन्दिग्धे, अन्य एवेति वा विपर्यस्यति। नाहमिति वा व्यतिरेकं निर्णयतीत्यस्वप्रकाशत्वे बाधकसत्त्वात्। न च- त्वन्मते सन्देहाद्यविषयस्याहमर्थस्यानात्मत्वात्तदन्यस्मिञ्छब्दैकगम्यात्मनि सन्देहादिसत्त्वादप्रयोजकत्वं तदवस्थमेवेति वाच्यम्, अहमर्थस्य चिदचिद्ग्रन्थिरूपतया अहंत्वावच्छेदेनाचिदंशे सन्देहाद्यभाववत् चिदंशेऽपि सन्देहाद्यभावात्। न च शब्दजान्तःकरणविषयतद्वृत्तौ व्यभिचारि ज्ञानत्वमिति- वाच्यम्, तस्य स्फुरणार्थकत्वात्। न च द्वितीयहेतोस्तेजोरूपस्य घट इव स्वाश्रयेऽपि तमोनिवर्तकतया तद्विषये व्यभिचारः, रूपस्य ज्ञानादिवत् सविषयत्वाभावात्। `अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योति'रित्यादिश्रुतिरप्यत्र प्रमाणम्। तथा हि- `अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्ये'त्यादिना `किं ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष' इत्यन्तेन ज्ञानसाधनालोकाद्यभावे जीवस्य कथं स्फुरणमित्युक्ते आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिः स्वयं ज्योतिरित्यादिना स्वातिरिक्तानपेक्षतया स्वप्रकाशत्वमुक्तम्। न चात्मशब्दस्य परमात्मपरत्वं पूर्ववाक्ये आत्मनि नाडीसम्बन्धप्रतिपादनात्। उत्तरवाक्ये च `कतम आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योति'रित्युत्तरवाक्यपर्यालोचनया संदंशन्यायेन जीवपरत्वात्। न च द्युभ्याद्यधिकरणन्यायेनात्मशब्दस्य तत्रैव मुख्यत्वम्, प्रधानाद्यनात्मनिराकरणार्थतया स्वशब्दादित्यात्मशब्दः। हेतुत्वेनोक्तेः, न तु मुख्यत्वाभिप्रायेण, जीवस्याप्रसक्तेः, मुख्यत्वस्योभयसाधारण्याच्च। अत एव- `अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वय'मित्युपसंहारस्य अस्येति पदानुषङ्गेण अयमीश्वरो जीवस्य स्वयमेव ज्योतिर्ज्ञानहेतुरित्येवं परत्वं- निरस्तम्, उक्तन्यायेन उपक्रमविरोधात्। न च- वाचैवायं ज्योतिषास्त इति ज्योतिःशब्दस्य वाचि ज्ञानसाधने प्रयोगादत्रत्यज्योतिःशब्दस्यापि ज्ञानसाधनपरत्वम्, न तु ज्ञानपरत्वमिति- वाच्यम्, लौकिकज्योतिषि रूढस्य ज्योतिःशब्दस्य वाचि ज्ञानसाधनत्वेन प्रवृत्तिवदत्रापि तमोविरोधित्वेन रूपेणाज्ञानविरोधिन्यपि प्रयोगसंभवात्। न च स्वप्रकाशपरत्वे सदा स्वप्रकाशत्वेन श्रुतावत्रेत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यम्। जाग्रदवस्थायामादित्यादिज्योतिः संभवेन दुर्विवेकतयास्यामवस्थायां सुविवेकतया अत्रेति विशेषणसाफल्यात्। न चास्येति षष्ठ्या विषयत्वाभिधानम्, स्वयंदासा इत्यादाविवानन्यवेद्यत्वपरत्वात्। न चामुख्यार्थत्वापत्तिः, मुख्यविषयासंभवेनेष्टत्वात्। न च प्रदीपादौ स्वविषयत्वेन स्वप्रकाशत्वव्यवहारः, सजातीयप्रकाशाप्रकाश्यप्रकाशत्वस्येव तत्रापि व्यवहारनिदानत्वात्। अत एव न घटादावप्रकाशे अतिप्रसङ्गः। विवरणानुमानानि च- आत्मा स्वप्रकाशः स्वसत्तायां प्रकाशव्यतिरेकविधुरत्वात्, प्रकाशाश्रयत्वात्, प्रकाशकर्तृत्वात्, प्रदीपवत्। ननु च- अवेद्यत्वं चेत् साध्यं, साध्यवैकल्यम्, सजातीयप्रकाशाप्रकाश्यत्वं चेदर्थान्तरम्, घटादाविवास्वप्रकाशत्वेऽप्युपपत्तेः, ज्ञानप्रभानुगतप्रकाशत्वासिद्धिश्च, ज्ञातैकसति दुःखादावाद्यहेतोर्व्यभिचारः, द्वितीयतृतीययोस्त्वन्मत आत्मनः प्रकाशत्वेनासिद्धिरिति चेन्न, स्वप्रकाश्यत्वस्य बाधिततया तदप्रकाश्यत्वेन पक्षस्य विशेषिततया वार्थान्तराभावात्। सजातीय प्रकाशाप्रकाश्यप्रकाशत्वमेव साध्यम्। एवं च न घटादिवदस्वप्रकाशत्वेनोपपत्तिः, स्वाप्रकाश्यसजातीयाप्रकाश्यत्वेनावेद्यत्वस्य लाभात्, विजातीयस्याप्रकाशत्वात्। ज्ञानप्रभानुगतं च प्रकाशत्वमावरणाभिभावकत्वम्। तच्च ज्ञानस्य चित्त्वेनान्यत्र तेजोविशेषत्वादिनेत्यन्यदेतत्। आवरणत्वं चाज्ञानतमसोः अर्थव्यवहारप्रति बन्धकत्वमनुगतमेव। तच्चाज्ञानस्य साक्षात् तमसो ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धद्वारेत्यन्यदेतत्। न च दुःखे व्यभिचारः, तस्याक्षणे प्रकाशव्यतिरेकसत्त्वात्, प्रकाशत्वेन विशेषणाच्च। नापि द्वितीयतृतीययोरसिद्धिः, पररीत्या तयोरुक्तेः, प्रतिबिम्बस्य बिम्बाधीनतया तदाश्रितत्वेन बिम्बज्ञानहेतुत्वोपपत्तेश्च। अत एवात्मा स्वानन्तरोत्पत्तिकप्रकाशाश्रयो न, प्रकाशाश्रयत्वादादित्यवदित्यपि साधु। न च सिद्धसाधनम्, घटादिविषयकज्ञानस्य त्वयापि जन्यत्वस्वीकारात्। आनन्दबोधोक्तं च- विवादाध्यासिता संवित्, स्वसमानाश्रयस्वसमानकाल स्वगोचरज्ञानविरहप्रयुक्तव्यवहारविरहवती न भवति, संवित्त्वादनन्तरव्यवहिनयमाणसंविद्वत्। न च- स्ववेद्यत्वेनोपपत्त्या सिद्धसाधनम्, अस्य परवेद्यताङ्गीकर्तृविषयत्वात्, स्वाविषयत्वरूपपक्षविशेषणमहिम्ना तवानभिमतपर्यवसानात्। अवेद्यत्वं तु ब्रह्मणः श्रुतिसिद्धमेव। न च साकल्येनावेद्यत्वपरा, सङ्कोचे कारणाभावात्। एतेन ज्ञाततालिङ्गानुमेयत्वे `अहं सुखी'तिवद् अहं जनामीति परोक्षानुभवविरोधः। गुरुमते अयं घट इत्यस्य जन्यस्यैव स्वविषयत्वे स्वजनकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः, व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययोः पार्थक्यानुभवविरोधश्च। न्यायमते अनुव्यवसायस्यापि परवेद्यत्वे ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षात्मविशेषगुणत्वेन इच्छादिवदवश्यवेद्यत्वात् ज्ञानधारानुभवापत्तिः, विच्छेदे चरमस्य निष्प्रामाणिकत्वापत्तिः, सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेरभावात्। एवं च व्यवसायसुखादिगोचरं स्वविषयं नित्यमेव ज्ञानं सिध्यति। स्वविषयतायां च न स्वजनकसन्निकर्षाद्यपेक्षा सन्निकर्षाद्यनपेक्षेश्वरसर्वविषयनित्यज्ञानवत्। तथा चैवं प्रयोगः- `चैत्रसुखदुःखादिकं, चैत्रीयनित्यापरोक्षज्ञानविषयः, तं प्रति ज्ञातैकसत्त्वाद्, यद्यं प्रति ज्ञातैकसत्, तत् तं प्रति तादृग्भानविषयः, यथेश्वरप्रयत्न'इति नित्यज्ञानसिद्धौ `तत् स्वविषयम्, नित्यज्ञानत्वात्, स्वव्यवहारे अन्यानपेक्षत्वात्, स्वसंशयादिविरोधित्वाच्च, ईश्वरज्ञानवद्'- इति। तस्मादात्मनो नित्यगुणभूतं ज्ञानं स्वविषयत्वरूपस्वप्रकाशत्ववद्, आत्मापि, तद्विषयः, यावद्द्रव्यभाविना तेनाभिन्नत्वात्, मामहं जानामीत्यनुभवाद्, `आत्मस्वरूपा संवित् स्वविषया, स्वजन्यव्यवहारविषयत्वात्'। `उक्ता संवित्, स्वविषयिणी, स्वसमानाधिकरणस्वत्वप्रकारकस्वविशेष्यकसंशयविरोधित्वात् उक्तविशेषणवद्विपर्यय विरोधित्वाद्वा' इति- निरस्तम्। आद्यानुमाने साक्षिरूपापरोक्षनित्यज्ञानविषयत्वेन सिद्धसाधनम्, सहोत्पन्नज्ञानेनापि ज्ञातैकसत्त्वोपपत्त्या ज्ञानगतनित्यतात्पर्यन्तसाधने तस्यासामर्थ्यं च। न च चैत्रस्य तादृग्ज्ञानाभावे सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शानुपपत्तिः, संस्कारेण तदुपपत्तेः, नित्यज्ञानस्य परामर्शविरोधित्वाच्च। स्वविषयत्वानुमाने च दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः, ईश्वरेऽपि स्वविषयकनित्यज्ञानासिद्धेः अप्रयोजकत्वं च, स्वाविषयत्वेऽपि व्यवहारादेरुपपादितत्वात्। किं च चैत्रनित्यज्ञानस्य स्वविषयत्वे नैकं नियामकम्, ईश्वरज्ञानस्य न्यायमते वस्तुत्ववत् सर्वविषयत्वोपपत्तेः, नाप्यभेदः, दुःखादावभावात्। नापि समानाधिकरणत्वम्, आत्मन्यभावाद्, धर्मादौ तत्सद्भावाच्चेत्यननुगतमेव वाच्यम्। तथा च किमपराद्धं व्यवसायस्वप्रकाशत्ववादिना गुरुणा ? अन्यत्र सन्निकर्षस्य नियामकत्वेऽपि स्वस्मिन्नभेदस्य संभवात्। पार्थक्यानुभवाननुभवरूपस्यानुभवकलहस्य त्वन्मत समानत्वात्। तस्माद्व्यवहार एवाननुगतं कारणमस्तु। तत्प्रयोजकानुगमार्थं किमिति निर्बन्धः ? पश्चादप्यननुगम एव पर्यवसानात्। एवं च न स्वविषयत्वरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वं, किंत्ववेद्यत्वे सत्यपरीक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वमिति सिद्धम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ आत्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वोपपत्तिः।। 12 ।। 13. अवाच्यत्वभङ्गः निर्धर्मकतया अवेद्यतया च ब्रह्म आनन्दादिपदलक्ष्यं, न वाच्यम्, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताभावादिति। ननु- अवाच्यशब्देनोच्यते चेद्, वाच्यत्वसिद्धिः, लक्ष्यते चेद्, अवाच्यरूपमुख्यार्थस्याभावात् कथं लक्षणा ? भावे वा ब्रह्म नावाच्यं, किन्तु तीरवदवाच्यरूपमुख्यार्थसंबन्धिमात्रमिति स्यात्। मुख्यार्थहीनस्यापि ब्रह्मलक्षकत्वे घटपदमपि घटलक्षकं स्यादिति- चेन्न, अवाच्यरूपमुख्यार्थाभावेऽपि नञ्समभिव्याहृतवाच्यशब्देन वाच्यत्वात्यन्ताभावबोधनद्वारा स्वरूपे लक्षणयैव पर्यवसानात्। एवं निर्विशेषपदमपि, अखण्डपदलक्षकतायामेव मुख्यार्थावश्यम्भावनियमात्। ननु- एवं लक्ष्यपदेनापि लक्ष्यत्वे तीरस्यागङ्गात्ववत् ब्रह्मणोऽलक्ष्यत्वापत्तिरिति चेन्न, इष्टत्वात्, सर्वथा निर्धर्मकत्वात्, लक्ष्यव्यवहारस्य च वाच्यत्वाभावनिबन्धनत्वात्, तथा प्रतिपादिकं प्राक्। न चैवं लक्ष्यत्वाभावेन वाच्यत्वव्यवहारप्रसङ्गः, गौणस्य तस्यापीष्टत्वात् सत्यज्ञानादिपदानां च कल्पितधर्मवाचिनां ब्रह्मरूपव्यक्तिलक्षकतयाऽखण्डार्थत्वानपायात्। न च- सत्त्वादिधर्माश्रयतया लक्ष्यत्वाभावे मञ्चसंबन्धित्वमात्रेण लक्ष्यस्य पुंसः अमञ्चत्ववत् सत्त्वादिसंबन्धित्वमात्रेण लक्ष्यस्य ब्रह्मणः असत्त्वाद्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, कल्पितचन्द्रत्वादिजातेः परमार्थचन्द्रादिव्यक्तितादात्म्येनाचन्द्रत्वा भाववदत्रापि सत्त्वाद्यभावानापत्तेः। तदुक्तम्- `लक्ष्यव्यक्तिरपि ब्रह्मे'ति। अत एव- स्वप्रकाशादेरब्रह्मत्वे यद्यद्, ब्रह्मतयेष्टं, तत्तदब्रह्मेति साधु समर्थितो ब्रह्मवाद इति निरस्तम्। यत्तु निर्वशेषादिपदानां च समासपदतया लक्ष्यादिपदानां यौगिकतया वाक्यतुल्यत्वान्न वाचकतेति वक्तुमशक्यम्, अन्विताभिधानपक्षे तेषामपि वाचकत्वाद्, अभिहितान्वयपक्षेऽपि वाक्य एवाभिहितान्वयस्वीकारेण प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोरन्विताभिधायकत्वाद् वाक्यतुल्यस्यापि वाचकत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः पदार्थसंसर्गरूपत्वे सखण्डत्वापत्त्या पदार्थत्वे वाच्यत्वापरिहारादिति। तन्न। पदलक्ष्यत्वेऽप्यपदार्थत्वोपपत्तेः, अकण्डत्वेऽपि वाक्यार्थत्वस्योपपादितत्वादन्विताभिधाने अन्वितवाचकस्यापि स्वरूपे लक्षणाङ्गीकारात्। न च तर्ह्यवाच्यत्वासिद्धिः, अखण्डब्रह्मसिद्ध्युपायत्वेन प्राप्तस्यावाच्यत्वादेः निवारकाभावेनानुषङ्गिकतया सिद्धेः। `यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते, अशब्दमस्पर्श'मित्यादि श्रुतयश्चात्रानुसन्धेयाः, अवाच्यशब्दवदशब्दशब्देऽपि व्याघाताभावात्। न चेयं श्रुतिरद्भुतत्वाभिप्राया, श्रूयमाणार्थत्वे बाधकाभावात्। न च `यतो वाच' इत्यत्रापि मनसा सहेति श्रुतमतो वृत्तेरिवान्तःकरणवृत्तिव्याप्ते ब्रह्मणि वाग्वृत्तेरपि सर्वथा निषेधायोगः, लक्षणायाः स्वीकारेण शक्तिमात्रस्यैव निराकरणात्। न च आनन्दाद्यनेकपदामुख्यार्थत्वापेक्षया निवर्तन्त इत्येकपदार्थामुख्यत्वमेव युक्तमिति- वाच्यम्, ब्रह्मणो निर्धर्मकतया तत्र शक्त्यभावेन बहुत्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वाद्वाच्यत्वविरोध्यर्थद्वारैवाखण्डार्थपरतया तद्विरोधतादवस्थ्यात्। अत एव कस्मादुच्यते परं ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुतेः परमात्मेति चाप्युक्त इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च तत्तच्छब्दबोध्यत्वमात्रेण वाच्यत्वाभिलापः, न तु शक्यत्वाभिप्रायेणेति ताभ्यां न विरोधः। तात्पर्यविषयो ब्रह्म वाच्यं वस्तुत्वाल्लक्ष्यत्वाच्च तीरवदिति चेत्, निर्धर्मकतया वाच्यत्वबाधात्, तदुन्नीतसधर्मकत्वाद्युपाधिसंभवाच्च। परमार्थसत्यपदादिकं कस्यचिद्वाचकम्, पदत्वादित्यपि न, किमत्र पदत्वम् ? न तावत्सुप्तिङन्तत्वम्, समासपदस्याशक्तत्वेन राजपुरुषादौ व्यभिचारात्, नापि शक्तत्वम्, साध्याविशेषाद्, अवयवद्वारा समासपदस्य वाचकत्वं चेद्, इष्टमेव। नापि सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यं वाच्यार्थतात्पर्यवच्छब्दयुक्तं वाक्यत्वादित्यपि, विषं भुङ्क्ष्वेत्यादौ व्यभिचारात्। ननु- अवाच्यत्वे लक्ष्यत्वानुपपत्तिः, वाच्यार्थसंबन्धित्वेन ज्ञातस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वात्, तज्ज्ञानं च न शब्दभिन्नेन, उपनिषन्मात्रगम्यत्वात्, नापि स्वप्रकाशतया, नित्यसिद्धे शब्दवैयर्थ्यात्। अवाच्यशब्दस्य च लक्षकस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वात्तत्रापि वाच्यसंबन्धित्वेन ज्ञेयत्वे अनवस्थेति चेन्न, तथा ज्ञानमुपस्थितावुपयोगि। ब्रह्म स्वप्रकाशतया स्वत एवोपस्थितमिति किं तेन ? न चैवं शब्दवैयर्थ्यम् आवरणाभिभावकवृत्तावुपयोगात्। अत एव नानवस्था। तस्मात् प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य दुर्निरूपत्वादवाच्यत्वम्। तदुक्तम्- दृष्टा गुणक्रियाजातिसंबन्धाः शब्दहेतवः। नात्मन्यन्यतमो ह्येषां तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते।। इति। न चारोपितगुणाश्रयतया वाच्यता, तस्य तात्पर्याविषयतया तात्पर्यविषये अवाच्यत्वस्य स्थितत्वात्। न च सत्यादिपदानां लक्षकत्वे सिद्धे निमित्ताभावः, तस्मिंश्च लक्षकत्वमिति परस्पराश्रयः, निर्विशेषवाक्येन नेति नेतीत्यनेनैव निमित्ताभावस्य सिद्धत्वात्। न च- निर्विशेषवाक्यस्य स्वरूपमात्रपरत्वे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताविरोधः, निर्विशेषत्वविशिष्टपरत्वे च तस्यैव सत्त्वेन निर्विशेषपदवाच्यत्वस्यैव प्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्, द्वारतया उपस्थितस्य स्वपरविरोधित्वान्निर्विशेषस्य वाच्यत्वासंभवाच्च। तस्मान्निर्विशेषत्वादेव जीवब्रह्माभेदः सिद्धः, भेदकासंभवात्। तथा च। ब्रह्मण्यवाच्ये यो विद्वान्वाच्यतामधिगच्छति। स निस्त्रपो निमित्तानां विरहैः प्रतिबोध्यताम्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणः शब्दावाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः।। 13 ।। 14. सामान्यतो भेदखण्डनोद्धारः स्यादेतद्- इदमयुक्तम्, भेदस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्। न च- भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वे अनपेक्षत्वापत्त्या धर्मत्वम्, तथा चानवस्था, स्तम्भकुम्भयोः परस्परभेदग्रहोऽन्योन्यभेदग्रहसापेक्ष इति अन्योन्याश्रयश्च, एवं च भेदासिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, तत् किं भेदे प्रतीतिरेव नास्ति ? कारणाजन्या वा ? बाध्यविषया वा ? नाद्यः, विकल्पादिकरणरूप व्यवहारविप्लवापत्तेः, न हि भिन्नतया अज्ञातेन विकल्पः। न द्वितीयः, अकारणकोत्पत्तेर्व्याहतत्वेन नित्यत्वापत्त्या तन्निरासकमोक्षोपायाननुसारणापत्तेः। न तृतीयः, उक्तशुष्कतर्कस्याबाधकत्वात्। अन्यथा ऐक्यस्य स्वरूपत्वे अनपेक्षत्वापत्तिः, धर्मत्वे अद्वैतहानिरित्यादिना ऐक्यबुद्धिरपि बाधितविषया स्यात्। न च- मम वैतण्डिकस्य परमक्षमात्रं खण्डनीयमिति- वाच्यम्, स्वपक्षसत्त्वेऽपि तव तथात्वे ममापि तथात्वाविरोधात्। न च मम परपक्षखण्डनमात्रेण स्वमतभूतैक्यसिद्धिः, ममापि तावन्मात्रेण स्वमतभूतभेदसिद्धिसंभवात्। न च- मां प्रति भेदखण्डनमात्रनियोगे ममैव वैतण्डिकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, मां प्रत्यप्यैक्यखण्डनमात्रनियोगसंभवात् मध्यस्थस्य त्वदनधीनत्वात्। अस्वव्याघातकैरेव त्वयैक्यं दूष्यमिति यदा, तदा अस्वव्याघातकैरेव त्वया भेदो दूष्य इत्यपि स्यादिति- चेत्, मैवम्, न हि वयं भेदप्रतीतेः स्वरूपं कारणं वापलपामः। किन्तु बाधितविषयत्वं ब्रूमः, व्याप्तिसध्रीचीनतया अशुष्कस्तर्कैरेवानन्यपरया श्रुत्या स्मृत्या च भेदस्य बाधितत्वात्, विषयभेदादिना प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्य परिहृतत्वेन श्रुत्यादावुपचरितार्थत्वाभावात्। यत्त्वभेदस्याप्येवं निरासः। न चाभेदखण्डनयुक्तीनां स्वस्य स्वाभेदोऽपि सिध्येदिति स्वव्याघातादाभासता, भेदखण्डनयुक्तीनामपि भूषणयुक्त्यभेदेन स्वव्याघातकतायाः समानत्वादिति, तन्न, भेदखण्डनयुक्तीनां तत्त्वतो भेदनिवारकत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकभेदस्यानिराकरणेन स्वाव्याघातकतोपपत्तेः। न चैवं ब्रह्मण्यनृतभेदस्य तत्त्वतो निषेधे तत्र तत्तादात्म्यापत्तिः, घटे कल्पितघटान्तरभेदभ्रमस्थले तत्तादात्म्यादर्शनात्। न चैवमभेदोऽपि तत्त्वतो निषेध्यः, तर्हि स्वरूपापर्यवसानेन शून्यवादापत्तेः। किञ्च ब्रह्मातिरिक्तमैक्यमस्माकं नास्त्येव। तस्य च तथा निषेधे श्रुतिविरोधः। न च- मम घटातिरिक्तो भेदो नास्ति, तस्य निषेधे प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति- वाच्यम्, प्रत्यक्षस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाविषयत्वेनाविरोधित्वस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वात्। ननु- भेदबाधकं न भेदविषयमेव, तत्साधकतापत्तेः, नाप्यभेदविषयम्, एवं हि तदन्यः तद्विरोधि तदभावो वा नञर्थो विषयो वाच्यः। सर्वथा च भेदो दुष्परिहरः, तदनन्यत्वे तद्विरोधतदभावत्वयोरयोगाद्, भेदाभावग्राहिणापि प्रतियोगिविलक्षणतयैवाभावस्य ग्रहणाच्च, औदासीन्येन प्रवृत्तस्य इदमिति ज्ञानवदबाधकत्वाच्चेति- चेन्न, पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण भेदाभावविषयस्यैव बाधकत्वात्। न च भेदे दुष्परिहरता, व्यावहारिकभेदेनैव व्यावहारिकतद्विरोधित्वतदभावत्वयोरुपपत्ति संभवात्, `यक्षानुरूपो बलिरिति न्यायात्। भेदभ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वगोचरं ज्ञानं भ्रमबाधकमित्युपपन्नम्, उक्तरीत्या भेदवैलक्षण्येन तद्ग्रहणोपपत्तेः। यत्तु `नायं भेदो नास्त्यत्र भेदोऽन्यदेव भेदात्मना प्रत्यभा'दित्येवमाकारकं बाधकज्ञानं वाच्यम् `नेदं रजत'मिति वत्, इदं च सर्वथा भेदावगाहीति कथं तत्र बाधकमिति, तन्न, प्रतियोगितया तद्ग्रहणस्य तद्बाधकत्वाविरोधित्वात्। न च- अत्र भेदो नास्तीति धीः सर्वथा न भेदाभावमवगाहत इति- वाच्यम्, अन्यत्र भेदसत्त्वे तद्भेदस्यात्रावश्यकत्वेनात्र भेदो नास्तीत्यस्यैव कुत्रापि नास्तीत्यत्र पर्यवसानाद् एकमेव नानात्मना अभादित्यादि बाधकमनुसन्धेयम्। कोट्योर्व्यावहारिकभेदेन तद्वत्तया ग्रहणाच्च यथा बाधकत्वयोगः, तथोक्तमेव। एतेन- भेदाद् भिन्नतया स्वार्थं बाधधीर्गाहते न वा। आद्ये भेदः स्थिरः, अन्त्ये तु न सा स्यात् भेदबाधिका।। इति- निरस्तम्, स्वरूपेण स्थैर्येऽपि तत्त्वतोऽस्थिरत्वसंभवात्। एवं चाक्लृप्त विषयत्वादन्योन्याश्रयत्वादेरुत्त्थानम्, उत्थितस्य च नाभासत्वम्। किं चायं देश्याभासो निर्वचनवादिनः प्रति, नास्मान्। वयं हि भासमानो यो भेदः स स्वरूपादिपक्षान्तर्भावबहिर्भावाभ्यां वा अन्येन वा धर्मान्तरेणानिर्वाच्य इति ब्रूमः। न च तर्काभासेनानिर्वाच्यत्वे ऐक्यस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गः, भेदबाधकस्यानाभासताया उक्तत्वाद्, ऐक्यभेदयोः श्रुत्यनुग्रहाननुग्रहाभ्यां विशेषाच्च। ननु- ब्रह्मण्यनृतादिव्यावृत्तिः ब्रह्मज्ञानाबाध्या वाच्या, शून्याद्यनात्मकघाटदौ शून्यादितः स्वज्ञानाबाध्यभेददर्शनादिति- चेत्, ब्रह्मघटयोरधिष्ठनाध्यस्तत्वाभ्यां विशेषाद्, अनृतत्वस्य मृषात्वेन तद्व्यावृत्तेरपि मृषात्वस्य युक्तत्वेन घटे तज्ज्ञानबाध्यत्वस्य उभयोः समानत्वात्। न च- एवं प्रातिभासिकरूप्यादिव्यावृत्तेरपि प्रातिभासिकत्वापत्तिः, तथा च भ्रान्तिबाधव्यवस्था न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, विशेषदर्शनजन्यत्व तदजन्यत्वाभ्यां बाधभ्रान्तिव्यवस्थोपपत्त्या प्रातिभासिकत्वस्येष्टत्वात्। न चैवं सत्यादिवाक्यस्यानृतव्यावृत्तिबोधकस्याप्रामाण्यापत्तिः, तस्या आर्थत्वात्। न च- एवं व्यावृत्तिवन्मृषाप्रतियोगिकस्यात्यन्ताभावस्यापि मृषात्वेनाधिष्ठानज्ञानाबाध्यात्यन्ताभाव प्रतियोगित्वरूपमिथ्यात्वं न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, अधिष्ठानज्ञानबाध्यत्वस्य तत्राविशेषणत्वात्। न च- एवमात्मनि देहभेदस्य बाध्यत्वे देहात्मैक्यस्य मिथ्यात्वं न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, भेदमिथ्यात्वस्य प्रतियोग्यैक्यामिथ्यात्वाप्रयोजकत्वस्योक्तत्वात्। न च- नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्य साधनचतुष्टयान्तर्गतस्य ज्ञानं भ्रमः स्यात्, तथा च तेनानित्यपरिहारेण नित्ये प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, हानोपादानोपयुक्तरूपावगाहिबुद्धेर्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यशालितया व्यवहारिकहानोपादानस्य निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात्। एतेन- प्रपञ्चे सद्वैलक्षण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वे सदैक्यापत्तिः, जगन्मिथ्यात्वप्रमाणानां चातत्त्वावेदकत्वापात इति- निरस्तम्, मिथ्यात्वनिरुक्तावुक्तोत्तरत्वाच्च। एतेन- भेदादभेदस्य भेदाभावे अन्यतरखण्डनसाधनाभ्यामुभयखण्डनसाधने इति- निरस्तम्, तात्त्विकभेदाभावेऽपि कल्पितभेदेन व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। न च कल्पितेनाकल्पितकार्यप्रतिबन्धायोगः, अविद्यया स्वप्रकाशरूपब्रह्मकार्यप्रतिबन्धदर्शनात्, कल्पितकान्तया विश्लेषकार्यप्रतिबन्धदर्शनाच्च। ननु- भेदस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वार्थमपि त्वया अन्योन्याश्रयादिकमुद्धरणीयम्, परस्परसापेक्षेण व्यवहारस्याप्यभावात्, न हि व्यावहारिकमृदः स्वजन्यघटसापेक्षत्वम्। किं चात्र (1) न भेदमात्रेण तद्दर्शनमात्रेण वा अन्योन्याश्रयाद्यापादनम्, तथा सति व्यावहारिकयोरपि तयोरसिद्धिः स्यात्। (2) नापि तत्प्रतीतिवास्तवत्वेन तदापत्तिः, चरमवृत्त्यवास्तवत्वेऽपि तद्विषयवास्तवत्ववदुपपत्तेः वास्तवे अन्योन्याश्रयादर्शनेन व्याप्त्यसिद्धेश्च। (3) न च प्रमारूपतत्प्रतीत्या तदापादनम्, प्रतीति सामान्य एव त्वयान्योन्याश्रयस्योक्तत्वेन प्रमात्वपर्यन्ते तत्र दोषाभावात्। (4) नापि तत्प्रतीतेर्धर्मिप्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वेन तदापादनम्, तावतापि तत्सापेक्षतामात्रस्यैव निवृत्तिरिति- चेन्न, अस्माकमविद्यासामर्थ्यात् सर्वानुपपत्तिविधूननोपपत्तेः। न हि मायायामसंभावनीयं नाम। तथा च परस्पराश्रितमपि इन्द्रजालवद्दर्शयिष्यति। न च- ईश्वरसामर्थ्यात्तादृशमपि सत्यं स्यादिति वाच्यम्, उभयसिद्धमृषाभूतेन्द्रजालस्थले कारणादिव्यवस्थोल्लङ्घिकार्यादिदर्शनवदन्यत्र तथा अदर्शनात्, दर्शने च मृषात्व एव पर्यवसानात्। आपादनं च- भेदस्तत्प्रतीतिश्च यदि मायिकी न स्यात्, सर्वव्यवस्थोल्लङ्घिनी न स्यात्, सर्वव्यवस्थोल्लङ्घिनी चेयम्। तस्मान्मायिकीति विपर्ययपर्यवसानात्, मायिके व्यवस्थोल्लङ्घनस्य दर्शनेन व्याप्तिसिद्धिः। उक्तश्रुत्या अस्वव्याघातकयुक्त्या च भेदस्य बाधादभेदस्याबाधाच्च स्वाभेदस्वभेदयोर्व्यावहारिकत्वे समानेऽपि स्वाभेदं परित्यज्य भेद एव सर्वथा प्रद्वेषो नाकारणकः। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ सामान्यतो भेदखण्डनम्।। 14 ।। 15. विशिष्य भेदखण्डनोद्धारः ननु निरपेक्षस्वरूपत्वे सापेक्षत्वानुपपत्तिरिति यदुक्तं, तत्ताबदयुक्तम्, अविद्यानिवृत्तेर्जीवब्रह्मैक्यस्य च तव मते मतद्वयेऽपि स्थितौ व्यक्तिसापेक्षस्य जातिमात्रस्य प्रतीतौ सापेक्षस्य नीलतरत्वादेरिवार्थप्रकाशात्मकज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मणि ब्रह्माभेदस्य `अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कालसापेक्षस्यास्तित्वस्य निरपेक्षब्रह्मव्यक्त्यादिरूपताया दर्शनादिति- चेन्न, अविद्यानिवृत्तिजीवब्रह्मैक्ययोः प्रतीतौ सापेक्षत्वस्याविद्यकतया तात्त्विकनिरपेक्षत्वविरोधित्वाभावात्। जातिमात्रस्य व्यक्त्यभेदासिद्धेः, व्यक्तिसमानसत्ताकघटत्वादौ तदभावाद्, व्यक्त्यसमानसत्ताकसत्तादिजातौ तु सापेक्षत्वस्य काल्पनिकत्वात् नीलरत्वादेर्व्यक्तिरूपत्वासिद्धौ हेतोरभावादर्थप्रकाशात्मकज्ञानस्य ब्रह्माभेदस्य च सापेक्षतायाः काल्पनिकत्वात्। अस्ति ब्रह्मेत्यादावप्येवमेव। तथा च तत्त्वतो निरपेक्षस्य सामानाधिकरण्यासिद्ध्या न तर्काभासताव्याप्तिसिद्धिः। अत एव- ऐक्यस्यास्वरूपत्वे अद्वैतहानिः मिथ्यात्वे भेदस्य सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गः, यत्र यदध्यस्तं, तत्र तद्विरोधि तज्ज्ञानाबाध्यम्, यथा शुक्तावरूप्यत्वम्। यत्र यदैक्यं बाध्यं, तत्र तद्भेदस्तज्ज्ञानाबाध्यः। यथा दूरस्थवनस्पत्योर्भेद इति वा। यत्र यदध्यस्तं तत्र तद्विरोधि तात्त्विकम्, यथा ब्रह्मण्यनृतत्वस्याध्यस्तत्वे सत्यत्वं तात्त्विकमिति वा व्याप्तेरिति- निरस्तम्, ऐक्यस्य ब्रह्मभेदानङ्गीकारात्, विरोध्यनुरोधिनां सर्वेषां ब्रह्मणि कल्पितत्वेन तज्ज्ञानबाध्यत्वेन व्याप्तीनामसिद्धेः। ननु- ऐक्यस्य निरपेक्षत्वे तत्त्वंपदार्थपराणां `सत्यं विज्ञानघन' इत्यादीनामैक्य परमहावाक्यैकवाक्यत्वाभावेन वैयर्थ्यं स्यादिति- चेन्न, ऐक्यस्य स्वप्रकाशब्रह्माभिन्नतया स्थितिप्रतीत्यादौ निरपेक्षत्वेऽपि यथा लक्ष्यार्थभेदभ्रमनिवर्तकवृत्तिजनने पदार्थसापेक्षतया स्वरूपपरवाक्यानामेकवाक्यतायाः सत्त्वात्, भेदरूपप्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वेन तत्र सापेक्षत्वव्यवहारात्। न च घटः पटो नेति नञर्थस्य भेदस्येव तादात्म्यनिषेधरूपत्वेन वैपरीत्यम्, तादात्म्यस्य तन्निष्ठासाधारणधर्मरूपत्वे भेदस्याभेदानपेक्षत्वात्, अभेदरूपत्वे भेदसापेक्षत्वेनैव तस्य तदनपेक्षत्वात्। न चैतावता ऐक्यस्य सापेक्षत्वापत्तिः, काल्पनिकस्येष्टत्वात्। अत एव- अज्ञानहानिवद् ब्रह्मरूपधीवदभेदवत्स्वरूपत्वेऽपि भेदस्य सापेक्षत्वं हि युज्यत इति- निरस्तम्, तव सापेक्षत्वयोस्तात्त्विकतया दृष्टान्तवैषम्यात्। न च भेदेऽप्येवमेवास्तु, भेदस्य निषेधप्रतियोगितया श्रुतत्वेन ब्रह्मरूपत्वाभावात्। न च तत्राभेदश्रुतिरस्ति। एतेन- स्वरूपेण निरपेक्षस्याप्यभेदस्याभेदत्वेन सापेक्षत्ववत् स्वरूपेण निरपेक्षस्यापि घटस्य भेदत्वेन सापेक्षत्वमस्तु, अवच्छेदकभेदेन सप्रतियोगित्वाप्रतियोगित्वे अपि यथा तद्वदिति- निरस्तम्, भेदस्य स्वरूपतो निरपेक्षत्वे निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वे च परान् प्रतीव स्वमपि प्रति अविशिष्टतया स्वव्याघातः। न चैवमभेदस्यापि स्वान् प्रतीव परान् प्रति तथा सति तथात्वापत्तिः, इष्टापत्तेः। घटत्वादिना भेदः परं कल्पितः, स्वरूपतस्त्वभेद एव। तथा सति परत्वं परं व्याहतम्, न स्वरूपत्वमपि। यत्तु सप्रतियोगिकत्वनिष्प्रतियोगिकत्वव्यवस्था तु यदसाधारण्येन स्ववाचकप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तावच्छेदेन प्रतीतौ प्रतियोगिप्रतीति सापेक्षम् तत्सप्रतियोगिकम्, अन्यत्तु निष्प्रतियोगिकमिति, तन्न, भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वे तदन्यत्वासिद्धेः। एतेन- एकस्यार्थस्य लघुत्वकठिनत्वादिना उल्लेखेन निरपेक्षत्वेऽपि अगुरुत्वाद्रवत्वादिना उल्लेखेन सापेक्षत्वमपि यथा, तथा घट इत्युल्लेखेन निरपेक्षस्यापि भेद इत्युल्लेखे सापेक्षत्वोपपत्तिरिति- निरस्तम्, शब्दानुल्लेखेऽपि सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोरनुभवाच्च, लयादिवत् नञनुल्लेखमात्रेण दृष्टान्तासम्प्रतिपत्तेश्च। न च- एकस्यैव गमनस्य गच्छतिचलति शब्दोल्लेखाभ्यामेकस्यैव च प्रयत्नस्य करोति प्रवर्तत इति शब्दोल्लेखाभ्यां कर्मसापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वयोः शब्दस्वभावप्रयुक्तिदर्शनादत्रापि घटभेदशब्दोल्लेखेन सापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वे स्यातामिति- वाच्यम्, अर्थगतसकर्मकत्वादीनां शब्दस्वभावानधीनत्वात्। प्रत्युत एकस्मिन्नेव तपधातावर्थभेदेन तयोर्दर्शनात् तपति ऋषिस्तपति पृथिवीं सविते'त्यादौ। एवं च दृष्टान्तेष्वर्थभेद एव, फलं धात्वर्थ इति मते संयोगरूपार्थभेदात्। मतान्तरे तूत्तरसंयोगावच्छिन्नस्पन्दस्य गम्यर्थत्वं, पूर्वविभागफलकस्पन्दस्य चलत्यर्थत्वम्, अनुकूलयत्नस्य करोत्यर्थत्वं, यत्नमात्रस्य यत्यर्थत्वमिति। न च- भेदत्वमेव सापेक्षम्, न तु भेद इति- वाच्यम्, सापेक्षतया विशेष्यस्यैवानुभवाद्, अन्यथा घटप्रतियोगिकं भेदत्वमित्युल्लेखः स्यात्। एतेन- `भावाभावस्वरूपत्वान्नान्योन्यभावता पृथक्' इत्युक्तेः न स्वरूपमात्रं भेदः, किंत्वन्योन्याभावः, स च वस्तुनः सविशेषाभिन्न इत्युक्तेश्च घटादिरेव भावाभावरूपतया भेद इति निरस्तम्, घटतदभावस्थले भावत्वाभावत्वयोर्विरुद्धत्वेन कल्पनात् कथं तदाश्रयैक्यम् ? न च अविद्यानिवृत्त्यद्वैतयोरपि कथं ब्रह्मैक्यमिति- वाच्यम्, अस्मन्मते तत्राभावत्वस्य कल्पितत्वेन मायिकतया विरोधाभावात्, तव तु द्वयोरपि तात्त्विकत्वेन विरोधस्य दुष्परिहरत्वात्। अत एव- तत्तादात्म्यायोग्यत्वं वा तदैक्यप्रमित्यविषयत्वं वा, यत्र यद्दर्शनं तत्र तत्तादात्म्याध्यासविरोधितत्वं वा, स्ववृत्तियत्किञ्चिद्धर्मानाधारनिष्ठ यत्किञ्चिद्धर्मानाधारत्वस्वरूपं वा स्वावृत्तियत्किञ्चिद्धर्माधारानिष्ठधर्माधारत्व रूपं वा स्वरूपत्वं तद्भेदत्वम्, अनाधारत्वं चाधारत्वराहित्यम्, न त्वाधारादन्यत्वमिति नान्योन्याश्रय इति- निरस्तम्, स्वरूपत्वे सापेक्षत्वानुपपत्तेः, अतिरेके अनवस्थानाद्, अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोरैक्यापत्तेः, प्रमितिदर्शनादिघटितत्वेन चक्षुराद्यगम्यातापत्तेश्च। किञ्च भेदस्य घटस्वरूपत्वे तन्निरूपकप्रतियोगिनोऽपि तत्स्वरूपतापत्तिः, न हि भेदरूपमात्रं घटः, किन्तु पटप्रतियोगिकभेदरूप इति। ननु नायं दोषः, भेदप्रतियोगिन उपलक्षणत्वेन स्वरूपतायामनन्वयाद्, अन्यथा दुःखनिवृत्तेः पुमर्थतया दुःखस्यापि पुमर्थत्वं, दोषाभावस्य साधकताप्रयोजकत्वे दोषस्यापि सधाकताप्रयोजकत्वम्, अनृतव्यावृत्त्यज्ञाननिवृत्त्योरज्ञानादिप्रकाशरूपज्ञानस्य च ब्रह्मरूपत्वे अनृतादीनामपि तद्रूपत्वम्, अज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्मोक्षत्वे अज्ञानस्य च मोक्षत्वं च स्यात्। न च लम्बकर्णादौ कर्णादेर्विशेषणतयान्वयदर्शनादत्रापि तथा, चित्रग्वादिषु अनन्वयात्तथैव किं न स्यात् ? अन्यथोदाहृतस्थले अगतेः। न च प्रतियोगिन उपलक्षणत्वे तदज्ञानेऽपि काकाज्ञाने गृहज्ञानवत्तज्ज्ञानापत्तिः, इष्टापत्तेः, अन्यथोदाहृतागतेश्च। केचितु प्रतियोगिनोऽनन्वयेऽपि `शब्दः अनित्य' इत्यादौ शब्दत्वादेर्विशेषणत्वमिवात्रापि विशेषणत्वमित्याहुरिति- चेन्न, न हि वयं पटभेदो घटस्वरूपमित्यन्वयप्रविष्टत्वेन प्रतियोगितया निरूपकत्वमात्रेण वा पटस्य घटरूपतामापादयामः, किन्तु समानाधिकरणप्रतीतिविषयस्वरूपं प्रति प्रतियोगितया निरूपकत्वेन, अभेदनिरूपकप्रतियोगिवत्। न चाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यादयः समानाधिकरणप्रतीतिविषयाः भेदस्तु घटः पटो नेति समानाधिकरणप्रतीतिविषयः, अन्यथा समानाधिकरणनिषेधबुद्धिविषयत्वं भेदलक्षणं न स्यात्। एतेन- पुरुषार्थे दुःखमिव ब्रह्मण्यज्ञानवत्तया। मोक्षे च मोहवन्नान्तर्गतं कुम्भादिकं पटे।। तटस्थत्वेऽपि कुम्भादेरप्रतीतौ न भेदधीः। अज्ञानादेरप्रतीतौ तद्धान्याद्यप्रतीतिवत्।। इति - निरस्तम् । किञ्च विदारणात्मनो भेदस्य घटस्वरूपत्वे घटस्यापि विदारणं स्यात् एवं तदवयवानामपीति परमाणुरपि नैक इति शून्यतापत्तिः, एकाभावे तत्समाहाररूपानेकस्याप्यभावात्। ननु- अविदारणात्मकस्याभेदस्य ब्रह्मरूपत्वे पारमार्थिकब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिकप्रातिभासिकशून्यैरपि अविदारणे तदैक्यमपि स्यात्। न च जीवाभेद एव स्वरूपम्, न तु घटाद्यभेदः, तर्ह्यत्रापि घटादिभ्यो भेद एव पटस्वरूपम्, न तु स्वस्मादिति सममिति- चेन्न, स्वरूपत्वे भेदस्य स्वज्ञानाप्रतिबध्यज्ञानप्रतियोगिकत्वे स्वरूपत्वेनाभेदवत् स्वप्रतियोगित्वनियमेन स्वविदारकत्वस्यावश्यकत्वाद्, घटधर्मेषु पटप्रतियोगिकभेदत्ववद् घटप्रतियोगकभेदत्वस्यापि अभ्युपगमात्, पटाद् भिन्नो घट इतिवद् घटाद्भिन्नो घट इति प्रतीतेर्वज्रलेपत्वाच्च। यत्तु स्वस्माद्विदारकत्वे अवयवानां विभागेन सूक्ष्मत्वमेव स्यात्, न तु शून्यत्वम्, न हि शून्यसंयोगात् किञ्चिदुत्पन्नमिति, तन्न, विभाजकत्वं न विदारकत्वम्, किंत्वेकत्वविरोधित्वम्। तथा चैकस्याभावे अनेकस्य सुतरामभावाच्छून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानाच्च। एतेन विदारकलवित्रादेः स्वसंबन्धिन्येव विदारकत्वम्, न तु स्वस्मिन्निति भेदश्चेत्स्वरूपं, तदा स्वं न विदारयेत्। किञ्च भेदस्य न विदारकत्वम्, भावव्युत्पत्त्या विदारणत्वात्। तथा च स्वरूपभेदेन घटस्य न विदारणं स्यात्, स्ववृत्तिविरोधादिति- निरस्तम्, भेदस्य विदारणरूप विभागात्मकत्वेन विभागस्य विभज्यमानवृत्तित्वनियमेनावयवानवस्थया शून्यतापत्तेस्तादवस्थ्यात्। अत एव विभागरूपविदारणात्मा न भेदः, किंत्वन्योन्याभावः, धातूनामनेकार्थत्वात्। तदुक्तम्- क्रियावाचित्वमाख्यातुमेकैकोऽर्थः प्रदर्श्यते। प्रयोगतोऽनुसर्तव्या अनेकार्था हि धातवः।। इति । अन्यथा संयुक्तयोर्भिन्नाविति व्यवहारो न स्यादिति- निरस्तम्, अन्योन्याभावस्वरूपत्वे कपालादिरूपाश्रयप्रतियोगिकभेदस्य घटादिरूपाश्रितरूपतया स्वप्रतियोगिकभेदाश्रयत्वादेकत्वं कपालादिषु भज्येतेत्यवयवानवस्थया शून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानात्। अत एव- नानेकत्वैकार्थसमवायिना भेदेन एकत्वं निराकृत्य तेन पुनरनेकत्वनिराकरणं युज्यते, उपजीव्यविरोधादितिनिरस्तम्, अनेकत्वमस्पृष्ट्वैव स्वप्रतियोगिकभेदमात्रेण ऐक्यविरहस्यापाद्यत्वात्। अत एवोक्तमाचार्यैः- `अभेदैकार्थसमवायिन्या एकताया भेदेन विरोधा"दिति। यदुक्तं स्वस्मिन्वृत्तिविरोधादिति, तन्न, विभागादिरूपव्यापारस्यानङ्गीकाराद् इतरविरोधितादिरूपव्यापारस्य सर्वत्र सत्त्वात्। किञ्च स्वरूपत्वे भेदस्य संशयादिर्न स्यात्, धर्मिज्ञाने भेदाज्ञानाभावात्, तदज्ञाने हेतोरेवाभावात्। ननु- अभेदस्यापि स्वरूपत्वे संशयाद्यनुपपत्तिस्तवापि समा, यदि चाभेदत्वेनाज्ञानात्तथा, ममापि भेदत्वेनाज्ञानात्तदिति- चेन्न, भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वे शून्यतापादकयुक्त्या कोटीनामेवोच्छेदात्। न च- अभेदस्यापि स्वरूपत्वे भेदकोट्युच्छेदस्तवापीति- वाच्यम्, कल्पितकोटिमादाय संशयोपपत्तेः। न च तवापि भेदकसत्त्वादिकोटिः कल्पिता, शून्यतापत्तेरित्युक्तत्वात्। यत्तु प्राक् चैतन्ये स्वयंभातेऽपि तदभिन्नस्यैक्यस्यानवच्छिन्नस्यानन्दस्य चाप्रकाशवद्धर्मिणः प्रकाशेऽपि तदभिन्नस्य भेदस्याप्रकाशो भविष्यति, किञ्चैक्यप्रकाशे तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात्, तदुपदेशानर्थक्यं च स्यादिति, तन्न, ऐक्यादीनां स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपत्वेऽपि तस्याज्ञानतत्कार्यविप्रतिपत्त्यादीन् प्रति अविरोधितया तद्गोचरविरोधिवृत्तिपर्यन्तमुक्तानुपपत्याभावात्। न च तर्हि प्रत्यगर्थेऽपि विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्, चार्वाकादीनां तस्या अपि दर्शनात्। तस्मादज्ञानाश्रयत्वादिना प्रत्यगर्थप्रकाशमुपजीव्यं नाविद्यावृणोति, ऐक्याद्यंशं त्वावृणोत्येवेति तत्र विप्रतिपत्त्यादयः। न च- एवं सादृश्यादिदोषादत्रापि भेदांश आवृत इति- वाच्यम्, कोट्यनुपस्थितेः प्रधानपूर्वमारोपवादिनः तव तदसंभवात्। यत्तु स्वरूपभेदो भेदत्वेन भासत एव, प्रायः सर्वभिन्नत्वेनैव प्रतीतेः, अन्यथा सर्वकोटिकः संशयः स्यात्। तत्र च घटप्रतियोगिकत्वादिरूपा अनेकधर्माः सादृश्यादिवशादगृहीताः संशयविषया भविष्यन्ति, न चानेकनिरूप्यस्य भेदस्य निरूपकानेकत्वादनेकत्वापत्तिः, तादृशस्यापीश्वरज्ञानादेरनेकद्वैतनिरूप्याद्वैतस्य चैक्यदर्शनाद्, एक निरूप्यप्रागभावध्वंसयोरनैक्यदर्शनाच्चेति, तन्न, न वयं निरूपकभेदेन भेदं ब्रूमः, किन्तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकभेदेनाभावभेदस्यावश्यकतया, अन्यथा एकघटप्रतियोगिनां चतुर्णां ध्वंसादीनामैक्यापत्तेः। न चाधिकरणरूपाभाववादिनामधिकरणभेदेनैवाभावभेदः, ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरैक्यापत्तौ विलक्षणव्यवहारानापत्तेः। न चैवमद्वैतेऽप्यैक्यानुपपत्तिः, ब्रह्मेतरत्वरूपप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकस्यैक्यात्, प्रतियोगिभेदाभेदयोरतन्त्रत्वात्। यदपि भेदज्ञानं न भ्रमविरोधि, किंत्वधिष्ठान आरोप्यविरुद्धधर्मादिज्ञानमिति, तन्न, शाब्दाभेदभ्रमस्य शाब्दभेदज्ञानादनिवृत्त्यापत्तेः। यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तम्- अदोषमूला ताद्रूप्येणाप्रतीतौ प्रतीतिः स्वरूपभेदलक्षणम्, शुक्तेश्च शुक्त्यात्मना अप्रतीतिः दोषमूलेति न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः। अदोषमूलेत्यस्य यद्यपि सप्तम्यन्तविशेषणत्वं न संभवति, तथापि विशिष्टविशेषणत्वेन तद्विशेषणत्वपर्यवसानादिति, तन्न, ताद्रूप्येणाप्रतीतौ प्रतीतेरभेदसाधारण्येनादोषमूलत्वपर्यन्तज्ञानं भेदव्यवहारकारणं वाच्यम्। तत्रादोषमूलत्वं फलैकोन्नेयमिति चाक्षुषत्वं न स्यात्, प्रतीतिघटितत्वात्, अप्रत्ययकाले च भेदो न स्यात्। किञ्च रजतात्मना शुक्तेः प्रतीतिसमये तत्र तद्भेदस्ते न स्यात्, अदोषमूलेत्यस्याभावविशेषणत्वेनाव्याप्तिवारणे असामर्थ्यात्, विशेष्यानधिकरणस्य सुतरां विशिष्टानधिकरणत्वात्। न हि पुरुषहीने दण्डिपुरुषसंभवः। न चादोषमूलेति अशरीरजन्यत्वमित्यत्र शरीरमिव प्रतियोगिविशेषणं बाधितसंग्रहाय, नञा समस्तप्रतीतेरसमस्तेनानन्वयात्। न ह्यब्राह्मणः समीचीन इत्यनेन समीचीनविप्राभावः प्रतीयते। अदोषमूलतादात्म्यप्रकारप्रतीत्यभावोक्तौ च शुक्ते रूप्यात्मना अप्रतीतिकाले सामग्रीविरहात् शुक्त्यात्मना चाप्रतीतौ स्वभेदापत्तेः तादवस्थ्यात्। न च- तदापि प्रतीयमानशुक्त्यात्मना प्रतीयमानत्वमीश्वरज्ञानमादायास्त्येवेति- वाच्यम्, एवं सत्यप्रतीतिदशाविरहेण प्रतीयमानपदवैयर्थ्यात्। न चान्योन्याभावत्वं तत्। तस्यानिरूपणात्। तदुक्तमाचार्यैः- सापेक्षत्वात्सावधेश्च तत्वेऽद्वैतप्रसङ्गतः। एकाभावादसन्देहान्न रूपं वस्तुनो भिदा।। इति । किञ्च घटस्य भेदत्वे एकतरपरिशेषापत्तिः। ननु- ऐक्यस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्दस्य च ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वे एकतरपरिशेषापत्तिस्तवापि समाना, न च वस्तुन एकत्वेनेष्टापत्तिः प्रकृतेऽपि साम्यादिति- चेन्न, एकतरपरिशेषापत्त्या घट इति भेद इति विलक्षण व्यवहाराभावस्यापादनात्। न च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तघटत्वभेदत्वयोर्भेदात्तदुपपत्तिः भेदत्वस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। तथा हि- न तावज्जातिः, जात्यादिसाधारणत्वात्, नोपाधिः तादात्म्यावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकाभावत्वादिरूपः, तादात्म्यस्य भेदविरहरूपत्वे अन्योन्याश्रयात्, तन्निष्ठासाधारणधर्मरूपत्वे तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावेऽतिव्याप्तेः, तस्यापि स्वरूपत्वे अनुगतव्यवहारानापत्तेः, न च- ज्ञानानन्दादावपि विलक्षणव्यवहारो न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, कल्पितधर्मभेदमादायोपपत्तेः। न च- भेदत्वमपि तथास्त्विति- वाच्यम्, तर्ह्यनिराकार्योऽसि। किञ्च भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वे इदं भिन्नमस्य भेद इति संबन्धित्वेन धीर्न स्यात्। न चानन्दो ब्रह्मण इति वदुपपत्तिः, प्रमाणसिद्धे ह्यैक्ये भेदव्यवहारस्यौपचारिकत्वं कल्प्यते राहोः शिर इत्यादिवत्। न च प्रकृते तथा, ऐक्ये मानाभावाद् बाधकाच्च। न च पक्षान्तरानुपपत्तेरेव पक्षान्तरपरिग्रहः, शशशृङ्गादौ भावत्वाभावत्वयोरन्यतरानुपपत्त्याऽन्यतरग्रहणापत्तेः। न च तत्रोभयत्र बाधकादलीकत्वेनोपपत्तिः, प्रकृतेऽप्युभयत्र बाधकादाविद्यकत्वेनोपपत्तेः संभवात्। ननु- अस्ति भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वे ज्ञानं मृद् घट इतिवत् घटः पटात्मको नेति पटतादात्म्यनिषेधरूपस्य भेदस्य घटसामानाधिकरण्येनाभेदप्रत्यक्षं, तथा घटभेदयोरेकैकस्य प्रतीतावितरस्य नियमेन प्रतीयमानत्वादिकं लिङ्गम्। `सत्यं भेदस्तु वस्तूनां स्वरूपं नात्र संशयः- इत्याद्यागमश्चेति- चेन्न, घटः पटात्मको नेत्यादेरन्योन्याभावभेदविषयतया भेदाभेदाविषयत्वाद्, अन्यथा नीलो घट इत्यादेरपि रूपाभेदविषयत्वापत्तेः। लिङ्गस्य चाभेदसिद्धेः पूर्वमसिद्धत्वात्, सामान्यव्याप्तेर्जातिव्यक्त्यादौ समानसंवित्संवेद्ये व्यभिचाराद्विशेषव्याप्तावपि प्रतियोगिनि व्यभिचाराच्च, आगमस्य चाधिष्ठानातिरेकेणासत्त्वपरत्वात्। किञ्च पटाद् भेदः घटमात्ररूपं वा, घटकुड्यादिसर्वरूपं वा ? आद्ये कुड्यादिः पटभेदो न स्यात्। द्वितीये स्वरूपाणामननुगतत्वात् पटभेदानुगतप्रतीतिर्न स्यात्। न च पटज्ञानेच्छादौ यथा पटविषयत्वेनानुगतेनानुगतव्यवहारः, तथा पटप्रतियोगिकत्वेनात्राप्यनुगतव्यवहार इति- वाच्यम्, एतावता हि ज्ञानादिषु पटविषयं ज्ञानं पटविषयेच्छेति पठविषयत्वांशे अनुगमवत् पटप्रतियोगिकत्वांश एवानुगमः स्यात्, न भेदांशेऽपि। न च भेदत्वमप्येकमित्युक्तम्। किञ्चेदमस्माद् भिन्नमिति वाऽस्यामुष्मात् भेद इति वा धर्मिप्रतियोगिघटितत्वेन भेदग्रहणे परस्पराश्रयः, धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञाने भेदज्ञानं तस्मिंश्च सत्यस्यामुष्मादिति विलक्षणधर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानमिति घटपटौ भिन्नाविति। घटपटविशेषणतया तयोंर्भेद इति तद्विशेष्यतया वा ग्रहणेऽपि अन्योन्याश्रय एव। घटपटप्रतीतौ तद्विशेष्यत्वादिना भेदग्रहः, भेदग्रहे च द्वित्वावच्छिन्नघट पटप्रतीतिरिति। न च- भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वात् स्वरूपप्रतीतेरेव भेदधीत्वेन धीद्वयाभावान्नोक्तदोष इति- शङ्क्यम्, स्वरूपज्ञानस्य द्वितीयत्वाभावेऽपि प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्य स्वरूपज्ञानातिरिक्तस्य द्वितीयस्यापेक्षणात्। न च- सर्वात्मकमिदमिति विपर्ययादर्शनेनेदं न सर्वात्मकमिति सामान्यतः सर्वतो व्यावृत्तं वस्त्वनुभूयत इति प्रतियोगिविशेष ज्ञानानपेक्षणानन्नान्योन्याश्रय इति वाच्यम्, सर्वात्मकं नेत्यत्र सर्वत्वं वा प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं स्वेतरसर्वत्वं वा। आद्ये स्वस्मांद्वैलक्षण्ये स्वासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्, द्वितीये अन्योन्याश्रयस्य स्पष्टत्वात्। न च- `सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'त्यत्र यथा ब्रह्मात्मत्वेनाप्रतीतं सर्वमुच्यते। तद्वदत्रापि सर्वस्मादित्यनेन तदात्मकत्वेनाज्ञातं सर्वं विवक्ष्यत इति- वाच्यम्, स्वग्रहात् पूर्वं स्वस्यापि स्वात्मनाऽज्ञातत्वात् स्वस्य प्रतियोगितापत्तेः, दृष्टान्ते सर्वशब्दस्यासङ्कुचितत्वे तवासम्प्रतिपत्तिश्च। न च- वस्तुतो भेदाश्रयस्याभेदेनाज्ञातस्य ज्ञानं प्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वेन कारणम्, न तु भिन्नत्वप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेनेति- वाच्यम्, एवं हि चन्द्रे द्वित्वभ्रमो न स्यात्, वस्तुतो भेदाभावात्। ननु- `अस्तीदं न जानामि' `सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'त्यादिषु साक्षिसिद्धकालविषयसर्वैः सह वस्त्वज्ञानाभेदानामिवेहापि साक्षिसिद्धेन प्रतियोगिना सहैव व्यावृत्तेः प्रतीतेर्नान्योन्याश्रय इति चेन्न, विशिष्टज्ञानस्य विशेषणज्ञानाजन्यत्वेऽपि प्रतियोगिसविकल्पकस्याभावज्ञानं प्रत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां जनकत्वात्। साक्षी च प्रमाणमनपेक्ष्य प्रतियोगिपटादिकं धर्मिभिन्नतया न गृह्णातीति कथं साक्षिसिद्धप्रतियोगिना भेदग्रहोपपत्तिः स्यात् ? तदुक्तं चिन्तामणौ अन्यथा- निर्विकल्पकादपि घटो नास्तीति वृत्त्यापत्ते'रिति। न च- एतावता प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकपटत्वादिप्रकारकज्ञानमात्रमर्थनीयम्, न तु धर्मिभिन्नत्वज्ञानपर्यन्तमिति- वाच्यम्, धर्मितावच्छेदकभेदाज्ञाने प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतया अभावनिरूपकत्वस्यैवाभावाद्, अन्योन्यधर्मभेदज्ञाने च विशिष्य स्तम्भात् कुम्भस्य भेदप्रतीतौ कुम्भात् स्तम्भस्य भेदधीरित्यन्योन्याश्रयतादवस्थ्यात्। ननु- त्वन्मतेऽपि बिम्बब्रह्मजीवानां प्रतिबिम्बब्रह्माभेदे `इदमनेनाभिन्नमस्यामुष्मादभेदः एतयोरभेद' इत्येवं प्रतीतिः स्यात्। तथा च धर्मिप्रतियोगिभावधीर्द्वित्वावच्छिन्नधीश्च भेदज्ञानाधीनेति तद्विरुद्धाभेदज्ञानानुपपत्तिरिति- चेन्न, काल्पनिकभेदज्ञानस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिभावद्वित्वावच्छिन्नज्ञाननिर्वाहकस्य तात्त्विकाभेदज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगात्। किञ्चाभेदज्ञाने न धर्मिरूपप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षा, तस्य निष्प्रतियोगिक वस्तुस्वरूपत्वात्, सप्रतियोगिकत्वव्यवहारस्तु निरूपकभेदसप्रतियोगिकत्वेन। अत एव- जीवस्य प्रतियोगितया ब्रह्माभेदनिरूपकत्वं तदभिन्नतया ज्ञातस्यैवेत्यन्योन्याश्रयः, धर्मिणा सहाभेदेन प्रतीतस्यैवाभेदप्रतियोगित्वाद्, अन्यथा दहनस्यापि तुहिनाभेदसप्रतियोगित्वापत्तेरिति- निरस्तम्, भेदग्रहस्य तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वाच्च। अत एव- `तत्त्वमसी'त्यत्र त्वंपदवाच्यस्य विशिष्टस्य ब्रह्माभेदप्रतियोगित्वप्रसङ्गविनिवारणाय विद्यमानाभेदस्यासति प्रतिबन्धके अभेदयोग्यचित्त्वादिरूपेण प्रतीतिरभेदधीहेतुः भेदभ्रमे तु दोषः प्रतिबन्धक इति नाबेदधीरिति परसिद्धान्तं परिकल्प्य स्वरूपभेदपक्षे वस्तुतोऽग्योन्यप्रतियोगिकयोर्घट पटस्वरूपभेदयोरन्योन्यप्रतियोगित्वयोग्यघटपटत्वादिरूपेण प्रतीतयोरसति प्रतिबन्धेऽन्योन्यप्रतियोगितया विशिष्टधीः, धर्मभेदपक्षेऽपि विद्यमानभेदस्यासति प्रतिबन्धके भेदयोग्यनीलपीतत्वादिरूपेण प्रतीतिर्भेदहेतुः, दूरस्थवनस्पत्यादौ तु दूरादिदोषः प्रतिबन्धक इति न भेदधीरिति साम्येन समाधानं निरस्तम्, वैषम्यस्योक्तत्वात्। ननु- यथा गौर्गवयसदृशीत्यादौ गवयादीनां गवादिभ्यो भेदः सन्नेव प्रतियोगित्वहेतुः, न तु ज्ञातः, न हि गौर्गवयसदृशीति प्रत्यक्षधीरपि नियमेन गवयो गोभिन्न इति धूपूर्विकाऽनुभूयते, सुतरां शाब्दधीः, तत्र भेदवाचिशब्दाभावात्, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि। अन्यथा चैत्रस्य मैत्रपितृत्वादौ ज्ञात एव मैत्रस्य चैत्रपुत्रत्वादिज्ञानं, गवयस्य गोसादृश्ये ज्ञात एव गौर्गवयसदृशीति ज्ञानमिति सप्रतियोगकपदार्थमात्रे अन्योन्यश्रयः स्यादिति- चेन्न, इष्टापत्तेः, अत एव सप्रतियोगित्वेन निष्प्रतियोगित्वेन च भेदसादृश्यादि दुर्वचं, सर्वत्र बाधकसत्त्वादिति अस्माकं सिद्धान्तः। यत्तूक्तम् प्रतियोगिधर्मिभेदग्रहपूर्वकत्वनियमो नानुभूयत इति, तदिष्टमेव, तस्यैव सप्रतियोगित्वे बाधकत्वात्, प्रत्यक्ष एव सप्रतियोगिकपदार्थग्रहे एव मन्योन्याश्रयस्यापाद्यत्वे शाब्दे भेदवाचकपदासत्त्वस्यास्मान् प्रत्यदूषणत्वात्। एवं च प्रतियोगिधीमात्रं न भेदधीहेतुः, तन्निर्विकल्पकादपि तदापत्तेः, किन्तु प्रतियोगित्वेन। तत्रापि नान्यं प्रति प्रतियोगित्वेन किन्तु भेदं प्रति। तथा चान्योन्याश्रयः। न च सप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यादावेवं स्यात्, इष्टापत्तेः, अभेदश्च न सप्रतियोगिक इत्युक्तत्वाच्च। यत्तु यत्र धर्मिप्रतियोगिनौ सन्निहितौ, तत्र धर्मिप्रतियोगिसद्भावयोस्तद्भेदस्य च युगपद्धीः, इदमनेन सदृशमितिवत्। तथा विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य च युगद्धीः, इमौ सदृशावितिवत्, सर्वस्य योग्यस्य इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण युगपत्सर्वविषयैकज्ञानसंभवात्। न हि मन्मते दण्डीति धीरपि दण्डज्ञानसाध्या। उक्तं चैतत् यत्र धर्मिप्रतियोगिनोरन्यतरस्यासन्निधानं, तत्रापि संस्कारसचिवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण एवमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तदनेन सदृशमित्यादिवत्। अन्यथा अभेदज्ञानमपि न स्यात्। तथा चान्योन्याश्रयः। तदुक्तम्- धर्मित्वप्रतियोगित्वतद्भावा युगपद्यदि। विशेषणं विशेष्यं च तद्भावश्यैव गृह्यते।। इति । तन्न, प्रमेयत्वादिना घटे ज्ञातेऽपि घटाभाव इत्यप्रतीतेः घटत्वादिना घटस्य पूर्वमवश्यं ज्ञेयत्वेन युगपदेव धर्मिप्रतियोग्यादिबुद्ध्यसिद्धेः। न च- तत्र घटत्वादिना घटस्य पूर्वमवश्यं ज्ञेयत्वेन युगपदेव धऱ्मिप्रतियोग्यादिबुद्ध्यसिद्धिः। न च- तत्र घटत्वादिज्ञानसामग्रीविलम्बादेव विलम्बः, तत्सत्त्वे इष्टापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, प्रतियोग्यविषयकाभावप्रत्ययापादनस्यैवमप्यपरिहारात्। न च तादृक्प्रतियोगिग्रहसामग्रीकारणम्, तदपेक्षया प्रतियोगिग्रहस्यैव लघुत्वात्। ननु- अन्यत्वाग्रहणे प्रोक्तः कथमन्योन्यसंश्रयः। अन्यत्वं यदि सिद्धं स्यात् कथमन्योन्यसंश्रयः।। इत्युभयतःपाशारज्जुरिति- चेन्न, न ह्यन्यत्वबुद्धिं व्यवहारक्षमामपि निराकुर्मः किंत्वनाविद्यकत्वे नोपपद्यत इति ब्रूमः। किं च भेदस्य विशेषणविशेष्यभावेनैव ज्ञेयत्वात् तत्तद्भावप्रतीतेश्च भेदप्रतीत्यधीनतया दण्डचैत्रादौ दृष्टत्वेन भेदप्रतीतिपरम्परानवस्था स्यात्। न च- ब्रह्म जीवाभिन्नम्, जगन्मिथ्येत्यादावप्यभेदादेर्विशेषणतया भेद ज्ञानस्यापेक्षणीयतयाऽनवस्थापत्तेः, न प्राथमिकाभेदादिधीरिति तवापि समानमिति- वाच्यम्, अविद्याकल्पितभेदेनाज्ञातेनापि विशेषणत्वाद्युपपत्तेः। न चैवं तवापि, भेदभेद्ययोः स्वरूपतो भेदाभावात्, भेदस्याधिकरणानतिरेकात्, धर्मो भेद इति पक्षे तु प्रतीत्यनवस्थोद्धारेऽपि विषयानवस्थाया दुष्परिहरत्वापत्तेः। न चाविद्यकभेदपक्षेऽप्यनवस्थादिदोषः, अनुपपत्तेरलङ्कारत्वात्। अत एव अभिन्नं ब्रह्मेत्यत्राबेदस्य भिन्नतया ज्ञातस्य विशेषणत्वेन तेन सह ब्रह्माभेदबोधनानुपपत्तिः, प्राचीनभेदधिया प्रतिबन्धादिति- निरस्तम्, अनिर्वचनीयभेदज्ञानस्य तात्त्विकाभेदज्ञानाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। किं च धर्मभेदपक्षे प्रत्यक्षं किं भेदमेव गोचरयति ? उत वस्त्वपि ? नाद्यः, भेद इत्येवाप्रतीतेः। द्वितीयेऽपि किं भेदपूर्वकं वस्तु गोचरयेत् ? उत वस्तुपूर्वकं भेदम्, युगपद्वा उभयम् ? नाद्यः, भेद इत्येवाप्रतीतेः, विरम्य व्यापारायोगाच्च। अत एव न द्वितीयः, न तृतीयः, वस्तुग्रहस्य भेदग्रहजनकतायाः स्थापितत्वात्। न च वस्तुमात्रज्ञानानन्तरभाविना विशिष्टज्ञानेन युगपदुभयग्रहः, प्रतियोगित्वादिना ज्ञातस्यैव भेदधीहेतुत्वाद्, अन्यथा पञ्चमीप्रयोगाद्यनुपपत्तेः। तत्र च प्रागुक्तो दोषः। अत एव- विशिष्टधियो विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वमते अनयोर्भेद इति ज्ञानानन्तरमिमौ भिन्नाविति धियः संभवः, विशेषणज्ञानाजन्यत्वेऽपि युगपदेव उभयगोचरधियः संभव इति- निरस्तम्, अनयोर्भेद इत्यादौ षष्ठ्योल्लिख्यमानसंबन्धग्रहार्थं भेदग्रहस्य पूर्वमवश्यापेक्षणीयतया अनवस्थाया दुष्परिहरत्वात्। न च बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोश्चाभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षं शब्दश्च किमभेदमेव गोचरयेदित्यादिविकल्पसाम्यम्, अभेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपत्वेनेदृग्विकल्पानवकाशात्। किं च भेदस्यान्योन्याभावत्वे तत्प्रतियोगिनोः स्तम्भकुम्भयोस्तादात्म्यस्याप्रामाणिकत्वेनान्योन्याभावस्याप्रामाणिकत्वं स्यात्। न च द्वैतादेरप्रामाणिकत्वे तद्विरहस्याप्रामाणिकत्वापत्तिः, अतिरेकपक्षे इष्टापत्तेः, अनतिरेकपक्षे त्वधिकरणप्रामाणिकत्वस्यैव प्रामाणिकत्वे तन्त्रतया प्रतियोग्यप्रामाणिकत्वेऽपि प्रामाणिकत्वोपपत्तेः। न च- अन्योन्याभावेऽपि तत्पक्षे तथाङ्गीक्रियतामिति- वाच्यम्, तस्याधिकरणरूपतायां शून्यवादाद्यापत्तेरुक्तत्वात्। यत्त्वप्रामाणिकस्य निषेधप्रतियोगित्वमित्युक्तं परैः, तन्न वारयामः, किंत्वधिकरणातिरेके निषेधस्याप्रामाणिकत्वमात्रं ब्रूमः। ननु- अत्र न कुम्भस्तम्भोभयतादात्म्यं निषेधप्रतियोगि, किंतु स्तम्भतादात्म्यं स्तम्भे प्रमितं कुम्भगतं निषिध्यत इति न प्रतियोग्यप्रामाणिकत्वमिति- चेन्न, तादात्म्यमात्रस्य निषेधप्रतियोगित्वे दूरस्थवनस्पत्येरिव बाधोत्तरकालमिमौ वनस्पती इतिवदिमे शुक्तिरजते इति प्रतीत्यापत्तेः। न चासन्निधानकृतो विशेषः, एतावतापि शुक्तितद्रजते इति प्रतीत्यापत्तेः। यत्त्वन्योन्याभावसंसर्गाभावयोर्लक्षणं यत्राधिकरणे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकमारोप्य निषेधावगमः, सोऽन्योन्याभावः, यत्राधिकरणे प्रतियोगिनमारोप्य निषेधावभासः, स संसर्गाभाव इति, तन्न, अतीन्द्रिये भेदे संसर्गाभावे च तन्मते अव्याप्तेः। शब्दजन्याभावबुद्धौ व्यभिचारेणारोपस्याभावबुद्धावहेतुत्वाच्च। किञ्च भेदे स्वेतरभेदस्य वक्तव्यतया स्ववृत्तिविरोधोऽनवस्था वा। न च- ब्रह्माभेदेऽपि स्वाभेदस्य वक्तव्यतया स्ववृत्तित्वं समानमिति- वाच्यम्, अभेदस्य स्वनिर्वाहकत्वादित्यवेहि। न च भेदे तथा, भेदाधिकरणकभेदव्यवहारस्य स्वरूपेण निर्वाहे घटेऽपि तथात्वे धर्मपक्षकभेदानुपपत्तेः। किञ्च भेदे भेदत्वमुपाधिरूपं जातिरूपं वा वाच्यम्, तत्र पुनर्भेदो वाच्यः, अन्यथा भेदत्वस्यान्यस्माद् भेदो न स्यात्। तथा चान्योन्यवृत्त्या स्ववृत्त्यापत्तेः स्ववृत्तित्ववत्तस्यापि विरुद्धत्वात्। न च- अभेदेऽप्यभेदत्वं वाच्यम्, तत्र पुनरभेदो वाच्यः, अन्यथा तस्य स्वाभेदो न स्यादिति तत्रापि तथात्वापत्तिः, प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वादिवदन्योन्यवृत्तित्वस्याभेदे अदोषत्वे भेदेऽपि साम्यमिति वाच्यम्, अस्माकमभेदमात्रस्याभेदत्वस्य च ब्रह्माभेदाभिन्नतया अन्योन्यमित्यस्यैवाभावेनान्योन्यवृत्तित्वस्यैवापादयितुमशक्यत्वात्। न च तर्हि घटे घटाभेदस्य जीवे जीवाभेदस्य वा जीवब्रह्माभेदत्वे वेदान्तवैयर्थ्यम्, भेदभ्रमनिवर्तकवृत्तेर्महावाक्यं विनानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात्। यत्तु प्रमेयत्वादौ प्रमितत्वादन्योन्यवृत्तिरदोष इति, तन्न, आत्माश्रयादित्वदोषेण तत्रापि प्रमितत्वासिद्धेः। अत एव न कश्चित् केवलान्वयी। किञ्च भेदः किं भिन्ने निविशते ? अभिन्ने वा ? आद्ये आत्माश्रयोऽन्योन्याश्रयो वा। द्वितीये विरोधः। न च- अभेदानिर्वाच्यत्वादिकं किं तद्वति तदभाववति चेत्यादिविकल्पस्यात्रापि साम्यमिति- वाच्यम्, अभेदस्य स्वरूपत्वेन तत्र तद्विकल्पानवकाशात्, अनिर्वाच्यादावस्य विकल्पस्यानिर्वाच्यत्व- प्रयोजकस्यास्माकमनुकूलत्वात्। न च भेदोऽपि स्वरूपम्, प्रागेव निरासात्। न च- भेदः स्वाश्रयत्वयोग्ये वर्तते, योग्यता च प्रमारूपफलैकोन्नेया इति- वाच्यम्, योग्यताया भेदं विना वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। न ह्यभिन्ने कदापि तद्योग्यता, धर्मान्तरस्यापि भेदमपुरस्कृत्य योग्यत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात्, भेदाभेदावज्ञात्वा भ्रमप्रमारूपफलभेदस्यैवाज्ञानेन भेदयोग्यतायाः प्रमारूपफलभेदानुन्नेयत्वाच्च। अस्वव्याघातकैरेव जातिभिन्नैः सदुत्तरैः। निरस्तं भेदमादाय स्वात्माभेदो निषीदति।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ विशेषतो भेदखण्डनम्।। 15 ।। 16. विशेषसमर्थनम् ननु- अस्माकं भेदो न स्वरूपमात्रम्, किं त्वन्योन्याभावः, स च वस्तुना सविशेषाभिन्नः, ततश्चाभिन्नात्वानस्थादिः। भेदप्रतिनिधेर्विशेषस्य विद्यमानत्वान्न पर्यायत्वादिकम्, विशेषश्च भेदहीनेऽपि एकतरपरिशेषाभावादिनिर्वाहक इति- चेन्न, पर्यायत्वादिप्रमाजनकस्य स्वरूपातिरिक्तस्य विशेषस्याङ्गीकारे तस्यैव भेदत्वेन भेदस्य धर्मभेदोक्त्ययोगाद्, विशेषस्यापि भेदः सविशेषाभिन्न एव वाच्यः। तथा चानवस्थातादवस्थ्यम्। न च वैशेषिकाभिमतविशेषवत्तस्य स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वम्, एतादृशविशेषे मानाभावात्। ननु- `विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मे'त्यादिवाक्यबोध्यविज्ञानानन्दादीनां त्वन्मतेऽपि भेदस्य भेदाभेदयोर्वाऽखण्डार्थकत्वेन `एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य'मित्यादि श्रुतिविरोधेन चाङ्गीकर्तुमशक्यतया भेदप्रतिनिधेर्विशेषस्यापर्यायत्वाद्यर्थमवश्यं स्वीकार इति अर्थापत्तिरेव मानमिति- चेन्न, भेदे ऐकरस्यश्रुतिविरोधवद् अत्रापि तत्तादवस्थ्यात्। लक्ष्यार्थाभेदेऽपि वाच्यार्थभेदेनापर्यायत्वस्य व्यावर्त्यभेदादवैयर्थ्यस्य चान्यथैवोपपत्तेः। किञ्च तवापि ज्ञानानन्दत्वादिनिमित्तभेदादेवापर्यायत्वमस्तु, किं विशेषेण ? न च- `एवं धर्मा'निति श्रुत्या तयोरपि भेदनिषेधात् नैवमिति- वाच्यम्, तर्हि विशेषस्याप्याश्रितत्वेन धर्मतयाऽस्यापि भेदनिषेधात्तेनाप्यनुपपत्तिः। न च- ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वयोरर्थप्रकाशत्वनिरुपाधिकेष्ठत्वरूपयोरर्थप्रकाशनिरुपाधिकेष्टरूपाश्रयविशेष आवश्यक इति- वाच्यम्, ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वयोर्जातिरूपत्वेन उक्तरूपत्वाभावात्। न च- आकाशशब्दाश्रयशब्दयोः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताभेदेन पर्यायत्वापत्तिः, तत्परिहाराय विशेषो वाच्य इति- वाच्यम्, पर्यायत्वेऽपि सहप्रयोगस्य व्याख्यानव्याख्येयभावादिनाप्युपपत्तेः। न च- एवं ज्ञानानन्दयोरेकतरपरिशेषेण मोक्षे आनन्दप्रकाशो न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, तयोर्भेदाभावेन एकतरत्वस्यैवाभावात्, द्वयोर्वचने तरब्विधानात्। एतेन- शोधिततत्पदार्थादैक्यस्य न भेदः, नापि भेदाभेदौ, किंत्वत्यन्ताभेदः, एवं च विशेषानङ्गीकारे स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यभाने ऐक्याभानापत्तिः, तत्प्रकाशस्य भेदभ्रमाविरोधित्वेऽप्यैक्यप्रकाशस्य तद्विरोधः, तस्य निरपेक्षत्वेऽपि ऐक्यस्य सापेक्षत्वं च नोपपद्यत इति- निरस्तम्, आवरकाज्ञानकल्पितांशमादाय सर्वस्योपपत्तेः। न च- एकस्या एव शुक्तेरावृतानावृतत्वे शुक्त्यंशभेद एव स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, तदंशकल्पकस्य फलस्याभावात्। ननु- `एवं धर्मा'निति श्रुतिरस्तु मानम्, अत्र हि ब्रह्मधर्मानुक्त्वा भेदो निषिध्यते। न च भेदप्रतिनिधेरभावे धर्मधर्मिभावो धर्माणामनेकत्वं च युक्तमिति- चेन्न, धर्मानित्यस्य निषेधानुवादत्वेन धर्मत्वानेकत्वादौ तात्पर्याभावात्। न च श्रुतितोऽन्यतो ब्रह्मधर्माः प्राप्ताः, आविद्यकमात्रस्य साक्षिसिद्धतया प्राप्तेः। ननु- गुणगुणिनोरभेदपक्षे घटोपलम्भे शुक्लाद्यनुपलम्भार्थं भेदाभेदपक्षे तयोरविरोधार्थम् अत्यन्तभेदपक्षेऽपि समवायः सम्बन्धः, सत्ता सती, अन्त्यविशेषो व्यावृत्तः, कालः सदास्ति, देशः सर्वत्रास्तीत्यबाधितव्यवहारार्थं विशेषोऽङ्गीकार्यः अभावादावप्यस्तित्वादिर्नाभावादितो भिन्नः, गुणादिष्वनन्तर्भावेन षडेव पदार्था इति नियमभङ्गापत्तेः अनियमपक्षेऽप्यस्तित्वेऽप्यस्तित्वान्तरमित्यनवस्थापत्तेः तत्रापि सोऽङ्गीकार्य इति- चेन्न, स्वभावविशेषादेव सर्वस्योपपत्तेः। न च- तर्हि विशेषस्याङ्गीकारेण मन्मतप्रवेश इति- वाच्यम्, तत्तदसाधारणस्वरूपस्यैव स्वभावविशेषशब्दार्थत्वेन त्वदुक्तविशेषानुक्तेः, तत्तदसाधारणरूपेण समवायादेः स्वनिर्वाहकत्वात्। अत एव- स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं हि स्वकर्मकनिर्वहणकर्तृत्वम्, तच्चैकस्मिन्विरुद्धमिति तदुपपादनायापि विशेषाङ्गीकार इति- निरस्तम्, स्वनिर्वाहकशब्दस्य स्वेतरानपेक्ष व्यवहारविषयत्वमात्रार्थकत्वाद्, अन्यथा विशेषोऽप्यनवस्थाभिया वस्त्वभिन्न इति तवाङ्गीकारेण तद्दूषणापातात्, स्वरूपभेदपक्षोक्तैकतरपरिशेषादिदूषणतादवस्थ्यापत्तेश्च। न च- अन्त्यविशेषवदस्य धर्मिग्राहकमानेन तादृक्स्वभावतया सिद्धेः पर्यनुयोगायोग इति- वाच्यम्, दृष्टान्त इव दार्ष्टान्तिके स्वरूपातिरेकस्य त्वयैवानङ्गीकारेण वैषम्यात्। यत्तु यत्रैव भेदाभावो भेदकार्यं च प्रमितं, तत्रैव विशेषः कल्प्यते, न तु प्रमितभेदे घटपटादौ विशेषमादाय भेदत्यागः, न हि सोमाभावे पूतीक इति तल्लाभेऽपि स इति, तन्न, मुख्यत्वनियामकस्य तत्रेवात्राभावाद् विशेषभेदयोरुभयोरपि स्वरूपपर्यवसन्नत्वेन त्वद्वाग्भङ्गेरनवकाशात्। किञ्च भेदः स्वयमेव स्वकार्यं करोतु, अभेदकार्यार्थं तत्प्रतिनिधिरस्त्वित्याद्यापत्तेश्च। न चानन्दादावभेदवद् भेदस्य बोधाभावः, अलौकिकस्थले द्वयोः साम्यात्। ननु- अनुमानमत्र मानम्, तथा हि- (1) ब्रह्मस्वरूपभूतयोर्विज्ञानानन्दयोर्ब्रह्माभेदयोश्च एकतरपरिशेषाभावः, प्रमेयत्वादेः स्वाश्रितत्वादिकं वा भेदान्यनियम्यम्, भेदानियम्यत्वे सति नियम्यत्वाद्, यद् यदनियम्यत्वे सति नियम्यम्, तत् तदन्यनियम्यम्, यथा संमतम्। (2) ब्रर्ह्मस्वरूपभूतं विज्ञानानन्दादिकं वा, भेदान्यैकतरापरिशेषनिर्वाहकवद्, भेदहीनत्वे सति एकतरापरिशेषरूपनिर्वाह्यवत्त्वात्, यद्येन हीनत्वे सति यन्निर्वाह्यवद्, तत्तदन्यनिर्वाहकवद्, यथा सम्मतम्। (3) स्वाश्रितं प्रमेयत्वादिकं वा, भेदान्याश्रयाश्रयिभावनिर्वाहकवद्, भेदहीनत्वे सत्याश्रयाश्रयिभावरूपनिर्वाह्यवत्त्वाद्, यथा संमतमित्यादिकमिति चेन्न, त्वदभिमतविशेषादन्यस्यैवाविद्यादेः सर्वत्र नियामकत्वसंभवेनार्थान्तराद्, आविद्यकभेदनियम्यत्वेन बाधादसिद्धेश्च। ननु- तथापि प्रत्यक्षमत्र मानम्, तथा हि- तन्तुपटादिबुद्धीनां भिन्नघटादि बुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यं तावदनुभूयते, तच्च न तावत्संबन्धविषयत्वेन, कुण्डवदरादिबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यानुभवात्। नापि संयोगान्यसंबन्धविषयत्वेन, घटतज्ज्ञानतदभावबुद्धितोऽपि वैलक्षण्यानुभवात्। नापि स्वरूपप्रत्यासत्तिसंयोगान्यसंबन्धविषयत्वेन, घटतद्धर्मिकान्योन्याभावबुद्धेर्घटपटादिबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्याभावापातात्। नाप्ययुतसिद्धिविषयत्वेन, आश्रयाश्रयिभावनियमो ह्ययुतसिद्धिः, तत्र च तदानींतन आश्रयाश्रयिभावः कुण्डबदरादावपि भाति, नियमस्तु न तन्तुपटादिबुद्धावपि, न हि तन्तुपटादिधीः प्रत्यक्षा, अनयोः सम्बन्धनाशो वा, विभागो वा, न भविष्यतीत्याकारा, न वा कुण्डवदरादिधीस्तयोः सम्बन्धनाशो वा, विभागो वा, भविष्यतीत्याकारिका। नापि समवायविषयत्वेन, उक्तन्यायेन सम्बन्धनित्यत्वस्य सम्बन्ध्ययुतसिद्धत्वस्य वा तत्र तत्रास्फुरणात्। तस्मादभेदविषयत्वेनैव वैलक्षण्यं वाच्यम्, अयं घटः, गजादिकं सेना, पत्रमेव ताटङ्क इत्यादौ पुरोवर्तिना घटादेरिवातानवितानात्मकास्तन्तव एव पटः, शुक्लः पट इत्यादावपि तन्त्वादिना पटस्याभेदप्रतीतेः। न च- अत्र पटत्वशुक्लत्वयोरेकस्थत्वमेव भातीति- वाच्यम्, पटशुक्लयोरैक्यस्यापि तत्रान्तर्गतेः, अन्यथा क्वाप्यभेदो न स्यात्। `घटः पटो'नेति धीश्च भेदविषया न स्यात्। `दण्डी चैत्र' इत्यादावपि दण्डिना चैत्रस्याभेदो भात्येव। न च- शुक्लः पट इत्यत्र शुक्लवानेव इति प्रतीयत इति- वाच्यम्, शुक्लं रूपमित्यत्र यत् शुक्लं तस्येवेह प्रतीतेः। अन्यथेहापि दण्डीतिवत् शुक्लीति स्यात्। मतुब्लोपादिकल्पनं शब्दविषयकव्यवहारे, न तु प्रतीतौ। पटस्य शौक्ल्यमित्यादिधीर्न भेदविषया, किन्तु सम्बन्धविषया सती सत्तेत्यादिवद् भेदाभावेऽपि उपपन्ना च। पटस्य तन्त्वन्यत्वे च गुरुत्वद्वयापत्तिः। तन्तुमति पटवृत्तिश्च न स्यात्, मूर्तानां समानदेशताविरोधात्। व्यवहारार्थक्रियाभेदादिकं तु पत्रताटङ्कादिवद्युक्तम्। तस्मात्तन्तुपटादिबुद्धिरभेदविषयैव। यदि चैवं केवलाभेदविषया, तर्हि सामानाधिकरण्यव्यवहारं न जनयेत्, घटः कलश इत्याद्यव्यवहारात्। तेन ज्ञायते अधिकोऽप्यस्य विषयोऽस्ति। न चायं भेदः, घटः न शुक्ल इत्युल्लेखापातात्, भेदाभेदाविरोधाय विशेषस्यावश्यकत्वाच्च। तस्माद्योऽधिको विषयः, स विशेष इति- चेन्न, सत्यप्यभेदे काल्पनिकभेदमादाय तथा व्यवहारोपपत्त्या विशेषस्यासिद्धेः। न च पटो न शुक्लः इति प्रतीत्यापत्तिः, फलबलेन काल्पनिकभेदस्य सामानाधिकरण्यादि व्यवहारमात्रनिर्वाहकत्वकल्पनेन विपरीतोल्लेखनं प्रत्यहेतुत्वात्। तस्मादेवं विशेषोऽयं न मानविषयः सखे। विषादं जहि मत्सिद्धाविद्यया सर्वसङ्गतिः।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ विशेषखण्डनम्।। 16 ।। 17. भेदपञ्चके प्रत्यक्षम् एवं प्रत्यक्षतः प्राप्तभेदस्यैव निवारणात्। असाक्षात्कृतजीवेशभेदादौ का कथा तव।। तथा हि- ईश्वरस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वेन तद्धर्मिकस्य तत्प्रतियोगिकस्य वा भेदस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। ननु- ईशधर्मिकभेदस्य जीवाप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि स्वधर्मिकभेदः तथापि तत्प्रत्यक्षः, `नाहं सर्वज्ञो नाहं निर्दुःख' इत्याद्यनुभवात्। न च- योग्यप्रतियोगिकत्वमभावयोग्यत्वे प्रयोजकमिति- वाच्यम्, स्तम्भः पिशाचो नेत्यादिप्रत्यक्षरूपफलबलेन संसर्गाभावे तथात्वेऽपि अन्योन्याभावे अधिकरणयोग्यताया एव तन्त्रत्वात्। वस्तुतस्तु- संसर्गाभावेऽपि न तन्मात्रं योग्यता, जलपरमाणौ योग्यपृथिवीत्वाभावग्रहप्रसङ्गात्, किन्तु यत्र यत्सत्त्वमनुपलब्धिविरोधि, तत्र तस्याभावो योग्य इति अधिकरणनियतैव सर्वाभावसाधारणी योग्यता। सा च प्रकृतेऽप्यस्त्येव, अन्यथा अभेदश्रुतेरप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधकतापत्तेः। भेदश्रुतेश्च त्वदुक्तप्रत्यक्षसिद्धभेदानुवादित्वं न स्यात्। ईशधर्मिकजीवभेदेऽपि `तान्यहं वेद सर्वाणि न त्वं वेत्थ परन्तप। उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्य' इत्यादितद्वचनानुमितप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वमेवेति- चेन्न, उक्तानुभवस्यान्तः- करणाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य तदनवच्छिन्नचैतन्यप्रतियोगिकभेदावगाहितया शुद्धचैतन्यधर्मिकनिर्दुःखादिप्रतियोगिकभेदानवगाहित्वात्। श्रुतिरप्यवच्छिन्नभेदानुवादिनी। भेदनिषेधश्रुतिस्तु अनुमानादिप्रसक्तभेदनिषेधपरा। न च `योऽहमस्वाप्सं तस्य ममाज्ञानसंसारादि, सोऽहं निर्दुःखो ने'ति सुषुप्तिकालीनान्तःकरणावच्छिन्नाभेदेनाज्ञानाद्याश्रयाभेदेन च प्रत्यभिज्ञायमाने शुद्धे भेदप्रतीतिः, संसाराधारस्य तदनाधारात् भेद एव ह्यावयोर्विवादः, न तु चैतन्यस्य चैतन्यादिति- वाच्यम्, एतावता अज्ञानावच्छिन्न एव भेदग्रहो न तु शुद्धे। न हि सुषुप्तिकाले अन्तःकरणानवच्छिन्नत्ववदज्ञानानवच्छिन्नत्वमप्यस्ति। यत्तु चैतन्यस्य चैतन्याद् भेदो नास्तीति, तदस्माकमनुकूलम्, चैतन्ये स्वाभाविकस्याभेदस्यैवास्मद्रहस्यत्वात् भवत्प्रतिकूलं च। न हि भवतां चैत्रमैत्रादि चैतन्यानामैक्यमिति मतम्। अहमर्थस्य यथा न शुद्धात्मत्वं तथोक्तं प्राक्। साक्षिप्रत्यक्षस्याध्यस्तादिसाधारणतया तत्सिद्धत्वमात्रेण भेदे अबाधितत्वमसंभावितमेव। एतेन- जीवानां परस्परं भेदे प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमिति- निरस्तम्, नाहं चैत्र इत्यादेरवच्छिन्नभेदविषयत्वात्। `घटो न ब्रह्म, घटो न पटः, नाहं घट' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्य कल्पितभेदविषयत्वेन तात्त्विकभेदासिद्धेः। तस्मात् भेदपञ्चके न प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ भेदपञ्चके प्रत्यक्षभङ्गः।। 17 ।। 18. जीवब्रह्मभेदे अनुमानानि नाप्यनुमानम्। (1) जीवेश्वरौ, भिन्नौ, विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वाद्, दहनतुहिनवदित्यत्र दुःखादेरन्तःकरणादिधर्मत्वेन स्वरूपासिद्धेः, एकत्रैव निर्दुःखत्वदुःखवत्त्वयोरवच्छेदकभेदेन दृष्टतया धर्मिभेदासाधकत्वाद्, भेदमात्रे सिद्धसाधनात्, तात्त्विकभेदे साद्यवैकल्यात् (2) ब्रह्म, तत्त्वतो जीवाद् भिन्नम्, सर्वज्ञत्वात्, व्यतिरेकेण जीववदित्यत्राप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वात् ब्रह्म, धर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकभेदवदिति साध्यकरणे असाधारण्यात्, (3) आत्मत्वं, नानाव्यक्तिनिष्ठम्, जातित्वात्, पृथिवीत्ववदित्यत्रात्मैक्यवादिनं प्रत्यसिद्धेः, कल्पितव्यक्तिनिष्ठत्वेन सिद्धसाधनाच्च (4) दुःखं, गुणत्वावान्तरजात्या सजातीयश्रयात् भिन्नाश्रितम्, गुणत्वाद्रूपवदित्यत्र शब्दे व्यभिचारात्, दुःखादीनामन्तःकरणधर्मत्वेन सिद्धसाधनाच्च (5) विमतानि शरीराणि, स्वसङ्क्या सङ्क्येयात्मवन्ति, शरीररत्वात्, संमतवदित्यत्र योगिशरीरे व्यभिचारात्। (6) आत्मा, धर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकात्मप्रतियोगिकभेदवान्, द्रव्यत्वाद्, घटवत्, (7) आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजात्या नाना, अश्रावणविशेषगुणाधिकरणत्वाद्, घटवदित्यत्र चात्मनो निर्गुणत्वेनासिद्धेः चैत्रश्चैत्रप्रतियोगिकोक्तभेदवान्, उक्तहेतोरुक्तदृष्टान्तवदित्याभाससाम्याच्च। एतेन- नवीनानुमानान्यपि- निरस्तानि, (1) ईश्वरः, जीवप्रतियोगिकतात्त्विकभेदवान्, सर्वशक्तित्वात्, सर्वज्ञत्वात्, सर्वकार्यकर्तृत्वात्, स्वतन्त्रत्वाद्वा, व्यतिरेकेण जीववत्। (2) जीवो वा, ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिकतात्त्विकभेदवान्, अल्पशक्तित्वाद्, अल्पज्ञत्वाद्, अल्पकर्तृत्वात्, संसारित्वाद्वा, व्यतिरेकेण ब्रह्मवद्, इत्यादिषु भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वेन तद्वत्त्वसाधने बाधात्। न च विशेषमादाय तदुपपादानम्, तस्य स्वरूपानतिरेकेण तद्वत्त्वसम्पादकत्वात्, अप्रसिद्धविशेषणतापत्तेश्च। न च- जीवब्रह्माभेदेऽनिष्टप्रसक्त्या अष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्यत्वादेरिव त्वत्सिद्धस्वप्रकाशत्वादरिव च साध्यस्य मानयोग्यत्वसम्भव इति- वाच्यम्, तात्त्विकभेदव्यतिरेकेऽपि उपाधिकल्पितभेदेन सर्वानिष्टपरिहारसम्भवात्। न च- जीवो ब्रह्म वा, किञ्चिद्धर्मिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदप्रतियोगी, अधिष्ठानत्वात्, शुक्तिवदिति सामान्यतः साध्यप्रसिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, यत्किञ्चिदभावप्रतियोगिघटादिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदप्रतियोगित्वेनात्मज्ञानाबाध्यभेदासिद्धेः, स्वप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदप्रतियोगित्वे साद्ये दृष्टान्ते स्वपदेन शुक्तेर्दार्ष्टान्तिके स्वपदेनात्मन उक्तेर्व्याप्तिग्रहानुपपत्तेः। यत्तु जीवाद् भिन्न इत्येव साध्यम्, मिथ्याभेदेन सिद्धसाधनं पश्चान्निरसनीयमिति, तन्न, निरसनोपायस्य निरसिष्यमाणत्वात्। न च ब्रह्म जीवप्रतियोगिकधर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकभेदवदित्येव साध्यम्, धर्मिपदेन ब्रह्मण उक्तावप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वतादवस्थ्यात्, यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्युक्तौ घटादिधर्मिसमानसत्त्वेन सिद्धसाधनात्, विपक्षबाधकरूपविशेषाभावे पूर्वोक्तासाधारण्यापत्तेश्च। यत्तु ब्रह्म जीवप्रतियोगिकतात्त्विकाभेदवन्नेति, तन्न, एवमपि तात्त्विकाभेदस्यातात्त्विकाभावेन सिद्धसाधनात्, अभावेऽपि तात्त्विकत्वविशेषणे अप्रसिद्धितादवस्थ्यात्। ननु- अत्र जीवप्रतियोगिकतात्त्विकभेदस्यान्योन्याभावरूपत्वान्नाप्रसिद्धिर्दोषः, यत्र ह्यभावव्यापकतया हेत्वभावो गृह्यते, तत्रैव साध्यप्रसिद्धिरङ्गम्, इह तु जीवतादात्म्यव्यापकता हेत्वभावस्य ग्राह्या, तदभावो हेतुना साध्यत इति किं साध्यप्रसिद्ध्या ? तां विनापि व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्तेः, सन्देहरूपपक्षतासम्पत्तयेऽपि न तदपेक्षा, तस्यास्सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसाधकमानाभावरूपत्वेन सन्देहाघटित्वाद्, `ब्रह्म तत्त्वतो जीवभिन्नं न वे'ति सन्देहाभावेऽपि `जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदे तात्त्विकत्वमस्ति न वे'ति सन्देहसम्भवाच्च, प्रमेयत्वमेतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि न वेति सन्देहवदिति- चेत्, न, एवं हि प्रसिद्धेतरभेदः पृथिव्यामिव प्रसिद्धजीवभेदो ब्रह्मणि सिद्ध्यतु, न तद्गततात्त्वकत्वमपि, व्यापकव्यतिरेकस्य व्याप्यव्यतिरेकमात्रसाधनसमर्थत्वाद्, अन्यथातिप्रसङ्गात्। यदपि भेदतात्त्विकत्वं धर्मिनिष्ठत्वेन उदशङ्कि, तदपि साध्याप्रसिद्ध्या दुष्टम्। नापि ब्रह्म, जीवाद्, भिन्नम्, दुःखाननुभवितृत्वाद्, घटवदित्यन्वयि, सर्वानुभवितरि हेतोरसिद्धेः। स्वनिष्ठेति विशेषणे जीवे व्यभिचारः, दुःखस्यान्तःकरणनिष्ठत्वात्, मिथ्याभेदेन सिद्धसाधनाच्च। न च- भेदे साध्ये अर्थशून्यभ्रान्त्या सिद्धसाधनोक्त्ययोग इति- वाच्यम्, भ्रान्तेर्वस्तुशून्यत्वस्यैवाभावात्। उक्तमिदमनिर्वाच्यवादे। न चैतदनुमितिविषयतया प्रामाणिकत्वेन सिद्ध्यतः कथं मिथ्यात्वम् ? अनुमितिविषयतायाः प्रामाणिकत्वे अतन्त्रत्वात्। न चैवं मिथ्यात्वाद्यनुमानेऽपि कल्पितमिथ्यात्वादिना सिद्धसाधनापत्तिः, कल्पितत्वं व्यावहारिकत्वमभिप्रेतम् ? प्रातिभासिकत्वं वा ? आद्य इष्टापत्तेः, अन्त्ये हेतोस्स्वसमानसत्ताकसाध्यसाधकतया प्रातिभासिकत्वाप्रसक्तेः। एतेन- ब्रह्म, जीवप्रतियोगिकधर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकभेदवद्, दुःखाननुभवितृत्वाद्, अभ्रान्तत्वाद्, असंसारित्वाद्, घटवत्। जीवो वा, ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिकतादृग्भेदवान्, असर्वशक्त्यादिभ्य इति- निरस्तम्, उपहितस्य पक्षत्वे धर्मिसमसत्ताकत्वे सिद्धेऽपि तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धेः सिद्धसाधनात्। शोधिततत्त्वंपदार्थयोः पक्षत्वे तयोर्धर्मित्वाभावेन बाधापत्तेः। न च- धर्मित्वाधर्मित्वाभ्यां व्याघातः, ब्रह्मणः सर्वनिषेधस्वरूपत्वेन व्याघाताभावात्। न च धर्मिशब्देनाश्रयमात्रविवक्षा, धर्मित्ववदाश्रयत्वस्यापि तत्रासत्त्वात्। यत्तु धर्मिशब्दस्य पित्रादिशब्दवत् सम्बन्धिशब्दत्वेन यत्किञ्चिद्धर्मिसमसत्ताकतया न सिद्धसाधनमिति, तन्न, शब्दस्वभावोपन्यासस्यानुमानं प्रत्यनुपयोगात्। एतेन- धर्मिपदस्थाने स्वपदमिति- अपास्तम्, धर्मिपदतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात्। अत एव- धर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकपदस्थाने पारमार्थिकेति वा, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानेति वा स्वाज्ञानाकार्येति वा, स्वज्ञानाबाध्येति वा विशेषणं देयम्, स्वपदस्य समभिव्याहृततत्तदर्थपरत्वस्य व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वादितिनिरस्तम्, आद्ये साध्यवैकल्याच्च। न च- घटो जीवप्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, जीवधर्मिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्याभेदाप्रतियोगित्वाद्, यद्यज्ज्ञानाबाध्ययद्धर्मिकाभेदाप्रतियोगि, तत् तज्ज्ञानाबाध्यतत्प्रतियोगिकभेदवद्, यथा दूरस्थवनस्पत्योरेक इत्याद्यनुमानेन साध्यसिद्धेर्नाप्रसिद्धिरिति- वाच्यम्, यच्छब्दाननुगतेन पक्षधर्महेतौ व्याप्त्यग्रहाद्, धर्मित्वप्रतियोगित्वादिसामान्याकारेण व्याप्तिग्रहे विशिष्य साधनायोगात्। न च- एवं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तेत्यादौ का गतिरिति- वाच्यम्, तत्राप्येतद्दूषणसञ्चारेण व्यतिरेकिणि वानुमानान्तरे वा तात्पर्यात्। नापि- ब्रह्म तत्त्वतो जीवाभिन्नं नेति साध्यम्, एवं च न साध्यवैकल्यशङ्कापि, त्वन्मतेऽपि कल्पितघटे कल्पितजीवात् तात्त्विकभेदवत्तात्त्विकाभेदस्याप्यभावादिति- वाच्यम्, तात्त्विकाभेदस्यातात्त्विकेनाभावेन सिद्धसाधनस्योक्तत्वात्। नापि- जीवेश्वरौ, धर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यपरस्परप्रतियोगिकभेदवन्तौ, विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वात्, दहनतुहिनवत्। विरोधश्च परस्परात्यन्ताभावरूपत्वम्, तद्व्याप्यत्वं वा, कालभेदेनापि सामानाधिकरण्यायोग्यत्वं वा, संयोगतदत्यन्ताभावयोश्च सामानाधिकरण्यं मतद्वयेऽपि नेति न तदाश्रये व्यभिचार इति- वाच्यम्, धर्मिपदमादाय दोषस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वाद्, अव्याप्यवृत्तिदुःखशब्दाद्यधिकरणे व्यभिचाराच्च, जीवब्रह्माभेदसिद्धौ स्वतन्त्रत्वास्वतन्त्रत्वादीनां सामानाधिकरण्यायोग्यत्वरूपविरोधस्यैवासिद्ध्या स्वरूपासिद्धेः, कल्पितसार्वज्ञ्यासार्वज्ञ्यादिव्यवस्थाया वर्णे ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिव्यवस्थावत् कल्पितभेदेनैवोपपत्त्या स्वाभाविकभेदं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वाच्च। न च- "अल्पशक्तिरसार्वज्ञ्यं पारतन्त्र्यमपूर्णता। उपजीवकत्वं जीवत्वमीशत्वं तद्विपर्ययः।। स्वाभाविकं तयोरेतन्नान्यथा तु कथञ्चन।।" इत्यादिश्रुत्या सार्वज्ञ्यादेः स्वाभाविकत्वोक्त्या कल्पितत्वासिद्धिः, अनाद्यविद्यासिद्धत्वेनेदानीन्तनत्वाभावेन च स्वाभाविकत्वोक्तेः, तच्छब्देनोपहितयोरेव परामर्शात्। न तत्र स्वाभावाकित्वोक्तिविरोधः, न ह्युपहितेऽपि सर्वज्ञत्वादिकमागन्तुकम्। नापि ब्रह्म, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यजीवप्रतियोगिकभेदवत्, पदार्थत्वाद्, घटवत्। चेतनत्वम्, जीवत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवद्वृत्ति, सर्वचेतनवृत्तित्वात् चेतनावृत्तित्वरहितत्वाद्वा, शब्दार्थत्ववदिति- वाच्यम्, स्वपदधर्मिपदाननुगमतादवस्थ्याद्, अन्त्यहेतोर्जीवत्वे व्यभिचाराच्च, जडवृत्तित्वाद्युपाधिसत्त्वेन विपक्षबाधकाभावेन चाप्रयोजकत्वात्। ब्रह्मणो जीववत्संसारित्वापत्ताविष्टापत्तिः। कल्पितभेदेन वा परिहारो विधेयः। तदुक्तम्- `अप्रमेयेऽनुमानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न कथञ्चन। प्रमेयस्य त्वनात्मत्वात् तत्र भेदानुमेष्यते।।' शुद्धचैतन्ये धर्मानधिकरणतयानुमानाप्रसरः। यत्र प्रसरः, तत्रेष्टापत्तिरित्यर्थः। न च एवमैक्यानुमानमपि कथम् ? भवत्पद्यस्य तदैक्यानुमितिः कथमिति पठितुं शक्यत्वादिति- वाच्यम्, शुद्धचैतन्यैक्यस्य शब्दैकगम्यत्वेन तत्राननुमेयत्वस्येष्टत्वात्। न च तर्ह्यैक्यानुमानोपन्यासानर्थक्यम्, तस्य भेदे तात्त्विकत्वभ्रममात्रनिरासफलकत्वात्। तस्मात्। अप्रसिद्धविशेषत्वादन्यथैवोपपत्तितः। सर्वशक्त्यल्पशक्त्यादेर्न भेदे तन्त्रता ततः।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ जीवब्रह्मभेदानुमानभङ्गः।। 18 ।। 19. जीवानामन्योन्यभेदऽनुमानानि एवं जीवानामपि न परस्परभेदानुमानम्। (1) चैत्रो मैत्रप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, मैत्रप्रतियोगिकतात्त्विकाभेदवान्नेति वा, मैत्रानुसंहितदुःखाननुसन्धातृत्वात्, मैत्रस्मृतसर्वास्मर्तृत्वात्, मैत्रानुभूतसर्वाननुभवितृत्वाच्च, घटवदित्यत्र प्रथमसाध्ये धर्मिपदविकल्पेन द्वितीयसाध्ये तात्त्विकाभेदस्यातात्त्विकभेदेन सिद्धसाधनाद्, उपहितस्य पक्षत्वे अर्थान्तरात्, चैतन्यमात्रपक्षत्वे हेत्वसिद्धिः, साधनैकदेशस्याननुसन्धानादेरुपाधित्वसंभवाच्च। (2) विमतो बन्धध्वंसः, स्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नाधारप्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवन्निष्ठः, बन्धध्वंसत्वात् सम्मतवत्। (3) जीवः, संसारी, संसारध्वंसाधारो वा, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यजीवप्रतियोगिकभेदवान्, संसारिप्रतियोगिकस्वज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान् वा, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यसंसारध्वंसाधिकरणप्रतियोगिकभेदवान्वा, पदार्थत्वाद्, घटवत्। विमत आनन्दः, स्वनिष्ठदुःखविरोधित्वव्याप्यधर्मेण सजातीयप्रतियोगिकस्वज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, दुःखविरोधित्वाद्, दुःखाभाववद्, इत्यादिषु बन्धप्रतियोगिकभेदवति कालादौ ध्वंसस्य विद्यमानत्वेनार्थान्तराद्, दुःखनिगडसाधारणबन्धत्वासंभवाच्च, स्वपदाननुगमाच्च। चैत्रबन्धध्वंसः, चैत्रबन्धाधारप्रतियोगिकभेदवन्निष्ठः, बन्धध्वंसत्वात्, संमतवदित्याभाससाम्याच्च, विपक्षबाधकाभावाच्च। ध्वंसप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं न नानाबन्धानुगतबन्धत्वम्, तस्य सामान्याभावत्वाभावात्। एतेन- (1) आत्ममात्रभेदे आत्मा, आत्मप्रतियोगिकस्वज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, पदार्थत्वाद्, घटवत्। आत्मवैभवपक्षे (2) आकाशः, आत्मप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदाधारविशेषगुणवद्विभुव्यतिरिक्तः, द्रव्यत्वात्, पृथिवीवत्। (3) पृथिवीत्वं जलत्वतेजस्त्ववायुत्वमनस्त्वेतरद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिभिन्नम्, प्रमेयत्वाज्जलत्ववत्। गगनत्वजातिपक्षे तदितरत्वमपि विशेषणम्। (4) सत्ता, द्रव्यत्वान्यात्मनिष्ठजात्यन्या, द्रव्यत्वं वा सत्तान्यात्मनिष्ठजात्यन्यत्, मेयत्वाद्। घटवत्, आत्माणुत्वमते (5) आत्मा, द्रव्यत्व व्याप्यजातिमान्, अविभुद्रव्यत्वाद्, घटवदित्यादिभिरात्मत्वजातिसिद्धौ तात्त्विकात्मभेदसिद्धिरिति- निरस्तम्; आद्ये जडत्वमुपाधिः, आत्मपदयोः स्थाने चैत्रपदं प्रक्षिप्याभाससाम्यं च। द्वितीये शब्दानाश्रयत्वमुपाधिः, विभावात्मान्यत्वं विशेषणं दत्वा आत्माकाशभिन्नस्य विभोर्विशेषगुणवतः साधनप्रसङ्गाच्च। जातिपक्षकानुमानेषु कल्पितव्यक्तिभेदेनापि तस्याः जातेरुपपत्त्या तात्त्विकव्यक्तिभेदपर्यवसायित्वेनार्थान्तरात्। न च- जातेः धर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदं विनाऽयोगः अन्यथा व्यक्त्यभेदः क्वापि जातिबाधको न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, जातेर्व्यक्तिभेदसमानसत्ताकत्वनियमेन प्रातिभासिकभेदस्य व्यावहारिकजातिं प्रति न साधकत्वमिति व्यक्त्यभेदस्य जातिबाधकत्वसम्भवात्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ जीवभेदानुमानभङ्गः।। 19 ।। 20. आत्मभेदे अनुकूलतर्काः ननु- यद्यात्मैक्यं स्यात्, चैत्रेण सर्वदुःखाद्यनुसन्धानं स्याद् इति- चेन्न, औपाधिकभेदेनाननुसन्धानोपपत्तेः। ननु- हस्तपादाद्युपाधिभेदेऽप्यनुसन्धानदर्शनाद् उपाधिभेदोऽप्रयोजकः, न च विश्लिष्टोपाधिभेदस्तत्र तन्त्रम्, मातृसुखादेर्गर्भस्थेनानुसन्धानापातात्। भारते- `उद्यतायुधदोर्दण्डाः पतितस्वशिरोक्षिभिः। पश्यन्तः पातयन्ति स्म कबन्धा अप्यरीन्युधि।।' इत्यादिना विश्लेषेऽप्यनुसन्धानोक्तेश्चेति चेन्न, न हि वयं यत्किंचिदुपाधिमात्रमननुसन्धानप्रयोजकं ब्रूमः, किंत्वन्तःकरणरूपोपाधिभेदमविद्याभेदं वा। सा च भेदः कबन्धे योगिनि च नास्त्येव। तेन तत्रानुसन्धानं चैत्रमैत्रयोश्चास्तीति अननुसन्धानम्। एतेनशरीररूपोपाधिभेदस्याननुसन्धानप्रयोजकत्वे बाल्यानुभूतस्य यौवने जातिस्मरेण पूर्वजन्मानुभूतस्य योगिना नानाशरीरानुभूतस्य च स्मरणं न स्यादिति- निरस्तम्, शरीरभेदस्य तत्रातन्त्रत्वाद्, योगिजातिस्मृर्तॄणामन्तःकरणैक्यात्। न च- चैतन्यैक्ये अन्तःकरणभेदस्य नाननुसन्धानप्रयोजकत्वम्, चक्षुरादिकरणभेदेऽप्यनुसन्धानदर्शनादिति- वाच्यम्, अन्यकरणभेदेन तथा दर्शनेऽप्यन्तःकरणभेदस्य तदैक्याध्यासापन्ने अननुसन्धानप्रयोजकत्वं कल्प्यते, अन्यथा ब्रह्मैक्यस्य जीवे श्रुतिसिद्धतया सर्वानुसन्धानापत्तेः। न च- अन्तःकरणस्य प्रत्यहं सुषुप्तौ विलयेन पूर्वदिनानुभूतस्याननुसन्धानापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, संस्कारात्मनावस्थितस्यैव पुनरुद्बोधेन तत्रान्तःकरणभेदाभावात्। न च- एवं सुषुप्तप्रलीनमुक्तानामननुसन्धानप्रयोजकान्तःकरणभेदाभावात् संसारिदुःखानुसन्धानापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, तेषामनुसन्धानप्रयोजकान्तःकरणैक्याध्यासरूपसामग्रीविरहात्। न हि प्रतिबन्धकमात्रेण कार्यविरहः, किन्तु सामग्रीविरहेणापि। न च- एवं मुक्तस्य स्वरूपसुखानुभवोऽपि न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, तस्याजन्यत्वेनान्तःकरणानपेक्षत्वात्, जीवविभाजकोपाध्यज्ञानभेदाभेदाभ्यामनुसन्धानाननुसन्धानोपपत्तेश्च। न च- ज्ञानप्रागभाववदज्ञानस्यापि भेदाभेदयोस्तत्राप्रयोजकत्वम्, यावन्ति ज्ञानानि तावन्त्यज्ञानानीति मते एकस्मिन्नपि जीवे ब्रह्मविषयकाज्ञानानां भिन्नत्वेनानुसन्धानविरहप्रसङ्ग इति- वाच्यम्, ज्ञानप्रागभावानां ज्ञानसमसङ्ख्याज्ञानानां च जीवविभाजकत्वाभावेनानुसन्धानादावप्रयोजकत्वात्। यत्तु- मुक्तस्यैव संसारदुःखानुसन्धानापत्तिः, अविद्यारूपोपाधिभेदाननुसन्धाने स्वरूपसुखस्याप्यननुभवापातः- इति, तन्न, वैषयिकसुखाद्यनुसन्धाने तस्य तन्त्रत्वेन स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपस्फुरणे तदनपेक्षत्वात्। ननु- एवमनेकाविद्यासंबन्धस्य दुःखानुसन्धानस्वरूपस्यानर्थस्य च विशिष्टगतत्वे बन्धमोक्षयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापातेन शुद्धगतत्वे वाच्ये यच्छुद्धं चैत्रीयदुःखानुसन्धातृ, तदेव मैत्रीयदुःखानुसन्धात्रिति कथमनुसन्धानाननुसन्धानव्यवस्थेति- चेन्न, अविद्यात्मकबन्धनिवृत्त्यात्मकमोक्षस्य शुद्धगतत्वेऽपि दुःखाद्यनुसन्धातृत्वस्य उपहितवृत्तितया शुद्धभेदापादनायोगात्। न च संसारस्य शुद्धगतत्वे ब्रह्मणोऽपि संसारित्वापत्तिः, बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरवदातत्वश्यामत्ववद् घटाकाशमहाकाशयोः परिच्छिन्नत्वापरिच्छिन्नत्ववद् एकस्यैव नभसस्तत्तत्कर्णपुटावच्छेदेन तत्र तत्र श्रोत्रतावच्च औपाधिकभेदेन संसारित्वासंसारित्वव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। अत एव- दुःखानुसन्धानरूपस्यानर्थस्य उपहितनिष्ठत्वेन तस्य कल्पितत्वेन बद्धस्य निवृत्तिरेव, न तु मोक्ष इत्यापात इति- निरस्तम्, उपाधेः कल्पितत्वेन निवृत्तावप्युपधेयस्याकल्पिततया तन्निवृत्त्ययोगान्मोक्षान्वयोपपत्तेः। न च प्रतिबिम्बस्य छायावद्वस्त्वन्तरत्वेनाकाशस्यापि त्वन्मतेऽपि कार्यद्रव्यतया सावयवत्वेन तैजसाहङ्कारकार्याणां श्रोत्राणां स्वत एव भिन्नत्वेन दृष्टान्तासंमतिरिति- वाच्यम्, प्रतिबिम्बे वस्त्वन्तरत्वस्य निरसिष्यमाणत्वाद्, आकाशश्रोत्रभावस्य पररीत्या दृष्टान्तत्वाद्, `आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिण' इति श्रुतेर्विशिष्टस्यैव भोक्तृत्वात्तस्य भिन्नत्वाद् व्यवस्थेति कौमुद्युक्तप्रकारेणापि अनुसन्धानाननुसन्धानोपपत्तेश्च। अत एव- शुद्धचिन्मात्रगतत्वे तत्र भेदाप्रतीत्या भेदस्य कल्पितस्याप्यभावः, भावे वा भेदस्यैव व्यवस्थारूपस्वकार्यकारिणो वह्नावुष्णत्ववद्धर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यत्वम्, अभेदस्य त्वव्यवस्थारूपस्वकार्याकारिणोऽनुष्णत्ववन्मिथ्यात्वमित्यापातः, आविद्यकभेदहीनस्य मुक्तस्य संसारिदुःखानुभवापातश्च इति- निरस्तम्, व्यवस्थायाः स्वसमानसत्ताकभेदकार्यत्वेन स्वाधिकसत्ताकभेदाऽनाक्षेपकत्वाद्, अव्यवस्थायाः शुद्धचैतन्याभेदाकार्यत्वेन तदकारित्वप्रयुक्तमिथ्यात्वस्यापादयितुमशक्यत्वात्, उपाध्यभेदस्यैव तत्र तन्त्रत्वात्। किंचोपाधिकल्पितांशजीवानां वानुसन्धानमापाद्यते ? अंशिनो ब्रह्मणो वा ? नाद्यः, हस्तावच्छिन्नेन पादावच्छिन्नदुःखाद्यननुसन्धानात्। न च- न वयं भोगायतनानां साङ्कर्यमापादयामः, येन पादे मे वेदना शिरसि मे सुखमिति न स्यात, किंत्वनुसन्धानमात्रम्, तच्चांशानामस्त्येवं, अन्यथा चैत्रदेहलग्नकण्टकोद्धरणाय मैत्रस्येव पादलग्नकण्टकोद्धरणाय हस्तस्य व्यापारो न स्यादिति- वाच्यम्, पादावच्छिन्नदुःखस्य हस्तावच्छिन्ने अनुत्पादनवत् चैत्रीयदुःखाद्यनुसंधानस्य मैत्रेऽनुत्पादः। हस्ते दुःखप्रयोजकसामगीविरहवत् मैत्रे अनुसन्धानप्रयोजकोपाध्यैक्याभावात्। तथा च हस्तावच्छेदेनानुसन्धानमस्त्येवेति न तत्र व्यापाराभावापत्तिः। नान्त्यः तस्याभोक्तृत्वेन भोगाप्रसङ्गात्, दुःखादिज्ञानमात्रस्य च सर्वज्ञे तस्मिन्निष्टत्वात्। न च भोक्तृजीवाभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणोऽपि भोक्तृत्वापत्तिः, बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बवद्व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः, अनुसन्धानस्यावच्छिन्नगततया शुद्धब्रह्मण्यापादनायोगाच्च। न चैतावता बन्धमोक्षयोर्वैयधिकरण्यम्, अविद्यात्मकबन्धस्य शुद्धगतत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेः अवच्छिन्नस्यानुसन्धातृत्वेऽप्यवस्थात्रयानुस्यूताविद्यावच्छिन्नद्वारा शुद्धे अनुसन्धातृत्वस्येष्टत्वाद्, `अनेन जीवेने'त्यादिश्रुतेः। किञ्च यथा स्वकर्णपुटपरिच्छिन्ननादोपलम्भे भागान्तरवर्त्तिनादानुपलम्भः, तथा सुखदुःखाद्युपलम्भानुपलम्भौ। न च- आत्मभेदे कर्णपुटानां तत्तदीयत्वनियामकवदेकात्मवादे सर्वदेहानां स्वीयत्वेन तत्तदीयत्वनियमाभावेन व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, तवात्मभेदेनेवावच्छेदकज्ञानादिभेदेन मम व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। किञ्च व्यवस्थया भेदं वदन् प्रष्टव्यः केयं व्यवस्था ? न तावद्धर्मभेदः, एकस्मिन्नेव सुखदुःखदर्शनेन व्यभिचाराद्, भिन्नाश्रयधर्मोक्तौ अन्योन्याश्रयाद्, विरुद्धधर्मोक्तौ तु विरुद्धत्वस्य सहानवस्थानरूपत्वे असिद्धेः, बाध्यबाधकभावरूपत्वे तस्यैकाश्रयत्वेनोपपत्त्या भेदासाधकत्वात्। नाप्यनुसन्धानाननुसन्धाने, तयोरुक्तेन प्रकारेण उपाधिभेदेनोपपत्तेरात्मभेदासाधकत्वस्योक्तत्वात्। अत एव बन्धमुक्त्यादिव्यवस्थापिन स्वाभाविकभेदसाधनाय, तत्तदुपाध्युपगमापगमाभ्यामेव व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। न चोपाधेरप्युपहितनिष्ठत्वेनात्माश्रयादिर्दोषः, उपाधेरविशेषणत्वेन व्यक्त्यन्तरानपेक्षत्वेन चात्माश्रयादिचतुर्णामनवकाशात्। एतेन शुद्धनिष्ठत्वे किमेकैकोपाध्यपगमो मुक्तिः ? उत सर्वोपाध्यपगमः ? नाद्यः, सदा मुक्तिरेव, न तु बन्ध इत्यापातात्। नान्त्यः, अधुना बन्धः, एव न कस्यापि मुक्तिरित्यापातादिति निरस्तम्, येनोपाधिना यस्य चैतन्यस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वं तस्मिन् चैतन्ये तदुपाध्यपगमस्यैव मुक्तित्वे नानाजीववादे पूर्वोक्तदोषानवकाशात्। एकजीववादे सर्वोपाध्यपगमस्यैव मुक्तितया इदानीं मुक्त्यभावस्येष्टत्वात्। ननु- उपाधेः कथं भेदकत्वम्, तथा हि- उपाधिः किमेकदेशेन सम्बध्यते ? कृत्स्नेन वा ? आद्ये त्वन्मते स्वाभाविकांशाभावेनौपाधिकत्वं वाच्यम्, तथा चानवस्था। अन्त्ये न भेदकता, कृत्स्नस्यैकोपाधिग्रस्तत्वात्। गगनादावपि स्वाभाविकांशाभावे घटाद्युपाधिसम्बन्धो न स्यादेव। तदुक्तम्- न चेदुपाधिसम्बन्ध एकदेशेऽथ सर्वगः। एकदेशेऽनवस्था स्यात् सर्वगश्चेन्न भेदकः।। इति- चेन्न, सर्वविकल्पासहत्वेन मिथ्याभूतस्यैवोपाधेर्मिथ्याभेदप्रयोजकत्वस्य प्रागेवोपपादनात्। यथा चात्मनां सर्वगतानां भेदे व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः, तथा प्रपञ्चितं भाष्यकृद्भिः।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ जीवभेदानुकूलतर्कभङ्गः।। 20 ।। 21. भेदपञ्चके अनुमानानि एवं जडेशभेदे जडेदीवभेदे च तात्त्विके प्रमाणं नास्ति। (1) ब्रह्म, जीवो वा, अनात्मप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, पदार्थत्वाद्, घटवत्, (2) ब्रह्म जीवो वा, घटप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, घटासम्बन्धिकालसम्बधित्वात्, तदसम्बन्धिदेशसम्बन्धित्वात्, तज्जनकाजन्यत्वाद् वा पटवत्, (3) ब्रह्म जीवो वा, जडप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवान्, जडानात्मकत्वाद्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा दूरस्थवनस्पत्योरेक इत्यादिषु पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तेः, परिच्छिन्नत्वस्य जडत्वस्य जन्यत्वस्य चोपाधित्वाद्, अप्रयोजकत्वाच्च। जीवो ब्रह्म वा, आत्मप्रतियोगिकतादृग्भेदाधिकरणम्, पदार्थत्वादित्याद्याभाससाम्याच्च। न च- घटाभेदे घटसिद्ध्यैव तत्सिद्ध्या वेदान्तवैयर्थ्यम्, ब्रह्मणो जडत्वानित्यत्वाद्यापत्तिः, मुक्तिसमानाधिकरणबन्धाधारस्य जीवस्य जडवन्निवृत्त्यापत्तिः, गोरोऽहमित्यादिप्रतीतिश्च प्रमा स्यादित्यादिविपक्षबाधकान्नाभाससाम्यादिकमिति- वाच्यम्, स्वप्रकाशत्वेन सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वेन च ब्रह्मसिद्धावपि सविलासाज्ञाननिवर्तकज्ञानाय वेदान्तसाफल्यस्य बहुधाभिधानात्। घटादौ कल्पितव्यक्त्यन्तरेणाकल्पितभेदस्याभावेऽपि न यथा कल्पितव्यक्त्यात्मकत्वं तद्वत् प्रातिभासिकत्वतद्वद्विशेषदर्शनेन निवृत्तिर्वा कल्पितव्यक्त्यन्तरेणैक्यज्ञानप्रमात्वं वा, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि कल्पितजडेन तदभावेऽपि न तदात्मकत्वादीति न विपक्षबाधकस्याप्यप्रसरः। एवं जडानामन्योन्यभेदेऽपि नानुमानम्। (1) घटः, तत्त्वतः शुक्त्यभिन्नो न शुक्तिसम्बद्धकालासम्बन्धित्वात्, तज्जनकाजन्यत्वात्तत्रारोपितरूप्यवद्, व्यावहारिकभेदस्य त्वयाप्यङ्गीकारेण न पक्षदृष्टान्ताद्यनुपपत्तिः, अन्यथा भेदसिद्ध्यसिद्ध्योर्दोषतदभावयोश्चाभेदेन स्वक्रियाविरोधः स्यादिति। अत्र तात्त्विकशुक्त्यभिन्नत्वरूपप्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्ध्या साध्याप्रसिद्धेः, तत्त्वत इत्यस्य नेत्यत्र विशेषणत्वे सुतरामप्रसिद्धेः, घटादिसमसत्ताकभेदमात्रेण हेतोरुपपत्त्या अप्रयोजकत्वाच्च, भेदस्य तात्त्विकत्वे बाधस्योक्तत्वेन बाधाच्च। (2) अनात्मा, स्ववृत्तिधर्मानाधारज्ञानबाध्यान्तर्गणिकभेदवान्, पदार्थत्वादात्मवद्। विपक्षे च दूरस्थवनस्पत्योः शुक्तिरूप्ययोश्चाभेदग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं तत्त्वावेदकं स्यात् मुक्तिसंसारादिसाङ्कर्यं च स्यादित्यादि बाधकमिति यत्, तन्न, एकत्र घटे कल्पिता ये अनेके घटाः, तेषु स्ववृत्तिधर्मानधिकरणघटज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवत्सु व्यभिचारात्। यत्किञ्चित्स्ववृत्तिधर्मानाधारोक्तौ घटत्वानधिकरणपटज्ञानाबाध्यभेदेनात्मज्ञानबाध्येनार्थान्तरम्। स्ववृत्त्यशेषधर्मानाधारोक्तौ तव मते ब्रह्मणोऽपि वाच्यत्वादिकेवलान्वयिधर्माधारत्वेन साध्याप्रसिद्धेः, कल्पितेन सह तात्त्विकभेदाभाववत् तात्त्विकाभेदस्याप्यभावेन उदाहृतस्थले तत्त्वावेदकत्वसाङ्कर्यादीनामप्रसङ्गात्। यत्तु आत्मनामात्मानात्मनोश्छ परस्परं तात्त्विकभेदे- अनात्मा, स्वावृत्तिधर्माधिकरणप्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदाधिकरणं यत्स्वावृत्तिधर्माधिकरणं तत्प्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदाधिकरणम्, पदार्थत्वादात्मवत्, पक्षे स्वावृत्तिधर्माधिकरणमात्मा, ततो भिन्नादात्मान्तराद्भिन्नत्वेन साध्यसिद्धिः। दृष्टान्ते च स्वावृत्तिधर्माधिकरणं जडम्, ततो भिन्नात् जडान्तरात् भिन्नत्वेन साध्यसत्त्वमिति, तन्न, पक्षदृष्टान्तयोः स्वपदार्थप्रतियोगिपदार्थयोरननुगमेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धेः, अजडत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च, जडत्वेन व्यतिरेकिणा सत्प्रतिपक्षाच्च। यदपि जीवस्य ब्रह्मतो जीवाच्च जडस्य सत्यभेदे- पृथिवी, ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानबाध्यभेदाधिकरणं यदप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणम्, तत्प्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवती, वस्तुत्वात्तोयवत्, अप्त्वादीत्यादिशब्देन तत्तद्वादिनः प्रति तत्तद्वादिसिद्धाः पृथिवीत्वभिन्नाः जडनिष्ठा धर्मा विवक्षिताः। पक्षे ब्रह्मभिन्नाज्ज्वीवात् भिन्नत्वेन साध्यसिद्धिः। दृष्टान्ते तु ब्रह्मभिन्नपार्थिवभिन्नत्वेनेति। तन्न। अप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणत्ववज्जीवत्वानधिकरणेत्यपि विशेषणं दत्वा जीवब्रह्मभिन्नात्मनोऽपि साधनप्रसङ्गाद्, गन्धाधारत्वादिव्यतिरेकिणा सत्प्रतिपक्षसम्भवाच्च, धर्मिपदविकल्पनिबन्धनदोषतादवस्थ्याच्च। एतेन- जीवस्य ब्रह्मजीवान्तराभ्यां जीवाच्च जडस्य भेदे- पूर्वप्रयोग एव जीवस्य जीवान्तराद्भेदसिध्यर्थमन्तर्गणिकभेदवदित्यप्त्वानधिकरणेत्यत्र विशेषणं दत्वानुमानम्। अत्र च पक्षे ब्रह्मणः परस्परं च भिन्नाज्जीवाद् भिन्नत्वेन साध्यसिद्धिः, दृष्टान्ते तु ब्रह्मणः परस्परञ्च भिन्नात् पार्थिवाद् भिन्नत्वेनेति - निरस्तम्। जीवस्य ब्रह्मजीवान्तराभ्यां जडस्य च जीवात् ब्रह्मणो जडाच्च भेदे- पृथिवी, ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिकधर्मिज्ञानाबांध्यबेदाधिकरणम् अप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणमान्तर्गणिकभेदवच्च यत्तत्प्रतियोगिकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाबांध्यभेदवत्त्वे सति अप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणासंसारिधर्मिकधर्मिज्ञानाबाध्यभेदप्रतियोगिनी, वस्तुत्वादम्बुवदित्यत्र ब्रह्मणो जडादपि भेदार्थं पूर्वस्मादधिकमप्त्वानधिकरणासंसारीत्यादि विशेषणम्। अत्र पक्षे अप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणमसंसारि ब्रह्म, तद्धर्मिकभेदप्रतियोगित्वेन साध्यसिद्धिः, दृष्टान्ते त्वप्त्वाद्यनधिकरणासंसारि पार्थिवम्, तद्धर्मिकभेदप्रतियोगित्वेन ज्ञेयम्। अत्र जीवत्वानधिकरणत्वस्य अप्त्वानधिकरणेत्यत्र विशेषणत्वेन पूर्ववदाभाससाम्यात्, पाकजरूपाधिकरणत्वादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षाच्च, धर्मादिपदविकल्पग्रासाच्च। एवं भेदमात्रेऽपि नानुमानम्। (1) ब्रह्म, भेदहीनं नावतिष्ठते स्वज्ञानाबाध्यभेदवद्वा, पदार्थत्वाद्, घटवद् इति; तन्न मुक्त्यसहवृत्तित्वस्य जडत्वस्य चोपाधित्वात्, स्वपदविकल्पग्रासाच्च। एतेन (2) अनात्मा स्वान्यज्ञानाबाध्य भेदाधिकरणम्। पदार्थत्वाद्, आत्मवदिति- निरस्तम्। (3) ब्रह्मभेदो न सर्वनिष्ठात्यन्तभावप्रतियोगी, ब्रह्मनिरूप्यत्वाद्, ब्रह्माभेदवदित्यत्र ब्रह्माभिन्नावृत्तित्वमुपाधिः, ब्रह्माभेदस्याब्रह्मनिरूप्यत्वेन तदनिरूप्यतया साधनवैकल्यं च। (4) ब्रह्मज्ञानं, स्वाबाध्यभेदवद्विषयकम्, ज्ञानत्वाच्छुक्तिज्ञानवदित्यत्राज्ञानात्मविषयत्वमुपाधिः। स्वपदेन ब्रह्मज्ञानोक्तौ तदबाध्यभेदाप्रसिद्ध्या साध्याप्रसिद्धिः, शुक्तिज्ञानोक्तौ सिद्धसाधनम्। (5) घटो घटसंसर्गानवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपटादिधर्मिकत्रैकालिकाभावप्रतियोगी, द्रव्यत्वात्, पटवदित्यत्र काल्पनिकाभावस्यापि कालत्रयवृत्तित्वसंभवेन सिद्धसाधनम्, घटसंसर्गानवच्छिन्नेतिवत्तादात्म्यानवच्छिन्नेत्यपि विशेषणं दत्वा पञ्चमाभावसाधनस्यापि प्रसङ्गश्च, विपक्षबाधकाभावस्य उभयत्र सत्त्वात्। (6) समानाधिकरणकर्मप्रागभावसमानकालीनज्ञानबाधायोग्यो भेदः, परमार्थसन्, प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वात्, स्वासत्त्वागोचरप्रमां प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वाद्, आरोपितमिथ्यात्वकत्वात्, कल्पकरहितत्वात्, स्वविषयकसाक्षात्कारात् पूर्वभावित्वाद्, आत्मवत्। (7) ब्रह्मजीवप्रतियोगिको भेदः, परमार्थसन्, अनादित्वादात्मवत्। (8) साक्षिवेद्यसुखदुःखादिभेदः, परमार्थसन्, अनिषेध्यत्वेन दोषाजन्यज्ञानं प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वात् (9) धर्माधर्मयागदानादिभेदः, परमार्थसन्, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वादित्यादिष्वात्मसाधारणधर्माणां चेतनत्वादीनामुपाधित्वं जडत्वादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षश्च, मिथ्यात्वसाधकानां प्राबल्यस्योक्तत्वेन तैर्बाधश्च। आद्ये च प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वात्मकत्वे असिद्धिः, ब्रह्मज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वोक्तौ चरमवृत्त्यव्यवहितप्रातिभासिके व्यभिचारश्च। द्वितीयहेतौ तादृक्प्रमाविषयत्वस्य भेदपारमार्थिकत्वसिद्ध्यधीनत्वेन साध्याविशेषपर्यवसानम्। तृतीये चरमवृत्त्यन्यबाध्यमिथ्यात्वकत्वस्योपाधित्वम्। चतुर्थे अविद्यारूपकल्पकसत्त्वेनासिद्धिः। पञ्चमे दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे असिद्धिः, इतरत्राप्रयोजकता। अनादित्वं च अज्ञानादौ व्यभिचारि। दोषाजन्यज्ञानं प्रतीत्यत्र श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वादित्यत्र चासिद्धिः, साक्ष्यवच्छेदकवृत्तेर्दोषजन्यत्वात्, मुख्यतस्तात्पर्यस्य तत्राभावात्। तस्माद् भेदपञ्चकं नानुमानविषयः।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ भेजपञ्चके अनुमानभङ्गः।। 21 ।। 22. भेदश्रुतेः अनुवादकत्वभङ्गः ननु- भेदतात्त्विकत्वे `द्वा सुपर्णा,' `य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्,' `नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्,' `अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्य' इति श्रुतयो मानमिति- चेन्न, द्वा सुपर्णेत्यत्र पूर्वार्धे न भेदः प्रमेयः, अपदार्थत्वादवाक्यार्थत्वाच्च। द्वित्वस्य स्वाश्रयप्रतियोगिकभेदसमानाधिकरणत्वनियमात्। श्रुतद्वित्वार्थापत्तिसमधिगम्यस्यापि भेदस्य श्रौतत्वमिति चेत् न। द्वौ चन्द्रमसावित्यत्रेव कल्पितभेदेनाप्युपपत्तेः तात्विक भेदानाक्षेपकत्वात्। अत एव नोत्तरार्धस्यापि तात्त्विकभेदपरत्वम्, वस्तुतस्त्वस्याः श्रुतेः पैङ्गिरहस्यब्राह्मणे बुद्धिजीवपरतया व्याकृतत्वेन जीवेशभेदपरत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। `य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इत्यादावाधाराधेयभावस्य `चेतनश्चेतनाना'मिति निर्धारणस्य `अजोऽन्य' इत्यत्र भेदव्यपदेशस्य काल्पनिकभेदमादायाप्युपपत्तेः भेदतात्त्विकत्वापर्यवसायित्वात्, श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधाच्च। न चैतत् श्रुतिविरोधात् सैव श्रुतिरन्यपरा, भेदश्रुतेः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धभेदानुवादत्वेन हीनबलत्वात्। न च जीवत्वावच्छिन्नजीवभेदस्याप्राप्त्या `न हिंस्या'दित्यादिवदननुवादत्वम्, जीवेश्वरभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धतया तदन्यथानुपपत्तिसिद्धेशधर्मिकजीवत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धतुल्यकक्ष्यतया तद्बोधकश्रुतेरनुवादत्वोपपत्तेः। न हिंस्यादित्यत्र नानुवादत्वशङ्कापि, ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्य इत्यादेः पुरोवादकत्वनिर्णायकाभावात्। न च - पुंविशेषं प्रत्यस्यार्थवत्त्वं शाखान्तरस्थविधिवाक्यवदिति- वाच्यम्, एकस्यानेकशाखाध्ययनासंभवात्, प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वपुरुषसाधारण्येन प्राथमिकप्रसरत्वेन च पुरुषविशेषं प्रत्यपि सार्थकत्वस्य वक्तुशक्यत्वात्। न च- द्वयोः प्रणयन्ती'त्यादिवद् वर्तमानमात्रग्राहिप्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तकालत्रयाबाध्यभेदप्रापकत्वमिति-वाच्यम्, अजो ह्यन्य इत्यादौ त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वबोधकपदाभावात्। न च- अभेदे षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवद्दार्ढ्यार्थत्वं भेदश्रुतेरिति- वाच्यम्, तत्र प्रयोजनवत्त्वेऽप्यनुवादत्वापरिहाराद् अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजमितिवत्। न च `षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयादि'तिवत् प्रतिप्रसवार्थत्वम्, तदपेक्षया हीनबलत्वेन प्रतिप्रसवायोगात्, भेदनिषेधकश्रुतेः भेदतात्त्विकत्वनिषेधपरत्वेन भेदस्वरूपप्रतिपादकवाक्यस्य तत्प्रतिप्रसवायोगात्। न च प्रत्यक्षस्याप्रामाण्ये श्रुतेस्तत्सिद्धानुवादकत्वायोगः, तस्या ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वमात्रेणानुवादकत्वोपपत्तेः। न च- एवमपि निरपेक्षानुवादत्वेन धारावाहिकद्वितीयादिज्ञानवत् प्रमात्वोपपत्तिरिति- वाच्यम्, निरपेक्षसापेक्षसाधारणानुवादत्वमात्रस्याप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वाद्, दृष्टान्तस्यातिरिक्तकालकलाविषयत्वेनानधिगतार्थ विषयतया विषमत्वात्। न च विद्वद्वाक्यवत् सप्रयोजनानुवादत्वेन स्वार्थपरता, तस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वेऽपि द्वित्वसम्पादकतया स्वार्थपरत्वाभावात्। न च यत्तन्नेत्यादिनिषेधार्थानुवादलिङ्गाभावेन विधेयान्तरश्रवणेन च निषेधार्थानुवादत्वायोगः, यत्तदित्यादेरनुवादलिङ्गत्वेऽपि अनुवादव्यापकत्वाभावाद्, अन्येनापि ह्युन्नयनसंभवाद्, `ब्रह्मणो न हन्तव्य' इत्यादौ यत्तत्पदाभावेऽपि निषेधानुवाददर्शनाद्, विधेयान्तरसत्त्वे तु निषेधार्थानुवादकत्वाभावेऽपि तदर्थानुवादत्वापरिहारात्। न चैवं विधानार्थानुवादे तात्त्विकत्वनियमः, यद्रजतं तदानयेत्यादौ अन्यविधानार्थं भ्रान्तिसिद्धानुवादे तात्त्विकत्वादर्शनात्। न च- अनुवादत्वेऽपि यथार्थत्वरूपप्रामाण्याहानिरिति- वाच्यम्, तस्य बाधकाभावनिबन्धनत्वेन प्रकृते असंभवात्। ननु- औपनिषदस्य ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रातिरिक्तेनाप्राप्तेः तद्धर्मिकस्य तत्प्रतियोगिकस्य वा भेदस्य कथं शास्त्रनिरपेक्षप्रत्यक्षादिना प्राप्तिरिति- चेन्न, प्रतियोगिग्रहार्थं तदपेक्षत्वेऽपि स्वसमानविषयप्रमाणपूर्वकत्वानियमेन प्रत्यक्षस्य भेदप्रापकत्वोपपत्तेः। यद्यपीशधर्मिकस्य भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्तिः, तथापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धजीवधर्मिकेशभेदान्यथानुपपत्तिसिद्धस्यापि तस्य श्रुतार्थापत्तिसिद्धस्य श्रौतत्ववत् प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वोपपत्तेः। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ भेदश्रुतेरनुवादकत्वम्।। 22 ।। 23. भेदश्रुतेः व्यावहारिकभेदपरत्वभङ्गः अथवानुवादकत्वाभावेऽपि व्यावहारिकभेदपरत्वेनैव श्रुत्युपपत्तिः। न चाप्रामाण्यापातः, अर्थवादवाक्यवदुपपत्तेः, प्रतीयमानार्थे चाभेदश्रुतिविरोधेनाप्रामाण्यस्येष्टत्वाच्च। न चाभेदश्रुतेरखण्डचिन्मात्रपरत्वेन भेदाविरोधित्वम्, तद्द्वारीभूतार्थमादाय तद्विरोधात्। नापि वैपरीत्यम्, प्राप्ताप्राप्तार्थत्वाभ्यां विशेषात्। न च- ऐक्यश्रुतेरपि प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धत्वादप्रामाण्यम्, मानान्तरप्राप्तिवत् तद्विरोधस्यापि दौर्बल्यहेतुत्वादिति वाच्यम्, विरोधे विरोधिनो मानत्ववद् अनुवादकत्वोपपादकस्य मानताया अनपेक्षितत्वात्। किञ्च षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवत्त्वाद् ऐक्यश्रुतेः प्राबल्यम्। न च- तात्पर्यमात्रज्ञापकत्वेन तेषामर्थतथात्वाज्ञापकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, श्रुतेस्तत्परत्वज्ञापनेन परम्परयोपयोगात्, एतद्विरुद्धश्रुतेः श्रूयमाणेऽर्थे तात्पर्याभावसम्पादनेनाधिकबलसम्पादकत्वाच्च। न च अत्रापि स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन् पूर्णः परः जीवसंघो ह्यपूर्ण इत्याद्युपपत्तिरूपं `सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदेत्यभ्यासादिरूपं तात्पर्यलिङ्गमस्तीति भेदश्रुतिरपि तत्परेति वाच्यम्, अत्तीति अपूर्ण इति च जीवानुवादेन तस्य पूर्णब्रह्मरूपताविधानार्थत्वेन भेदोपपत्तित्वाभावात्। सत्यं भिदेति न भेदाभ्यासः, एतद्वाक्यस्याप्रामाणिकत्वात्, प्रामाणिकत्वे वा बाधायां सामानाधिकरण्येनाभेदे पर्यवसानात्। ननु- भेदश्रुतिरेव प्रबला, `असञ्जातविरोधित्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिसंवादान्निरवकाशत्वाच्चेति चेन्न, अभेदश्रुतिरूपविरोधिनो जातत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रमाणत्वेन तत्संवादस्य प्राबल्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, शतमप्यन्धानामिति न्यायाद्, व्यावहारिकभेदविषयत्वेन सावकाशत्वाच्च। ननु- नायं भेदो व्यावहारिकः, मुक्तावपि भेदस्य श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां सिद्धेरिति चेन्न, तस्या मुक्तेरवान्तरत्वात्। ननु व्यावहारिकः, मुक्तावपि भेदस्य श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां सिद्धेरिति चेन्न, तस्या मुक्तेरवान्तरत्वात्। ननु इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः। सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च।। इत्यादिस्मृतौ सर्गाद्यभावोक्तेः। न यत्र माया किमुतापरे हरे- रनुव्रता यत्र सुरासुरार्चिताः। श्यामावदाताः शतपत्रलोचनाः। पिशङ्गवस्त्राः सुरुचः सुपेशसः।। इति स्मृतौ मायानिषेधाच्च। `यो वेद निहितं गुहायां सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिते'त्यत्र शुद्धब्रह्मज्ञानफलतत्वोक्तेश्च। त्वयापि शुद्धब्रह्मविषयत्वेन स्वीकृतायाः भूमविद्यायाः फलोक्त्यवसरे `तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति पञ्चधा सप्तधे'त्यादिभेदोक्तेः `परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' `स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाण' इत्यादौ स्वरूपाभिव्यक्त्युक्तेश्च तथा `विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैतीत्यत्र कर्मक्षयोक्तेश्च। `जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेती'त्.यादौ भेदज्ञानान्मोक्षोक्तेश्च। त्वन्मतेऽपि भेदभोगादिफलेषु फलाध्यायान्त्यपादस्थेषु `जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्' `सङ्कल्पादेव तु तत् श्रुतेः' `भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्चे'ति सूत्रेषु प्रक्रान्तशुद्धब्रह्मविद्याफलस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वाच्च परममुक्तित्वमेवेति चेन्न, सगुणोपासनया ब्रह्मलोकं गतस्यापि `न स पुनरावर्तत' इत्यादिश्रुत्या दैनन्दिनसर्गाद्यसम्बहन्धस्य प्रतिपादनेनावान्तरमुक्तावप्युपपत्तेः। `न तत्र माये'त्यादिस्मृतौ च मायाशब्दस्य मात्सर्यादिपरत्वेन मूलमायाविरहाप्रतीतेः, अन्यथा श्यामावदातत्वादिति विरोधापत्तेः, `यो वेद निहित' मित्यत्र शुद्धब्रह्मज्ञानफलभूता या सर्वकामावाप्तिः, सा न वैषयिकभोगरूपा, किन्तु सर्ववैषयिकसुखानाम् एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ती'तिश्रुत्या ब्रह्मानन्दे अन्तर्भावोक्तेस्तदभिप्रायेति न तद्वलान्नानाकामावाप्तेः शुद्धज्ञानफलत्वम्, भूमविद्याफलोक्त्यवसरे सर्वलोककामचारानेकधाभावादेः फलस्य भूमविद्यावाक्योपक्रमे प्राणविद्याफलत्वेनोक्तस्य ज्योतिष्टोमप्रकरणे श्रूयमाणाहीनद्वादशोपसत्तावत् निर्गुणविद्यास्तावकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः, स्वयंज्योतिरित्यादौ जक्षणप्रभृतीनां भेदगर्भत्वेन जक्षन्निव क्रोडन्निवेत्यादिबाधितत्वविवक्षया परममुक्तेस्तत्रोक्त्या त्वदभिमतभेदगर्भक्रीडादीनां परममुक्तित्वाभावात्, पुण्यपापे विधूयेत्यत्र परमसाम्यस्यैक्यरूपतया कर्मक्षयस्य ऐक्यरूपमुक्तिफलतया भेदगर्भमुक्तिफलत्वाभावात्, जुष्टमित्यत्रान्यपदस्य देहेन्द्रियादिविलक्षणात्मपरत्वेन जीवेशपरत्वाभावात्। तथा च भेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वम् अतोऽवगम्यते मन्मते भेदभोगादिपरेषु `सङ्कल्पादेव तच्छुतेरित्यारभ्याध्यायपरिसमाप्तिपर्यन्ताधिकरणेषु सगुणविद्याफलस्य उक्ततया शुद्धब्रह्मविद्याफलाप्रतिपादकत्वात्। तस्मात् परममुक्तौ भेदस्याप्रसक्तेः व्यावहारिकत्वोपपत्त्या भेदश्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकपरत्वं स्थितम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ भेदश्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकभेदपरत्वोपपत्तिः।। 23 ।। 24. जीवेशभेदे शब्दान्तरादिभङ्गः। ननु- पूर्वतन्त्रे द्वितीयाध्याये यैरेव शब्दान्तरादिभिः कर्मभेद उक्तः, तैरेव जीवेशभेदोऽपि सिध्यति। तथा हि- एष एव जीवं प्रबोधयति `एतस्माज्जीव उत्तिष्ठती'ति विरुद्धार्थधातुनिष्पन्नाख्यातरूपशब्दान्तरस्य `नित्यः परो नित्यः जीव' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानपुनः श्रुतिरूपाभ्यासस्य `द्वा सुपर्णे'त्यादिसङ्ख्याया अशब्दमनश्नन्नित्यादेर्भेदकस्य गुणान्तरस्य `यतो वाचो निवर्त्तन्त' इत्यादिप्रकरणान्तरस्य जीवेशाविति नामधेयद्वयस्यापि सत्त्वाच्चेति चेन्न, प्रत्यक्षादिसमकक्ष्यतया शब्दान्तरादीनां भेदकत्वेऽपि तात्त्विकाभेदाविरोधित्वात्। किञ्चादृष्टचरस्त्वं मीमांसकः यः कर्मभेद शास्त्रभेदे वा प्रमाणत्वेन क्लृप्तानां शब्दान्तरादीनां चेतनभेदे प्रमाणत्वं कल्पयसि। न ह्यन्यभेदप्रयोजकस्यान्यभेदप्रयोजकता। विशिष्टभेदे प्रयोजकस्यापि विशेषणभेदस्य विशेष्यभेदकत्वापत्तेः। `देवदत्त उत्तिष्ठति शिष्यं बोधयति यजति ददाति जुहोती'त्यादावपि भेदापत्तेः। न शब्दान्तरस्य कर्तृभेदकता।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ शब्दान्तरादेरात्मभेदकत्वाभावः।। 24 ।। 25. भेदश्रुतेः षड्विधतात्पर्य लिङ्गानि ननु- षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेतश्रुतिगम्यभेदस्य कथमतात्त्विकत्वम् ? तथा हि- आथर्वणे द्वा सुपर्णेत्युपक्रमः, परमं साम्यमुपैतीत्युपसंहारः, `तयोरन्यः अनश्नन्नन्यः अन्यमीश'मित्यभ्यासः, शास्त्रैकगम्येश्वरप्रतियोगिकस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यभेदस्य शास्त्रं विना अप्राप्तेरपूर्वता, `पुण्यपापे विधूये'ति फलम्, `अस्य महिमान'मिति स्तुतिरूपोऽर्थवादः, अत्ति अनश्नन्नित्युपपत्तिः। अत्र च `मायामात्रमिदं द्वैत'मित्यादाविव द्विशब्द एव भेदवाचकः, तदाक्षेपको वा द्वित्वसङ्ख्यैवैक्यविरोधिनीति वा भवत्युपक्रमो भेदविषयः। तद्भिन्नत्वविशेषितमेव च तद्गतबहुधर्मयोगित्वं तत्सादृश्यम्, न तु विशेष्यमात्रम्, नायं सः किन्तु तत्सदृशः नायं तत्सदृशः, किन्तु स एवेति सादृश्यैक्ययोरेकतरविधानायान्यतरनिषेधाद्। `गगनं गगनाकार'मित्यादि तु तत्सदृशवस्त्वन्तरनिषेधपरम्, गगनाद्येकदेशस्य तदेकदेशसादृश्यपरं वा इत्युपसंहारोऽपि भेदविषय एव। अभ्यासत्वेऽपि अर्थत एवैकप्रकारत्वं तन्त्रम्, न तु शब्दतः, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। अन्यमीशमित्यत्र ईशगतान्यत्वं प्रति पश्यतीति प्रकृतो जीव एव पदिन्यायेन प्रतियोगितया सम्बध्यत इत्यभ्यासोऽपि संभवतीति चेत्। मैवम्, आथर्वणे प्रथममुण्डके `कस्मिन्नुभगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवती'ति शौनकप्रश्नानन्तरं `द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये' इति विद्याद्वयमवतार्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणामपरामुक्त्वा `अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रवर्ण'मित्यादिना परविद्याविषयमक्षरं प्रश्नानुसारेण प्रतिपादयता अभेदस्यैवोपक्रान्तत्वाद्, अन्यथा तदुत्तरत्वानुपपत्तेः। द्वितीयमुण्डके `पुरुष एवेदं विश्वं ब्रह्मैवेदं वरिष्ठ'मिति मध्ये परामर्शात्। तृतीयमुण्डकान्ते च `परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति, स यो ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवती'त्यैक्यलक्षणफलेनोपसंहाराच्च मुण्डकत्रयात्मिकाया उपनिषद ऐक्यपरत्वे स्थिते `असंयुक्तं प्रकरणा'दिति न्यायेनाभिक्रमणादिवन्मध्यस्थितवाक्यस्यापि द्वासुपर्णेत्यादेस्तदनुकूलत्वे सम्भवति महाप्रकरणविरोधेन विपरीततात्पर्यकल्पनया भेदोपक्रमत्वाभावात्। `परमं साम्यमुपैती'त्यस्य पूर्वोक्तन्यायेन ऐक्यपरतया भेदोपसंहारत्वाभावात्। अतः अनश्नन्नित्यादिना न तात्त्विकभेदाभ्यासः, नापीशस्य शास्त्रगम्यतया तत्प्रतियोगिकस्तद्धर्मिको वा भेदोऽपूर्वः, ईशज्ञानमात्रे तदपेक्षायामपि प्रत्यक्षेण तत्समकक्ष्यमानेन च तयोः प्राप्तत्वात्। त्वदुक्तफलार्थवादयोरैक्यपक्षेऽपि सम्भवेन न भेदासाधारणलिङ्गता, अनश्नन्नित्यादेः काल्पनिकभेदेनोपपत्त्या तात्त्विकभेदोपपत्तित्वाभावात्। ननु- अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणं षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेतं वाक्यं भेदे प्रमाणम्। तथा हि- `वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तमन्तर्यामिण'मित्युपक्रमः `एष त आत्मान्तर्यामी'त्युपसंहारः, `एष त आत्मेत्याद्येकविंशतिकृत्वोऽभ्यासः अन्तर्यामित्वस्याप्राप्ततयाऽपूर्वता, `स व ब्रह्मवि'दित्यादि फलम्, `तच्चेत्त्वं याज्ञवल्क्य सूत्रमविद्वांस्तं चान्तर्यामिणं ब्रह्मगवीरुदजसे मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यती'ति निन्दारूपोऽर्थवादः, `यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यं पृथिवी न वेद' इत्याद्युपपत्तिरिति चेत्, मैवम्। `आत्मेत्येवोपासीते'ति सूत्रितब्रह्मविद्याविवरणरूपायां चतुरध्याय्याम् अनेन ह्येतत्सर्वं वेदेति एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञापूर्वकं `ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मस्मीति तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभव'दित्यभेदेनोपक्रम्य षष्ठाध्यायन्ते मैत्रेयीब्राह्मणे निगमनरूपे `यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत् केन कं पश्ये'दित्यादिनाऽभेदेनैवोपसंहाराद् अध्यायचतुष्टयस्याप्यभेदपरत्वे स्थिते तदन्तर्गतस्य ब्रह्मलोकान्तरसूत्रात्मप्रतिपादनपरस्य उत्तरब्राह्मणप्रतिपाद्यनिरूपाधिकसर्वान्तरब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलस्य महाप्रकरणानुरोधेन तद्विरोधिभेदपरत्वाभावात्, त्वदुपन्यस्तलिङ्गानां भेदपरतानिर्णायकत्वेऽपि कल्पितभेदपरतया तात्त्विकाभेदाविरोधित्वात्। अत एव न `शारीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयत' इति सूत्रविरोधः, नवा तद्भाष्यव्याहतिः।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ भेदश्रुतेः ष़ड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गभङ्गः।। 25 ।। 26. ऐक्यस्वरूपभङ्गः ननु- ऐक्यं (1) आत्मस्वरूपम् ? (2) उतान्यत् ? नाद्यः, एकतरपरिशेषाद्यापत्तेः, सापेक्षस्यैक्यस्य निरपेक्षात्मत्वायोगाच्च। नान्त्यः, सत्यत्वे अद्वैतहानेः, मिथ्यात्वे तत्त्वमसीत्यादेरतत्त्वावेदकतापत्तेरिति चेन्न, आद्यमेवानवद्यम्। ज्ञानानन्दयोरात्मैक्येऽपि यथा नैकतरपरिशेषापत्त्यादिकं कल्पितानन्दत्वादिधर्मात् तथा प्रकृतेऽपि सम्भवाद्, ऐक्ये अभिज्ञेयत्वस्य प्रागुक्तेः तस्यापि निरपेक्षतया निरपेक्षात्मस्वरूपत्वाविरोधाद्, अज्ञानाद्यधिष्ठानतया भासमानात्मस्वरूपत्वेऽपि ऐक्यस्य तद्गोचरवृत्तिविशेषस्याज्ञाननिवर्तकस्य इदानीमसत्त्वात्संसारोपपत्तेः। अन्त्ये पक्षे दोषास्त्वनुक्तोपालम्भा एव। अत एव अतिरिक्तमैक्यं। नैकत्वसङ्क्या, न वा तन्निष्ठाशेषधर्मवत्त्वम्, न वा तन्निष्ठासाधारणधर्मवत्त्वम्, निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि तेषामभावात्। नापि भेदविरहः, भेदस्यैक्यविरहरूपत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात्। नापि तदवृत्तिधर्मानधिकरणत्वम्, शून्यस्यापि ब्रह्मैक्यापातादिति निरस्तम्, तदवृत्तिधर्मानाधारत्वोपलक्षितस्वरूपस्याभेदत्वात्। शून्यस्य निःश्वरूपत्वात् न शून्यस्यैक्यरूपता। न च- तदवृत्तिधर्मनिषेधेन तद्वृत्तिधर्मविधानप्रसङ्गः, विशेषनिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञाफलकत्वादिति वाच्यम्, शेषविधायकत्वस्य सर्वत्रासम्प्रतिपत्तेः। अन्यथा वायौ न नीलरूपमित्यस्यापि गौरं प्रति विधायकत्वापातात्। ननु- अभेदे अभेदत्वपारमार्थिकत्वासद्वैलक्षण्यादीनि तत्त्वतः सन्ति वा ? न वा ? आद्ये सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिः `द्वितीये अभेदत्वादिहानिरिति चेन्न, तत्त्वतः स्वरूपभूतैरेव तैरभेदरूपताया अद्वैतस्य चाहान्युपपत्तेः। न च- एवमभेदस्याबाधितात्मस्वरूपपर्यवसाने तस्य चात्मस्वरूपस्य परैरपि संमतत्वेन त्वच्छास्त्राविषयत्वमिति वाच्यम्, जीवावृत्तिधर्मानधिकरणत्वोपलक्षितात्मस्वरूपस्य परैरनङ्गीकारात्। तदेवमुक्ते जीवब्रह्माभेदे `तत्त्वमसि' स वा अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिर्मानम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ऐक्यरूपोपपत्तिः।। 26 ।। 27. ऐक्यश्रुतेरुपजीव्यबाधः ननु- सार्वज्ञ्यासार्वज्ञ्यादिविशिष्टयोरैक्यमयोग्यत्वपराहतं कथमुदाहृतश्रुत्या बोध्यमिति चेन्न, सोऽयमित्यादाविव विरुद्धाकारत्यागेन शुद्धाकारैक्यबोधनात्। ननु विरुद्धाकारत्यागः किमविवक्षामात्रेण ? उतानित्यत्वेन ? उतमिथ्यात्वेन ? नाद्यः, विरुद्धाकारस्याविवक्षायामप्यनपायात्। न हि `असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुत्या सत्त्वशून्यत्वयोश्चित्त्वजडत्वयोर्वेहाविवक्षामात्रेण ब्रह्मणः शून्येन जडेन च ऐक्यं सुवचम्। न द्वितीयः, तत्त्वं भविष्यसीति निर्देशापत्त्या असीति वर्तमाननिर्देशायोगाद्, दशाभेदेन भेदाभेदयोः सत्त्वापत्त्या त्वयाप्यनङ्गीकाराच्च, जीवेशयोः स्वातन्त्र्यापारतन्त्र्यादेर्नित्यत्वाच्च। न तृतीयः, निर्दोषश्रुतिसाक्षिसिद्धयोर्विरुद्धधर्मयोर्मिथ्यात्वायोगादिति चेन्न, विरुद्धाकारस्याविवक्षयैव त्यागात्। त्यागश्च ब्रह्मानुभवाविषयत्वम्, न त्वपायः, तस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारसाध्यत्वात्। तथा च तत्तेदन्ते इवानपेते अपि सार्वज्ञ्यासार्वज्ञ्ये नाश्रयाभेदविरोधाय। अविवक्षा च प्रधानप्रमेयनिर्वाहाय। न च- सोऽयमित्यत्र तत्तेदन्तयोर्न त्यागः। क्रमेणैकत्र तयोरविरोधादिति वाच्यम्, अभेदपरे अस्मिन्विशेषणयोरैक्यापत्त्या क्रमेणैकत्र सत्त्वेऽपि तत्त्यागस्यावश्यकत्वात्, `असद्वे'त्यादौ `सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ च न शून्यजडैक्यापत्तिः शून्यसतोः चिज्जडयोर्वा विरुद्धाकारपरित्यागेन जीवब्रह्मणोरिवानुस्यूतस्याकारस्याभावाद्। असतो निःस्वरूपत्वाज्जडस्य बाध्यस्वरूपत्वात्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ जीवब्रह्माभेदे प्रमाणम्। ननु- ऐक्यश्रुत्या प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं जीवमनूद्य ब्रह्मत्वं वा बोधनीयं, श्रुतिसिद्धं ब्रह्मानूद्य तस्य जीवत्वं वा, उभयानुवादेनाभेदो वा विधेयः, सर्वथाप्युपजीव्यविरोधात् नैक्ये प्रामाण्यम्, प्रत्यक्षेण जीवस्य ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वेन श्रुत्या च सर्वज्ञत्वादिमद्ब्रह्मग्राहिण्या तद्धीनत्वेनानुभूयमानाज्जीवाद् भिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणोज्ञायमानत्वात्। न चानुमानेन ब्रह्मोपस्थितिः, तेनापि सर्वज्ञत्वादिना ब्रह्मणो विषयीकरणेन उपजीव्यविरोधतादवस्थ्यादिति चेन्न। शक्तिग्रहादौ तयोरुपजीव्यत्वेऽपि स्वप्रमेयेऽनुपजीव्यत्वात्। तदुक्तं वाचस्पत्ये- `यत् उपजीव्यं, तन्न बाध्यते, यद्वाध्यते तन्नोपजीव्यमिति। यथाकथञ्चिदपेक्षामात्रेणोपजीव्यत्वे नेदं रजतमित्यत्रापि इदं रजतमित्यस्योपजीव्यतापत्तेः। ननु- यद्धि यदपेक्षं यस्य बाधे स्वस्य बाधापत्तिश्च तत्तस्योपजीव्यम्, प्रकृते च धर्म्यादिग्राहकस्यैव स्वप्रामाण्यग्राहकतया तद्बाधे स्वबाधापत्तिः, निषेध्यार्पणस्थले तु न तथा। न हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपधर्मिज्ञानाप्रमाण्ये ऐक्यज्ञानाप्रामाण्यवत् प्रतिषेध्यज्ञानाप्रामाण्ये प्रतिषेधज्ञानाप्रामाण्यम्, प्रतिषेधशास्त्रविलोपप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्, सत्यम्, सार्वज्ञ्यादिविशिष्टं न तावद्धर्मि, किन्तु ब्रह्मस्वरूपमात्रम्। विशिष्टधर्मिज्ञानप्रामाण्यं ऐक्यज्ञानप्रामाण्ये नापेक्ष्यते, किन्तु स्वरूपज्ञानप्रामाण्यमात्रम्। अन्यथा `इंद रजत'मित्यस्यापि धर्मिज्ञानत्वेन उपजीव्यतया निषेधज्ञानप्रामाण्ये रजतत्वविशिष्टेदं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं स्यात्। रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यस्य धर्मित्वाप्रयोजकत्ववत् सार्वज्ञ्यादिवैशिष्ट्यस्यापि तदप्रयोजकत्वस्य प्रकृतेऽपि समानत्वात्। ननु- एवमसाधारणसार्वज्ञ्यादिधर्मावच्छेदेन ब्रह्मणोऽनुद्देश्यत्वे साधारणधर्मेण स्वरूपेण वा उद्देश्यता वाच्या। तत्राद्ये इष्टापत्तिः, चित्त्वादिसाधारणधर्मैक्यस्यास्माभिरप्यङ्गीकाराद्। द्वितीये ब्रह्मैक्यासिद्धिः, साधारणस्वरूपमात्रोद्देशादिति चेन्न। ब्रह्मैक्यासिद्धिरित्यत्र ब्रह्मशब्देन सार्वज्ञ्यादिविशिष्टं चेदभिमतम्, तदेष्टापत्तिः, तदा त्वमा च लक्षितयोरेव पदार्थयोरैक्यबोधस्य प्राक् प्रतिपादितत्वात्। अत एव शब्देन असाधारणब्रह्मस्वरूपोद्देशस्यासाधारणधर्मेण विनाऽसिद्धेरुपजीव्यविरोधतादवस्थ्यमिति निरस्तम्, असाधारणधर्मस्य उद्देश्यसमर्पणे उपलक्षकत्वात्। न च- उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाभावे उपलक्ष्यत्वासिद्धिः, चित्त्वस्य तत्त्वे सिद्धसाधनादिति वाच्यम्। स्वरूपोपलक्षण उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकस्यानपेक्षणात्। यत्तु चित्त्वेनैक्ये सिद्धसाधनम्, तन्न। चित्त्वैक्यस्येष्टत्वेऽपि तदाश्रयैक्यस्य तवानिष्टत्वाद्, इष्टौ चाविवादात्। अत एव- `पुरोडाशकपालेन तुषानुपवतीत्यत्राधिष्ठानलक्षणायाम् अन्यतोऽप्राप्ततुषोपवापविधानरूपेष्टसिद्धिवदत्र न लक्षणयाभीष्टसिद्धिः, येन लक्षणा स्यादिति निरस्तम्। चित्त्वैक्यस्य प्राप्तत्वेऽपि आश्रयैक्यस्याप्राप्तस्य लक्षणाप्रापणीयस्य सत्त्वात्, सोऽयमित्यत्रापि उक्तप्रकारस्यावश्यवाच्यत्वात्। न च तत्ताविशिष्टस्य तत्रोद्देश्यता यद्वत्तया ज्ञात एव यदन्वयधीः, तत्त्वस्य विशेषणत्वस्य तत्तादौ सम्भवादिति वाच्यम्, दत्तोत्तरत्त्वात्। ननु- एवं परमाणुः सावयवः, ईश्वरो न सर्वज्ञः, आदित्यो यूप इत्यादावपुपजीव्यविरोधो न स्याद्, उत्पन्नशिष्टगुणविधौ सगुणोत्पत्तिवाक्यविरोधश्च न स्यात्, तत्रापि परमाणुत्वादिविशिष्टं न धर्मी, किन्तु स्वरूपमात्रमिति सुवचत्वादिति- चेन्न, परमाणवादेः स्वरुपेणापि सावयत्वादिकं प्रति धर्मित्वे परमाणुत्वादिकं धर्मिसमानसत्ताकं परमाण्वादौ न स्यात्, तदीयसमसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्सावयवत्वबोधकप्राबल्याधीनत्वात्, तत्प्राबल्येऽनुमानाभावात्, प्रत्युत भ्रान्तवाक्यत्वेन दुर्बलत्वात्। आदित्यो यूप इत्यत्राभेदो न प्रमेयः। स्तुतिद्वारान्यशेषत्वात्, स्तुतेश्च प्रत्यक्षाविरुद्धैर्गुणैरपि सम्भवे प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धार्थकल्पनायोगाद्, उत्पन्नशिष्टगुणविधौ तूत्पत्तिवाक्यस्थितामिक्षादिपदस्य द्रव्यसामान्यपरत्वे तत्पदवैयर्थ्यापत्तिः, `तद्धितार्थान्तर्गतास्येति सर्वनाम्ना यजतिचोदनाद्रव्यदेवताक्रियमिति न्यायेन यागचोदनमात्रेण च द्रव्यसामान्यलाभात्। प्रकृते अनन्यशेषतया प्रबलत्वात् प्रमाणवाक्यत्वाच्च तद्विरोध्यैक्यप्रतिपादकतया स्वरूपलक्षणाया युक्ततमत्वाच्च। ननु- रूप्यरूपनिषेध्यार्पकस्यापेक्षितस्यापि परीक्षितत्वाभावाद्, यद्यपि दुर्बलत्वम्, उपजीव्यत्वमात्रस्य प्राबल्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, तथापीह निषेध्यार्पकभेदश्रुतिः, साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं च निर्दोषत्वात् परीक्षितमपि प्रबलं तद्विरोधात् कथमैक्यपरत्वमिति- चेन्न, निर्दोषाया अपि श्रुतेः भेदपरत्वस्यैवाभावेन तद्विरोधस्यैक्यश्रुतावसम्भवावितत्वात्। न हि श्रुतेरुपक्रमादिषड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गशून्यार्थपरत्वम्, तन्नियामकाभावात्, अन्यथाऽतिप्रसङ्गात्, साक्षिणोऽपि निर्दोषत्वमात्रेण परीक्षितत्वाभावाद्, दुःखाभावादावारोपितसुखादेरपि प्रामाणिकत्वापत्तेः मन्मते प्रातिभासिकमात्रस्य साक्षिसिद्धस्य मिथ्यात्वात्, साक्षिणोऽपि निर्दोषजवृत्त्युपरक्तत्वेनाबाध्यत्वासिद्धेरुक्तत्वाच्च। प्रमाणतदभावव्यवस्थापि प्रातिभासिकव्यावहारिकयोः करणसंसर्गिदोषप्रयुक्तत्वाप्रयुक्तत्वाभ्याम्, व्यावहारिकस्य चैतन्यमात्रस्थाज्ञानदोषप्रयुक्तत्वात्। तस्मादुपजीव्यविरोधाभावात्, प्रत्युताभेदश्रुतेरेव सर्वशेषितया भेदश्रुतिं प्रत्युपजीव्यत्वाद्, भेदश्रुतेरेव तद्विरोधेन तदनुकूलतया नेयत्वात् सर्वविरोधशून्यं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यम्। तथा चैक्यपरमिति सिद्धम्।। इत्यैक्यश्रुतेरुपजीव्यविरोधाभावः।। 27 ।। 28. तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थः ननु- एवं पदद्वयेऽपि लक्षणा स्यात्, तथा च मन्मतमाश्रित्य एकपदलक्षणैवाश्रयणीया। तथा हि- `द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजे'त्यादौ जीवस्य ब्रह्मसाहचर्योक्तेस्तत्साहचर्यात्तदिति व्यपदेशः, `वसन्तादिभ्यष्ठगि'त्यत्र वसन्तसहचरिते अध्ययने वसन्तपदप्रयोगस्य महाभाष्ये उक्तत्वात्, `सन्मूलाः प्रजाः सदायतना'इत्यादिवाक्यशेषात्। प्रसिद्धतदाश्रितत्वाद्वा तदिति व्यपदेशः, `समर्थः पदविधि'रिति सूत्रे समर्थपदाश्रितत्वेन पदविधिः समर्थपदप्रयोगस्य महाभाष्योक्तेः, `सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः प्रजाः सर्वा'इति वाक्यशेषात्। प्रसिद्धतज्जत्वाद्वा तत्पदप्रयोगः, `ब्रह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासी'दित्यादिवत्, `इग्यणः संप्रसारण'मित्यत्र संप्रसारणाज्जातो वर्णः संप्रसारणमिति भाष्योक्तेः। `प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मन'इति वाक्यशेषेण जीवस्येशाधीनत्वोक्त्या तदधीनत्वाद्वा तच्छब्दप्रयोगः, `धान्यमसि धिनुहि' इत्यत्र मन्त्रे तण्डुले धान्यपदप्रयोगवत्। तत्सादृश्याद्वा तत्पदप्रयोगः, सारूप्यादिति जैमिनिसूत्रे `आदित्यो यूप' इत्यादिकं सादृश्यादित्युक्तत्वात् `तदगुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञव'दित्यत्र ब्रह्मसूत्रे ब्रह्मगुणयोगज्जीवे तद्व्यपदेश इत्युक्तेः, महाभाष्ये च बहुगणेत्यादिसूत्रे वतिं विनैव सङ्क्यावदिति वत्यर्थो गम्यते। अब्रह्मदत्तं ब्रह्मदत्तेत्याह तेन वयं मन्यामहे ब्रह्मदत्तवदयं भवतीत्युक्तेश्चेति- चेन्न। अभेदे तात्पर्येऽवधृते तन्निर्वाहकलक्षणाबाहुल्यस्यादोषत्वात्। न हि लक्षणैक्यानुरोधेन तात्पर्यपरित्यागः। तदुक्तं न्यायचिन्तामणौ- `तात्पर्यात्तु वृत्तिः, न तु वृत्तेस्तात्पर्य'मिति। जहदजहल्लक्षणया मुख्यपरत्वे संभवति तत्सहचरिताद्यर्थपरत्वकल्पनस्यानुचितत्वाच्च। यथा अभेदपरत्वे न बोधकत्वानुपपत्तिः, तथोक्तं प्राक्। `द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा' इत्यादिना न जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा सहचरितत्वोक्तिः, किंत्वन्तःकरणेनेति न तेन सहचरितत्वप्रसिद्धिरपि। न वा सन्मूलाः प्रजा इत्यादिना जीवस्य तदाश्रितत्वप्रसिद्धिः, प्रजाशब्दस्य प्रजायमानवाचकत्वेन जीवस्य नित्यस्याप्रतिपादनात्। अत एव न तज्जन्यत्वेनापि तच्छब्दप्रयोगः। ब्राह्मणो मुखमित्येव मुखाज्जातत्वहेतुतः। यथावदुच्यते तद्वज्जीवो ब्रह्मेति वाग्भवेत्।। इति स्मृतिरप्यस्मृतिरेव, श्रुतिविरोधात्। यत्तु तद्गुणसारत्वादित्यादिना जीवे ब्रह्मगुणयोग उक्त इत्युक्तम्, तन्न, बुद्धिगुणसूक्ष्मत्वयोगात् जीवे ब्रह्मणीव सूक्ष्मत्वमित्येवं परत्वात्सूत्रस्य। एतेन- शाखासदेशे चन्द्रे शाखेतिवत् जीवान्तर्यामितया जीवसदेशे ब्रह्मणि त्वमिति प्रयोगः, आत्मनि तिष्ठन्निति श्रुतेः, ब्राह्मणो वै सर्वा देवता इत्यादिवत्। जीवाश्रयत्वाद्वा ब्रह्मणः सर्वकर्तृत्वेन यजमानः प्रस्तर इत्यादिवत् तत्सिद्ध्या वा ब्रह्मणि त्वमिति व्यपदेश इति निरस्तम्। ननु- जहदजहल्लक्षणायां वाच्यान्तर्गतत्वेन प्राग्धीस्थस्य बाधकात् त्यक्तस्य पुनः स्वीकारः, जहल्लक्षणायाम् अधीस्थस्यात्यक्तस्यैव स्वीकारः त्यक्तस्वीकाराद्वरमधीस्थस्य स्वीकार इति- चेन्न, अनुपपत्त्या विशेषणत्यागेऽपि विशेष्यांशात्यागात्। एतेन- तच्छब्दात् परतृतीयादिविभक्तेः सुपां सुलुगित्यादिना प्रथमैकवचनादेशो वा लुग्वा, तथा च तेन त्वं तिष्ठसीति वा, ततः सञ्जात इति वा, तस्य त्वमिति वा, तस्मिन् त्वमिति वार्थः, `अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठति सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजा ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वमित्यादिवाक्यशेषात्। तथा च मीमांसका `उत यत्सुन्वन्ति सामिधेनीस्तदन्वाहु'रित्यत्र यत्तच्छब्दयोः सप्तम्यर्थे प्रथमां स्वीकृत्य यत्र सुन्वन्ति तत्र हविर्धाने स्थित्वा सामिधेनीरनुब्रूयादिति व्याख्याञ्चक्रुः। न्याय्यं च निरवकाशप्रधानभूतानेकप्रातिपदिकस्वारस्याय सङ्ख्यर्थत्वेन सावकाशप्रधानैकविभक्त्यस्वारस्यमिति निरस्तम्, प्रोद्गातॄणामित्यत्र विभक्तिस्वारस्याय प्रातिपदिकस्यान्यथानयनवदत्रापि प्रातिपदिकस्यैवान्यथानयनाच्च। न च- षष्ठीबहुवचनस्य प्रथमैकवचनवदन्यत्राविधानेन तस्यान्यथानयनमसंभवीति बहुवचनानुसारेण प्रातिपदिकस्य प्रस्तोत्रादिछन्दोगेषु लक्षणाऽऽश्रितेति वाच्यम्, `सक्तून् जुहोती'त्यत्रेवान्यत्र नयनस्य संभावितत्वात्। किं च न तावत् प्रतिपादकस्य निरवकाशत्वम्, विभक्तेः सङ्ख्यामिव विशेष्यांशे सावकाशत्वात्। नापि प्राधान्यं, प्रधानार्थवाचकप्रत्ययस्यैव प्राधान्यात्। तदुक्तं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं बूतः तयोः प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येने'ति। नापि प्रातिपदिकानेकत्वं स्वारस्ये तन्त्रम्, `गभीरायां नद्या'मित्यादौ अनेकत्वेऽप्यस्वारस्यदर्शनात्। तात्पर्यबलात्तत्र तथेति चेत्, समं प्रकृतेऽपि। यत्तु `प्रयाजशेषेण हवींष्यभिघारय'तीत्यत्र प्रयाजशेषं हविःषु प्रक्षिपतीति तृतीयाविभक्त्यस्वारस्यं, सक्तून् जुहोतीत्यादावपि द्वितीयाविभक्त्यस्वारस्यं, तदगत्या, `प्रयाजशेषेण'त्यादौ उपयुक्तसंस्कारव्यतिरेकेण प्रकारान्तरस्यासंभवात्, सक्तूनित्यादौ भूतभाव्युपयोगाभावेन संस्कार्यत्वाभावात्। एतेन- तस्य त्वं तत्त्वमिति समस्तं पदमिति निरस्तम्, असमासेनैव षष्ठ्यर्थलक्षणादिरहितेन उपपत्तौ षष्ठीसमासस्यान्याय्यत्वाद्, अन्यथा स्थपत्यधिकरणविरोधापत्तेः। ननु- ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीत्यत्र तत्पदेन नात्मा परामृश्यते, किन्तु ऐतदात्म्यम्, नपुंसकत्वाद्, ऐतदात्म्यमित्यस्य एष चासावात्मा च एतदात्मा तस्येदमैतदात्म्यम्। एवं च एतदीयं वस्तु त्वमसीत्यर्थः, न त्वभेदः, एतदात्मा यस्य तदैतदात्म्यमित्यर्थे भावप्रत्ययवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः। ततो वरमर्थान्तराश्रयणम्; विचित्रा हि तद्धितगतिरिति वचनात्। स स्रष्टा चैव संहर्ता नियन्ता रक्षिता हरिः। तेन व्याप्तमिदं सर्वमैतदात्म्यमतो विदुः।। इति स्मृतेश्चेति- चेन्न, तस्येदमित्यर्थे ष्यञोऽविधानात् प्रयोगादर्शनाच्च। स्वार्थे च सौख्यमित्यादिप्रयोगदर्शनात्। तथा च एतत् सद् आत्मा यस्य सर्वस्य तदेतदात्मा तस्य भाव ऐतदात्म्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं च स्वार्थिकत्वाद्वा, भावभवित्रोरभेदोपचाराद्वा, `यो वै भूमा तत्सुख'मितिवत्। यत्तु स्मृतावेतद्व्यापकत्वेन ऐतदात्म्योक्तिः, सा न युक्ता, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञाविरोधात्। ननु- शरीरवाचिनां देवमनुष्यशब्दानां शरीरिपर्यन्तत्वदर्शनाद् ब्रह्मशरीरभूतजीववाचित्वं पदस्य ब्रह्मपर्यन्तत्वेन तत्त्वमिति व्यपदेशः शरीरशरीरिभावनिबन्धनः, `यस्यात्मा शरीर' मित्यादिश्रुतेरिति मुख्यमेवास्मन्मते पदद्वयमिति- चेन्न, शरीरिपर्यन्तत्वमिति तल्लक्षकत्वं वा ? तत्रापि शक्तत्वं या ? शरीरविषयवृत्त्यैव तत्प्रतिपादकत्वं वा ? नाद्यः, मुख्यत्वानुपपादनात्। न द्वितीयः, शरीरवाचिनामित्यसाधारण्येन निर्देशानुपपत्तेः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमनुष्यत्वादिजातेः शरीरिण्यवृत्तेरुक्तत्वाच्च। न तृतीयः, अन्यविषयवृत्तेरन्यानुपयोगेन शरीरशरीरिणोरनादिभ्रमसिद्धाभेदनिबन्धनोऽयं प्रयोगो वाच्यः। तथा चात्राप्यभेदनिबन्धन एवायं प्रयोगः, अभेदस्तु बाधकाभावादत्र तात्त्विक इत्येव विशेषः। यत्तु `आदित्यो ब्रह्मेति'वत् जीवे ब्रह्मत्वोपासनार्थस्तत्त्वमसीति निर्देश इति, तन्न, अनुपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वेन दृष्टान्तवैषम्याद्, उक्तरीत्या वस्तुनिष्ठत्वे संभवति तत्त्यागायोगाच्च। ननु- स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीत्यत्रातत्त्वमसीति पदच्छेदः, `शब्दोऽनित्य'इत्यत्रानित्य इति पदच्छेदो यथा घटदृष्टान्तानुसारेण, तथाऽत्रापि शकुनिसूत्रादिदृष्टान्तानुसारात्। न हि प्रथमखण्डे शकुनिसूत्रयोः स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्ध इत्युक्तयोः शकुनिसूत्रयोः, षष्ठे लवणमेतदुदकमित्यादिनोक्तयोर्लवणोदकयोः, सप्तमे `पुरुषं सोम्य गन्धारेभ्य' इत्यादिनोक्तयोः पुरुषगन्धारदेशयोः, नवमे च `अपहार्षीत् स्तेयमकार्षी'दित्यादिनोक्तयोः स्तेनापहार्ययोः ऐक्यम्। स्तेनापहार्यदृष्टान्ते हि स्पष्टमैक्यज्ञानिनोऽनर्थः, परकीयब्रह्मत्वाभिमानी हि स्तेनः, न तु विद्यमानब्रह्मत्वाज्ञानीति चेन्न। शकुनिसूत्रादौ दृष्टान्ते विद्यमानोऽपि भेदो नातदितिपदच्छेदप्रयोजकः, तं विनैव तदुपपत्तेः, घटदृष्टान्तस्तु न नित्यत्व उपपद्यत इति वैषम्यात्। तथा हि- ज्वरादिरोगग्रस्तस्य तन्निर्मोके स्वास्थ्ये विश्रान्तिवज्जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोः करणव्यापारजनितश्रमापनुत्तये जीवस्य देवतात्मस्वरूपावस्थानमित्यस्मिन्नर्थे शकुनिसूत्रदृष्टान्त इत्यन्यथैवोपपत्तेः, `स्वमपीतोभवती'ति श्रुतेः। ननु- ब्रह्मणि स्वशब्दो न जीवाभेदाभिप्रायः, किन्तु आत्मीयत्वाद्यर्थः स्वातन्त्र्याभिप्रायो वा, `स्वातन्त्र्यात्स्व' इति प्रोक्त इत्यागमाद्, `अपीतो भवती'त्यस्यापि तिरोहितः सन् प्राप्तो भवतीत्येवार्थः, न त्वभिन्न इति अपेः पिधाने, इणोधातोश्च गतौ, निष्ठायाः कर्तरि शक्तेः क्लृप्तत्वाद्, ऐक्ये योगरूढ्योरभावाच्चेति चेत्, न। स्वशब्दस्य स्वरूपे मुख्यस्यार्थान्तरपरत्वे गौणीलक्षणयोरन्यतरापत्तेः, अभेदे योगरूढ्योरभावेऽपि उपसर्गप्रकृतिप्रत्ययपर्यालोचनया लब्धस्वरूपप्राप्तिरूपार्थस्याभेदे पर्यवसानात्। अत एव- ऐक्यार्थत्वे अपीत इत्यस्य भवतेश्चाकर्मकतया श्रुतद्वितीयायोगः अश्रुततृतीयाकल्पनमिति- निरस्तम्। अत एव- `यथा अस्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियते एवमेवायं पुरुष' इति सुषुप्तिसमये श्रुत्यन्तरे भिन्नश्येननीडदृष्टान्तोक्तिरिति च- निरस्तम्, सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्ततायामतन्त्रत्वात्। न च- प्राज्ञेनात्मनां सम्परिष्वक्तः स इति सुषुप्तिविषये भेदश्रुत्या त्वन्मतेऽपि भेदपरेण सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेनेति सूत्रेण त्वत्पक्षेऽपि जागरण इव सुषुप्तावपि आविद्यकजीवब्रह्मभेदस्वीकारेण च विरोध इति वाच्यम्, यतो जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरिव स्फुटतरविक्षेपो नास्तीत्यभिप्रायेण स्वस्वरूपप्राप्त्युक्तिः, न त्वात्यन्तिकाभेदाभिप्रायेण, अन्यथा सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योरविशेषापत्तेः। यदि सज्जगतो मूलम्, तदा कथं नोपलभ्यत इत्याशङ्कायां विद्यमानमपि वस्तु नोपलभ्यते, अन्यथा तूपलभ्यत इत्यमुमर्थं स्पष्टीकर्तुं लवणोदकदृष्टान्त इति, तत्राप्यन्यथोपतत्तेः। यद्येवं लवणमिवेन्द्रियैरनुपलभ्यमानमपि जगन्मूलं सद् उपायान्तरेण उपलब्धुं शक्यते इति तस्यैवोपलम्भे क उपाय इत्याशङ्कायाम् `आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेदे'त्युपायं वक्तुं गान्धारपुरुषदृष्टान्त इति तत्राप्यन्यथैवोपपत्तेः। तथा चाचार्यवान् विद्वान् येन क्रमेण सता सम्बध्यते स क इत्याशङ्कायां सत्याभिसन्धस्यार्थप्राप्तिरनृताभिसन्धस्यानर्थप्राप्तिरिति वक्तुं स्तेनास्तेनदृष्टान्त इति तत्राप्यन्यथैवोपपत्तेः। न च सत्यानृतदृष्टान्तेन पूर्तेरपहार्षीत् `स्तेयमकार्षी'दिति उदाहरणायोगः, तदुपपादकत्वेन पृथक् दृष्टान्तत्वाभावात्। ननु- नवमखण्डे `नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणां रसानि'त्यादिनोक्तानां नानावृक्षरसानां दशमे `इमाः सोम्य नद्य' इत्यादिनोक्तयोर्नदी- समुद्रयोश्चैक्यं वक्तुं न हि शक्यम्, न हि नानावृक्षरसा अन्योन्यभेदत्यागेन प्राक् सिद्धेन मधुना ऐक्यमापद्यन्ते, न वा प्राक् भेदभ्रान्तिविषयाः पश्चात्तदविषयाः, किन्तु तन्तव इव पटमन्योन्यभिन्ना एव प्रागसिद्धं मधूत्पादयन्ति, न चेदं दार्ष्टान्तिकानुगुणम्। नदीसमुद्रदृष्टान्तेऽपि किं नदीसमुद्रावयविनोरैक्यम् ? किं वा तदवयवजलाणूनाम् ? उत द्रव्यान्तरारम्भः ? नाद्यद्वितीयौ, माषराशौ प्रक्षिप्तमाषतदवयवानामिव क्षीरे प्रक्षिप्तनीरतदवयवानामिव चान्योन्यमिश्रीभावेऽपि प्राग्भिन्नानां पश्चादप्यैक्यायोगात्। तृतीये तु भेद एव, एवं दार्ष्टान्तिकानानुगुण्यं चेति-चेन्न, स्पुटावच्छेदकविरहेण स्पष्टभेदाभावाभिप्रायेण दृष्टान्तनामुपात्तत्वेन दृष्टान्ते वास्तवभेदाभेदयोरौदासीन्येन त्वदुक्तदूषणगणानामगणनीयत्वात्। अत एव सतो भेदस्याज्ञानमात्रे दृष्टान्त इति निरस्तम्; भेदसत्तायामौदासीन्यात्। न चैवमस्फुटभेदविषयत्वस्यात्यन्तिकाभेदेऽनुपयोगः, सूक्ष्मोपाध्यवच्छिन्नस्य महोपाध्यवच्छिन्नैक्यवत्तदवच्छिन्नस्यापि तद्विलये अनवच्छिन्नैक्यमिति सम्भावनाबुद्धिजननद्वारोपयोगित्वसम्भवात्। अत एव `ताः समुद्रात् समुद्रमेवापियन्ति स समुद्र एव भवती'त्यत्र प्रकृतनदीरुद्दिश्य समुद्रभवनविधाने सुवर्णं कुण्डलं भवतीतिवत्, ताः समुद्र एव भवन्तीति व्यपदेशः स्यात्। अतो नद्योऽनियतजलराशिरूपात् समुद्राद् गच्छन्ति तं प्रविशन्ति च, समुद्रस्तु स एव, नैतासां समुद्रत्वमिति वा, समुद्र एव न तु नदीत्वं प्राप्नोतोति वार्थः। सतोऽप्यन्यौन्यं भेदस्याज्ञान एवेमौ दृष्टान्तौ। अत एव नानारसवाक्ये दार्ष्टान्तिके `एवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति सम्पद्य न विदुः सति सम्पत्स्यामह इति त इह व्याघ्रो वे'ति नदीसमुद्रवाक्ये च दार्ष्टान्तिके `सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामह'इति `त इह व्याघ्रो वे'ति सतो भेदस्याज्ञानेनैवानर्थ उक्त इति निरस्तम्, स्पष्टभेदविषयताभावाभिप्रायेण दृष्टान्तत्वात्। यच्च भेदाज्ञाननिबन्धनव्याघ्रादिरूपानर्थपरा श्रुतिरिति, तन्न, सति सम्पद्येत्येस्यासन्नत्वात् `न विदु'रित्यनेन सत्सम्पत्त्यज्ञानमुच्यते न तु भेदाज्ञानम्। तथा च सत्सम्पत्तेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वाभावात् तत्तद्वासनया तत्तद्व्याघ्रादिभाव एव भवतीत्येतत्परत्वात्। तस्माद् दृष्टान्तवर्याणां भेदे तात्पर्यहानितः। एतेषामनुसारेण छेदो नातदिति स्फुटम्।। ननु- अष्टमखण्डे स्वप्नान्तं मे सोम्य विजानीहिति स्वातन्त्र्यशङ्कानास्पदसुषुप्तिनिदर्शनेन एकादशे चास्य यदेकां शाखां जीवो जहातीत्यादिना अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्त्या पञ्चदशे च पुरुषं सोम्योतोपतापिनमित्यादिना स्वातन्त्र्यशङ्कानास्पदमरणनिदर्शनेन ईश्वराधीनत्वस्योक्तत्वादतदित्येव छेदो युक्त इति- चेन्न, स्वप्नान्तमित्यादेः सुषुप्त्यवस्थायामेव जीवत्वविनिर्मुक्तं स्वं देवतारूपं दर्शयिष्यामीत्यनेनाभिप्रायेण उद्दालकेनावतारितत्वेनेश्वराधीनत्वपरत्वाभावात्। जलादुत्थितानां वीचीतरङ्गफेनबुद्बुदानां पुनस्तद्भावं गतानां विनाशो दृष्टः। जीवानां प्रत्यहं स्वरूपतां गच्छतां मरणप्रलययोश्च नाशाभावः कथमित्याशङ्कायां तत्परिहारत्वेनोक्तस्य वृक्षशाखानिदर्शनस्य जीवाधिष्ठितं शरीरं जीवति, तदपेतं च म्रियते, न तु जीवो म्रियत इत्येतत्परत्वात् `जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो म्रियत' इति वाक्यशेषात्। यथा सोम्योतोपतापिनमित्यस्यापि `आचार्यवान् विद्वान् केन क्रमेण सत् सम्पद्यत इत्याशङ्कायां तत्क्रमप्रदर्शनपरत्वेन ईश्वराधीनत्वे तात्पर्याभावात्। यत्तु एकादशे `जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठती'त्यत्र जीवशब्द ईश्वरपरः मोदमान इति संसारिणः पृथगुक्तेरिति, तन्न, मोदमान इत्यस्य दृष्टान्तत्वेन प्रक्रान्तवृक्षविशेषणत्वेन संसारिपरत्वाभावेन जीवइत्यत्र श्रुतार्थत्यागायोगात्। यच्च द्वादशे एतस्यैव सोम्यैषोऽणिम्न एम महान् न्यग्रोधस्तिष्ठतीति, अत्र अणिमशब्दः सूक्ष्मेश्वरपरः, स एषोऽणिमा ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वमिति इहैव श्रुतावीश्वरे तस्य प्रयोगात्, न तु धानापरः, तासां किमत्र पश्यसीति अण्व्य इवेमा धाना इति भावप्रत्ययरहितेन स्त्रीलिङ्गेन बहुवचनान्तेन इवशब्दशिरस्केनाणुशब्देन निर्दिष्टतया तद्विपरीताणिमशब्दानर्हत्वाच्चेति चेन्न। एषोऽणुरात्मेत्यत्र भावप्रत्ययरहितप्रयोगविषयेऽपीश्वरे एषोऽणिमेति प्रयोगदर्शनेन धानासु तथा वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। न च तर्हि न निभालयस इत्युक्तादृश्यत्वायोगः, अनुभूतायां धानायामेव महान् न्यग्रोधस्थिष्ठति स त्वयाऽनभिव्यक्तत्वात् न ज्ञायत इत्येवं परत्वात्। ननु- यदि पञ्चदशे विदुषो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिमात्रं विवक्षितम्, तदा तस्य वाङ्मनसि सम्पद्यत इत्यादि तेजः परस्यां देवतायामित्यन्तमेव वाक्यं स्यात्, यावन्न वाङ्मनसि सम्पद्यत इत्यादि व्यर्थं स्यादिति- चेन्न। लौकिकमरणे यः सत्सम्पत्तिक्रमः, स एव विदुषोऽपि, विशेषस्तु ज्ञानाज्ञानकृत इति अमुमर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं दृष्टान्तेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सत्सम्पत्तिक्रम इति वैयर्थ्याभावात्। न च `तत् सत्यं स आत्मा' इत्यत्रात्मशब्देनाणिमशब्दोक्तेश्वर एव गृह्यते, न तु जीवः। "यदाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह। यच्चास्य सन्ततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति गीयते।।" इति वचनादिति- वाच्यम्, कतम आत्मेत्यादौ आत्मशब्दस्य जीवे प्रसिद्धत्वाद्, वचनोक्तविषयात्तृत्वस्य जीव एव च संभवात् तत्परिग्रहस्यैवोचितत्वात्। यच्च `तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मान'मिति वाक्योक्तो न जीवः तद्वाचिशब्दाभावादिति सिद्धान्तितम्, तदात्मशब्दस्य न जीवे अमुख्यत्वाभिप्रायेण किन्तु प्रधानादौ। जीवस्य तु आत्मत्वेऽपि परिच्छिन्नतया जगत्कर्तृत्वासम्भवाद् व्युदास इत्येवं परम्। जीवेनात्मनेति सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तेश्च। न च जीवशब्देन ईश्वर एवोक्तः, रूढिपरित्यागे कारणाभावाद्, रूढेश्च क्लृप्तत्वाद्, अहं हि जीवसंज्ञ इत्यादेश्च अभेदपक्षेऽपि संभवात्। न च प्राणधारकत्वमीशमात्रवृत्ति, जीवसाधारणत्वात्। न च त्रिवृत्करणपूर्वकनामरूपव्याकरणस्य जीवेऽसंभवः अस्मदादावसंभवेऽप्यत्रिवृत्कृतभूतारब्धलिङ्ग शरीराभिमानिनो हिरण्यगर्भस्य नामरूपात्मकप्रपञ्चव्याकरणसंभवात्। न च- तर्हि पुनर्जीवप्रवेशोक्त्ययोगः, `तत्तेज ऐक्षत ता आप ऐक्षन्त इमास्तिस्रो देवता' इति पूर्वमेव चेतनत्वसिद्धेरिति वाच्यम्, अव्याकृतभूतसृष्टौ साक्षात्कारणत्ववत् ब्रह्माण्डादिसृष्टौ न साक्षात्कारणता किन्तु स्वाभिन्नजीवद्वारेणेत्येवं परत्वात्। किञ्च `एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्युपक्रमात् न श्येनादिदृष्टान्तानुसारादतदिति पदच्छेदो युक्तः, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञानविरोधाद्, ब्रह्मजीवैक्यस्याप्रसक्तत्वेन निषेधानुपपत्तेश्च। न च- `इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठ'मित्यादाविंव श्रुतितात्पर्यापरिज्ञानेन `तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसी'दित्यादाविवानादिकुसमयेन वा देहेन्द्रियादीन् प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यरूपस्य ऐश्वर्यस्य सर्वैरपि स्वात्मन्यभिमन्यमानत्वेन प्रत्यक्षेण वा प्रसक्तिरैक्यस्येति- वाच्यम्, ऐक्यतात्पर्यस्य प्रमितत्वेन सुसमयत्वस्य व्यवस्थापितत्वेन च तात्पर्यापरिज्ञानकुसमय प्राप्तत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वाद्, ऐक्यलिङ्गस्यापि आभिमानिकत्वाभावेन तेन चेत् प्रसक्तिः, तदा निषेद्धुमशक्यतैव, देहेन्द्रियादीनां जीवस्यैक्येनाध्यस्तत्वात् तान् प्रति स्वातन्त्र्याभिमानस्य सार्वलौकिकस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वाद्, यत्किञ्चित्प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यस्य ईश्वरलक्षणत्वाभावाच्च। एतेन- एकमेवाद्वितीयमिति समाभ्यधिकराहित्यस्योपक्रमाद्, ऐतदात्म्यमिति तस्यैवोपसंहाराद्, अतत्त्वमसीति नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासाद्, शास्त्रं विना शास्त्रैकगम्यस्य ईश्वरभेदस्याप्रसक्ततयाऽपूर्वत्वाद्, अथ सम्पत्स्यत इति फलश्रवणाद्, येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवतीत्यर्थवादात्, शकुनिसूत्रादिदृष्टान्तैरुपपादनात्, षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गानि भेदपराण्येवेति- निरस्तम्, एकमेवेत्यत्र समाभ्यधिकराहित्यमात्रेण भोदोपक्रमत्वाभावाद्, अभेदेऽपि तत्संभवाद्, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञानविरोधाद्, द्वितीयाभावमात्रस्यैवोपक्रमात्। अत एवाभ्यासोपसंहारावपि भेदविषयौ न भवतः अभेदे तु यथाऽपूर्वता तथोक्तम्। फलार्थवादोपपत्तीनामभेद एव संभवाच्च। तथा शाखान्तरस्थिताभेदवाक्यानामुपासनाप्रकरणस्थितानां तूपासनापरतया नाभेदपरवाक्यविरोधः। इति तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थनिरूपणम्।। 28 ।। 29. अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यादिश्रुत्यर्थः बृहदारण्यकस्थितस्य तु `ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मी'ति वाक्यस्यानुपासनाप्रकरणस्थतया अभेदप्रमापकत्वमेव। न च तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुद्ध्यत, स एव तदभवत्तथर्षीणां तथा मनुष्याणामिति भेदपरवाक्यशेषविरोधः, तत्रापि देवादिषु प्रबुद्धं पुरुषं निर्धार्य `स एव तदभव'दिति ब्रह्माभेदपरत्वेन भेदपरत्वाभावात्। न च- अत्र वाक्ये ब्रह्मण एव प्रकृतत्वान्नानेन जीवब्रह्मैक्यसिद्धिरिति शङ्क्यम्, यो देवानामिति जीवपरामर्शिवाक्यशेषानुसारेण ब्रह्मपदस्य कार्यब्रह्मपरत्वात्, शुद्धब्रह्मपरत्वे च बोधनिमित्तस्य तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवदिति सार्वात्म्यलक्षणफलकीर्तनस्यायुक्तत्वापत्तेः। न च- `नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीतादित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेश' इत्यादावितिशब्दशिरस्कतया नामाद्यभेदाभावादत्रापीतिशब्दशिरस्कतया ब्रह्मभेदाभाव इति शङ्क्यम्, अनुपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वेनाभेदाविवक्षाया नाम ब्रह्मेत्यादाविव वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। न चेतिशब्दवैयर्थ्यम्, आत्मेत्येवोपासीत इत्यादाविव शब्दज्ञानयोः स्वाभाविकसकर्मकत्वप्राप्तौ तन्निराकरणपरत्वेनोपयोगात्। यच्च- अहं शब्दो जीवान्तर्यामिणि मुख्यः, अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति अन्तर्यामिण्यहं शब्दप्रयोगात्, सर्वान्तर्यामिको विष्णुः सर्वनाम्नाभिधीयते। एषोऽहं त्वमसौ चेति न तु सर्वस्वरूपतः।। इति वचनाच्चेति, तन्न। शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववदिति न्यायेन वामदेवजीवचैतन्यस्य वस्तुतो ब्रह्माभेदेन सूर्यादिभावस्योक्ततया अन्तर्यामिपरत्वाभावाद्, `तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्युबुद्ध्यत स एव तदभव'दिति पूर्ववाक्ये तत्त्वबोधनिमित्तकब्रह्मभावस्य प्रकृततया पश्यन् प्रतिपेदे इत्यादेरपि बोधनिमित्तब्रह्मभावपरतया अन्तर्यामिपरत्वाभावात्। स्मृतेरपि असाधारणतत्तदात्मनि शक्तेरावश्यकतया तत्सहचारेणान्तर्यामिणि एषोऽहमित्यादिप्रयोगः, न तु सर्वस्वरूपत इति। निषेधस्य तूपहितयोरैक्याभावनिबन्धनत्वान्न विरोधः, अत एव- विशिष्टचैतन्यरूपे वामदेवे विशिष्टचैतन्यरूपमनुसूर्यादिभावो न सम्भवतीति निरस्तम्, शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूक्तत्वात्। न च तर्हि शुद्धचित्यभवमित्युत्तमपुरुषायोगः, भूतपूर्वगत्या सम्भवात्। न च- अहं भूमिमदामार्यायेत्याद्ययोगः, न हि चिन्मात्रं भूमिदात्रिति- वाच्यम्, उपहितचितमादाय तेषामुपपत्तेः। अहं नामाभवत्तस्योपनिषदहमित्यादेश्च तादृशोपासनापरत्वेन शक्तिनिर्णायकत्वाभावात्। तस्मान्नान्तर्याम्यभेदपरेयं श्रुतिः, अन्तर्यामिणि भेदाप्रसक्तेश्च। न च नियम्यानन्त्यादिना प्रसक्तिः, एकस्न्निपि जीवे अनेकावयवनियामकत्वस्यैकस्मिन्नपि राजन्ये अनेकदेशनियामकत्वस्य च दर्शनात्। `स यश्चायं पुरुषे यश्चासावादित्ये स एकः' इत्यस्यापि नान्तर्याम्यैक्यपरता, ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादिना शुद्धस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रकृततया तस्मिन्नुपाधिकृतभेदस्य तात्त्विकत्वप्रसक्तौ तन्निराकरणार्थत्वेन ऐक्योपदेशोपपत्तेः। न चैवं छान्दोग्ये य एष आदित्ये पुरुषो दृश्यते सोऽहमस्मीत्यत्र स एवैनान् ब्रह्म गमयतीत्यत्र भेदपरोत्तरवाक्यविरोधः, तस्य उपासनाप्रकरणस्थत्वेनाहं ग्रहोपासनापरतया विरोधाभावात्। न चोपासनाप्रकरणस्थितवाक्यबलादैक्यासिद्धावपि अनुपासनाप्रकरणस्थितादपि तदसिद्धिः शङ्क्या। अन्यशेषत्वस्य तस्य तत्प्रयोजकस्याभावाद्। `अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्त' इत्युत्तरवाक्यस्य भेदज्ञाननिन्दापरतया तदनुसारेण पूर्ववाक्यस्योपासनापरत्वायोगात्। यत्तु ब्रह्मशब्दोऽत्र बृंहणार्थ इति न परब्रह्मैक्यसिद्धिः, अन्यथा पूर्ववाक्ये आत्मानमेवावेदहमित्यनेनैव ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानस्य सिद्धत्वाद् ब्रह्मास्मीति व्यर्थमिति, तन्न। आत्मशब्देन जीवचैतन्यमनूद्य बृंहितत्वाद्युपलक्षितब्रह्मचैतन्याभेदविधिपरत्वेन सार्थकत्वात्। तथा च स्मृतिः `अहं हरिः सर्वमिदं जनार्दन' इत्यादिकापि सङ्गच्छते। यत्तु `अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशु'रित्यत्रान्तर्यामिभेदज्ञाननिन्दनमिति, तन्न, अन्तर्यामिणोऽप्रकृतत्वात् पदद्वयलक्षणादेस्तात्पर्यानुरोधेन लब्धत्वात्। यत्तु अत्र योऽन्यो जीव अन्यां विलक्षणां देवतामुपास्ते अन्योऽसौ परमात्मा अहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुरित्यर्थ इति, तत्तुच्छम्, व्यवहितान्वयदोषात्। अहं शब्दसन्निहितान्य इत्यस्य य इत्यत्र नयनात्। न च `यस्य येनार्थसम्बन्ध' इति न्यायेन सन्निधानाद्योग्यतायाः प्रबलत्वमिति शङ्क्यम्, यथास्थितार्थसम्बन्धेऽप्युक्तक्रमेण योग्यतासत्त्वात्। न चेयं श्रुतिः स्वातन्त्र्येणान्यसद्भावनिषेधिका, अन्यत्वप्रतियोगिनि स्वातन्त्र्योपस्थापकपदाभावात्। यत्तु कैश्चिदुपास्त इति श्रवणात् प्रयत्नसाध्यज्ञानविजातीयवृत्त्यन्तररूपपोपासनाया एव निषेधः, न तु ज्ञानस्येत्युक्तम्, तन्न। `तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुध्यते'ति पूर्ववाक्ये न स वेदेति निन्दावाक्ये च वेदनस्यैव निर्देशात् मध्यस्थितोपास्तेरपि ज्ञानपरत्वात्। एवं मुण्डके `स यो ह वैतत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इत्येतदपि वाक्यमभेदपरमेव। न च- द्वितीयब्रह्मशब्दो जीवपर एव, तस्य जातिजीवकमलासनाद्यनेकार्थत्वात्, द्वे ब्रह्मणी इत्यादौ जीवे ब्रह्मशब्दप्रयोगसम्भवाच्च, यः परमं ब्रह्म वेद स जीव एव भवति, न तु परमं ब्रह्मेत्यर्थः। अत एव आद्यो ब्रह्मशब्दः परमत्वेन विशेषित इति- वाच्यम्, जीवे ब्रह्मपदप्रयोगसम्भवेऽपि प्रकृते परब्रह्मोपदानमेवोचितम्, जीवभावस्याब्रह्मभावस्य च प्रागेव सिद्धतया ब्रह्मज्ञानसाध्यत्वाभावात्। एवं च अर्थाद् द्वितीयब्रह्मभवनमपि परमत्वविशेषितमेव। यच्च ब्रह्म भवतीत्यस्य बृंहितत्वरूपब्रह्मत्वाक्रान्तो भवती'त्यर्थः, सम्पूज्य ब्राह्मणं भक्त्या शूद्रोऽपि ब्राह्मणो भवेद् इतिवत्। न हि शूद्रोऽपि पूजितब्राह्मणव्यक्तिर्भवति, किन्तु ब्राह्मणत्वजात्याक्रान्त इति, तन्न, पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या प्रकृते व्यक्त्यभेदस्यैव सम्भवेन दृष्टान्तवैषम्यात्। न च- `अस्य महिमान'मिति वाक्यशेषात्तदीयमहत्त्वप्राप्तिरेव, न तु तद्भाव इति युक्तम्, देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपञ्चविलक्षणं यो वेद, प्रपञ्च तद्विभूतिं च यो वेद, स वीतशोको भवतीत्येवं परत्वात्। न च `यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमाना' इति भिन्ननदीसमुद्रदृष्टान्तोक्तिरयुक्तेति वाच्यम्, स्पष्टभेदविलयनमात्रपरत्वेन दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात्। परात् परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यमिति न देशान्तरस्थब्रह्मप्राप्त्युक्तिपरा, तस्याः सगुणोपासनाफलत्वेन ब्रह्मविद्याफलत्वासम्भवेन स्वरूपभूतब्रह्मप्राप्तिपरत्वात्। न च- अद्वैतमते नित्यं ब्रह्मभूतस्यापूर्वब्रह्मभावोक्तिरयुक्तेति वाच्यम्, कण्ठगतचामीकरादौ भ्रान्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रेण प्राप्तप्राप्तिरूपतया फलत्वदर्शनात्। न चारोपनिवृत्तेरशाब्दत्वम्, श्रुतार्थापत्तिगम्यतया शाब्दत्वोपपत्तेः। `ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येती'ति श्रुतिरप्यैक्यपरा। न चात्र प्रथमब्रह्मपदस्य जीवपरत्वाभावे कर्तृकर्मभावविरोधः, साक्षात्कारप्राक्कालीनौपाधिकभेदमादाय तादृङ्निर्देशोपपत्तेः। परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्तीत्येतदप्यभेदे मानम्। न च गावः सायं गोष्ठ एकीभवन्ति। एकीभूता नृपाः सर्वे ववर्षुः पाण्डवं शरैः। कीटो भ्रमरेणैकीभूत इति स्थानैक्यमत्यैक्यसादृश्यनिबन्धनैकीभावस्य गोनृपकीटभ्रमरादौ दर्शनाद्, अत्रापि तैरेव निमित्तैः गौण एकीभाव इति- वाच्यम्, मुख्यत्वे सम्भवति गौणत्वस्यायोगात्। ब्रह्मैक्यमात्रपरत्वेन सकृदुच्चरितस्य नानेकार्थपरत्वशङ्कापि। न चैक्यस्य प्रागेव सिद्धतया अभूततद्भावार्थच्विप्रत्ययायोगः, स्वगृहनिक्षिप्ताज्ञातनिधिवत् सतेऽप्यावृतत्वेनाभूतसमतया च्विप्रत्ययोपपत्तेः। न च परेऽव्यय इति श्रुतसप्तमीहानिरश्रुततृतीयाकल्पनापत्तिश्चेति- वाच्यम्, श्रुत्यन्तरानुसारेण सप्तम्या अननुसरणीयत्वात्। न च `परमं साम्यमुपैति', परात्परं पुरुषमुपैतीति पूर्वोत्तरवाक्यविरोधः, तस्य प्रागेव निरासात्। तथान्तर्यामिप्रकरणस्थं`नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टे' इति वाक्यम् अक्षरप्रकरणस्थं `नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्ट्रिति' वाक्यं च ऐक्ये प्रमाणम्। न चात इत्येनेन प्रस्तुतं सर्वनियन्तारं परामृश्यान्यो द्रष्टा नास्तीत्युक्तेः स्वनियामकद्रष्ट्रन्तरनिषेध आयाति, न तु द्रष्टृसामान्यनिषेधः, अस्मिन् ग्रामे अयमेव सर्वनियामको नान्यः पुरुषोऽस्तीत्यदावन्यशब्दस्य प्रस्तुतसदृशान्यपरतया व्युत्पन्नत्वात् समानमितरच्छ्येनेनेत्यत्र इतरशब्दस्य पूर्वनिर्दिष्टसदृशपरत्वोक्तेश्चेति- वाच्यम्, अनेन ह्येतत्सर्वं वेदेति प्रतिज्ञातस्य एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानस्योपपादनार्थम् अन्यत्वेन प्रतीतेन जीवेनाभेदबोधनात्। अचेतनवर्गस्य अतोऽन्यदार्तं, नेति नेतीति निषेधाच्च जीवब्रह्माभेद एव वाक्यप्रमेयः। दृष्टान्ते तु अभेदस्याविवक्षितत्वात् त्वदुक्तप्रकाराश्रयणे बाधकाभावात्। न चात्राप्यन्तर्यामिवाक्ये `य आत्मनोऽन्तरः यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयती'ति पूर्वक्येन `एष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतः अतोऽन्यदार्तमि'त्युत्तरवाक्येन च विरोधः। तत्र परमात्मनोऽन्यं चेतनमङ्गीकृत्य तस्यार्तियुक्तत्वेनास्वातन्त्र्यस्यैवोक्तिरिति वाच्यम्, पूर्ववाक्यस्यौपाधिकभेदमात्रेणोपपत्तेः। उत्तरवाक्येन न चेतनान्तरस्यार्तियोगो विधीयते, किन्तु `एषोऽन्तर्यामी ते आत्मे'ति जीवस्वरूपभूतादन्तर्यामिणो व्यतिरिक्तं सर्वम् आर्तं विनश्वरमिति वा मिथ्येति वा बोधनान्न विरोधशङ्का। अत एव अक्षरवाक्येऽपि `एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः' इत्यादिपूर्ववाक्येन विरोध इत्यपास्तम्। किञ्च द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवतीति भेदस्य भयहेतुत्वेन निन्दितत्वादप्यभेद एवोपनिषद्गम्यः। न च- अस्य विरोधिनः समानाद् भयं भवतीत्येवार्थः, लोके तादृशादेव भयं भवतीति लोकसिद्धनुवादित्वात् पूर्वत्र `तस्मादेकाकी बिभेति' उत्तरत्र `तस्मादेकाकी न रमत' इति श्रवणाच्चेति वाच्यम्, यन्मदन्यन्नास्ति कस्मान्न बिभेमीति तत एवास्य भयं वीयायेति श्रुतेः। सामान्यतो द्वितीयमात्रदर्शनस्यैव भयहेतुत्वाद् विशेषकल्पनायोगात्। एकाकी बिभेतीति पूर्ववाक्ये परमार्थदर्शनरहितस्य तन्निमित्तभयसम्भवाद् एकाकी बिभेतीत्युक्तम्। उत्तरवाक्ये तस्मादेकाकी न रमत इत्यत्र इष्टसंयोगजन्यरतेरेकाकिन्यभावाद् एकाकिनो रतिर्नास्तीत्युक्तम्। ततश्चातत्त्वज्ञविषयोक्तवाक्यानुसारेण तत्त्वज्ञविषयमध्यवाक्यस्य स्वार्थसमर्पणेनाप्युपयुक्तत्वात् तद्विरोध्यर्थपरत्वायोगात्। `एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते अथ तस्य भयं भवती'ति भेदनिन्दयाप्यभेदसिद्धिः। न च एतस्मिन्निति श्रवणात् स्वगतभेदनिषेधोऽयम्, न भेदमात्रनिषेध इति शङ्क्यम्, अल्पार्थकारशब्दस्वारस्यादप्यर्थकोत्पदस्वारस्याद्, एतस्य प्रतियोगित्वेनानुल्लेखाच्च भेदमात्रनिषेधपरतया तद्विशेषनिषेधपरत्वकल्पनायोगात्। एवं `एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढ' इत्यादिश्रुतिरप्यत्रैक्यप्रमाणम्। न च- अर्न्ताम्यैक्यपरेयं श्रुतिः, `यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादाविव भूतशब्दस्य चेतनपरत्वादिति वाच्यम्। दृष्टान्तासम्प्रतिपत्तेः, चेतनस्य जायमानत्वाद्ययोगाद्, भूतहिंसानिषेधवाक्य इव चेतनाधिष्ठितप्राणशरीरादेरेव भूतशब्दवाच्यत्वात्। अत एव `एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः। इत्यादिस्मृतिरपि। एवं यावन्मोहं तु भेदः स्यात् जीवस्य परमस्य च। ततः परं न भेदोऽस्ति भेदहेतोरभावातः।। विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते। आत्मनो ब्रह्मणो भेदमसन्तं कः करिष्यति।। इत्यादिस्मृत्या भेदस्याविद्यकत्वप्रतीतेरभेद एव तात्त्विक इति गम्यते। न चात्र भेदशब्दो मित्रभेद इत्यादाविव वैमत्यार्थः, तथा सति लक्षणापत्तेः, अन्योऽन्याभावादेरेव मुख्यत्वात्, श्रुतार्थत्यागस्यान्याय्यत्वात्। क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत इत्यादिस्मृतिरप्यत्र मानम्। न च क्षेत्रज्ञं सर्वज्ञं मां सर्वक्षेत्रेषु विद्धीत्यर्थः। `महाभूतान्यहङ्कार' इत्याद्युक्त्वा `एतत्क्षेत्रं समासेन सविकारमुदाहृतम्' इत्यनेन `यस्य पृथिवी शरीर'मित्यादिश्रुत्येश्वरशरीरतयोक्तं चेतनाचेतनात्मकं सर्वं क्षेत्रमित्युक्तत्वादिति वाच्यम्, सर्वनियामकतया सकलक्षेत्रसम्बन्धस्य प्रागेव सिद्धेः पौनरुक्त्यापत्तेः, तत्तत्क्षेत्राधिष्ठातृत्वेन क्षेत्रज्ञपदवाच्यजीवाभेदपरत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात्। अत एव क्षेत्राणि च शरीराणि बीजानि च शुभाशुभे। श्रुतानि वेत्ति योगात्मा ततः क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते।। प्रकृतेश्च विकाराणां द्रष्टारमगुणात्मकम्। क्षेत्रज्ञमाहुर्जीवं तु कर्तारं गुणसंवृतम्।। इत्यादिस्मृतौ क्षेत्रज्ञशब्दस्य सर्वान्तर्यामिसर्वज्ञपरत्वेऽपि प्रकृते तदसम्भवः जीवे सुप्रसिद्धत्वाच्च। न च शास्त्रस्था वेति न्यायः, तस्य एकतराशास्त्रीयविषयत्वात्। एवमन्यान्यपि वाक्यानि यथासम्भवमैक्ये योज्यानि। तस्मादागम ऐक्ये मानम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्याद्यनेकश्रुतिस्मृत्यर्थकथनम्।। 29 ।। 30. एक्यानुमानभङ्गः एवमनुमानमपि तत्र मानम्- जीवाः, परमात्मनस्तत्त्वतो न भिद्यन्ते, आत्मत्वात्, परमात्मवत्। ननु- आत्मत्वं जातिरत्र हेतुः तथा चाभेदे हेतूच्छित्तिरेव प्रतिकूलतर्क इति चेन्न, तत्त्वतोऽभेदेऽपि व्यावहारिकभेदेनैव व्यावहारिकजातेरनुच्छेदोपपत्तेः। ज्ञातृत्वादित्यप्यत्र हेतुः। जीवे उपधेये अन्तःकरणोपहितवृत्तेस्तस्यासिद्धेरभावात्। व्यवहारे स्वभिन्नज्ञानानपेक्षत्वं हेतुः। तवापि जीवस्य स्वाभिन्ननित्यज्ञानस्याबाध्यव्यवहारविषयत्वात्। अबाध्यत्वमप्यत्र हेतुः। न च जडे व्यभिचारः, तत्र बाध्यत्वेन हेतोरभावात्, `तात्त्विकभेदस्य सर्वत्रासत्त्वेन व्यभिचारानवकाशात्। न च- एवं व्यावहारिकभेदव्यतिरेकोऽप्येवमेव साध्यतां जीवपरमात्मनोरिति वाच्यम्, तत्र प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्यैव बाधकत्वात्, श्रुत्यनुग्रहाच्चाभाससाम्यापादनाप्रयोजकत्वानवकाशात्। अत एव- विमता जीवाश्चैत्रात् तत्त्वतो न भिद्यन्ते, जीवत्वाच्चैत्रवदिति जीवैक्ये, विमता जीवा वस्तुतो ब्रह्मणो न भिद्यन्ते, वस्तुत्वाद्, ब्रह्मवदिति ब्रह्मजीवक्ये च यदनुमानम्, तत्र व्यवहारतोऽपि न भिद्यन्त इत्यप्येवं साध्यतामित्याभाससाम्यम्- अपास्तम्। एवं विमतानि शरीराणि, चैत्राधिष्ठितानि, शरीरत्वात्, संमतवत्। न च- एतावता न जीवैक्यसिद्धिः, चैत्राधिष्ठितत्वेऽपि अन्याधिष्ठितत्वसम्भवात्, चैत्रमात्राधिष्ठितत्वे तु अन्तर्याम्यधिष्ठितत्वेन दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, चैत्रमात्रसंसार्यधिष्ठितत्वस्य साध्यत्वात्। चैत्रमात्रभोगायतनानीति वा साध्यम्। न च- भोक्तृत्वमन्तःकरणविशिष्टस्य, तच्च प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नम्, यच्चैकं शुद्धचैतन्यं तन्न भोक्त्रिति बाध इति वाच्यम्, भोक्तृत्वस्य विशिष्टवृत्तित्वेऽपि विशेष्यवृत्तित्वानपायात्। न चैवं विमतानि शरीराणि चैत्रमनसैव युक्तानीत्याभाससाम्यम्, मनसोऽप्यैक्ये व्यवस्थायाः सर्वथानुपपत्तेः, श्रुत्यनुग्रहाननुग्रहाभ्यां विशेषाच्च, दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे तदभ्युपगमाच्च। आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वापरजात्या नाना न, विभुत्वाद्, आकाशवत्। न च- प्रतिकल्पमाकाशस्य भेदेन साध्यवैकल्यं परिच्छिन्नत्वेन साधनवैकल्यं चात्मत्वस्य परमाणुत्वादिवदजातित्वेऽपि आत्मभेदसिद्ध्या चार्थान्तरमिति- वाच्यम्। आत्मत्वाधिकरणं, द्रव्यत्वापरजात्यैककाले नाना न, समानकालीनमूर्तमात्रसंयुक्तत्वाद्, गगनवदित्यत्र तात्पर्यात्। पक्षविशेषणमहिम्ना च नार्थान्तरम्। विमतो भेदः, मिथ्या, एकस्यां दृशि कल्पितो वा, भेदत्वाद्, दृश्यत्वाद्वा, चन्द्रभेदवद्, एकस्यां दृशि कल्पितो वा, भेदत्वाद्, दृश्यत्वाद्वा, चन्द्रभेदवद्, एकस्यां दृशि क्षणिकवादिकल्पितभेदवद्वा। मिथ्यात्वं प्रागुक्तमेव। न च कल्पितसाधारणभेदत्वासिद्धिः, भेदे अकल्पितत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः। अत एव- चन्द्रस्य कल्पितद्वितीयचन्द्राद् भेदस्य सत्यत्वेन दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यम्, मुक्तेः संसाराद् ब्रह्मणो अनृताद् भेदे च व्यभिचार इति निरस्तम्, न चैवमभेदो मिथ्या अभेदत्वाद् देहात्माभेदवदित्यादि सुसाधम्, शून्यवादापत्तेरुक्तत्वात्। एवं विमता भेदधीः, मिथ्या, भेदधीत्वाच्चन्द्रभेदधीवत्। न च ब्रह्मानृतभेदप्रतीत्यादौ व्यभिचारः, तासामपि पक्षसमत्वात्। आभाससाम्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वे प्रत्येतव्यत्वानुपपत्त्यैव निरासः। अत एव। विमतं तात्त्विकस्वान्तर्भेदशून्यं महत्त्वतः। यदेवं तत्तथा यद्वत् खं तथेदं ततस्तथा।। इत्यत्र गगनस्य सावयत्वेन न साध्यवैकल्यम्, स्वान्तःपदेन स्वावयवातिरिक्तस्योक्तेः। एवं संवित्, स्वान्तर्गणिकस्वाभाविकभेदहीना, उपाधिमन्तरेणाविभाव्यमानभेदत्वाद्, गगनवत्। न च साध्यवैकल्यम्, नैयायिकदिशा दृष्टान्तत्वोक्तेः। न च- इच्छादेरपि घटपटाद्युपाधिभेदन विभाव्यमानभेदतया व्यभिचारस्तेष्विति वाच्यम्, इच्छादीनामेकान्तःकरणपरिणामत्वेन तत्रापि साध्यसत्त्वात्। विमतो अव्याप्यवृत्तिधर्मानवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताको भेदः, स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी, भेदत्वात्, संयुक्तभेदवत्। विमतो भेदः, केवलान्वय्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी, पदार्थत्वात्, नित्यद्रव्यवत्। स्वरूपेणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे यथा न तुच्छत्वं पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे ब्रह्मवत् तद्रूपतोपपत्त्या न यथार्थान्तरम्, तत् प्रागुक्तम्। अन्योऽन्याभावत्वम्, स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिवृत्ति, त्रैकालिकाभाववृत्तित्वे सति अभावत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यत्वाद्, अत्यन्ताभावत्ववदित्यनुमानं पूर्वोक्तसंयुक्तप्रतियोगिकभेदरूपदृष्टान्तसिद्ध्यर्थम्। न च शुक्तौ शुक्तिभेदस्यारोपितस्य सत्त्वेन सिद्धसाधनम्, असदन्यथाख्यातिवादिनस्तवानङ्गीकृत्वेन तस्य साध्यत्वात्। न च त्रैकालिकत्वे मिथ्यात्वायोगः, मायाचित्सम्बन्धस्य कालत्वेन सर्वकालस्थितेरतद्विरोधित्वात्। न चाव्याप्यवृत्तितया संयोगादिवत् समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेनार्थान्तरम्, पक्षविशेषणमहिम्ना अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वस्यासम्भवेन तदयोगात्। अनुसन्धानाद्यव्यवस्थादिकं प्रागेव निराकृतम्। अप्रयोजकत्वाभाससाम्यसत्प्रतिपक्षोपाध्यादि पूर्वोक्तप्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुमानवन्निराकरणीयम्। एवमात्मत्वमेकत्वव्याप्यम्, आत्ममात्रवृत्तित्वात्, चैत्रत्ववदित्याद्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ जीवब्रह्माभेदानुमानम्।। 30 ।। 31. अंशत्वे नैक्यसिद्धिभङ्गः `पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानी'ति श्रुतौ `ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः' इति स्मृतौ चांशत्वव्यपदेशादपि जीवब्रह्माभेदसिद्धिः। यद्यपि ब्रह्म प्रति जीवस्यांशत्वं न तावदारम्भकत्वम्, ब्रह्मणोऽनादित्वात्। नापि खण्डत्वम्, अच्छेद्यत्वात्। नापि समुदायित्वम्, समुदायस्य समुदाय्यनन्यत्वेन व्यवहारदशायामपि संसार्यन्यशुद्धब्रह्माभावापातात्। नापि भिन्नाभिन्नद्रव्यत्वम्, अनङ्गीकारात्। नापि पटं प्रति खण्डपटस्येव प्रदेशत्वम्, निष्प्रदेशब्रह्म प्रति कल्पनां विना तदयोगात्। तथापि घटाकाशस्य महाकाशं प्रतीव कल्पितप्रदेशत्वरूपमंशत्वं जीवस्यावच्छेदपक्षे गम्भवति। स्वतो निरंशेऽपि औपाधिकांशो यथा युज्यते, तथोक्तं पुरस्तात्। न तु सदृशत्वे सति ततो न्यूनत्वम्, स्थूलपटं प्रति सूक्ष्मपटस्याप्यंशत्वापत्तेः। वस्त्वेकदेशे मुख्यस्यांशशब्दस्य स्वतो निरंशेऽपि कल्पितैकदेशे प्रयोगस्यार्थान्तरे प्रयोगकल्पनापेक्षयाऽभ्यर्हितत्वात्। `अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एक' इति सूत्रे `सोऽन्वेष्टवव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्य, एतमेवं विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति य आत्मनि तिष्ठ'न्नित्यादिभेदव्यपदेशस्य `ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म दासा ब्रह्मेमे कितवा उतेत्याथर्वणमन्त्रे अभेदव्यपदेशस्य चोदाहृतत्वाच्चोक्तार्थपरिग्रहस्योचितत्वात्। आत्यन्तिकभेदगर्भार्थान्तरस्वीकारे चैतत्सूत्रविरोधापत्तेःष कुत्रचिदन्यत्र प्रयोगमात्रेण सर्वत्रैतत्कल्पने बहुविप्लवापत्तेश्च। अत एव ननु जीवस्य शुद्धचैतन्यांशत्वं वा ? ईश्वरांशत्वं वा ? पादोऽस्येत्यनया श्रुत्या बोध्यम् ? नाद्यः, पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानीति श्रुताविदंशब्देन सहस्रशीर्षत्वादिविशिष्टप्रकृतेश्वरस्य ममैवांश इति स्मृतौ चेश्वरे प्रयुक्तास्मच्दब्देनेश्वरस्यैवोक्तेः। नान्त्यः, त्वन्मते ईश्वरस्याप्युपहितत्वेन घटाकाशं प्रति करकाकाशस्येवेश्वरं प्रति जीवस्यांशत्वायोगात्। न च गृहाकाश एव पुनर्घटेनेवेश्वरोपाधिनाऽवच्छिन्नमेव चैतन्यं पुनर्जीवोपाधिनावच्छिद्यत इति वाच्यम्, तथात्वे हि मुक्तस्य शुद्धब्रह्मत्वं न स्यात्, तस्मात्त्वन्मतेऽपि न मुख्यमंशत्वम्, नाप्यौपाधिकं वक्तुं शक्यम्, अतो मदुक्तप्रकार एवादरणीय इति निरस्तम्। अर्थान्तरपरिग्रहे विरोधस्योक्तत्वात्, श्रुतिस्मृतिगतसर्वनाम्ना सहस्रशीर्षत्वाद्युपलक्षितचैतन्यपरामर्शादुक्तदूषणानवकाशाच्च। तस्मात् "त्वं स्त्री त्वं पुमानसि त्वं कुमार उत वा कुमारी त्वं जीर्णो दण्डेन वञ्चसि त्वं जातो भवसि विश्वतोमुखः सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जीवब्रह्माभेदे प्रमितेऽपि मन्तृमन्तव्यत्वादिभेदव्यपदेशनिर्वाहार्थं काल्पनिकांशत्वस्य श्रुतिस्मृतिव्याहतत्वेन तद्बलादप्यभेदोऽवगम्यत इति सिद्धम्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ अंशत्वेनाप्यैक्यसिद्धिः।। 31 ।। 32. बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बैक्यभङ्गः तथा जीवब्रह्मणोर्मुखप्रतिमुखवद् बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बरूपत्वादप्यभेदोऽवगन्तव्यः। ननु दृष्टान्ते नाभेदः संप्रतिपन्नः, चैत्रतच्छाये भिन्ने इतिवत् चैत्रतत्प्रतिबिम्बे भिन्ने इत्येव पार्श्वस्थितेन ग्रहणात्, स्वेनापि स्वकरतत्प्रतिबिम्बे भिन्ने इति ग्रहणाच्चेतिचेन्न। आपाततो भेदप्रतीतावपि सयुक्तिकप्रत्यक्षेण बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरैक्यसिद्ध्या दृष्टान्तत्वोपपत्तेः। यथा लक्षणापरिज्ञाने भेदभ्रमवतोऽपि बहिस्थितश्चैत्रो यत्स्वलक्षणकत्वेन प्रतिपन्नः, ततो गृहस्थे तथा भाति तस्मिन् चैत्र एवायमिति धीः, तथा ग्रीवास्थं मुखं यत्स्वलक्षणकं प्रतिपन्नं दर्पणस्थमपि तथेत्यवधार्य तथैवेदं मुखमिति स एवायं कर इति च स्वपरसाधारणप्रतीतिरप्यनुभवसिद्धा। न च किञ्चित्स्वच्छताम्रादौ मुखछायामात्रे प्रतीतेऽपि संस्थानविशेषाप्रतीत्या प्रत्यभिज्ञाया असिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, सर्वत्राप्रतीतावपि निर्मलदर्पणादावेव तत्सिद्ध्या दृष्टान्तसिद्धेः। ननु स्वनेत्रगोलकादौ स्वस्याभिज्ञाविरहात् प्रत्यभिज्ञापि कथमिति चेन्न, दर्पणाहतचक्षूरश्मीनामग्रावच्छेदेन सम्बन्धात् स्वनेत्रगोलकादीनामभिज्ञायाः सन्निहितपूर्वसमय एव संभवात्। यत्तु सूर्यपार्श्वस्थिते प्रतिसूर्ये प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरहादत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरहः इति, तन्न, तत्रोपाधेरत्रेवानाकलनेनौपाधिकत्वानिर्णयात्। तथा च उपाधिनिबन्धनत्वज्ञानं तल्लक्षकत्वज्ञानं चाभेदसाक्षात्कारे सामग्री। तस्यां सत्यां दर्पणे मम मुखं लग्नमिति अनुभवाभाव एवानुभवविरुद्धः। यत्तु चैत्रप्रतिबिम्बो दृष्टो न चैत्रः, किन्तु तेनानुमित इति विपरीतानुभवविरोधः इति, तन्न, वस्तुतोऽभेदे ज्ञातेऽपि उपाध्यवच्छिन्नो दृष्टोऽनवच्छिन्नोऽनुमित इति प्रतीत्यविरोधात् शरद्गङ्गया वर्षर्तुगङ्गानुमानवत्। न च एवं प्रतिमुखे प्रत्यङ्मुखत्वादिना दृश्यमाने स्वमुखे तदबुद्धिः स्यात्, बालानां च स्वप्रतिबिम्बे बालान्तरभ्रमो न स्यादिति वाच्यम्, तयोः स्वलक्षणकत्वाज्ञाननिबन्धनत्वात्। अत एव कदाचित् प्रतिमुखेऽपि मम मुखमिति बुद्धिव्यपदेशौ। न चायं व्यवहारो भेदज्ञानपूर्वकत्वेन मार्गे स्वपदव्यां स्वपदव्यवहारवद्गौणः, स्वलक्षणकत्वज्ञानदशायां भेदज्ञानस्यासत्कल्पत्वात्। ननु अविवादः स्याद् भेदसाक्षात्कारे, अन्यथा त्वयापि कस्य भ्रमत्वमुच्येत ? न च भेदं भेदकं च साक्षात्कुर्वन् अभेदं साक्षात्कुर्वाणो दृष्ट इति चेत्, श्वैत्यव्याप्यशङ्कत्वसाक्षात्कारे पीतसाक्षात्कारवद् उपाधिमाहात्म्यादभेदं साक्षात्कुर्वाणो भेदं साक्षात्करोतीत्यङ्गीक्रियते, अनुभवस्य दुरपह्नवत्वात्। न चैवमुपादानस्य ऐक्याज्ञानस्य ऐक्यज्ञानेन निवृत्तेः भ्रमानुपपत्तिः, तन्निवर्तने उपाधिविरहस्यापि सहकारित्वात्। न च एवं तज्ज्ञाने सति तन्न जानामीत्यननुभवेन तस्य स्वप्रागभावं प्रतीवाज्ञानं प्रत्यप्यन्यानपेक्षस्यैव निवर्तकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, न जानामीति व्यवहारप्रयोजकाज्ञानांशनिवर्तनेऽपि भ्रमस्यानुभूयमानत्वेन तदुपादानांशस्य निवृत्तौ जीवन्मुक्तौ प्रारब्धकर्मण इवोपाधेरेव प्रतिबन्धकतया तद्विरहापेक्षाया आवश्यकत्वात्। एतेन भेदभ्रमस्यास्य मूलाविद्योपादानकत्वे व्यावहारिकत्वापत्तिः, अज्ञानानुपादानकत्वे अपसिद्धान्तः, बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभेदस्य सत्यत्वापत्तिश्चेति निरस्तम्, उक्तन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्व्यावहारि कत्वेऽप्यनुपपत्त्यभावाच्च। तयोरैक्ये अनुमानमपि प्रमाणम्। अत्र यद्यप्यत्यन्तासादृश्यं सव्येतरकरादौ व्यभिचारि, तथापि प्रतिबम्बो बिम्बाभिन्नः तद्गतासाधारणधर्मवत्त्वात्, तद्विरुद्धधरमानधिकरणत्वाद्, बिम्बाजनकाजन्यत्वाच्च। न च द्वितीयहेतोरसिद्धिः, प्रत्यङ्मुखत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मस्य उपाधिकृतत्वेन स्वाभाविकविरुद्धधर्मानधिकरणत्वस्य सत्त्वात्। न च बिम्बानन्तरजाते प्रतिबिम्बे तृतीयहेतोरसिद्धिः, ऐक्य वादिनं प्रति बिम्बानन्तरत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः। ननु पृथक्कार्यानुरोधेन परिवेषेन्द्रचापच्छायाप्रतिसूर्यादाविवात्रापि पृथक्कारणं कल्पनीयम्, प्रतिबिम्बमपि हि छायाविशेषः, न हि भेरीघातादिक्लृप्तहेत्वभावाद् ध्वनावुपरतेऽपि श्रूयमाणः प्रतिध्वनिर्न शब्दान्तरमिति चेन्न। प्रतिबिम्बस्य छायाविरोधिन्यालोकेऽपि सम्भवेन छायाविशेषत्वासिद्धेः, प्रतिध्वनेस्तु भिन्नकालत्वेन तद्भेदस्य प्रकृतेऽनुपयोगात्, कार्यपार्थक्यसिद्ध्युत्तरकालकल्प्यकारणभेदस्य प्रथमं वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्, क्लृप्तहेतुभावेन कार्यस्यैव भावाच्च। प्रत्यक्षस्य भेदाभेदयोः समत्वात्, युक्त्या अभेद एव प्राबल्याच्च। अत एवोक्तम्। विवरणे- `दर्पणादौ न मुखव्यक्त्यन्तरमस्ति, तज्जनकशून्यत्वात्, शशशिरसि विषाणवदिति। एवमभेदधिय उपपादितत्वाद् अस्याः प्राबल्यम्। व्यक्त्यन्तरहेत्वभावात् सैव नास्तीत्यपास्तं प्राक्। न च छायादाविव कारणभेदस्य कल्प्यत्वेन भेदबुद्धिः सोपपत्तिका तथा क्लृप्तद्रव्यानन्तर्भावे तमोवद् द्रव्यान्तरतैवेति वाच्यम्, अन्योन्याश्रयापत्तेः। भेदसोपपत्तिकत्वेद्रव्यान्तरत्वकारणान्तरत्वयोः कल्पनम्, तस्मिंश्च सोपपत्तिकत्वमिति। अत एव `नोपरक्तं न वारिस्थ'मिति स्मार्तव्यवहारो मुख्यः, न तु यथा चित्रितः सिंहः, यथा दारुमयी योषा, यथा चर्ममयो मृग इत्यादिवद् गौणः। न च त्वत्पक्षेऽपि वारिस्थशब्दो न मुख्यः, वारिणि सूर्यान्तराभावाद् गगनस्थस्य वारिस्थत्वायोगादिति वाच्यम्, वारिस्थत्वेनोपस्थिताशेषवारिस्थसूर्यनिषेधात्। ननु वारिस्थत्वेन सूर्य एवोपस्थितः तयोरभेदो न प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः, नापि युक्तः न्यूनाधिकपरिमाणवत्त्वचलत्वोपाधिसंयुक्तत्वासंयुक्तत्वत्वगादिग्राह्यत्वाग्राह्यत्वप्रत्यङ्मुखत्वाप्रत्यङ्मुखत्वादिना कस्तूरीबिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोः सौरभासौरभादिना च भेदसिद्धेरिति चेन्न, न्यूनपरिमाणादिना सौरभादिना च उपाधिगतस्य भेदः साधनीयः। तथा च उपाधिगतत्वस्य बिम्बे कल्पितत्वेन पक्षहेत्वोरसिद्धेः, कल्पितहेत्वादिना तत्समानसत्ताकसाध्यसिद्धावविवादाच्च। नापि- "यथैषा पुरुषे छाया एतस्मिन्नेतदाततम्। छाया यथा पुंसदृशी पुमधीना च दृश्यते। एवमेवात्मकाः सर्वे ब्रह्माद्याः परमात्मनः।।" इति श्रुत्या भेद इति वाच्यम्, कल्पितभेदमात्रेण सादृश्योपपत्तेः तात्त्विकत्वे श्रुतितात्पर्याभावाद्, ऐक्यप्रतिपादकानेकश्रुतिविरोधाच्च। ननु तत्स्वलक्षणकस्यैव दर्पणस्थत्वेनारोपिततया तद्रूपादियुक्तस्येव तद्गन्धादियुक्तस्यापि दर्पणस्थत्वेन प्रतीतिः स्यादिति चेन्न, तत्स्वलक्षणकत्वेनारोपितत्वेऽपि यावत्स्वलक्षणकत्वेनारोपितत्वानङ्गीकारेण गन्धादिप्रतीत्यापादनस्याशक्यत्वात्। ननु एवं दर्पणे मुखस्याभावे उपाधेः प्रतिबिम्बपक्षपातित्वेन मुखप्रतिमुखयोरवदातत्वश्यामत्ववत् जीवब्रह्मणोः संसारित्वासंसारित्वादिव्यवस्था कथमिति चेत्, न। आरोपितेनादर्शस्थत्वेन विशिष्टे प्रतिबिम्बे तद्धर्मस्य मालिन्यादेः सम्भवात्। न च उपाधिस्थत्वस्यापि आरोप्यत्वेन कथं मालिन्याश्रयतावच्छेदकत्वम् ? एकविशिष्टे इतरारोपाभावादिति वाच्यम्, आरोपपूर्वप्रतीतधर्मविशिष्टस्यैवारोप्याश्रयत्वात्, न तु तस्य सत्यत्वमपीति परप्रक्रियानिबन्धनदोषानवकाशात्। न च प्रतिमुखमेव दर्पणस्थं न तु मुखमिति प्रतिबिम्बदर्पणस्थत्वानुभवेन कथं प्रतिबिम्बत्वस्य तत्स्थत्वगर्मतेति वाच्यम्, अविद्योपहितस्याविद्याश्रयत्ववत् दर्पणोपहितस्य दर्पणाश्रित्वसंभवात्। एतेन मालिन्यस्थानीयस्य संसारस्य विशिष्टवृत्तित्वात् शुद्धाश्रितमोक्षसामानाधिकरण्यायोग इति निरस्तम्। संसारस्तावदुपहितवृत्तिः, तथा चोपधेयांशमादाय सामानाधिकरण्यसंभवात्। तथा च वृक्षस्थकपिसंयोगाधारता अग्रेणेव मुखेमालिन्यं दर्पणसम्बन्धेनावच्छिद्यते। एतावानेव विशेषः वृक्षे कपिसंयोगस्तु साहजिकः, मुखे औपाधिकं मालिन्यम्। तेनोपहिते उपाध्यवच्छिन्न एव मुखे मालिन्यधीः, एतेन दर्पणमालिन्यस्य मुखनिष्ठत्वे संसारस्यापि शुद्धनिष्ठतापत्तिः, वृक्षः संयुक्त इति वत् मुखं मलिनमिति प्रतीत्यापत्तिः, मखं न मलिनम् किन्तु प्रतिमुखमित्यनुभवविरोधापत्तिश्चेति निरस्तम्। ननु कस्तूर्यादिप्रतिबिम्बस्य स्वलक्षणाननुगमेन कथं बिम्बैक्यम् ? न च तदाकारतामात्रेण तत्त्वं, तर्हि छायाप्रतिमुद्राप्रतिमादीनामपि तत्त्वं स्यात्, प्रत्यङ्मुखत्वादेर्भेदकस्यात्रापि सत्त्वाच्च। न च प्रत्यङ्मुखत्वधीर्भ्रान्ता, प्रतिबिम्बं बिम्बाभिमुखं नेति कदाप्यननुभवादिति चेन्न, दर्पणादिप्रतिबिम्बे स्वलक्षणानुगमेन बिम्बैक्ये व्यवस्थिते प्रतिबिम्बत्वावच्छेदेनैव तत्कल्पनाद्, छायादौ स्वलक्षणकत्वस्य कुत्राप्यदर्शनेन साम्याभावात्। नापि प्रत्यङ्मुखत्वादि भेदकम्, मलिनत्ववदुपाधिकृतत्वात्। अत एव जपाकुसुमे रक्तताप्रतीतिवत् तद्धीर्भ्रान्ता। दर्पणाहतं चक्षुः प्रत्यङ्मुखं भवति, तस्य च स्वाभिमुखतया ग्रहणसामर्थ्याच्चान्याभिमुखस्यापि मुखादेस्तथाग्रहणोपपत्तेश्च। तदुक्तं- "दर्पणाभिहता दृष्टिः परावृत्त्य स्वमाननम्। व्याप्नुवन्त्याभिमुख्येन व्यत्यस्तं दशयेन्मुखम्।।" न च परावृत्त्य स्वमुखस्यैव ग्रहणे पार्श्वस्थस्य मुखद्वयप्रतीत्ययोगः, स्वमुखस्यैवेति नियमासिद्धेः, उपाधिसन्निहितमात्रस्यैव तथा ग्रहणात्। न च एवं दर्पणादेरभिघातकतामात्रेण उपक्षीणतया दर्पण इव दर्पणभेदेऽप्यनेकमुखप्रतीतिर्न स्यादिति वाच्यम्, अभिघातकानेकत्वेन चक्षुषोऽनेकाग्रसम्पत्त्या प्रत्यग्रं स्वाभिघातकावच्छेदकमुखग्राहकतया दृष्टान्तवैषम्यात्। न च मणिदर्पणकृपाणादिषु विरुद्धरूपानेकमुखप्रतीतिः कथमेवं युज्यत इति वाच्यम्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धोपाधि- प्राबल्यनिबन्धनत्वादिति गृहाण। न च चक्षुः परिवृत्तिप्रक्रिया ब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बे जीवे न संभवतीति वाच्यम्, चाक्षुषप्रतिबिम्बमात्रविषयतयैवास्या उपपादितत्वात्। न च विरलावयस्य जलस्य नेत्राभिघातकत्वे जलान्तर्गतशिलाद्यग्रहणप्रसङ्गः, सर्वावच्छेदेनाभिघाताभावेनान्तरेऽपि चक्षुषः प्रवेशसंभवात्। न च एवं बहुदूरव्यवहितोर्ध्वभागसूर्यादिग्रहणे पृष्ठभागस्थस्य व्यवहितस्यापि ग्रहणापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् चक्षुषो गमनागमनाभ्यां विशेषात्। न हि दूरस्थसूर्यग्रहणं वदता पृष्ठकुड्यादिकं भित्त्वा चक्षुर्गच्छतीत्युक्तं भवति। न च एवं शिलाभिहतमपि चक्षुः परावृत्त्य मुखं गृह्णात्विति वाच्यम्। तवापि प्रतिबिम्बं तत्रोत्पद्यतामित्यापत्तेः, अस्वच्छतया परिहारस्यास्माकमपि समत्वम्। तव स्वच्छ एव उत्पद्यते, मम तत एव चक्षुः परावर्तते इत्यङ्गीकारात्। न चैवं प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनेनापि बिम्बदर्शनजन्यसुखपुण्यादिप्रसङ्गः, यत्र तद्दर्शनमात्रजन्यता नान्यतः, तत्रेष्टापत्तेः यत्र चोपाधिविनिर्मुक्तज्ञानत्वेन विशिष्य जन्यता, तत्रापादकाभावात्। नचैवं सूर्यकस्यापि सूर्यवद् दुर्दर्शत्वापत्तिः, गोलके सूर्यतेजःसाम्मुख्यस्य दुर्दर्शताप्रयोजकस्य सूर्यकग्रहणकालेऽभावात्। न च स्वच्छदर्पण किञ्चित्स्वच्छताम्रादौ मुखसंस्थानविशेषप्रतीत्यापातः, उपाधिगतात्यन्तस्वच्छताव्यतिरेकप्रयोजकमालिन्यादेरेव तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वाद्, अन्यथा तवापि तादृक्संस्थानविशेषवत् प्रतिबिम्बं तत्र कथं नोत्पद्यत इत्यस्य दुष्परिहरत्वापत्तेः। ननु अवच्छेदपक्षे द्विगुणीकृत्य वृत्त्यसम्भवेऽपि प्रतिबिम्बपक्षे तत्संभवेनान्तर्यामित्वमिति स्ववचनविरोधः, उपाधेः प्रतिबिम्बपक्षपातित्वमित्युक्त्ययोगश्चेति चेन्न, सर्वोपाध्यवच्छिन्नत्वैकदेशोपाध्यवच्छिन्नत्वाभ्यामुपाधिकल्पितभेदेन च स्वोक्त्यविरोधोपपत्तेः। अत एव दर्पणे न मुखमित्येव उपाधिसंसृष्टतया निषिध्यते, न तु `नेदं रूप्य'मितिवत् नैतन्मुखमिति स्वरूपेण। ननु नात्र मुखच्छायास्तीत्यननुभवेन प्रत्युतैतावन्तं कालम् अत्र प्रतिसूर्य आसीदितिवत् प्रतिमुखमासीदित्येवानुभवेन प्रतिबिम्बमिवादर्श इत्यादिस्मृत्या वा प्रतिमुखे दर्पणस्थत्वस्याप्यबाध एव, न हि भूमौ मेघो नेत्येतावता मेघच्छायापि तत्र बाधितेति - चेन्न, मुखप्रतिमुखयोरेकस्वलक्षणकत्वेनैक्यव्यवस्थित्या मुखस्यैव तत्स्थत्वनिषेधेन प्रतिमुखस्य तत्सत्त्वनिषेधसंभवात्। मेघच्छायाप्रतिसूर्यादीनां न तथेति न मेघादिनिषेधेन छायादिनिषेधः। स्मृतिस्तु प्रातीतिकार्थमादाय दृष्टान्तपरा। न च एवं प्रतिबम्बाद् बिम्बानुमानोच्छेदः साध्याविशेषादिति वाच्यम्, उपाधिकल्पितभेदेन विशेषोपपत्तेः। एतेन `नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्य'मित्यनेन उद्यत्प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनस्यापि निषेधः स्यात्, वारिस्थ सूर्यदर्शननिषेधेनाकाशस्थसूर्यदर्शनस्यापि निषेधश्च स्यात्, प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनेनैव दृष्ट्वा स्नायादिति शास्त्रार्थोऽप्यनुष्ठितः स्यादिति निरस्तम्, कल्पितभेदादेव शास्त्रीयव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः न च औदुम्बरतया ज्ञातेनानौदुम्बरेण औदुम्बरो यूपो भवतीति शास्त्रार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः, आत्मतया ज्ञातदेहश्रवणादिनात्मा श्रोतव्य इति शास्त्रार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गश्चेति वाच्यम्, प्रमया उपपत्तौ संभवन्त्यां भ्रमेण तदुपपादनस्यायुक्तत्वात्। ननु अनादेर्जीवस्य नोपाध्यधीनं प्रतिबिम्बत्वम्, किन्तु तदधीनत्वे सति तत्सदृशत्वम्, तच्च भेदव्याप्तमिति विरुद्धो हेतुः। उक्तं हि सूत्रकृता- `अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिव'दिति चेत्, न, उपाध्यधीनत्वं हि उपाधौ सत्येव सत्त्वम्। तच्च नानादित्वविरोधि, अनादिजीवस्यापि तत्संभवात्। अत एव प्रतिबिम्बपदस्य भेदसादृश्यार्थकत्वमादाय विरुद्धत्वोक्तिर्हेतावयुक्ता। तदेवम्- प्रतिबिम्बस्य बिम्बेनैक्ये व्यवस्थिते। ब्रह्मैक्यं जीवजातस्य सिद्धं तत्प्रतिबिम्बनात्।। इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बन्यायेनैक्यसिद्धिः।। 32 ।। 33. जीवाणुत्वविवरणम् ननु अणुत्वाज्जीवस्य कथं व्यापकादीश्वरादभेद इति चेन्न, `नित्यः, सर्वगतः', `स वा एष महानज आत्मा' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जीवो नाणुः, प्रत्यक्षगुणाश्रयत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च, घटवद्, आत्मत्वादभूतत्वाच्चेश्वरवदित्याद्यनुमानैश्च जीवानणुत्वसिद्धेः। विपक्षे च देहव्यापिसुखज्ञानाद्यनुपलम्भापत्तिर्बाधिका। न च- "अमुर्ह्येष आत्मा यं वा एते सिनीतः पुण्यं च पापं च," बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च। भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते।। इति श्रुत्या जीवोऽणुरिति वाच्यम्, व्यापकत्वप्रतिपादकबहुश्रुतिविरोधेन दुर्विज्ञेयत्वपरत्वाद् देहव्यापिगुणोपलम्भस्यान्यथयितुमशक्यत्वात्। एतेन जीवो न व्यापकः, उत्क्रान्तिमत्त्वाद्, गतिमत्त्वात्, क्रियावत्त्वाच्च, खगशरीरवद्, विपक्षे हेतूच्छित्त्यापत्तिर्बाधिकेति निरस्तम्, हेत्वसिद्धेः। न च `सोऽस्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रम्यामुं लोकमधिगच्छति, अमुष्मादिमं लोकमागच्छती'त्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिः `तत्र चन्द्रमसं ज्योतिर्योगी प्राप्य निवर्तत' इत्यादिस्मृतिभिश्च हेतुसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, उत्क्रमणादीनां बुद्धिगतानां तदुपहिते श्रुत्या प्रतिपादनात्। न च `नाकस्य पृष्ठे सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति, ते अशुभमनुभूयावर्तन्त' इत्यादौ श्रुतौ सुखदुःखाद्यनुभवसामानाधिकरण्यस्य गतावुक्तेः कथं तस्या बुद्धिगतत्वमिति वाच्यम्, आत्मनि सुखदुःखाद्यनुभवस्यापि बुद्ध्युपाधिकत्वेन तत्सामानाधिकरण्यस्य गतौ स्वाभाविकत्वासाधकत्वात्। ननु- `स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयती'त्यादिश्रुतौ `तत्र प्रयाता गच्छन्ति ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदो जना' इत्यादिस्मृतौ च गतेर्मुक्तिसामानाधिकरण्योक्तेः कथमसिद्धिरितिचेन्न, अव्यापकस्यैवाव्यापकं प्रत्येव गमनम्। ब्रह्म च व्यापकं तत्प्रति गमनासम्भवेन गमनपदस्य उपाधिकृतभेदराहित्य- परतया गतिमुक्तिसामानाधिकरण्याप्रतिपादकत्वात्। ननु- `प्रद्योतेनैव एष आत्मा निष्क्रामती'त्यात्मनिष्ठत्वश्रुतेर्नासिद्धिः, अन्यथामोक्षादिकमपि बुद्धेरेव स्यात्, नापि श्रुतेर्बुद्ध्युपाधिकगत्यादिविषयत्वं संभवति, `तद्यथा अनः सुसमाहितमुत्सर्जद्यायादेवमेवायं शरीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनाऽन्वारूढ उत्सर्जत् याती'ति स्वाभाविकगत्याश्रयशकटदृष्टान्तोक्तेरिति चेन्न, एष इति बुद्ध्युपहितस्यैव परामर्शेन शुद्धात्मनिष्ठत्वस्य गतावनुक्तेः, मोक्षे तु बुद्ध्युपरमेण तन्निष्ठत्वस्यासंभाविततया वैषम्यात्, सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्ततायामप्रयोजकत्वात्, तद्वलेन स्वाभाविकत्वपर्यन्तत्वस्यासिद्धेः। न च- `तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामती"त्यादिश्रुतौ प्राणाख्यबुद्धिगतितः प्रागेव जीवे गत्युक्तेः कथं बुद्धिगत्याऽन्यथासिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, प्राणाख्यांशेन क्रियाशक्तिशालिना पश्चाद्गतावप्यंशान्तरेण प्रथममुत्क्रमणसंभवात्। एतेन- `मन उदक्रामन्मीलित इवाश्नन् पिबन्नास्ते वेत्यादिश्रुतौ मनउत्क्रमणेऽपि आत्मनस्तदभावश्रवणाच्च कथं तद्गत्यैव गतिमत्त्वमिति निरस्तम्, उपहितस्योपाधिनिबन्धनगतिमत्त्वे बुद्ध्यनुपहितस्य तदभावाविरोधात्। न च तथा `विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यमित्यादिश्रुतौ नामरूपविमोक्षानन्तरमपि गतिश्रवणात् कथं सा औपाधिकीति वाच्यम्, परमपुरुषस्य सर्वत्र सन्निहितत्वेन तं प्रति गमनासम्भवेन उपैतीत्यस्यापि पूर्ववदर्थान्तरपरत्वात्। अत एव "परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स उत्तमः स तत्र पर्येतीत्यादिश्रुतिरपि न गत्यर्था। ननु- बुद्धिगतेन गत्यादिना किं तदवच्छिन्नात्मनि गत्यादि जायते ? उत बुद्धिगतमेवारोप्यते ? उतोपचर्यते ? नाद्यः, घटगत्या तदवच्छिन्ने नभसि गत्यन्तरादर्शनात्। अन्यथा यतो घटस्य बुद्धेर्वा गतिः तत्राकाशस्यात्मनो वा सच्छिद्रत्वं स्यात्। अन्यत्र द्विगुणीकृत्य वृत्तिश्च स्यात्। न च प्रतिबिम्बपक्षे नोक्तदोष इति वाच्यम्, तस्य वस्त्वन्तरत्वमते उक्तदोषाभावेऽपि दर्पणाहता दृष्टिः परावृत्य स्वमुखं गृह्णातीति त्वन्मते उपाधिगत्या बिम्बे न गतिरिति प्रतिबिम्बेऽप्यस्यायोगात्। नान्त्यौ, कर्तुरवच्छिन्नस्यैतदात्मप्रदेशस्य न भोगायतनलोकप्राप्तिः, किन्तु गयता बुद्ध्याऽवच्छिन्नस्य प्रदेशान्तरस्यैवेति स्वीकारे कृतहान्यादिप्रसङ्गात् कर्तुर्भोक्तुश्चावच्छिन्नस्य भिन्नत्वात् अभिन्ने वाऽनवच्छिन्ने कर्तृत्वाद्यभावादिति चेन्न, उपाधिगत्या उपहिते गतिप्रयोग औपचारिक एव। न चैवं कृतहान्याद्यापत्तिः, यदबुद्ध्यवच्छिन्नेन येनैवात्मना यत् कृतं तदवच्छिन्नेन तेनैव भोगजननात्। न ह्यात्मनो निरवयवस्य प्रदेशोऽस्ति। यत्तु अवच्छिन्नस्य कर्तुर्भोक्तुर्भेद इत्युक्तम्, तन्न, अवच्छेद्यात्मनोऽवच्छेदकबुद्धेश्चैक्येऽवच्छिन्ने भेदस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। न चात्मत्वमणुनिष्ठं द्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातित्वात् पृथिवीत्ववदित्यनुमानम्, व्यापकावृत्तित्वस्योपाधित्वात्, स्पर्शादिसामानाधिकरण्यस्याप्येवं साधनप्रसङ्गाच्च। जीवो न व्यापकः, भूतेतरत्वे सति परत्वासमवायिकारणानाधारत्वे सत्यसर्वज्ञत्वात् शब्देतरानित्यविशेषगुणाश्रयत्वात् संस्काराश्रयत्वाच्च कटवदित्यत्रानात्मत्वमुपाधिः, अनित्यविशेषगुणसंस्कारादीनामुपाधिवृत्तित्वेनासिद्धिश्च। एवं महत्त्वस्यापि सुसाधत्वं च। जीवः, अणुः, ज्ञानासमवायिकारण संयोगाश्रयत्वात्, मनोवद् इत्यत्र मध्यमपरिमाणवत्त्वेन मनसो दृष्टान्तासम्प्रतिपत्तेः। जडत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च। सर्वत्र चात्र व्यापिसुखज्ञानाद्युपलम्भः प्रतिकूलस्तर्कः, एकस्याणोरेकदा व्यवहितदेशद्वयावच्छेदासंभवेन `पादे मे सुखं शिरसि वेदना' इत्यादियुगपदनुभवविरोधश्च। न च गुणनिः अणुत्वेऽपि गुणव्याप्त्या व्यापिसुखज्ञानानुमानविरोधः गुणिव्यतिरेकेणास्यासंभावितत्वात्। अन्यथा घटव्यतिरेकेणापि घटरूपं स्यात्। प्रदीपादन्यत्र दृश्यमानापि प्रभा न दीपगुणः, किन्तु अनुद्भूतस्पर्शं द्रव्यान्तरम्। न च जातिसमवायादेर्धर्मितोऽन्यत्र वर्तमानत्ववदत्रापि गुणस्य बुद्धेरन्यत्रोपलम्भः स्याद् इति वाच्यम्, जातिसमवायादिवदत्रापि तर्हि व्यापकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, धर्मिणो विहायापि स्थितौ तस्या नियामकाभावात्। न च कारणनियमान्नियमः, तर्ह्यव्यवहितसमवायिकारणनियमादेव नियमे अमुमात्रदेशता दुर्वारैव। न च वह्नेरौष्ण्यं बहिर्नोपलभ्येत, समीपवृत्त्यनुद्भूतरूपतेजसस्तदित्युच्यमाने वह्नेरौष्ण्यं न सिध्येदिति वाच्यम्। बाधके सति सविधे तेजोऽन्तरकल्पनेऽपि दृश्यमानवह्नावनुभूयमानौष्णस्पर्शे बाधकाभावेन तस्मिंस्तेजोऽन्तरत्वकल्पनस्याशक्यत्वात्। एतेन केतक्यादौ परितो गन्धानुभवाद् गुणानां गुणिनैरपेक्ष्यम्। न च तत्र केतक्यवयवानां परितः प्रसहतां ते गन्धाः, तर्हि द्रव्यक्षयप्रसङ्गात्। न चावयवान्तरप्रवेशात्तदक्षयः, स्फटिककरण्डिकास्थकस्तूर्यादौ अवयवान्तरप्रवेशकल्पते मानाभावाद् इति निरस्तम्, समवायिनैरपेक्ष्येकार्यस्य निराश्रयत्वापत्तौ तत्प्रत्यासत्तिनिबन्धनकारणान्तरस्याप्युच्छेदे कार्यत्वहानेरेव तत्र कल्पनायां मानत्वात्। यत्तु नित्यः सर्वगतस्थाणुरित्यत्र `नित्ये सर्वगते विष्णावणुर्जीवो व्यवस्थितः' इति स्मृत्यन्तरानुसारात् सर्वगतस्थः अणुश्चेति विग्रहः इति तन्न। `आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः' `स वा एष महानज आत्मे'ति श्रुत्यनुसार्यर्थस्यैवोचितत्वाद् अणुरिति पदच्छेदे तद्विरोधापत्तेः। यत्तु क्रमेण नानादेहसम्बन्धादणोरेव सर्वगतत्वोक्तिः इति, तन्न, अशेषवाचिसर्वशब्दसङ्कोचे मानाभावात्। यदपि प्रत्यक्षत्वादिनैवाव्यापकत्वं साधनीयमित्युक्तम्, तन्न, प्रतिकूलतर्कस्योक्तत्वाद् व्यापकत्वसाधने तस्यैवानुकूलत्वेनाप्रयोजकत्वाभावाच्च। ननु आत्मनो व्यापकत्वे `सर्वाणि शरीराणि सर्वस्यैव भोगायतनानि स्युः, सर्वशरीरेन्द्रियादीनां सर्वदा सर्वात्मसंयुक्तत्वात्, कर्मणामपि साधारणदेहादिकृतत्वेनासाधारण्यायोगाद्, अहन्त्वारोपादेरपि नियामकमूलसम्बन्धादेरभावेन नैयत्यायोगादिति चेन्न, तवापीश्वरस्य व्यापकत्वेन सर्वशरीराणां तद्भोगजनकत्वापत्तेः समानत्वात्। न च तददृष्टाजन्यत्वात्तत्संयुक्तत्वेऽपि न तत्र भोगजननम् तर्हीहापि समम्। न च कर्मणामेव कथमसाधारण्यम् ? पूर्वतत्कर्मजन्यत्वाद्, एवमनादितैव। अन्यथा ईशात्मनि तवाप्यगतेः चैत्रभोगजनकाङ्कुरादेः तददृष्टजन्यत्वाद आत्मसमवेतस्यादृष्टस्य साक्षादङ्कुरासंबन्धाद् आत्मद्वारकसम्बन्धस्य वाच्यतायामात्मनो विभुत्वम्। न च चैत्रभोगाहेतोरप्याङ्कुरादेरात्मद्वाराऽदृष्टासंबन्धेऽपि तदजन्यत्वेन तस्यातन्त्रत्वमिति वाच्यम्, जनकादृष्टनिरूपितात्मद्वारकसन्निकर्षस्यातिप्रसङ्गाभावेन तन्त्रत्वात्। जनकता तु अदृष्टस्य फलैकोन्नेया। एवमेवोपपत्तौ प्रतियोग्यभाववाच्यवाचकज्ञानज्ञेयादाविवादृष्टकार्ययोरपि संबन्धान्तरस्वीकारे मानाभावः। यत्तु कारीर्यदृष्टस्य वृष्ट्या सह तदुद्दशेन विहितक्रियाजन्यत्वादिरूपः संबन्धोऽस्तीत्युक्तम्, तन्न तत्रापि यजमानात्मद्वारकसंयुक्तसमवायस्यैव जलक्षरणादिप्रयोजकत्वात्। एतच्च सर्वं पररीत्योक्तम्। स्वमते च व्यवस्था प्रागुक्तैव। तथा च `बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव ह्याराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्ट' इति श्रुतौ बुद्धिगुणेनाराग्रमात्रत्वोक्तेः स्वाभाविकमेव विभुत्वम्। न चात्रात्मगुणेनाराग्रमात्रत्वं बुद्धेर्गुणेन चावरत्वमिति व्युत्क्रमयोजना, "तद्यथाणुनश्चक्षुषः प्रकाशो व्याप्तः, एवमेवास्य पुरुषस्य प्रकाशो व्याप्तः अणुर्ह्येवैषपुरुष" इति श्रुत्यनुसारादिति वाच्यम्। व्यापकत्वबोधकानेकश्रुतिविरोधेन बुद्धेर्गुणेनेत्येतदनुसारेण चास्या एव औपाधिकाणुत्वपरत्वात्, पुरुषस्येति षष्ठ्या राहोः शिर इत्यादिवदुपचरितार्थत्वाच्च। तथा च न व्युत्क्रमेणान्वयः, तस्मादणुत्वं नात्मभेदकम्।। इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ आत्मनोऽणुत्वभङ्गः।। 33 ।। स्तितानि ग्रन्थेषु प्रकटमुपदिष्टानि गुरुभिर्गुणो, वा दोषो वा न मम परवाक्यानि वदतः। परं त्वस्मिन्नस्ति श्रमफलमिदं यन्निजधिया, श्रुतीनां युक्तीनामकलि गुरुवाचां च विषयः ॥ १ ॥
1. akhaṇḍārthatvalakṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ tatrākhaṇḍārthatvalakṣaṇopapattiḥ- heyaṃ nirūpya bandhākhyaṃ tannivṛtternibandhanam| yajjñānaṃ tadakhaṇḍārthamādeyamadhunocyate|| taccākhaṇḍārthaṃ dvividham- evaṃ padārthaniṣṭham, aparaṃ vākyārthaniṣṭham| ekaikaṃ ca punarvaidikalaukikabhedena dvividham| padārthaniṣṭhaṃ vaidikamapi dvividham- tatpadārthaniṣṭhaṃ tvaṃ padārthaniṣṭhaṃ ca| tatra satyaṃ jñānamanantamityādi tatpadārthaniṣṭham| `yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣa' ityādi tvaṃ padārthaniṣṭham| `prakṛṣṭaprakāśa' ityādi tu laukikaṃ padārthaniṣṭham| vākyārthaniṣṭhamapi vaidikaṃ `tattvamasyā'divākyam, `so'yaṃ devadatta' ityādi tu laukikam| atrāhuḥ- kimakhaṇḍārthatvam ? na tāvannirbhedārthatvam, yato nirbhedārthatvasya śabdabodhyatve viśeṣaṇatāyāmupalakṣaṇatāyāṃ ca nirghaṭaṃ bhūtalamitivat sakhaṇḍārthataiva syāt śabdābodhyatve tu vastugatyā yannirbhedaṃ brahma tadbodhakasaguṇavākyānāmapi akhaṇḍārthatvāpattiḥ| atha yannirbhedaṃ vastugatyā tanmātraparatvam na| prakṛṣṭaprakāśādivākye'vyāpteḥ, teṣāṃ dharmisamasattākabhedavadvastuparatvena vastugatyā nirbhedārthe niṣṭhatvābhāvāt| ata eva nirviśeṣārthatvamapi na| nāpyaparyāyaśabdānāṃ prātipadikārthamātraparyavasāyitvam śītoṣṇasparśavantau payaḥ pāvakāvityādāvanekaprātipadikārthapare'tivyāpteḥ| na ca saṃbhūyārthaparatvamatra nāstyeva, pratyekaṃ tvekaikārthaparatvaṃ lakṣaṇavākyatvāditi nātivyāptiriti vācyam, tathāpi brahmaṇyabhāvād, abhidhayā lakṣaṇayā vā vedāntavākyānāṃ niḥsambandhe brahmaṇi paryavasānānupapaceḥ| ata eva naikaviśeṣyaparatvamapi, tadviśiṣṭaikaviśeṣyabodhakanīlotpalādivākye ativyāpteriṣṭāpatteśca| yattu- aparyāyaśabdānāṃ saṃsargāgocarapramitijanakatvaṃ vā teṣāmekaprātipadikārthamātraparyavasāyitvaṃ vā akhaṇḍārthatvam| taduktaṃ pañcapādikākṛdbhiḥ- `padānāṃ parasparānavacchinnārthānām ananyākāṅkṣāṇām avyatiriktaikarasaprātipadikārthamātrānvayaḥ' iti| uktañca tattvapradīpikākṛdbhiḥ- saṃsargāsaṅgisamyagdhīhetutā yā girāmiyam| uktā'khaṇḍārthatā yadvā tatprātipadikārthatā|| iti | tanna, ādye `aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyoga' ityādau saṃyogalakṣaṇavākye'vyāpteḥ| atha padasmāritapadārthasaṃsargāpramāpakatvaṃ vivakṣitam, tatrāpi `dviṣadannaṃ na bhoktavya' mityetatpare `viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣveti vākye ativyāptiḥ| na ca- `dviṣadannaṃ na bhoktavya'miti śāstramūlatvena śāstrīyapadasmāritapadārthasaṃsargapramāpakatvādatra nātivyāptiriti vācyam, yuktimūlatvenāsya śāstramūlatvāsiddheḥ| atha pratipipādayiṣitapadārthasaṃsargāpramāpakatvamatra vivakṣitam, tatrāpyasaṃbhavaḥ, candrabrahmādiśabdārthānāṃ svarūpato jñātatayā'pratipipādayiṣitatvena saṃsarga viśeṣapratiyogitvenaiva pratipipādayiṣitatvāt| ata eva na dvitīyalakṣaṇamapi, tathā ca lakṣaṇāsambhavāt pramāṇamapyasaṃbhavi, alakṣite pramāṇasyopanyasitumaśakyatvād iti| atrocyate- padavṛttismāritātiriktamatra saṃsargapadena vivakṣitam| tathā cāparyāyaśabdānāṃ padavṛttismāritātiriktāgocarapramājanakatvamādyalakṣaṇaṃ paryavasitam| tathā ca na saṃyogalakṣaṇe avyāptiḥ, tasya padavṛttismāritatvāt| nāpi dviṣannabhojananiṣedhake ativyāptiḥ, tatrāniṣṭasādhanatvasaṃsargasya padavṛttyasmāritasya pratipādyatvāt| `śītoṣṇasparśavantau payaḥ pāvakā' vityatra tvakhaṇḍārthatvamiṣṭameva| na ca - dharmadharmibhāvāsahamakhaṇḍārthatvaṃ kathaṃ dharmibhedaṃ sahatāmiti- vācyam, ekatrāsahiṣṇutāyāḥ sarvatrā sahiṣṇutāyāmahetutvāt, śītasparśavat payaḥ, uṣṇasparśavān pāvaka iti vākyārthabhedācca| asaṃbhavastu tanmātrapraśnottaratvāditi hetvasiddhyuddhāre nirasiṣyate| atra ca `ghaṭaḥ kalaśa'ityādau saṃsargāpramāpake ekārthapare'tivyāptivāraṇāyāparyāyaśabdānāmiti| tatrāpi bahuvacanena saṃbhūyaikārthapratipādakatvasya lābhānna`dhavakhadirapalāśā' ityādāvativyāptiḥ| padajñāpyetyukte arthāpattyā padajñāpyamaniṣṭasādhanatvamādāya `viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣveti vākye ativyāptiḥ syāttadvāraṇāya vṛttīti| tathāpyanvitābhidhānavādimate śaktyā'bhihitānvayavādimate ca lakṣaṇayā vākyārthabhūtasaṃsargasya vṛttijñāpyatvāt sarvatra pramāṇavākye ativyāptiḥ syāttadvāraṇāya uktaṃ smāriteti| ādyapakṣe kubjaśaktyaṅgīkārād, dvitīyapakṣe cājñātāyā eva padārthaniṣṭhāyā lakṣaṇāyā vṛttitvāṅgīkārāt na saṃsargasya padasmāritatvam, kiṃtvanubhāvyatvamityativyāptiparihāraḥ| evaṃ dvitīyamapi lakṣaṇaṃ samyageva| tatrāpyekatvaṃ prātipadikārthasyaikadharmāvacchedena vṛttiviṣayatvam, na tvekamātra vyaktitvam| ato yaugikārthaupagavādipraśnottare `śyāmo dīrghaḥ lohitākṣa aupagava' ityādau anekārthātmake vanasenādipraśnottare ekadeśasthā vṛkṣā vanamityādau ca nāvyāptiḥ| `śītoṣṇasparśavantau payaḥpāvakā'viti tu pratyekamekaikārthaparatvāt saṅgrāhyameva| taduktaṃ kalpatarukṛdbhiḥ- aviśiṣṭaparyāyānekaśabdaprakāśitam| evaṃ vedāntaniṣṇātā akhaṇḍaṃ pratipedire|| iti | nanu pravṛttinimittabhede aparyāyatvam, sa cānantādipadeṣu na saṃbhavati, śuddhabrahmamātraniṣṭhatvād, ato vedānteṣu lakṣaṇāvyāptiriti cenna, pravṛttinimittabhedaṃ svīkṛtyaiva lakṣaṇayā'nantādipadānāṃ śuddhabrahmaparatvasya vakṣyamāṇatvāt| na ca śuddhe saṃbandhābhāvānna lakṣaṇāpīti vācyam| atātvikasaṃbandhenaiva lakṣaṇopapatteḥ| bhramapratītarajatatvena saṃbandhena śuktau rajata padalakṣaṇāvat| śuddhasyaiva sarvakalpanāspadatvena śuddhe na kalpitasaṃbandhānupapattiḥ| yathā cānantādipadānāṃ lākṣaṇikatve'pi brahmaṇi nāntavattvādiprasaṅgaḥ tathā vakṣyate| ityadvaitasiddhau akhaṇḍārthalakṣaṇopapattiḥ|| 1 || 2. satyajñānādivākyānāmakhaṇḍārthatvānumānabhaṅgaḥ evaṃ lakṣaṇasaṃbhave pramāṇasaṃbhavo'pi tathā hi- satyādivākyamakhaṇḍārthaniṣṭhaṃ, brahmaprātipadikārthaniṣṭhaṃ vā, lakṣaṇavākyatvāt tanmātrapraśnottaratvādvā, prakṛṣṭa prakāśaścandra iti vākyavaditi padārthaviṣayākhaṇḍārthatvānumānam| tattvamasyādi vākyamakhaṇḍārthaniṣṭhamātmasvarūpamātraniṣṭhaṃ vā, akāryakāraṇadravyamātraniṣṭhatve sati samānādhikaraṇatvāt, tanmātrapraśnottaratvādvā, so'yamityādivākyavaditi vākyārthaviṣayākhaṇḍārthatvānumānam, na ca satyādivākye tanmātrapraśnottaratvamasiddham; `brahmavidāpnoti paramiti brahmavedanasyaiveṣṭasādhanatayā tanmātra eva bubhutsātaḥ tanmātrasyaiva praśnaviṣayatvāt| na ca prakṛṣṭādivākye sādhyavaikalyam; tadvākyaṃ pakṣīkṛtya tanmātra praśnottaratvena candramātraniṣṭhatāyāḥ sāmānyavyāptimavalambya sādhanāt| evaṃ `tattvamasyā'divākye'pi tanmātrapraśnottaratvaṃ nāsiddham, `ko'ha'mityātmasvarūpasyaiva praśnaviṣayatvena tadadhikapratyukterayukteḥ| nāpyatra dṛṣṭāntāsiddhiḥ, devadattasvarūpamātre pṛṣṭe asya pravṛtteḥ| na cāprayojakatvam, praśnottarayorvaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteḥ, vipakṣabādhakatarkasya vidyamānatvāt| na ca- saṃsargāgocarapramitijanakatvaṃ sādhyamaprasiddham, pratyakṣādināpi idamitthamiti viśeṣasaṃsargagocarāyā eva pramiterjananāditi vācyam, nirvikalpakasvīkartṝṇāṃ tasminneva prasiddheḥ, itareṣāṃ tu pramātvaṃ saṃsargāgocaravṛtti, sakalapramāvṛttitvādabhidheyatvavaditi sāmānyatastatprasiddheḥ| yadyapyatrāpi aprayojakatvaṃ saṃbhāvyate tathāpi sandeharūpā sādhyaprasiddhirna durlabhā| vastutastu prakṛṣṭādivākya eva tatprasiddhirdarśitā| na ca- lakṣaṇavākyatvaṃ satyādivākyeṣvasiddham, satyatvādeḥ parāparajātitayā tasyāścānyatrāpi vidyamānatvenāsādhāraṇyābhāvāt, na ca- tāttvikaṃ tad brahmaṇi, advaitaśrutivirodhād, ātattvikaṃ tvanyatrāpi tulyamiti- vācyam, paramārthasatyādirūpatāyāḥ brahmasvarūpalakṣaṇatvāt| asmanmate yadyapi satyādyanyatamapadaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇaparam, brahmaṇo'nyasya tadabhāsatvāt, tathāpi parairapi satyatvasya satyatve sati jñānatvasya satyatve satyānandatvasya śūnyavādibhirapi sattvarahitajñānāndātmakatvasya brahmaṇo'nyatrāṅgīkārānmilitaṃ vinā na nirvicikitsabrahmasiddhiriti militaṃ lakṣaṇam| na caivaṃ viśiṣṭasya lakṣaṇatve sakhaṇḍārthatvaprasaṅgaḥ, vācyasya sakhaṇḍārthatve'pi lakṣyasyākhamḍatvāt| yadyapi sarveṣāṃ satyādipadānāṃ lakṣyamekameva nirviśeṣaṃ brahma, tathāpi nivartanīyāṃśādhikyena na padāntaravaiyarthyam| ato vācyārtha vaiśiṣṭyasyākhaṇḍasiddhāvupāyatvāt na tadvirodhitā| nanu idaṃ viruddham asādhāraṇadharmarūpalakṣaṇaparavākyasya sakhaṇḍārthatvaniyamāditi- cet, na, sarvalakṣaṇavākyānāṃ svarūpamātraparyavasāyitvena niyamāsiddheḥ dharmalakṣaṇasyākhaṇḍatvavirodhitve'pi svarūpalakṣaṇasya tadavirodhitvācca| na cābhede lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāvāyogaḥ, antaḥkaraṇavṛttinibandhanākārabhedena ubhayopapatteḥ, āvṛtattvānāvṛtatvavad, anyathā svarūpalakṣaṇataṭasthalakṣaṇavibhāgo na syāt| na ca yāvaddravyabhāvitvābhāvitvābhyāṃ vyavasthā, tāvatā hi sthāyitvāsthāyitvavyavasthā syāt, na tu svarūpādirūpā, tava mate pārthivarūpādau svarūpalakṣaṇe avyāpteśca, brahmaṇi yāvaddravyabhāvidharmavirahācca| vastutastu- dvāratvena lakṣaṇe tātparyaṃ na dvāriṇo'khaṇḍārthatvaṃ viruṇaddhi| na ca- svarūpajñānasya prāgeva sāmānyato jātatvāt tajjñāne naitaddvārāpekṣeti vācyam, jñānamātre'sya dvāratvābhāve'pi saṃśayādinivartakaitajjñāne taddbārāpekṣaṇāt| na ca sakhaṇḍavanādilakṣaṇavākye vyabhicāraḥ, tatrāpi sādhyasattvasya vyutpādanāt| na ca kiṃ candralakṣaṇamityasādhāraṇadharmapraśnottare prakṛṣṭaprakāśādivākye vyabhicāraḥ| tatra hi na candrasvarūpaparatvam, kintu prakarṣāśrayo yaḥ prakāśaḥ, tatsvarūpaparatvam, tathā ca prakarṣopalakṣitaprakāśavyaktisvarūpamātrapratipādakatvena tatrāpyakhaṇḍārthatvāvirodhāt| ata eva- dharme pṛṣṭe candrasvarūpaṃ vaktuṃ nocitamiti-nirastam, dharmasyaiva svarūpata uktatvād, anyathā praśnottarayorvaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteḥ| nanu- idaṃ bādhitam, dharmijñānādhīnasaprakārakasaṃśayādinivartakaṃ mokṣahetuṃ saprakārakajñānaṃ prati sādhanatvena vedāntavicāravidhānānyathānupapattyā vedāntavākye sādhyābhāvaniścayāditi cenna, anṛtādipratiṣedhakavyāvṛttākārajñānenaiva anṛtādisaṃśayādinivṛttyupapatteranyathāsiddhatvāt| na hi saprakārakatvamātraṃ tatra tantram| bhramakālīnānuvṛttākārajñānasya saprakārakatvena saṃśayādinivartakatve bhramakathaivocchidyeta| jñānasyājñānasamaviṣayatvenaiva tannivartakatvam, na tu samānaprakārakatvenāpi gauravāt| ajñānaviṣayaścaśuddhaṃ brahma ajñānakalpitasya taditarasya ajñāna viṣayatvāyogāt| tathā ca śuddha brahmākārā cittavṛttiḥ niṣprakārikaivājñānanivartikāprakāramātrasyāvidyākalpitatvena tadviṣayatāyāṃ vṛtteravidyāsamaviṣayatvābhāvāt| yathā cāvidyātatkāryaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadanivartakaṃ tathā vyutpāditaṃ prāk| dravyādyākārajñānānāṃ ca ghaṭādyākāratvasyānubhavanirastatvānna dravyādyākārajñānena ghaṭādyākārājñānanivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ, dravyatvaghaṭatvayorbhedena viṣayabhedācca| yathā ca samānaprakārakatvamādāyāpi na nistāraḥ, tathā pratipāditamasmābhirvedāntakalpalatikāyāmiti dik| nanu- astu satpratipakṣaḥ, tathā hi- satyādivākyatātparyaviṣayaḥ saṃsṛṣṭarūpaḥ saṃsargarūpo vā, pramāṇavākyatātparyaviṣayatvāt, saṃmatavat, satyādivākyaṃ, svatātparyaviṣayajñānābādhyasaṃsargaparaṃ, svatātparyaviṣayajñānābādhyasvakaraṇa pramāviṣayapadārthanirūpyasaṃsargaparaṃ vā, pramāṇavākyatvādagnihotrādivākyavat| `viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣve' tyādau vācyārthasaṃsargaparatvābhāve'pi svakaraṇakapramāviṣayapadārthasaṃsargaparatvānna vyabhicāraḥ, `khaṃ chidraṃ kokilaḥ pika' ityādau cānatibhinnārthatve sāmānādhikaraṇyāyogena chidrakokilādīnāṃ khapikādiśabdavācyatvasaṃsarga paratvācca vyabhicāra iti cenna ādyānumāne saṃsṛṣṭarūpa iti sādhye saṃsarge, saṃsargarūpa iti sādhye ca saṃsṛṣṭarūpe padārthe vyabhicārāt| tayorubhayorapi pramāṇavākyatātparyaviṣayatvāt| dvitīyānumāne pramāṇavākyatvasyābādhyaparatvamātreṇa pramitiviṣayaparatvamātreṇa vopapattau viśiṣṭasādhyasya tatrātantratvenāprayojakatvād, alakṣaṇavākyatvasyopādhitvācca| nāpi vedāntavākyajanyapramā, saprakārikā, vicārajanyatvāt, saṃśayanivartakatvādvā, karmakāṇḍajanyajñānavad| vedāntajanyā pramā, brahmaprakāraviṣayā, brahmadharmikasaṃśayavirodhitvād brahmavicārajanyatvādvā, yadevaṃ tadevam, yathā karmakāṇḍajanyo niścaya iti pratisādhanamastviti vācyam, tava mate jñānamātrasya saprakārakatvena vicārajanyatvasaṃśayavirodhitvayorvyarthatvād, aprayojakatvāt, niṣprakārakajñānādapi saṃśayādi nivṛttisaṃbhavāt, lakṣaṇavākyājanyatvasyopādhitvācca| ata eva- dvitīyānumānamapi-apāstam, brahmaniṣṭhaprakāraviṣayatvasādhane dṛṣṭāntābhāvācca| sarveṣu ca pratisādhaneṣu praśnottarayoḥ vaiyadhikaraṇyāpattiḥ pratikūlatarko'vaseyaḥ| nanu- dṛṣṭānte sādhyavaikalyam, tathā hi- prakṛṣṭaprakāśādivākyaṃ na tāvadabhidhayā akhaṇḍārthaniṣṭham, prakṛṣṭādipadasyākhaṇḍe abhidhāyā abhāvāt, tvayānaṅgīkārācca, nāpi lakṣaṇayā, prakṛṣṭaprakāśasya dravyasya guṇasya vā candre anvayopapatteḥ anvayānupapattirūpalakṣaṇābījābhāvāditi- cenna, `yaṣṭīḥ praveśaye'tyādau loke `tarasamayāḥ puroḍāśā bhavantītyādau vede ca yathāśrutānvayasaṃbhave'pi yathā tātparyaviṣayībhūtānvayānupapattyā yaṣṭidharapuruṣeṣu savanīyahavirmātre ca yaṣṭipuroḍāśaśabdayorlakṣaṇā''śritā, tathaiveha tātparyaviṣayībhūtānvayānupapattinimittayā lakṣaṇayā akhaṇḍārthaparatvopapatteḥ kaścandra iti candrasvarūpe pṛṣṭe tanmātraparasyavottarasyocitatvāt| nanu- candrasvarūpasya jñātatve tatra praśno na yujyate, ajñātatve dharmijñānasādhyabubhutsāsaṃdehayoścandra ityanūdya ka iti praśnasya candraśabdasyārthavattvājñānenāprātipadikatayā taduttarasubvibhakteścāyuktatvaprasaṅgāt| candrasvarūpe jñāte'pi tasyāsaṅkīrṇaṃ svarūpaṃ na jñātamiti na yuktam, tasmin rūpadvayābhāvāt| asaṅkīrṇatvena na jñātamiti cet, asaṅkīrṇatvaprakārakapratītiparatvaṃ paryavasitam, tacca vyāvartakavaiśiṣṭyaṃ vā vyāvṛttivaiśiṣṭyaṃ vā, ubhayathāpyakhaṇḍārthatvabhaṅga iti- cenna, bhāvānavabodhāt| tathā hi- candrasvarūpasya jñātatvābhyupagamādeva tadajñātatvanibandhanadoṣānavakāśaḥ| jñātatve'pi ca viparyayavirodhijñānānudayadaśāyāṃ tadudayārthaṃ praśno yujyata eva anyathā sarvatra praśnamātrocchedāpatteḥ| athānabhyāsadaśāpannaṃ jñānaṃ na viparyayavirodhi, prakṛte'pi samam, viṣayatulyatve'pi jñānaviśeṣasyaiva viparyayanivartakatvasya sarvatantrasiddhāntatvāt| `śaṅkhaḥ śveto na pīta' ityādiparokṣajñāne bhāsate yādṛśaṃ śvaityasvarūpaṃ pītābhāvasvarūpaṃ vā, tādṛśamevāparokṣajñānaviṣayatādaśāyāṃ viparyayavirodhīti viparyayavirodhiphalopahitamevāsaṅkīrṇamityucyate| phalopadhānatadabhāvau ca doṣaviśeṣatadabhāvayorvaiparītyenetyanyadetat| tathā ca ekameva svarūpaṃ daśāviśeṣabhedena saṅkīrṇamasaṃkīrṇaṃ ceti saṅkīrṇatādaśāyāṃ yugapat jñānājñānayorupapattiḥ| ata eva- vyāvṛttivaiśiṣṭyaṃ vyāvartakavaiśiṣṭyaṃ vā asaṅkīrṇatvamiti- apāstam, `śaṅkhaḥ śveto na pīta' ityatrobhaya sadbhāve'pi viparyayāvirodhitvarūpasaṅkīrṇatāyā darśanāt| `yadyapi yaścandraḥ, tatra candratvaṃ tamonakṣatrādivyāvṛttiścāstīti mayā jñāyata eva, tathāpi candrasvarūpaṃ paraṃ na jñāyata' ityanubhavena vyāvartakavyāvṛttivaiśiṣṭyasyājijñāsitatvena jijñāsitaṃ candrasvarūpameva viparyayavirodhijñānaviśeṣaṃ janayatā `prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandra' iti vākyena bodhyata iti kimanupapannam ? vyāvṛtteḥ śābdabodhaphalatve'pi tadaviṣayatvānnākhaṇḍārthatvavyāghātaḥ, tadbodhakapadābhāvācca| atha lakṣaṇayā vyāvṛtteḥ śābdabodhe bhānam, na; vaiyarthyāttatra tātparyābhāvena lakṣaṇāyā ayogāt| tathā hi- candre vyāvṛttirbodhyate vyaktiviśeṣe vā, nādyaḥ, `yā śuktiḥ sā rajatādibhinne'ti jñāne'pi śuktisvarūpājñānatatkāryaviparyayadarśanavat `yaścandraḥ, sa tamaādivilakṣaṇa' iti jñāne'pi candrasvarūpājñānatatkāryaviparyayādidarśanāt| dvitīye tvāvaśyakatvādvyaktiviśeṣa eva bodhyatām, kiṃ vyāvṛttyā śabdānupasthitayā ? vyaktiviśeṣabodhādeva tatsiddheḥ| na hi `dhūmo'stī'ti vākye vahnau lakṣaṇā| ata eva vinaiva lakṣaṇāṃ vyāvṛttiḥ śābdabodhe bhāsate, `ghaṭena jalamāhare tyatra chidretaratvavaditi nirastam, chidretaratvasyānanyalabhyatvena śabdatātparyaviṣayatve'pi na vyāvṛttestathātvam; hānopādānādivat phalatvenānyalabhyatvāt| chidretaratvamapi lakṣaṇāṃ vinā na śābdabodhaviṣayaḥ, anyathā lakṣaṇocchedāpatteḥ kiṃ tu śābdabodhaviṣaye jalāharaṇasādhane vastugatyā'stītyanyatra vistaraḥ| ata evoktamākare- anyato vyāvṛttirarthāt na śabdā'diti| na ca kaścandra iti dharmapraśno'yam, kaścandradharma iti svādhīne śabdaprayoge niṣprayojanalakṣaṇāyā anyāyyatvāt, tadbodhane'pyakhaṇḍārthatvasyopapāditvācca| nanu- sarvalakṣaṇavākyānāṃ vastugatyā parasparabhinnatattatprātipadikārthamātra viṣayajñānajanakatvena saprakārakajñānajanakatvābhāvāt praśnavākyasthaṃ viśeṣyamātrasamarpakaṃ candrādipadameva prayoktavyamuttaravādinā, kiṃ prakṛṣṭaprakāśādipadeneti cenna, svarūpamātrasya jñeyatve'pi svarūpajñānasya tāvatpadārthādhīnatve satyeva tāvatpadārthetaravyāvṛttiphalatvena sarvapadānāṃ saphalatvāt, anyathā saṃśayādyanuvṛtteranubhavasiddhatvāt| nanu- uttarasya prakṛṣṭatvādiviśiṣṭabodhaparatvābhāve tātparyato yaḥ kaściccandra ityevāvabodhanādvastuto yasya kasyāpi candratvaṃ syāt, tātparyaviṣaye cāyaṃ candra iti lakṣyalakṣaṇarūpoddeśyavidheyavibhāgābhāvena candrabubhutsāyā anivṛttiḥ, kaścandra iti praśnasyottaraṃ ca na syāditi- cennaḥ yathā gaṅgāsaṃbandhitvaviśiṣṭe tātparyābhāve'pi vastugatyā gaṅgāsaṃbadhyeva tīraṃ gaṅgāpadena lakṣyate, yathā vā `vrīhīn prokṣatī'tyādau brīhyādisvarūpe prokṣaṇādividhānavaiyarthyād vrīhibhiryajetetyādivākyasiddhāpūrvasaṃbandhitvalakṣaṇāyāmapi vastugatyā vrīhitvādyāśrayībhūtā eva vyaktayo vrīhyādipadairlakṣyante, tathā prakṛte'pi prakṛṣṭaprakāśapadābhyāṃ vastugatyā svāśrayībhūtaiva vyaktirlakṣyate, na tu yā kāciditi viśiṣṭatātparyābhāve'pi na pūrvoktadoṣaḥ| ayaṃ candra iti lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāvābhāve'pi tadubhayapratipādakapadābhyāmupasthitasyaikasvarūpasyaiva udddeśyavidheyabhāvasaṃbhavena bubhutsānivṛtteruttaratvasya ca saṃbhavāt| niṣprakārakasyāpi jñānasya saṃśayādinivartakatvaṃ prāgupapāditameva| tadetanniṣkṛṣṭam- praśnottare tāvat candraprātipadikārthamātra viṣaye, candraprātipadikārthaśca prakṛṣṭaprakāśāśrayībhūtāsādhāraṇī viśeṣyabhūtā vyaktiḥ, na tu prakṛṣṭaprakāśaviśiṣṭā, prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandra iti sahaprayogānupapatteḥ, viśeṣyavyaktiścākhaṇḍetyakhaṇḍārthataiva| nanu- gāmānayetyatra gāmuddiśyānayanavidhānād yathā gotvasya uddeśyatāvacchedakatvādānayanenānanvaye'pi prakāratvaṃ, tathā prakṛte'pi prakṛṣṭaprakāśasya candraprātipadikārthatvenānanvaye'pyuddeśyatāvacchedakatvāt, prakāratvaṃ durvāram, na hi gāmānayetyatra gotvaṃ vinā'nvaya iti- cenna, prātipadikārthatāvacchedakatvasya prātipadikārthatvaniyatatvenāprātipadikārthe tadavacchedakatvasya vaktumaśakyatvāt| tathā ca prakṛṣṭaprakāśasya prātipadikārthatāvacchedakatve prātipadikārthatvaṃ durvārameva| nanu- pṛthivītvavatī pṛthivītyādau pṛthivītvasya vidheyena pṛthivīprātipadikārthatvena nānanvayaḥ, pṛthivītvasya pṛthivīprātipadikārthatvāt, sahaprayogastu pṛthivīśabdasya tadvyavahartavyatāparatayeti tatra vyabhicāra iti- cet, na, pṛthivīśabdārthatvena pṛthivītvajātiviśiṣṭamajānataḥ pṛthivītvapadena jāterupasthityabhāvād ananvaya eva syāditi pṛthivītvajātiviśiṣṭe pṛthivīśabdārthatvagraho'vaśyaṃ prāgeva śroturvaktavyaḥ| tathā ca vacanavaiphalyamityananyagatyā jalādivyāvṛttagandhasamānādhikaraṇajātimatī pṛthivītyādyarthe paryavasitamuttaram| gandhasamānādhikaraṇajātimattvādikaṃ ca na pṛthivīpadavācyamiti kathaṃ nānvayaḥ ? vyavahartavyatālakṣaṇayā sahaprayogopapādanaṃ cāyuktam, vyavahartavyatāyāṃ hi jahallakṣaṇā, tatra ca svārthahāniḥ, svarūpe tu jahadajahallakṣaṇā, tatra svārthānvaya iti svarūpe jahadajahallakṣaṇāyā evocitatvāt| taduktaṃ `vyāpteśca samañjasa'mityadhikaraṇe bhāṣyakṛdbhiḥ `lakṣaṇāyāmapi sannikarṣaviprakarṣau bhavata' iti| omityetadakṣaramudgīthamupāsīte'tyatra kimoṅkārasadṛśamudgīthamityarthaḥ, kiṃ vodgīthāvayavamoṅkāramiti vivakṣāyāṃ gauṇyāṃ vṛttau svārthahāneravayavalakṣaṇeva jyāyasī| sannikṛṣṭatvāditi tatra nirdhāritam| etena- dharmiṇaścandrasya sāmānyato jñātatvāt nakṣatrādibhyo vyāvartakadharmasya vyāvṛtteśca ghaṭādau prāgeva jñātatvādviśiṣṭaviṣaye eva praśnottare, tatra yadi vyāvṛtti vaiśiṣṭyameva praṣṭuḥ sākṣād bubhitsitaṃ, tadāpi tattadvyāvṛtteḥ samāsahasreṇāpi vaktumaśakyatayā vahnibubhutsāyāṃ dhūmamiva vyāvartakadharmavaiśiṣṭyamevābhidhatte, na hi vahnibodhārthasya dhūmo'stīti vākyasya na dhūme tātparyam, na vā yāgākṣepakasya `yadāgneya' ityādivākyasya dravyadevatāsaṃbandhe| yadā tu tattadvyāvṛttervaktumaśakyatāmavagamya vyāvartakadharmavaiśiṣṭyameva pṛcchati, tadā sutarāṃ praśnottarayorviśiṣṭaparatvamiti nirastam, prathame praśnottarayorvaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteḥ, dvitīye śrutārthaparityāgāpatteḥ| prathame'pi śrutārthaparityāgaḥ sthita eva| na cānanyagatyā śrutārthaparityāgābhyupagamaḥ, gatyantarasyoktatvāt| nanu- praśnottarayorvaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteḥ yadi svarūpe lakṣaṇā, tadā vahnipraśne dhūmo'stītyuttare vahnau lakṣaṇāstviti- cenna, dhūmo'stīti vākyenāhatya śaktyā liṅge bodhite tata eva vahnibodhopapattau tātparyānupapattikalpyalakṣaṇāyā ayogāt, śrutiliṅgādhikaraṇanyāyena vākyāpekṣayā liṅgasya balavattvācca, prakṛte cāsaṅkīrṇacandrasvarūpasiddhau vākyātiriktapramāṇābhāvena vaiṣamyācca| nanu- kiṃ lakṣaṇaścandraḥ ? ityasyāsādhāraṇadharmaviṣayakasya, katamaścanadraḥ ? ityasya jātiviṣayakasya, anayoḥ kataraścandraḥ ? ityasya jātiguṇakriyābhiḥ pṛthakkaraṇarūpanirdhāraṇaviṣayakasya praśnasyottara ivātrāpi prativacane lakṣaṇokteḥ praśne'pi prakṛṣṭa prakāśo aprakṛṣṭaprakāśo veti dharmavācakaṃ padaṃ kalpanīyaṃ tatsūcaka kiṃśabdaprayogācceti- cenna, vahnipraśne dhūmo'stīti prativacanadarśanena prativacanoktatvasya praṣṭurbubhutsitatve'tantratvāt| atha tatra bubhutsitabodhopayuktatvāttaduktiḥ, prakṛte'pi nopayoga iti kena tubhyamabhyadhāyi ? kiṃ lakṣaṇa ityādipraśna tathātve tadvācakapadavattvasyopādhitvāt, kvaciddarśanamātrasyāprayojakatvācca, kiṃ śabdasya bubhutsā sūcakatvena tasya dharmabubhutsāniyatatvābhāvācca| evaṃ ca praśne dharmavācipadābhāvāttadanurodhinyuttare dharmavācakaṃ padaṃ svarūpaparameva| svarūpabubhutsāyā upapāditatvena lakṣaṇābījābhāvāt na praśnavākyasthaṃ candrapadaṃ tadasādhāraṇadharmalakṣakam| yattu- lakṣaṇavākyaṃ candravyavahārakartavyatāvaiśiṣṭyaparam, ato nākhaṇḍārthatā| candravyavahārastu candrapadaviśeṣito vyavahāraḥ, na tu candrarūpārthaviśeṣita iti tajjñānājñānābhyāṃ vaiyarthyabodhanāśakyatādoṣau na bhavataḥ| na ca vṛddha vyavahāra eva śaktigrāhako'stu kiṃ lakṣaṇavākyeneti vācyam, upāyasya upāyāntarādūṣakatvād iti, tanna, praśnottaravaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteruktatvāt, praśnavākyasthacandraśabde lakṣaṇābījābhāvāt| asādhāraṇaṃ candrasvarūpamajñātvā tatra candraśabdaviśeṣitavyavahāravaiśiṣṭyasya jñātumaśakyatvāt tajjñānasyāvaśyakatvena tenaiva vākyaprāmāṇyopapattervyavahārakartavyatāparatve mānābhāvāt| ata evoktaṃ- `mānāntarasiddhaṃ prakṛṣṭaprakāśavaiśiṣṭyamakhaṇḍārthasiddhāvupāyamātra'miti| asmin jyotirmaṇḍale kaścandra iti praśnasamaye pratyakṣeṇeva anyadāpi prakārāntareṇaiva tasya jñātatvād, anyathā tasyānuvādyatvānupapatteḥ, candrasvarūpe tu jñāte'pyasaṅkīrṇajñānābhāvāt| bubhutsopapāditaiveti prathamānumānamanāvilam| dvitīyānumāne'pi nāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvabādhasatpratipakṣasādhyavaikalyādayo doṣāḥ| tathā hi- sādhyaṃ tāvat brahmaprātipadikārthaviśeṣyaniṣṭhatvam, anyathā brahmapadasya yaugikatvena sakhaṇḍārthatvaprasaṅgāt| prakṛṣṭaprakāśādivākyaṃ ca prātipadikārthaviśeṣyamātraparaṃ bhavatīti sāmānyavyāpto dṛṣṭānte na sādhyavaikalyamapi| brahmaprātipadikārthaviśeṣyamātraniṣṭhatvaṃ hi akhaṇḍārthatvameva| tatpraśnottaratvahetuvyutpādanamapi pūrvoktaprakṛṣṭādivākyanyāyenaiveti nāsiddhibādhau| praśnottaravaiyadhikaraṇyāpattirūpavipakṣabādhakasadhrīcīnatayā satpratipakṣāprayojakatvopādhīnāmanamavakāśaḥ| na ca- satyādirūpaprativacane praśnasya kaścandra itivadaśravaṇāttaduttarānusāreṇa praśnavākye kalpanīye dharmaviṣayakameva tat kalpyate, bādhakābhāvāt, tathā cāsiddhiriti- vācyam, `brahmavidāpnoti param' ekadhaivānudraṣṭavya mityādivākyabalātsatyatvādi vaiśiṣṭyāviṣayakasyaiva brahmaviṣayakavedanasya mokṣajanakatvāt tadatiriktabubhutsāviraheṇa tadviṣayakapraśnavākyasya kalpayitumaśakyatvena kaścandra itīva kiṃ brahmetyeva vākyaṃ kalpyata iti nāsiddhiḥ| nanu- katama ātmetyatra kataraḥ sa ātmetyatra ca tvaṃ padārthapraśne `vā bahūnāṃ jātiparipraśne ḍatamac' `dvayorekasya nirdhāraṇe ḍatarac' iti sūtrābhyāṃ nirṇītajātyādyarthakatamādipadaprayogāt tatprativacane `yo'yaṃ vijñānamaya' ityādau pakṣe tvadabhimatahetorasiddhiḥ| na ca- yadyatpraśnottaraṃ tattadakhaṇḍārthamiti na brūmaḥ, kintu yad yatpraśnottaraṃ tattadarthakamiti vācyam, evaṃ sāmānyavyāptyā'vyabhicāre'pi tadbalādetat pakṣīkṛtyākhaṇḍārthatvasādhane'khaṇḍārthapraśnottaratvāditi paryavasitahetāvasiddheranuddhārāditicet, naiṣa doṣaḥ, tātparyaviṣayasyaivārthatvena vivakṣitatvāt, tathāhi dharmavācakapadasattvepi uttarasya dharme na mukhyatātparyaṃ tathā praśne'pi tadvācakatamādipratyayasattve'pi na mukhyatastatparatvam, asādhāraṇātmasvarūpasya mukhyato bubhutsitasyopāyatvena tadupayogād, ātmasvarūpabodhasyaiva puruṣārthatvāt| na ca sarvasyāpyuttarasya praśna praṣṭṛnirdhāritadharminiṣṭhānirdhāritaikadharmaparatvādviruddho heturiti vācyam, anirdhāritanirdhāraṇatvenaivottaratopapattau tādṛgdharmaparatvasyottaratvāprayojakatvena niyamāsiddheḥ| nanu- kathaṃ svarūpamātraparasya nirdhārakatvam ? lakṣaṇavākyatvāditi gṛhāṇa| na ca- evamuttarajanyajñānasya niṣprakārakatayā kathaṃ saprakārakasaṃśayanivartakatvamiti vācyam, niṣprakārakatve'pi saṃśayanivartakatāyā upapāditatvāt| nanu- yadi praśnāduttaramandhikaviṣayaṃ na syād, uttarameva na syāt, praśna evottaraṃ syāditi cenna, praśnādanadhikaviṣayatve'pi asādhāraṇadharmavācakapadavattvena nirvicikitsaṃdharmi pratipādakatvena vā uttaratvasambhavāt| ata eva praśnottaram| tatprayojakarūpavirahāt| na ca- kiṃ karoti kimāneyamityādipraśnottare adhyayanaṃ karoti gāmānayetyādau vyabhicāraḥ, na hi tatrādhyayanatvagotvādityāgena lakṣaṇayā karmādimātraparatvamiti vācyam, atra hi na kṛtyānayanayoḥ praśnaḥ, kintu kṛtikarmānayanakarmaṇoḥ, anyathā kiṃ karaṇaṃ kimānayanamityeva pṛcchet| tathā ca praśnottarayoradhyayanatvādiviśiṣṭakarmāviṣayatvād, yad yatpraśnottaraṃ tattadarthakamiti sāmānyavyāptau vyabhicārābhāvāt| evaṃ sati- satyādivākyārtho brahmaprātipadikārthamātraṃ tanmātrapraśnottaravākyārthatvādityādi nyāyadīpāvalīsthamapyanumānaṃ sādhu| nanu- ekaprātipadikārthamātrapraśnottaratvena ekaprātipadikārthamātraparatve'pi kathamakhaṇḍārthatvam ? pañcakasya trikasya vā vaiyākaraṇamate prātipadikārthatvāt| taduktam- svārtho dravyaṃ tathā liṅgaṃ saṃkhyā karmādayo'pi ca| nāmārthapañcakaṃ prāhurādyaṃ trikamathāpare|| iti | prābhākaramate'smadekadeśimate cānvitasyaiva prātipadikārthatvācca, abhihitānvayavādimate'pi jātiviśiṣṭāyā eva vyakteḥ prātipadikārthatvapakṣe prātipadikārthasyaiva viśiṣṭatvācca| jātāveva śaktiḥ vyaktistvākṣepalabhyeti mate prātipadikārthamātraparatvena viśeṣyacandrādivyaktiparatvaṃ na syāt| brahmapadasya yaugikatvena sutarāmasya prātipadikārthasya viśiṣṭatvāditi- cenna, brahmaprātipadikārthaviśeṣyāṃśamātraparatvasya sādhyatvāt| tathā ca prātipadikārthasya viśiṣṭatve'pyakhaṇḍārthatvasiddhiḥ, `prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātra' ityatra liṅgāderapi prātipadikārthatvena tadgrahaṇavaiyarthyamāśaṅkya prātipadikārthapadasya liṅgādyaviśiṣṭasvarūpamātrābhidhāyakatayā samādhānasyābhiyuktairukteśca| yattu pañcakatvādikaṃ prātipadikārthasyoktaṃ, tadanaṅgīkāraparāhataṃ yuktiviruddhaṃ ca, dravyādiprātipadikād, guṇakarmaṇoraprāpteḥ| anyathā dravyamityukte `nīlaṃ pītaṃ vā ? calati na vā ?' iti sandeho na syāt| na ca- jijñāsānyathānupapattyā sāmānyatastaduktāvapi viśiṣyānabhidhānāt sandeha iti- vācyam, dravyatvādyākṣiptasāmānyajñānādeva jijñāsopapatteḥ, saṅkyākarmatvādīnāṃ ca vacanavibhaktyādinaiva prāpteśca| anvitābhidhānarūpaikadeśimatamapi na yuktisaham, anvayasyākāṅkṣādisahakārivaśāt padārthamātraśaktādeva siddheḥ| na ca prātipadikārthamātraparasya kathamekadeśaparatvam ? viśeṣaṇasyānākāṅkṣitatvena prāgeva tadupapādanāt| na cāprayojakatvam, svarūpamātrabubhutsāpravṛttatvarūpavipakṣabādhakasyoktatvāt| nanu- satyādivākye satsu viśeṣaṇeṣu sastutikavidhivākye prāśastya iva viśeṣaṇārthe'pi raktapaṭanyāyenākāṅkṣotthāpanīyā, uktaṃ hi- `ākāṅkṣaṇīyābhāva ākāṃkṣāyā abhāva' itīti- cenna, satyādivākye viśeṣaṇe satyapi na tadgocarākāṅkṣākalpanam, prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandra ityatra viśeṣaṇe satyapi kaścandra iti svarūpamātrākāṅkṣādarśanāt| na ca tatrāpi tatkalpanam, tatkalpanaṃ vināpi vyāvṛttibodhamātreṇaiva tatsārthakatvopapatteḥ| vyāvṛttiviśeṣabodhaśca viśeṣaṇaparatvābhāve'pi taddvārakasvarūpamātrajñānamātreṇaivopapadyate| nanu- saprakārakajñānasyaiva mokṣahetutayā `brahmavidāpnoti parāmityarthena `ya evaṃ vidvānamṛta iha bhavatī'ti śrutyā `yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyā' mityuttaravākyena ca mumukṣoḥ saprakāraka eva dharmijñāne sādhye bubhutsociteti- cenna, niṣprakārakajñānasyaiva svarūpopalakṣaṇopalakṣitādhiṣṭhānajñānatvena bhramādinivṛttyā mokṣahetutāyā upapāditatvena tadanurodhād brahmavidityādeḥ saprakārakabrahmajñānaparatāyāṃ mānābhāvāt| ya evaṃ vidvānityasyārthe itaraprakāratvaṃ nārthaḥ, kiṃ tu evaṃprakāropalakṣitatvam, ekadhaivetyādyanusārāt| na ca- evaṃ saguṇavākyasyāpi brahmabubhutsāyāṃ karmakāṇḍasyāpi karmabubhutsāyāṃ vaidyakādiśāstrasyāpi auṣadhādibubhutsāyāmakhaṇḍabrahmākhaṇḍakarmākhaṇḍauṣadhādi paratvaṃ syāditi- vācyam, nahi vayaṃ bubhutsāpravṛttavākyatvamātreṇākhaṇḍārthatvaṃ brūmaḥ, kintu svarūpamātrabubhutsāpravṛttavākyatvena| na ca tatrāpi svarūpamātrabubhatsā, viśiṣṭaparatve bādhakābhāvāt| tatrāpi cellakṣaṇavākyādau tathā, tadeṣṭāpatteśca| na ca tarhi saguṇavākyānāṃ satyaśuddhānyamithyāviśiṣṭārthaparatvena prāmāṇyāyogaḥ, karmakāṇḍavadvyāvahārikaprāmāṇyāvirodhāt| nanu- brahmaṇi karma ivālakṣaṇavākyamasti, tadapyakhaṇḍārthaṃ syāditi- cenna, avāntaratātparyamādāya cet, tadā brahmaparatvasyaivābhāvāt mahātātparyamādāya cettadeṣṭāpatteḥ| kiñca `ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyamityādyanekākāraniṣedhakavākyam `udaramantaraṃ kuruta' ityādibhedaniṣedhakavākyaṃ `kevalo nirguṇaśceti guṇaniṣedhakam `ekamevādvitīya'miti dvitīyamātraniṣedhakavākyaṃ ca bādhakaṃ, tathā sarvato'navacchinnavastuparānantaśabdabrahmaśabdau ca| na ca- teṣāmaikyabhedābhāvādiviśiṣṭārthaparatve vedāntamātrasyākhaṇḍārthatvāsiddhiḥ, satyaśuddhānyamithyāviśiṣṭārthaparatve prāmāṇyāyoga iti vācyam, aikyabhedābhāvādīnāṃ svarūpatvena viśiṣṭaparatvasyaivābhāvād, bhedābhāvādeḥ kalpitapratiyogikatayā kalpitatve tu satyādipadavadviśiṣṭārthābhidhānadvārā svarūpaparatvena prāmāṇyopapatteśca| na ca- evaṃ teṣāṃ lakṣaṇayā'khaṇḍārthatvena tadvirodhena viśiṣṭārthasya satyāpi vākyasya mukhyārthatyāgaḥ, viśeṣyaparasya viśiṣṭapareṇāvirodhāditi- vācyam, dvāratayopasthitasyāpyaikyabhedābhāvāderviśiṣṭārthavirodhitayā mukhyārthatyāgasaṃbhavāt| na ca- dvāratayopasthitaikyādeḥ mithyātvena satyatvādidharmaparatvavirodhitā, satyatve cāpasiddhānta iti vācyam, bhinnatve sati satyatāyāmevāpasiddhāntāt| na cābhede dvāratvānupapattiḥ, kalpitadharmatākatvena dvāratvasaṃbhavāt| na ca- atra satyatvāderdvāratvenopādānātteṣāmevaitadvirodha iti vācyam, satyatvādeḥ kalpitajātirūpasya dvāratayā svarūpeṇopādāne'pi pāramārthikatvākāreṇa niṣedhakānāmavirodhāt| etena brahmānantapadayorapi bādhakatvaṃ vyākhyātam| nanu- `atha kasmāducyate brahmeti bṛhanto hyasminguṇā' ityādi śrautyā `mahadguṇatvādyamanantamāhu'rityādismṛtyā ca brahmānantapadayoḥ saguṇavācitvena nirvacanāt kathaṃ na tābhyāṃ virodhaḥ ? iti- cenna; uktaśrutismṛtyoḥ saguṇaprakaraṇasthitabrahmānantaśabdārthaviṣayatvena lakṣaṇavākyasthitabrahmānantaśabdārthanirvacanaparatvāyogāt| nanu- ime hetavaḥ pratikūlatarkaparāhatāḥ| tathā hi- pakṣadṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇamaikyaparavākyaṃ yadi saṃsṛṣṭārthaṃ na syāt, vākyameva na syād; ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhimattvābhāvāt| ākāṅkṣā hi abhidhānāparyavasānam, tacca yena vinā yasya na svārthānvayānubhāvakatvam, tadeva tasyāparyavasānam| sannidhistvavyavadhānenānvayapratiyogyupasthitiḥ yogyatā ca eka padārthasaṃsarge aparapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitācchedakadharmaśūnyatvam, naitat trayaṃ saṃsargāviṣaye saṃbhavati iti naiṣa doṣaḥ, akhaṇḍārthe'pyetatttritayasaṃbhavāt, tathā hi- nirākāṅkṣayorapi yatkiñcidanvayānubhāvakatayā tātparyaviṣayānanubhāvakatvamevākāṅkṣā vācyā| tathā cānvayāṃśo vyarthaḥ, yena vinā yasya tātparyaviṣayānanubhāvakatvamityetāvanmātrasyaiva sāmañjasyāt| tātparyaviṣayaśca kvacitsaṃsṛṣṭaḥ kvacidakhaṇḍa iti na viśeṣaḥ| ataḥ sā tātparyaviṣayākhaṇḍārthānubhavajananāt prāgvedāntavākye'pyastyeva āsattirapyavyavadhānena śābdabodhānukūlapadārthopasthitimātram, na tvanvayapratiyogitvaviśeṣitapadārthopasthitiḥ, gauravāt| sā ca saṃsargābodhake'pyastyeva| yogyatāpi tātparyaviṣayābādha eva, na tvekapadārthasaṃsarga ityādisvarūpā, yatra bādhitābādhitasaṃsargadvayasaṃbhavaḥ, taṃtra bādhitatātparyaviṣayake'tivyāpteḥ| tātparyaviṣayābādhaścākhaṇḍārthe'pi sulabhaḥ| athavā- anvayasya bhedaghaṭitatvaniyamābhāvenābhedasaṃsargamādāyākāṅkṣādinirvāhaḥ kartavyaḥ| ekapadārthasyākhaṇḍasya tātparyaviṣayatvamapi nānupapannam| yatra hyasādhāraṇasvarūpeṇaikaḥ padārtho jñātaḥ, tatra padārthāntaraviśiṣṭaḥ sa pratipādyate| yatra tu na tathā jñātaḥ, tatra sa na śakyaḥ padārthāntarairviśeṣṭumiti sa eva pratipādyaḥ, tatraiva vākyaparisamāpteḥ| prakṛṣṭatvasatyatvādestattaddvārakatvarūpabodhena vyāvṛttibheda upayogāditi na vākyatvānupapattilakṣaṇapratikūlatarkaparāhatiḥ| nanu- saṃsṛṣṭārthatvaṃ na cet, tadā vedāntānāṃ nirviṣayatvāpattiḥ, akhaṇḍavākyārthasya svaprakāśacinmātrasyāvidyādyadhyāsādhiṣṭhānatvena tatsākṣitvena ca nityasiddhatvāditi cenna, anādyavidyopahitatvenādoṣāt, svataḥ siddhasyāpi pramāṇavṛttimantareṇāvidyānivartakatvābhāvāt| pramāṇavṛtteścāvidyānivṛttiphalopahitatvāt na kāpyanupapattiḥ| na ca- bādhakaṃ vinā mukhyārthatyāgāyogaḥ pratikūlatarkaḥ, ekarasatvādipratipādakaśrutīnāmapyakhaṇḍārthaparatvena bādhakatvābhāvāditi vācyam; dvāratayopasthitasyāpi bādhakatāyā uktatvāt| nanu- vedāntavākyajanyajñānaṃ niṣprakārakaṃ cet, jñānameva na syāt, jñānasyecchāditulyatayā saviṣayakatvavatsaprakārakatvasyāpi niyamāt, kañcitprakāraṃ vinā vastuno buddhāvanārohācceti cenna, vyāptyasiddheḥ tārkikādibhirapi nirvikalpakajñānābhyupagamāt| śabdavācyatvaṃ tu kañcitprakāramantareṇa saṃbhavati na veti vādino vivadante| taccāsmābhirbrahmaṇo nābhyupeyate| ākāśādipadavat kiñcitprayogopādhimādāya tadapi saṃbhavatyeva| na ca śabdatvena savikalpakatvasādhanam, svarūpopalakṣaṇajñānājanyatvasya svarūpaparavākyājanyajñānatvasya copādhitvāt, jñānatvasyeva śābdatvasyāpi savikalpakatvavyāpyatvagrahe mānābhāvācca| na ca- vedāntānāmabubhutsitārthatvāpattiḥ, dharmiṇaḥ prāgeva jñānāt| tatra bubhutsāvirahāditi vācyam, svarūpasya jñātatve'pyasādhāraṇasvarūpabubhutsāyā upapāditatvāt| nāpi vicāravidhyanupapattiḥ| vicārasya vedāntatātparyaniścayādiphalakatayā niṣpratyūhaniṣprakārakabrahmajñānārthatvopapatteḥ, āpātadarśanasya pratibaddhatvenājñānānivartakatvāt| śuddhabrahmaviṣayāṇāmapyadhikaraṇānāmapyārambho nānupapannaḥ, viṣayādipañcakasaṃbhavāt| vyāvṛttākāreṇājñāto hi viṣayaḥ, brahma ca tathā bhavatyeva| viṣayasvarūpanirdhāraṇādhīnaṃ ca prayojanaṃ na nirdhāraṇe saprakārakatvamapekṣate| niṣprakārake vastuni svarūpanirdhāraṇatvāvyāghātāt| advaitādyupalakṣitākhaṇḍārthajñānaṃ ca nirdhāraṇam| tadadhīnaṃ prayojanaṃ muktireva pūrvapakṣasiddhāntau ca kalpitaprakārāvalambinau| saṃśayo'pi kalpitasamānadharmadhījanmaiveti nānupapattiḥ| ata eva- prathamādhyāyatṛtīyapādīyādhikaraṇānāmanārambha eva prāptaḥ, viṣayādipañcakābhāvād, viśiṣyājñāto hi viṣayaḥ, sādhāraṇadharmadhījanyaśca saṃśayaḥ mithyāsatyaikaprakārāvalambinau ca pūrvapakṣaṃsiddhāntau, ekaprakāreṇa nirdhāraṇādhīnaṃ ca prayojanam, tacca pañcakaṃ nirviśeṣe kathaṃ syāditi parāstam, uktarītyopapatteḥ| na ca `brahmavidāpnoti param'- iti sāmānyato jñātatvāt satyādivākyavaiyarthyāpattiḥ, asādhāraṇasvarūpajñānārthatvena sāphalyāt| na ca- satyatvādiviśiṣṭe tātparyābhāve tātparyato yatkiñcidbrahmetyeva bodhanād yasya kasyāpi brahmatvaṃ syād, idaṃ brahmeti lakṣyalakṣaṇarūpoddeśyavidheyavibhāgābhāvācceti vācyam, lakṣaṇasvabhāvyādvastugatyā tatsvarūpalābhasya prāgevoktatvād, ekasminnapi kalpitoddeśyavidheyabhāvasaṃbhavāt| aprāptavidheyamātraparatvādvākyasya nākhaṇḍārthatvavyāghātaḥ| nanu svarūpeṇa jñātasya vidheyasyoddeśyasaṃsṛṣṭatayaiva bodhanīyatvaṃ vācyam| tathā ca sakhaṇḍārthataiva| uktaṃ hi- kiñcidvidhīyate'nūdya vākyeneti satāṃ sthitiḥ| satyajñānādivākyena kathyatāṃ kiṃ vidhīyate|| iti naiṣa doṣaḥ, asādhāraṇasvarūpasya prameyatayā vidheyatvāt, satyatvādidvārakasvarūpajñānenāsādhāraṇajñāpanaparyavasānād, dvāraphalābhyāmaprāptaprāpaṇasaṃbhavāt| tathā coddeśyatā ca vidheyatā ca svarūpamātraparyavasannaiva| nanu- evaṃ satyādipadānāṃ lakṣaṇā na syād, aśakyāsadṛśānvayapratiyogyupasthitirūpāyāstasyā asaṃbhavāttadbījasyānvayānupapatteścātrābhāvāditi- cenna, vṛttyā hi padārthopasthitiḥ, na tu saiva vṛttiḥ, ato noktarūpā lakṣaṇā, kintu śakyasaṃbandhaḥ sa ca prakṛte'pyastyeva| upasthitarūpatve'pi lakṣaṇāyāstātparyaviṣayānukūlopasthitireva sā, noktopasthitirūpā, atātparyaviṣayatādṛgupasthitau gatatvāt| nāpi bījānupapattiḥ, tātparyānupapattereva bījatvāt| nāpi satyādipadānāṃ paryāyatāpattiḥ, vācyārthabhedāt| satyatvaṃ hyasmanmate trikālābādhyatvam, paramate kumbhādisādhāraṇī parajātiḥ satyapadapravṛttinimittam| jñānapadānandapadayorapyasmanmate'ntaḥ karaṇavṛttyupadhānalabdhabhedacidānandaviśeṣānugate jñānatvānandatve, paramate tu svabhāvalabdhabhedajñānānandaniṣṭhe aparajātī pravṛttinimitte| tathā ca lakṣyārthābhede'pi na paryāyatāśaṅkā| nanu- kumbhādyanugatasattāyā brahmalakṣaṇatvāyogaḥ, mithyāsatyānugatasāmānyābhāvāt, tathā cānṛtād vyāvṛttyasiddhiḥ, trikālābādhyatvaṃ brahmaṇi śrautamiti tvanmatahānāpattiśceti- cenna, brahmaṇaḥ sarvādhiṣṭhānatayā tadrūpasattāyāḥ sarvānusyūtatvena jātitvavyapadeśāt, kalpitadharmatvamādāya brahmavyaktikatvācca| tacca sattvaṃ trikālābādhyatvameveti na tasya śrautatvahāniḥ, tasyānṛtaṃ pratyadhiṣṭhānatve'pi anṛtāśritatvābhāvena tadvyāvartakatvasaṃbhavāt| ānandatvādikalpitajātisāhityena lakṣaṇoktiḥ pararītyā| na ca- dharmisamānasattākabhedaṃ vinaivaupādhikabhedamātreṇākāśatvāderiva jñānatvāderapi jātitvāyoga iti- vācyam, jñānatvādīnāṃ dharmisamasattākabhedavadupahitavṛttitvāt| tarhi śuddhasya kathaṃ jñānatvādi lakṣaṇam ? nahi gandho jalasya lakṣaṇamiti cenna, upahitavṛttitve'pyupadheyavṛttitvānapāyāt| taduktaṃ- `satyatvādiviśiṣṭaśabalabrahmavācināṃ satyādipadānāṃ śuddhe brahmaṇi lakṣaṇe'ti| na ca- anṛtasvarūpe śabale satyatvāyogaḥ, yoge vā tato nānṛtavyāvṛttiriti- vācyam, śabale hi satyatā eṣaiva yat paramārthasaṃsargeṇa pratīyamāne tasmin satyaśabdasaṅgatigrahaḥ| taduktaṃ saṃkṣepaśārīrake- ākāśādau satyatā tāvadekā pratyaṅmātre satyatā kācidanyā| tatsaṃparkātsatyatā tatra cānyā vyutpanno'yaṃ satyaśabdastu tatra|| iti| evamānandādipadeṣvapi draṣṭavyam| tathā ca kathaṃ teṣāṃ nānṛtādivyāvartakatvam ? etena śuddhādanyatra satyatvādyasaṃbhavāt satyādivākyasya lakṣaṇayā akhaṇḍārthatve śuddhe satyatvāderabhānāt paryāyatvaṃ durvāramiti parāstam| svarūpamātraparatve'pi na padāntaravaiyarthyaṃ vyāvṛttibhedabodhanena sāphalyāditi coktameva| na ca vyāvartakasya satyatvādestātparyato'samarpaṇe vyāvṛttyasiddhiriti vācyam, `gambhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ prativasatī' tyatra yathā tīre tātparye'pi nadyāmagambhīravyāvṛttirabhidhābalāllabhyate, tātparyaviṣayāgambhīranadītiravyāvṛttatīrabuddhāvupāyatvāt, tathātrāpyabhidhābalāt satyatvādiviśiṣṭe tātparyābhāve'pyāpātatastatpratītimātreṇaiva vyāvṛttisiddhiḥ, tātparyaviṣayānṛtādivyāvṛttasvarūpabuddhāvupāyatvasya tulyatvāt| na ca nadyādipadalakṣye tīrādāvanadītvādivat satyatvādipadalakṣye'pi brahmaṇyasatyatvādyāpattiḥ, jahallakṣaṇānabhyupagamāt| yadi hi tīrādau nadītvādīvat brahmaṇyapi satyatvādikamabhidhābalāt na pratīyeta, tadaivaṃ syāt, na tvevamasti, nadyādau nadītvādivat satyatvāderbrahmaṇyeva pratīteḥ| na caivaṃ nirdharmakatvavyākopaḥ, vyāvahārikasya dharmasya sattve'pi svasamānasattākadharmaviraheṇa tadupapatteḥ| vācakānāmapi lakṣakatvamanyānuparaktasvarūpabhānāyetyanyat| taduktaṃ kalpatarukṛdbhiḥ- sattādīnāṃ tu jātīnāṃ vyaktitādātmyakāraṇāt| lakṣyavyaktirapi brahma sattādi na jahāti naḥ|| iti | gaurnityo gauranitya ityubhayatrāpi ekadeśānvayārthaṃ lakṣaṇābhyupagame'pi jāti vyaktyorubhayorapi tārkikairgopadārthatvābhyupagamācca| nanu- aupaniṣade puruṣe dharmā na pratyakṣeṇa prāptāḥ, kintu tattvāvedakena vedena, tathā ca kathaṃ vyāvahārikā iti cenna vedādāpātataḥ pratītānāmapi vedātātparyaviṣayatvābhāvādatāttvikatvopapatteḥ| tātparyaviṣaye hi vedasya prāmāṇyam, yatra ca tasya prāmāṇyaṃ, tadeva tāttvikamiti niyamāt| na ca- vedasyātatparatvamātreṇa kathaṃ vyāvahārikatvam ? bādhyatvena cet, prastare'pi yajamānatvaṃ vyāvahārikaṃ syāt| yajamānatvasya tatrānadhyāsāt avyāvahārikatve śuktirūpyādervyāvahārikatvāpattiriti vācyam, vedatātparyāviṣayatvenātāttvikatve siddhe tattvāvedakabādhyatvavyāvahārikāvedakabādhyatvābhyāṃ vyāvahārikaprātibhāsikavyavasthopapatteḥ| na ca tattvāvedakasya viśeṣyamātraparatvānna bādhakatvaṃ, viśeṣaṇabuddhidvārakatvena tanmātraparasyāpi bādhakatvasaṃbhavād, viśeṣaṇe'pyavāntaratātparyābhyupagamādvā| `yajamānaḥ prastara' ityādau tu na viśeṣaṇe avāntaratātparyaṃ, tātparyaviṣayasiddhāvanupāyatvāt| mahātātparyaviṣayasiddhyupāye hi avāntaratātparyamiti sarvamatasiddham| nanu- vyāvṛttayaḥ satyāḥ mithyā vā ? nādyaḥ, vyāvartakānāmapi satyatvāpattervyāvahārikāṇāṃ pāramārthikavyāvṛttyasādhakatvāt| nāntyaḥ śukteḥ śuktito vyāvṛttermithyātve śuktitvasya śuktisamasattākatvavadanṛtavyāvṛtteḥ brahmaṇi mithyātve anṛtatvasya brahmasamasattākatvāpatteriticenna, ubhayathāpyadoṣāt| tathā hi- (1) vyāvṛtterbrahmābhinnatayā pāramārthikatve'pi vyāvartakaṃ pāramārthikamiti kutaḥ ? na hi yat pāramārthikabodhakaṃ, tat pāramārthikamiti niyamo'sti, bodhyabodhakayoḥ samasattākatvasya padatadarthādau vyabhicāreṇa prāgeva nirastatvāt, doṣāprayuktabhānatvasya sattvaprayojakatvāt| nāpi vyāvṛttibodhakaṃ vyāvṛttisamasattākamiti niyamaḥ, svāpnāṅganāderapi svajanyasukhāpekṣayā sukhāntaravyāvṛttibuddhijanakatvāt, kāraṇasya kāryavyāvartakatvāt| sā ca vyāvṛttiḥ tava mate pāramārthikyeva| mama tu mate vyāvahārikī| sarvathāpi prātibhāsikavyāvartakāpekṣayādhikasattākaiva| na ca vyāvṛtte brahmābhinnatve brahmapadenaiva tallābhāditarapadavaiyarthyam, sāmānyatastatsiddhāvapyanṛtādivyāvṛttyākāreṇa tatsiddhau sāphalyāt| evamajñānādi vyāvṛttīnāmanyonyābhede satyapadenaiva cāritārthyamiti apāstaṃ, tattadākāreṇa siddhestattatpadaṃ vinānupapatteḥ| na ca- evaṃ satyatvajñānatvādidharmāṇāmapi vyāvṛttivad brahmābhinnatayā pāramārthikatvamastviti vācyam, iṣṭāpatteḥ| tadevaṃ vyāvṛtteḥ satyatve na ko'pi doṣaḥ| (2) vyāvṛttermithyātvapakṣe'pi nānṛtatvasya brahmasamasattākatvāpattiḥ, ekabādhakabādhyatvasyobhayatrāpi tulyatvād, vyāvṛttibādhakabādhyasyaiva pratiyogino vyāvṛttyadhikasattākatvam, na tvekabādhakabādhyasyāpi, kalpitarajatavyāvṛtteḥ kalpitarajate mithyātve'pi tadapekṣayā tasyādhikasattākatvābhāvād, adhikaṃ mithyātvamithyātvopapādane draṣṭavyam| nanu- tattvajijñāsuṃ mumukṣuṃ prati mithyābodhanāyogaḥ, na cānṛtatvādibhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ tad, adhiṣṭhānabrahmatattvasākṣātkāreṇaiva tannivṛttisaṃbhave bhrāntyantarotpādanāyogāt, na hi valmīke sthāṇurayamiti bhrāmyataḥ puruṣo'yamityupadiśyata iti- cenna, nivartakādhiṣṭhānatattvasākṣātkāra eva tasyopāyatvāt, sthūlārundhatīnyāyena pūrvapūrvabhramanivṛttaye kālpanikopadeśasya pañcakośasthale darśanācca| yathā cātmani kalpitena brāhmaṇyenāśaṅkitā brāhmaṇyabhrāntirnivartate tathā vyāvahārikyā vyāvṛttyā prātibhāsikyanṛtādibhrāntirnivartate| na cāsadvyāvṛttervyāvahārikatve'napoditaprāmāṇyena `asadvā idamagra āsī'diti vākyenāsattvasya pāramārthikatvaprasaṅgaḥ, `neha nāne'tyanena tasya niṣedhād, asadvā ityāderanyaparatvasya prāgeva darśitatvācca| tathā ca mīmāṃsakamate anṛtasyāpyarthavādārthasya satye prāśastya iva mithyābhūtānāmapi vyāvṛttīnāṃ satye brahmaṇi dvāratvena bodhanaṃ yuktam| uktaṃ hi- `satye brahmaṇi satyādiśabdā vyāvṛttidvārā paryavasyantī'ti| na ca vyāvṛttijñānasya dharmidhīsādhyatvena vaiparītyāpātaḥ, dharmaviśiṣṭadharmijñānasādhyāyā vyāvṛtteḥ śuddhadharmijñāne dvāratvāṅgīkārāt| na ca- śābde arthe ārthikasya dvāratvamanupapannam, anyathā nīlamutpamityāderanīlavyāvṛttidvārā svarūpamātraparatvaṃ syāditi vācyam, nīlamutpalamityādau svarūpamātrabodhe tātparyābhāvānna śābde'rthe ārthikārthāpekṣā, viśiṣṭārthatātparyāt| atra tu svarūpamātre tātparyam, taccārthikārthasya dvāratvaṃ vinā'nupapannam| na ca viśeṣasya tvanmate'bhāvāt kiṃ prāgajñātaṃ vyāvṛttyā jñāpanīyamiti vācyam, anyāviṣayakasya svarūpajñānasya bhramavirodhinaḥ sādhyatvāt| na caivamanyājñāne dvāratvam, anyajñānapratibandhadvāreṇa śuddhajñāna eva dvāratvasaṃbhavāt| na ca vyāvṛttijñāna eva svarūpajñānaṃ dvāramastu, tasyābhidhābalalabdhaviśiṣṭajñānādevopapatteḥ| na ca- prācīne brahmājñānanivartakabrahmāparokṣajñāne tadajñānakāryasyānyasya bhānāyogaḥ, brahmaprātipadikārthabubhutsāyāmeva etadvākyapravṛttiriti svaprakriyāvirodhaśceti vācyam, brahmāparokṣajñānaṃ hi tatsvarūpaṃ vā ? vṛttirūpaṃ vā ? ādye nānyabhānānupapattiḥ, tasyāvidyānivartakatvābhāvāt| vṛttirūpamapyāpātadarśanaṃ nāvidyānivartakam, tasyāsākṣātkāratvādvā, sākṣātkāratve'pi pratibaddhatvādvā| vicārajanyaṃ tu phalībhūtaṃ bhavatyavidyānivartakam, na tu tatprācīnamiti kimanupapannam ? nanu- satyaśabdenāsadvyāvṛttidvārā yadbodhitam, tadeva jñānādipadairajñānādivyāvṛttidvārā bodhyamiti padāntaravaiphalyam| na ca dvāravikalpaḥ, satyādipadānāṃ nityavacchravaṇād ekasmin prayoge vrīhiyavayorivaikasmin vākye satyādyanekapadopādānāyogād, anṛtatvādibhrāntinivṛttirūpadṛṣṭakāryāṇāṃ bhinnatvena brīhiyavādivad vikalpaprayojakasyaikakāryatvasyāpyabhāvācceti cenna, samuccitānāṃ dvāratvena saphalatvāt| pradhānasya brahmaṇaḥ pratipattyupayogināmānandādīnāṃ bhāvarūpāṇāṃ `ānandādayaḥ pradhānasye'tyanenāsthūlatvādīnāmabhāvarūpāṇām `akṣaradhiyāṃ tvavarodhaḥ sāmānyatadbhāvābhyāmaupasadavattadukta'mityanena ca sūtreṇa nirguṇabrahmapratipattāveva sarvaśākhopasaṃhārasya pratipāditatvena dvārasamuccayasyaiveṣṭatvāt| nanu- saguṇe brahmaṇyupāsanārthaṃ bhavatu śākhāntarīyaguṇopasaṃhāraḥ, nirguṇabrahmapratipattau tu kiṃ śākhāntarīyaguṇopasaṃhāreṇa ? satyādipadānāṃ pratyekaṃ lakṣakatvena lakṣyabrahmabodhane pratyekameva samarthatvāt, satyatvādeśca pratyekaṃ lakṣaṇatvāt| na hi prakṛṣṭatvādikamiva satyatvādikamativyāptamiti cet, na| prakṛṣṭaprakāśapadayoriva satyādipadānāmapi kumataprāptātivyāptinivṛttyarthaṃ samuccayāpekṣaṇāt| na hyanṛtavyāvṛttibodhanaṃ vinā `vijñānamānandaṃ brahme' tyatra sūnyavādavyāvṛttabrahmasiddhiḥ| evamekaikapadābhāve sarvatrātivyāptirūhanīyā| tathā ca satyatvādikamanṛtādivyāvṛttidvārā śūnyavādādivyāvṛttabrahmasiddherupāyaḥ| na ca- vyāvṛttiḥ, kiṃ brahmaviśeṣaṇatvena bodhyā ? svatantrā vā ? ādye sakhaṇḍārthatvam, dvitīye brahmajijñāsuṃ prati tadupadeśo'saṅgata iti vācyam, vyāvṛttiryadyapi viśeṣaṇatayaivārthikabodhe bhāsate, tathāpi na śābdabodhe sakhaṇḍārthatvam| yaścārthādartho na sa codanārtha iti nyāyāt| taduktaṃ vārtikakāraiḥ- `mānāntarādapohastu na śābdastena sa smṛtaḥ' iti | na cārthikaināpi viśeṣaṇena brahmaṇaḥ sakhaṇḍatvāpattiḥ, nirdharmakatvādiśruterviśeṣaṇasya dharmyasamānasattākatvena sakhaṇḍatvāprayojakatvāt| na ca- anantaśabdenāntavadvyāvṛttessākṣādeva bodhanānna tasya ārthikatvam, tathā cānantapadasya sakhaṇḍārthatvaṃ syāditi- vācyam, yadyapi- tatrānanto'ntavadvastuvyāvṛttyaiva viśeṣaṇam| svārthārpaṇaprāṇāḍyā tu pariśiṣṭau viśeṣaṇam|| iti | taittirīyavārtikoktadiśā vidhipadānāṃ svārthārpaṇapraṇāḍikayā arthāditaranivṛtti bodhakatvam, niṣedhapadānāṃ tu sākṣāditi sthitam, tathāpi dvārabhūte jñāne sakhaṇḍārthatve'pi paramatātparyaviṣayajñānenākhaṇḍārthatvavyāghāta ityasakṛduktam| etadevoktamānandabodhācāryaiḥ- lakṣyārthabhedābhāve'pi vyavacchedyavibhedataḥ| vijñānānandapadayoḥ paryāyavyarthate na hi|| iti | (1) evaṃ pade lakṣaṇeti pakṣe samāhitam| kecittvatra vākye lakṣaṇāmāhuḥ, na pade| tathā hi- yathā `gambhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣa' ityatra gambhīranadyoḥ parasparamanvayabodhānantaraṃ viśiṣṭārthasaṃbandhi tīraṃ lakṣyate, tathā prakṛte parasparaviśiṣṭārthabodhānantaraṃ tatsambandhyakhaṇḍaṃ lakṣyate| tathā ca na padavaiyarthyam| na ca tatrāpi pratyekaṃ lakṣaṇā, tathā sati gambhīranadītīrādilābhena viśiṣṭatīrabuddhirna syāt| na caṃ tatra gambhīranadīpadayoriva iha satyādipadānāṃ parasparamanvayabodhakatvaṃ tvanmate nāstīti- vācyam, ekasmin brahmaṇi dvārībhūtasya parasparārthānvayabodhasya satyādipadaiḥ militvā jananād, uttarakāla eva lakṣaṇayā akhaṇḍabodhasyābhyupagamāt| na ca- `satyaṃ jñānaṃ' `vijñānamānanda'mityādau anyonyānapekṣāṇāṃ satyādipadānāṃ brahmalakṣakatvādarśanāt kathaṃ gambhīrāyāmityāditulyanyāyateti vācyam, yatra vastugatyā gambhīranadyabhiprāyeṇaiva nadyāṃ ghoṣa ityuktam, tatra parasparanirapekṣalakṣakatvasya gambhīrāyāmityuktau ca militalakṣakatvasya darśanād, guṇopasaṃhāranyāyena dvārasamuccayasya sthāpitatvācca| na ca- parasparapadasāhityena tatra gambhīranadīsaṃbandhi tīraṃ lakṣyate, anyathā tvekaikasaṃbandhi, prakṛte tvadhikalābho na padāntareṇāpīti vācyam, tatrāpi yugapadvṛttidvayavirodhāpattyā gambhīranadītīratvena lakṣaṇānabhyupagamād, vastugatyā viśiṣṭasaṃbandhinaḥ pratyekapadādapi lābhāt| atha viśiṣṭabuddhidvāratvādvāratvābhyāṃ viśeṣaḥ, prakṛte'pi sa tulya eva| nanu- gambhīrāyāmityatrāpi na milite lakṣaṇā, kintu nadīpada eva, paraspara sāhityena viśiṣṭabodhānantaraṃ svajñāpyaviśiṣṭasaṃbandhini lakṣaṇāsaṃbhavāt, svajñāpyasaṃbandha eva hi lakṣaṇā, lāghavāt, na tu tadviśeṣaḥ śakyasaṃbandhaḥ, gauravāt| tathā ca padadvaye lakṣaṇā, lakṣaṇādvayaṃ vā na yuktam| evaṃ ca vṛtteḥ padavṛttitvaniyamo'pi saṅgacchata iti cet, naitatsāram, svajñāpyasaṃbandho hi lakṣaṇeti tvayocyate, tacca jñāpyaṃ prakṛte viśiṣṭam, tajjñāpakatvaṃ cobhayoḥ sādhāraṇamiti kathaṃ nadīpada eva lakṣaṇā ? na gambhīrapade, vinigamakābhāvāt| na ca gāmbhīryeṇa saha tīrasya paramparayā saṃbandhaḥ nadyāḥ sākṣātsaṃbandha eva vinigamaka iti vācyam, `nimnaṃ gabhīraṃ gambhīra'miti kośād gambhīrapadasya nimnarūpanadīdravyavācitvena sākṣātsaṃbandhasyāpi sādhāraṇatvāt| na ca viśeṣaṇavibhakteḥ sādhutvārthakatvād gambhīrapadalakṣaṇāyāṃ vibhaktyarthānanvaya iti- vācyam, viśiṣṭabodhasamaye gambhīrapadasya viśeṣaṇapadatve'pi viśiṣṭasaṃbandhilakṣaṇāsamaye viśeṣyapadatvāt| viśeṣaṇavibhakteḥ sādhutvārthakatvamityapyasaṃbaddham, abhedārthakatvasya naiyāyikaiḥ pratyekamanvayasya ca mīmāṃsakairaruṇādhikaraṇasiddhasya cābhyupagamāt| (2-3) evamanyadapi vākyalakṣaṇodāharaṇamanusandheyam- `gaccha gacchasi cet kānta' ityādi, viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣvetyādi ca| nanu- atra janmanā maraṇānumānam, tena ca tatsādhanībhūtāyāḥ gaterakartavyatānumānamityanumānaparamparaiva, na lakṣaṇā, ananyalabhyasyaiva śabdārthatvāt, na hi dhūmo'stīti vākyaṃ vahnilakṣakam| viṣamityādāvapi viṣabhojanasyeṣṭasādhanatoktyā śatrugṛhānnabhojanasyāniṣṭasādhanatvamākṣipyate| yadvā- āptasya pramāṇaviruddhopadeṣṭṛtvena kopo'numīyate| tatra ca pralasaktaśatrugṛhānnabhojanasya hetutvaṃ kalpayitvā tatrākartavyatānumānam, na lakṣaṇeti cet, naitatsādhu, janmanā maraṇākṣepe'pi tanmaraṇe gamanasya hetutvānākṣepāt, śatavarṣānantaraṃ jarādināpi tadupapatteḥ| tathā ca priyāmaraṇe hetutvaṃ gamanasya na lakṣaṇāṃ vinā'vagantuṃ śakyam| nāpi priyāmaraṇahetutvena gamanasyākartavyatvānumānam, priyāmaraṇahetorapi tattvenājñānadaśāyāṃ gurunideśādvā ātmatrāṇārthaṃ vā kulāpakīrtiparihārārthaṃ vā kartavyatvadarśanena vyabhicārāt| tathā ca gamanasya priyāmaraṇahetutvaṃ tādṛśasya cākartavyatvamityubhayamapi lakṣaṇādhīnam, janmanirdeśasya ca prakṛte'nupayogāt tena prakṛtopayoginyagamane tātparyaṃ jñāpyate samudāyasya| tathā ca samudāya eva lakṣaṇā| na pratyekapade, pratyekaṃ tātparyajñāpakābhāvāt| tathā ca nātrānumiti paramparā, na vā pratyekapade, lakṣaṇā| evaṃ `viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣve'tyatrāpi viṣabhojaneṣṭasādhanatvena śatrugṛhānnabhojanāniṣṭasādhanatvaṃ nākṣeptuṃ śakyate, vyadhikaraṇatvāt| tena vināpyubhayorapīṣṭasādhanatayopapattisaṃbhavācca| na hi yena kenacidyatkiñcidākṣipyate, kiṃtvanupapadyamānenopapādakam| nāpyāptatve sati pramāṇaviruddhopadeṣṭṛtvena kopānumānaṃ kopena ca taddhetau śatrugṛhānnabhojane akartavyatānumānam, āptasyāpi pitrāderbhramādinā vināpi kopaṃ pramāṇaviruddhopadeṣṭṛtvadarśanena vyabhicārādāptakopahetorapi bhramādinā priyāmaraṇahetoriva kartavyatvadarśanena tatrāpi vyabhicārācca| tathā cāprasaktapratipādanena prasaktavāraṇe tātparyaṃ jñātvā tenākalpitapadavibhāge samudāya eva lakṣaṇāṃ kalpayati, na tu pratyekapade, tatra tatra viśiṣya tātparyajñāpakābhāvāt| tathā ca padārthetātparyānvayānupapattibhyāṃ lakṣaṇā pade| vākyārthe taddbayānupapattyā lakṣaṇā vākye| vākyārthānupapattyanibandhanatvaṃ ca lakṣaṇāyā padavṛttitvasādhane upādhirityavadheyam| (4) evamevārdhamantarardhaṃ bahirityādau loke ardhamantarvedyardhaṃ bahirvedīti vede'pi vākya eva lakṣaṇā| na ca- tatrāpyardhasyāntastve satyardhasya bahiṣṭvenāntarālānumānam, na lakṣaṇeti vācyam, chinne gṛhe antarālarāhitye'pi taddvayadarśanena vyabhicārād yathākathaṃcidanumānasaṃbhave vā sarvatra śabdapramāṇocchedāpātācca| (5-6) evaṃ ca brahmajijñāsāpadena vicāro lakṣyata iti vivaraṇakāroktaṃ yajñāyudhipadena yajamāno lakṣyata iti saṃkṣepaśārīrakoktaṃ ca vākyalakṣaṇayopapannam, brahmajijñāsā yajñāyudhiśabdayoḥ subantatvalakṣaṇapadatve'pi śaktatvalakṣaṇapadatvābhāvena śakyasaṃbandharūpāyā lakṣaṇāyā ayogāt, svajñāpyasaṃbandharūpā tu lakṣaṇā yaugikapadasamudāye'pi vākyasthānīye nānupapannā| (7) evaṃ `vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devate' tyādau arthavāde'pi prāśastyapratipattaye vākya eva laṇaṇā'ṅgīkāryā, pratyekapadāttadanupapatteḥ| na ca- tatra karmaṇi kṣipradevatāprasādahetutvarūpatatpadārthasaṃbandhabodhakatvameva, na tu tadanyaprāśastyalakṣakatvamiti vācyam, padārthamātrasaṃsargabodhe vāyuḥ śīghratama ityeva dhīḥ syāt, na karmaprāśastyaviṣayā sā syāt| na ca- liṅgādyabhidheyakāryasyānvayānupapattistatra lakṣaṇābījamasti, prakṛte ca sarvapadānāṃ lakṣakatvādabhidheyānvayānupapattirnāstīti vācyam, kena tubhyamabhāṇyabhidheyānupapattyā lakṣaṇeti ? kintu tātparyānupapattyā| tacca tātparyamabhidheyānvayaviṣayamanvayasāmānyaviṣayaṃ svarūpamātraviṣayaṃ veti na kaścidviśeṣaḥ| anyathā yaṣṭīḥ praveśayetyatra lakṣaṇā na syāt| na ca- bhojanaprayojanakapraveśanasya yaṣṭiṣvanvayānupapattirevāstīti vācyam, evamapi praveśanaviśeṣe tātparyagraha evopajīvya iti tadanupapattireva lakṣaṇābījamastu| vinigamanāviraheṇa dvayorapi vyavasthitavikalpe'pyasmākaṃ na kṣatirityavadheyam| nanu- sarvapadānāṃ lākṣaṇikatve vākyārthānubhavo na syāt, lākṣaṇikasyānanu bhāvakatvāditi cenna, lākṣaṇikatve'pyanubhāvakatvopapatteḥ| śaktatvena hyanubhāvakatvam, na tu tacchaktatvena, gauravāt| lākṣaṇikamapi kvacicchaktameva, bhaṭṭācāryairvākyārthasya sarvapadalakṣyatvābhyupagamācca| tathā hi- abhihitānvayavāde padaiḥ svaśaktivaśāt padārthā abhidhīyante; na tu smāryante, smāryasmārakasaṃbandhātiriktamūlasaṃbandhakalpanāpatteḥ| ekasaṃbandhijñānaṃ hyaparasaṃbandhismārakam, na tu smārakatvameva saṃbandhaḥ, hastipakādiṣu tathā darśanāt| ata evoktaṃ- `padamabhyadhikābhāvāt smārakānna viśiṣyate|| iti | ajñātajñāpakatvābhāvānnānubhāvakam, saṃbandhāntarābhāvācca na smārakam, kintu śaktyā jñātajñāpakamiti smārakasadṛśamityarthaḥ smṛtyanubhavātiriktaṃ ca jñānaṃ pramāṇabalādāyātamaṅgīkāryameva, padārthajñāne tattānullekhācca, tattollekhaniyamabhaṅgenātra tatpramoṣakalpane cātigauravāt| tathā ca padajanyasmṛtyanubhavavilakṣaṇajñānaviṣayībhūtāḥ padārthāḥ abhihitā ityucyate| tādṛśāścākāṅkādyanusāreṇa svānvayamanubhāvayantīti vākyārtho lakṣya ityucyate, padena yad bodhyate tacchakyam padārthena yad bodhyate, tallakṣyamiti niyamāt| ata evoktaṃ `vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitam' iti| yadyapi padābhihitapadārthasmāryatvaṃ tīrādau lakṣyatvam, vākyārthe tu tadanubhāvyatvamiti viśeṣaḥ, tathāpi padārthabodhyatvamādāya lakṣyatvavyapadeśaḥ| ata eva padārthena padārthalakṣaṇāyāṃ pūrvasaṃbandhajñānāpekṣā, tasya smāryatvād, vākyarthalakṣaṇāyāṃ tu na tadapekṣā, tasyānubhāvyatvena pūrvasaṃbandhajñānānapekṣatvāt| padārthalakṣaṇāyāṃ pūrvasaṃbandhajñānameva vākyārthalakṣaṇāyāmākāṅkṣādikameveti parasparanirapekṣamubhayaṃ niyāmakam| ato'pūrve vākyārthe śakyasaṃbandhitayā jñātumaśakye kathaṃ lakṣaṇetyapāstam, padārthalakṣaṇāyā eva tathātvāt| evaṃ ca padaśakteḥ padārthopasthitāvevopakṣayādupasthitānāṃ ca padārthānāmanvayānubhāvakatvāt sarvapadalakṣaṇikatve'pi na vedāntavākyānāmanvayānubhāvakatvānupapattiḥ| syādetat- abhihitānvayavāde mā bhūdanupapattiḥ, anvitābhidhāne tu bhavati, tathā hi padānāmanvayānubhavajananasāmarthyameva śaktirityucyate, ekaikapadārthopasthitistu smṛtirūpā, na śaktisādhyā, ekasaṃbandhijñānādaparasaṃbandhismaraṇasya hastipakādisādhāraṇatvād, anvayānubhavajananasāmarthyarūpasya ca mūlasaṃbandhasya vidyamānatvāt| ata eva padaśaktyasādhyatvāt padārthopasthiteḥ smṛtyantarasādhāraṇāyāstadvaijātyakalpane ca mānābhāvādarthādhyāhāra evāsati bādhake, na padādhyāhāraḥ, puṣpebhya ityatra sādhutvārthaṃ spṛhayatipadasya `viśvajitā yajetetyatra niyojyalābhārthaṃ svargakāmapadasya' saurye carāvatideśaprāpte `agnaye juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmī'ti mantre prakṛtau vācakapadavattayā klṛptopakāre agnipadabādhena vācakapadalābhāya sūryapadasya cādhyāhāre'pi padārthasmaraṇāya vākyārthānubhavāya vā tadanapekṣaṇāt| śābdatvaṃ ca padajanyānvayānubhavatvenaiva, na padajanyopasthitijanyānvayānubhavatvena, gauravāt| ata eva yogyatāvacchedakasya chidretaratvādeḥ padādanupasthitasyāpi padajanyānvayānubhavaviṣayatvācchābdatvam, anyairapyanukūlatvapratiyogitvādīnāṃ tathātvābhyupagamāt| evaṃ ca caitro'yamityādau loke `udbhidā yajeta paśukāma' ityādau ca vede pratyakṣopasthitānāmeva caitrodbhidādipadānāṃ nāmatvenānvayaḥ, anyathā caitrapadavācyo'yam udbhitpadavācyena yāgenetyādikalpane lakṣaṇāprasaṅgāt, agṛhītasaṅgatike pade tadayogāt| `ghaṭaḥ paṭo ne'tyatra nañanvaya iva caitro'yamityādināmadheyānvaye'pi vibhaktyarthadvāratvānapekṣaṇena vyutpattyantarakalpanāt nañanvaye vibhaktyarthāpekṣāyāṃ jitamadvaitavādibhiḥ nīlaṃ sugandhimahadutpalamitivat ghaṭapaṭanañarthānāmabhedānvayopapatteḥ| nāmadheye vibhaktyarthāpekṣāyāṃ vede nāmadheyatvaṃ na sidhyediti jitaṃ pūrvapakṣiṇā| `somena yajete'tyatreva matvarthalakṣaṇayodbhidā yajetetyādāvapi viśiṣṭavidhitvopapatteḥ, ubhayatra lakṣaṇāyāstulyatve'pi pravṛttiviśeṣakaratvena vidhitvasyaivocitatvāt| vārtikakārāṇāṃ tu padārthopasthiteḥ padaśaktisādhyatvāttadarthaṃ sarvatra padādhyāhārāṅgīkāre'pi nāmadheyānvaye vyutpattyantarāśrayaṇamastyeva| tathā ca svayameva vyutpāditaṃ nāmadeyādhikaraṇa ityalaṃ prasaktānuprasaktyā| prakṛtamanusarāmaḥ- evaṃ sthite lākṣaṇikamapyanvayānubhāvakaṃ cedanvayānubhavajananasāmarthyameva śaktiriti lākṣaṇikasyāpi tadvattvānmukhyajaghanyavibhāgo na syāt| tathā ca liṅgādhikaraṇavirodhaḥ| tatra hi `barhirdevasadanaṃ dāmī'tyādimantrāṇāṃ mukhye jaghanye cārthe liṅgādviniyogaḥ uta mukhya eveti saṃśayya ubhayorapi śābdatvādubhayatrāpi viniyoga iti prāpte, mukhya eveti siddhāntitam| `arthābhidhānasaṃyogānmantreṣu śeṣabhāvaḥ syāttasmādutpattisaṃbandho'rthena nityasaṃyogā'diti| arthābhidhānasāmarthyarūpālliṅgāt śrutyaviniyukteṣu barhirdevasadanaṃ dāmītyādimantreṣu śeṣabhāvo viniyogaḥ syāt| tacca sāmarthyaṃ mukhye, na jaghanye śabdasāmarthyādupasthito hyartho mukhamivāvyavahito bhavatīti mukhya ucyate| mukhyārthasaṃbandhādupasthitastu jaghanamiva vyavahito bhavatīti jaghanya ucyate| tathā ca jaghanye'rthe viniyogaṃ bruvatāpi tadupasthitaye mukhyopasthitirvaktavyā| tathā cotpattisaṃbandhaḥ svabāvasaṃbandho'rthābhidhānasaṃbandha eva viniyojakaḥ syāt, tasyārthaniyatatvāt, tāvataivasvādhyāyavidheścaritārthatvāt| mukhyasaṃbandhastu na liṅgam, anekeṣāṃ mukhyasaṃbandhitvenārthāniyamāccaramatvācceti sūtrārthaḥ| ata eva mukhyasaṃbhave lakṣaṇā nopādeyeti sarvatantrasiddhāntaḥ| padavṛttirhi śaktiḥ padārthavṛttiśca lakṣaṇā| sā ca bahuprakāretyanyat| lākṣaṇikapadenānvayapratiyogyupasthitau kṛtāyāṃ yadavaśiṣṭaṃ śaktaṃ, tadevānvayānubhāvakam| arthavādapadānāṃ sarveṣāṃ lākṣaṇikatve'pi tadekavākyatāpannaṃ vidhipadamevānubhāvakam, vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syu'riti nyāyāt| tathā ca satyādipadānāṃ sarveṣāmapi lākṣaṇikatve kathamanvayānubhavopapattiriti cet, naiṣa doṣaḥ, śakyasyaivānvayānubhavābhyupagamāt, lakṣaṇātvekadeśatyāgamātrasya, na tvaśakyārthopasthitaye gaurnitya ityādivat| ata eva vācakānāmeva svārthe lakṣaṇeyamityuktaṃ prāk| nanu jahallakṣaṇābhyupagame kathamanvayānubhavaḥ ? śakyaikadeśasyāpi tatrābhāvāt| tathā coktaṃ saṃkṣepaśārīrake- sābhāsājñānavācī yadi bhavati punarbrahmaśabdastathā' haṃśabdo'haṅkāravācī bhavati tu jahatī lakṣaṇā tatra pakṣe || iti | asmin pakṣe anvitābhidhānavādānabhyupagamānna doṣaḥ| pakṣadvayāśrayaṇaṃ tu jahadajahallakṣaṇāpakṣa eva| tathā ca darśitaṃ tatraiva- abhihitaghaṭanā yadā tadānīṃ smṛtisamabuddhiyugaṃ pade vidhattaḥ| paradṛśi punaranvitābhidhāne padayugalāt smṛtiyugameva pūrvam|| iti | tattvapradīpikākṛdādayastu abhihitānvayapakṣamevorarīcakruḥ, sarvathāpi siddhāntānukūlatvāditi na kiṃcidavadyam| tārkikamatasyobhayapakṣabahirbhāvādikaṃ ca vedāntakalpatāyāṃ vyutpāditamityuparamyate| ityadvaitasiddhau satyādyavāntaravākyākhaṇḍārthatopattiḥ|| 2 || 3. tattvamasyādivākyasyākhaṇḍārthatvānumānabhaṅgaḥ evaṃ tattvamasyādimahāvākyapakṣakānumānamapi nirdoṣam| na ca so'yaṃ devadatta ityayaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyabikalaḥ, viśiṣṭābhedasya bodhayitumaśakyatvāt| tathā hi- kimatra taddeśakālaviśiṣṭa etaddeśakālavaiśiṣṭyaṃ pratipādyate ? etaddeśakālaviśiṣṭe vā taddeśakālavaiśiṣṭyam ? tadviśeṣaṇayoraikyaṃ vā ? tadviśiṣṭayoraikyaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, taddeśakālavaiśiṣṭyasyāpratyakṣatvenānuddeśyatvāt, tatkālāderidānīṃ sattvāpatteśca| na dvitīyaḥ, etatkālāderanyadā sattvāpatteḥ, na tṛtīyaḥ bādhāt| ata eva na caturtho'pi, viśeṣaṇamasya bhinnatvena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatatsaṃbandhātmakasya viśiṣṭasya bhinnatvāt, atiriktatve'pi viśeṣaṇabhedena viśeṣyabhedena ca tadbhedaniyamāt| tathā cobhayaviśeṣaṇaparityāgena viśeṣyamātramabhinnaṃ bodhyata iti siddhamakhaṇḍārthatvam| taduktam- `aviruddhaviśeṣaṇadvayaprabhavatve'pi viśiṣṭayordvayoḥ| ghaṭate na yadaikatā tadā natarāṃ tadviparītarūpayoḥ||' iti yadā hi `daṇḍī kuṇḍalī'tyādau daṇḍakuṇḍaloderekadeśakālāvasthitatvenāvirodhe'pi na tadviśiṣṭayoraikyam, viśeṣaṇayorapyaikyāpatteḥ, tadā kaiva kathā so'yamityatra tattedantayorekakālānavasthānaniyamena parasparaviruddhatvāttadviśiṣṭayoraikyasya| lakṣaṇayaikyabodhana tūbhayatrāpi samānam| lākṣaṇikatve'pi daṇḍī kuṇḍalītyādau viśiṣṭatātparyānnākhaṇḍārthatvavyavahāraḥ, so'yamityatra tu `ayaṃ sa na vā ? ayaṃ naiva sa' ityādisaṃśayaviparyayajñānaviṣayībhūtābhedamātrasya bubhutsitatvena tatraiva tātparyādakhaṇḍārthatvaṃ na hyanyasmin bubhutsite anyat pratipādayitumucitamityuktama| pratyabhijñāpratyakṣasyāpyabhijñādvayopasthitasvarūpātiriktāviṣayatve'pi ubhayopasthitidvārakābheda bodhanena bhramanivartakatvam, tatsamānārthakaṃ ca vākyametaditi na viśiṣṭaparam| yathā cābhijñādvayāt pratyabhijñāyā viṣayavailakṣaṇyābhāve'pi dvāraviśeṣanibandhanajñānagatavailakṣaṇyādeva phalabhedaḥ, tathā smṛtirūpāyāstadidampadārthopasthiteranubhavarūpasya vākyārthabodhasya| evaṃ ca `bhinnapravṛttinimittayorekārthabodhaparatvaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇya'miti prācāṃ vaco'pi niṣprakārake sutarāmupapadyate| nanu- so'yamiti pratyabhijñā tāvannākhaṇḍārthaviṣayā, tatra pratyakṣe śabdavṛtterlakṣaṇāyā abhāvāt, tattedantollekhitvena tatra niṣprakārakatvasyānubhavaparāstatvāt, tadanullekhe tvabhijñāto viṣayavailakṣaṇyānupapatteḥ| tathā ca śābdapratyabhijñā'pi tathā, svapratyabhijñāvagatasya paraṃ prati bodhanāditi- cenna, vṛttyanapekṣatve'pi pratyakṣasya viśiṣṭābhedaviṣayatve bādhasya pratibandhakatayā svarūpābhedamātraviṣayatvāt| abhedaśca na prakāraḥ svarūpatayā prādhānyād| tattedantayorapi na prakāratā, bhāsamānābhedarūpavaiśiṣṭyapratiyogitvābhāvāt| ata eva na tasyāstattedantollekhitā, tadabhilāṣe tu nirantarotpannābhijñādvayādeva tathollekhavyavahārāt, tatra ca lakṣaṇā labdhapadaiva| sarvatra nirvikalpakābhilāpa iyaṃ gatiḥ| na cābhijñāyā aviśeṣaḥ, saprakārakatvaniṣprakārakatvābhyāmeva viśeṣāt| phalavailakṣaṇyaṃ tūktameva| ata eva tattopalakṣitapratiyogikabhedarahita idantopalakṣitadevadattasvarūpatetātparyād yathājñānamupadeśo'pyupapadyate| bhedavirahaśca na kaściddharmaḥ, kintu svarūpameva| tadeva caikyamityucyate| na cāyamasti niyamaḥ svena yathāvagataḥ paraṃ prati tathaiva vācyamiti, samūhajñānenāpi śrotṛbubhutsitaikadeśopadeśadarśanāt, jñānamātrasādhyatvāt bubhutsānusāritvāccopadeśasya| evaṃ ca viśiṣṭa viṣayādapi jñānādakhaṇḍopadeśopapattiḥ| viśeṣaṇopalakṣaṇādivivekaścānyatra spaṣṭa iti neha pratanyate| yathā ca na dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyavikalaḥ| evaṃ tattvamasyādimahāvākye'pi boddhavyam| nanu- cinmātrasya cinmātreṇa sahābhedabodhane iṣṭāpattiḥ, aprasaktaniṣedhaśca abhedaścetsvarūpameva tasya svaprakāśatayā nityasiddhatvenopadeśavaiyarthyam, tadasphuraṇe ca tadbubhutsādyanivṛttiśca tattvampadārthaśodhakenāvāntaravākyenaivopapattyā mahāvākyavaiphalyaṃ ca ekapadenaivopapatteḥ padāntaravaiyarthyaṃ ca, bhramakālajñātādhikāpratipattermahāvākyāt bhedabhramanivṛttiśca na syāditi- cenna caitanyasya nityasiddhatve'pi sārvajñyādyupalakṣitasvarūpajñāna syājñānādinivartakasya sādhyatvāt| na ca saprakāratā, tattādivat sārvajñyādīnāmanvayabodhāprakāratvād upāyāntareṇaitādṛśajñānāsaṃbhavācca nopadeśavaiyarthyādayo doṣāḥ| bhramapratītabhedāśrayatāvacchedakapratiyogitāvacchedakadvayopalakṣitasvarūpamātrajñānasya bhedabhramanivartakatvena viṣayāvailakṣaṇye'pi phalavailakṣaṇyāt, śaṅkhaśvaityaviṣayatve tulye'pi tadanumānānivartyapītabhramasya tatpratyakṣanivartyatvadarśanāt| ata evoktaṃ vivaraṇe- `abhijñātaḥ pratyabhijñāyāstāvanna prameyato viśeṣaḥ, abhijñayā jñātasyaiva devadattaikyasya pratyabhijñayāpi grahaṇāt| na hi devadattasya svenaikyamabhijñāyāṃ na bhāti| na ca tasyaikyāntaramasti yadanabhijñātaṃ pratyabhijñāyate| ekasya kāladvayasaṃbandhaḥ pratyabhijñāgocara iti cenna, aikye kāladvayaṃsambandhasyābhijñādvayādeva siddheḥ| tasmāt kāladvayasaṃbandhipadārthaikyaviṣayatve dvayorapyaviśiṣṭe pratyabhijñāyā eva kāladvayaparāmarśitvena padārthabhedabhramanivartakatvam, nābhijñāyāḥ| evaṃ tattvamasīti vākyasya satyādi vākyāttatpadācca prameyāvailakṣaṇye'pi dharmadvayaparāmarśitvena bhedabhramanivartakatvāt| prāmāṇyam| uktaṃ ca kātyāyanena `siddhaṃ tu nivartakatvā'diti| syādetat- abhijñayā vastuta ekasmin kāladvayasaṃbandhasya devadattābhedasya ca grahaṇe'pi pratyabhijñayā ekasmin kāladvayaṃsabandha iti vā, kāladvayasaṃbandhyeka iti vā grahaṇena prameyata eva bhedaḥ| na hīdamiti jñānaṃ vastutaḥ śuktau śuktyabhedagrāhyapi iyaṃ śuktiriti jñānavadidaṃ tvaśuktitvādhāra eva ityākāram, anyathā tu phalato'pi viśeṣo na syāt, kāladvayaparāmarśasya bhedabhrame'pi sattvāt| evaṃ tattvamasītyatrāpīti| ucyate- na hi pratyabhijñāyāmaikyaṃ prakāra iti kasyacinmatam, tasya svarūpatvena viśeṣyatvāt| abhedasvarūpaviṣayatve tulye tattedantobhayaprakārikā seti tava matam, niṣprakārikaiveti mama| ekatvaṃ ca naikatvasaṅkhyā, guṇādābhāvāt, tajjñānasya bhedabhramāvirodhitvācca, kintu bhedaviraharūpaṃ svarūpamityuktam| anyathā tadabhilāpaka vākyamapi so'yameka iti syāt, na tu so'yamiti| so'yamiti vākye tvaikyasya prakāratvaṃ tatpratipādakapadābhāvādeva dūranirastam| bhedabhrame kāladvayaparāmarśe'pi bhramapratītabhedāśrayatāvacchedaketyādi niruktaphalavailakṣaṇyamupapannameva| ata eva `upādhibhedabhinnārtho yenaikaḥ pratipādyate| tadapi syādakhaṇḍārthaṃ mahat khaṃ kumbhakhaṃ yathā||' ityādi kalpatarūktam| `ghaṭākāśo mahākāśa ityukteścaikyadhīryathe'ti vārtikaṃ ca niravadyam| tathā ca tattvamasivākyamakhaṇḍārtham, upādhibhedabhinne'rthe aikyapratipādakatvād, ghaṭakhaṃ mahākhamiti vākyavadityuktaṃ bhavati| evaṃ ca- satyajñānādiretatsaṃsargavyarekiṇi arthe pramāṇam, mānatvāt, `nayanādipramāṇava'diti citsukhācāryoktamapi- sādhu| satyādivākyametatpadārthasaṃsargavyatirikta evārthe pramāṇamiti sāvadhāraṇaṃ sādhyaṃ vivakṣitam, tena saṃsargātiriktasaṃsargiṇyapi prāmāṇyāṅgīkārāt na siddhasādhanam| kaṇṭakoddhārastu pūrvavat| evamanyeṣāmapi prayogāḥ yathā yathamupapādanīyāḥ| tasmāt vṛthā rodiṣi mandabuddhe tava bhramādeva hi duḥkhametat| tasyāpanodo vihitaḥ pramāṇaistubhyaṃ tu roceta sa neti citram|| mānaṃ vedāntavākyāni nirguṇākhaṇḍabodhanāt| nirguṇatvaṃ ca tasyoktaṃ śrutyā yuktisahāyayā|| 2 || iha kumatiratattve tattvavādī varākaḥ pralapati yadakāṇḍe khaṇḍanābhāsamuccaiḥ| prativacanamamuṣmai tasya ko vastu vidvān na hi rutamanurauti grāmasiṃhasya siṃhaḥ|| 3 || ityadvaitasiddhau tattvamasyādimahāvākyākhaṇḍārthatvopapattiḥ|| 4. brahmaṇo nirguṇatvabhaṅgaḥ kaivalyaśrutyā tāvadātmā nirguṇaḥ| nanu- `bṛhanto'sya dharmā' iti śrutyā `brahmeśānādibhirdevaiḥ sametairyadguṇāṃśakaḥ| nāvasāyayituṃ śakyo vyācakṣāṇaiśca sarvadā||' iti smṛtyā ca brahma, dharmavat, padārthatvād'- ityādyanumānena ca svasamānasattākadharmavad brahmeti cet, maivam, na tāvat śrutyā saguṇatvasiddhiḥ, saguṇaprakaraṇasthāyā upāstividhiviṣayaviśeṣaṇasamarpakatvena tatparatvābhāvāt| na cāpūrvatvāt satyakāmādau viśeṣaṇe tātparyam| apūrvatve'pyanyaśeṣasyātatparatvadarśanād, yathā hi `jarttilayavāgvā vā juhuyād gavīdhukayavāgvā vā juhuyā'dityādau jarttilayavāgvāderhomasādhanatvasya `anāhutivai jarttilāśca gavīdhukāśce'pi nindāyāśca `ajakṣīreṇa juhotī'ti vidhyekavākyatayā atatparatvaṃ, tathaivātrāpyupapatteḥ| nirguṇaprakaraṇasthāyāstu advitīyabrahmapratipattyanukūlaniṣedhāpekṣitaviṣayasamarpakatayā anyathāsiddheḥ| na ca `kiñcane'tyādisāmānyavācakapadenaiva brahmātiriktasarvaniṣedhyopasthitau viśeṣagrahaṇamanarthakamiti vācyam, alaukikatayā vākyaprameyatvabhramavyudāsārthatvāt| ata eva śrutiprāptasya śrutyā niṣedhe ahiṃsāvākyam agniṣomīyahiṃsāyā, agrahaṇavākyaṃ ca ṣoḍaśigrahaṇasya, asadvetyādivākyaṃ brahmasattvasya bhedavākyaṃ caikyasya niṣedhakaṃ syāditi nirastam, prakṛte śrutiprāptasyaivābhāvāt| śrutiprāptatvaṃ hi na tatprasaktatvam, atiprasaṅgāt, tatpramitatvasya ca prakṛte abhāvāt| ahiṃsāvākyasyāvaidhahiṃsāviṣayatvena samānaviṣayatvābhāvāt, samānaviṣayatve grahaṇāgrahaṇavadvikalpāpatteḥ| grahaṇāgrahaṇavākyayostu satyapi samānaviṣayatve ekasyādhikabalatvābhāvena bādhyabādhakabhāvasyāsaṃbhāvitatvād, anyathā vikalpānāśrayaṇaprasaṅgāt| asadvākyabhedavākyayostu na brahmasattvaikyaniṣedhakatā, sattyaikyabodhakayoreva tatparatvena prābalyāt| nāpyanumānaṃ brahmaṇi tāttvikadharmasādhanāyālam| tathā hi- (1) brahma dharmi sattāsamānasattākadharmavad, uktasattākabhāvarūpadharmavadvā, yāvatsvarūpamanuvartamānadharmavadvā, tādṛśabhāvarūpadharmavadvā, svajñānābādhyadharmavadvā, tādṛśabhāvarūpadharmavadvā, dharmairbhāvarūpadharmairvā hīnaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate vā, padārthatvād, athavā bhāvatvād, ghaṭavat| (2) brahma, svajñānābādhyaprakāravat, svāro pitavyāvartakasvajñānābādhyaprakāravadvā, adhiṣṭhānatvāt, śuktivat| (3) brahma svajñānābādhyaduḥkhavyāvartakadharmavad, duḥkhānātmakatvāt, ghaṭavat| (4) brahma, svajñānābādhyaprakāraviśeṣyam, sandigdhatvāt, vicāryatvāt, nirṇetavyatvādvā sthāṇuvat| (5) brhama, vedāntatātparyagocaraprakāravat, vedāntavicāraviṣayatvāt, yadevaṃ tadevam, yathā karmakāṇḍavicāraviṣayo dharmaḥ| (6) īśvaraḥ, sadāvāptasamastakalyāṇaguṇaḥ, sadā prepsutve sati tatra śaktatvāt, yo yadā yatprepsuryatra śaktaḥ sa tadā tadvān, yathā caitraḥ| (7) īśvaraḥ, sadā tyaktasamastadoṣaḥ, sadā tajjihāsutve sati tattyāge śaktatvāt, yaścaivaṃ sa tathā, yathā caitraḥ ityādyanumāneṣu dharmipadasvapadayoryatkiñciddharmiyatkiñcitsaṃbandhiparatve ghaṭādisamasattākakalpitadharmavattvena siddhasādhanam, brahmaparatve sādhyāprasiddhiḥ, ghaṭādidharmaṃ brahmasamāna sattākatvāderaprasiddheḥ| na ca- dṛṣṭānte sādhyanirūpaṇe tadeva dharmi, pakṣe tannirūpaṇe brahmaiva dharmi, dharmipadasvapadādīnāṃ samabhivyāhṛtaparatvāditi vācyam, śabdasvabhāvopanyāsasyānumānaṃ pratyaprayojakatvāt| svarūpapadasyāpyevameva brahmaparatve sādhyāprasiddhiḥ, ghathaṭādiparatve siddhasādhanam| samabhivyāhṛtaparatvasya śabdasvabhāvasyānumānaṃ pratyaprayojakatvamiti dūṣaṇaṃ pūrvavat| dharmairvinā nāvatiṣṭhata ityasya brahma dharmavyāptamityarthaḥ| tathā ca siddhasādhanam, yasmin kāle deśe vā brahma, tatra, dharmā satyeva| na hi kālo deśo vā dharmarahitaḥ, māyācitsaṃbandhasya kālasya muktyasahavṛttitvāt| svajñānābādhyetyatrāpi pūrvavat svapadārthavikalpaḥ| ata eva- svāropitavyāvartakasvajñānābādhyadharmavaditi nirastam, svajñānābādhyaduḥkhavyāvartakadharmavadityatrāpi svapadārthavikalpaḥ pūrvavat| duḥkhavyāvartakadharmavattvena siddhasādhanam| vedāntatātparyagocaretyatrāvāntaratātparyamādāya siddhasādhanam| mukhyatastātparyoktau ca vedāntavākyamukhyatātparyaviṣayaprakārā prasiddhyā sādhyāprasiddhiḥ| na ca yattadbhyāmanugamayya sādhyaprasiddhiḥ, tathā śabdānugamasyānumānaṃ pratyanupayogāt| īśvaraḥ sadāvāptasamastakalyāṇaguṇa ityatra kālaṃ vyāpya āptaguṇatvasyāsmābhirapyaṅgīkārāt| na hi nirdharmakatāyāṃ satyāṃ kālasaṃbandho'sti| kiṃ ca śuddhasya pakṣīkaraṇe hetvasiddhiḥ, upahitasya pakṣīkaraṇe arthāntaram, svābhinnāptasamastakalyāṇaguṇatvena sadharmakatvāyogācca, siddhasādhanācca kalyāṇaguṇānāmānandādīnāṃ nityatvena tatprepsāyāstatra sāmarthyasya ca tvayāpi vaktumaśakyatvācca| ata eva prepsādikaṃ prajñānaghanatvāditi- nirastam| sadā tyaktasamasta doṣatve sādhye caramavṛttiparyantatyāge sāmarthyābhāvena hetvasiddheḥ| yadā tu tatsāmarthyam, tadā tyaktadoṣatvamiṣṭameva| prakāravattvādau sādhye aprayojakatvamapi| na ca adhiṣṭhānatva sandigdhatvādyanupapattirevānukūlastarkaḥ, adhiṣṭhānatve hi svāropitavyāvartakavattvaṃ tantraṃ kalpitākalpitasādhāraṇamityuktatvāt, svajñānābādhyatvaviśiṣṭadharmaṃ vinā tasyānupapattyabhāvāt| sandigdhatvamapi vyāvartakena kalpitenākalpitena vā rūpeṇāniścitatayaivopapadyata iti tasyāpi nāniścitasādhyadharmaṃ vinānupapattiḥ| evaṃ duḥkhānātmakatvaṃ duḥkhavyāvartakasvarūpatayaivopapannaṃ kadācidvaktavyam, anyathā anavasthānāpatteḥ| na hi vyāvartakadharmo'pi kevalānvayī, yena svavṛttiḥ syāt| tathā ca tadapi vyāvartakadharmaṃ vināpyupapannaṃ na tatsādhanāyālam| anavasthābhiyā kvaciddharme viśrāntau padārthatvamapi vyabhicāryeva| na ca svasyaiva svavṛttitvānna vyabhicāraḥ, ātmāśrayāt| na caivaṃ dṛśyatvasyāpi svasminnavṛttyā bhāgāsiddhiḥ, svavṛttitvābhāve'pi svaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvasya tatrāsiddhatāprayojakasyābhāvāt| tasmānnānumānaṃ brahmasamasattākadharme pramāṇam| kiṃ ca śrutiḥ aparabrahmaviṣayā, nirdharmakaśrutivirodhena viṣayabhedasyāvaśyakatvāt| na ca saguṇātiriktasya parabrahmaṇo'dyāpyasiddhiḥ, tvatpakṣe tāttvikaguṇavadvyakyantarasyābhāvāt, kiṃ viṣayatvaṃ ca saguṇaśruteriti vācyam, tāttvikatvaparyantasya saguṇaśrutyā aviṣayīkaraṇāt, nirdharmakatvaśrutyā śuddhabrahmasiddheśca| taduktamantaradhikaraṇe kalpatarukṛdbhiḥ- nirviśeṣaṃ paraṃ brahma sākṣātkartumanīśvarāḥ| ye mandāste'nukampyante saviśeṣanirūpaṇaiḥ|| vaśīkṛte manasyeṣāṃ saguṇabrahmaśīlanāt| tadevāvirbhavet sākṣāt apetopādhikalpanam|| iti | ata eva smṛtisūtrābhyāṃ na virodhaḥ| na ca saguṇe `paraḥ parāṇā'mityādismṛtyā parādapi paratvaṃ smaryate, tathā ca kathaṃ saguṇavākyānāmaparabrahmaviṣayatvamiti vācyaṃ, jaḍāpekṣayā paraḥ kiñcijjñaḥ tadapekṣayā sarvajñasya śuddhāpekṣayā'parasyāpi paratvāt| na ca sadeva somyedamagra āsīdasadvā idamagra āsī'diti śrutī api parāparabrahmaviṣaye syātāmiti vācyam, atredamiti prapañcasya prakṛtatvena brahmaparatvasya vaktumaśakyatayā prapañcasyaiva pūrvaṃ kāraṇātmanā sattvaṃ kāryātmanā asattvaṃ viṣayīkurutaḥ| nāpi grahaṇāgrahaṇavākye api parāparayāgaviṣaye, `aindravāyavaṃ grahaṃ gṛhṇātītyādivat ṣoḍaśigrahaṇavākyasya yāgaparatve'pi agrahaṇavākyasya tadabhāvabodhakatayā yāgaviṣayatvābhāvāt| nanu- evamasanneva sa bhavati asad brahmeti vedacediti śrutirapi nāsattvasiddhārthā, kintu śūnyatāpattirūpaparamamokṣapareti syāditi- cenna, śūnyatāyā apuruṣārthatvād, ānandāvāptirūpamuktipratipādakavirodhācca| yadvā- idānīṃ saguṇaṃ daśāntare nirguṇamiti vākyāvirodhaḥ| na ca etāvatā anityatvamātraṃ guṇānāṃ na tvadabhimatamithyātvasiddhiriti vācyam, tvadabhimatatāttvikatvasyāpyasiddheḥ| upāyāntarānusaraṇaṃ ca samānam| yattu brahmedānīṃ sat daśāntaretvasadityapyāpadyeta iti, tanna, daśāntare nirguṇatvavad asattvasyābodhanenāprasaṅgāt| na ca- `jñānaṃ nityaṃ kriyā nityā balaṃ nityaṃ parātmanaḥ|' `eṣa nityo mahimā brāhmaṇasye'tyādiśrutyā brahmajñānādīnāṃ nityatva pratipādanāt saguṇatvamiti vācyam, jñānādīnāṃ svarūpatayā guṇatvāsiddheḥ| svarūpātiriktānāṃ tu caramasākṣātkāraparyantasthāyitayā nityatvopacārād, `apāma somamamṛtā abhūme'tyādau amṛtaśabdasyābhūtasamplavasthāna mamṛtatvaṃ hi bhāṣyata iti paurāṇikoktāmṛtatvavat| ata eva- `eṣa nityo mahimetyādivākyasya taittirīyaśākhāgatasya nityaguṇaparatvamiti nirastam, bṛhadāraṇyakagatasya tu `sa eṣa neti netī'ti vākyaṃ pratiṣiddhasarvopādhikarūpasya mahimnaḥ tyaktasarveṣaṇapuruṣagatasya pratipādanena brahmagataguṇaparatvābhāvāt| na ca `sarvasya vaśī'tyādau brahmaṇaḥ prakṛtatvena tadgataguṇaparatvamiti śaṅkyam, `yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣvi'tyādivākyoktajīvasvarūpānuvādena brahmasvarūpatābodhanaparatvena brahmagataguṇaparatvābhāvād, brāhmaṇapadasya `tadadhīte tadvedeti sūtravihitāṇantasya brahmavitpratipādakatayā brahmaparatve lakṣaṇāpatteśca| kiṃ ca saguṇavākyānāmaupādhiguṇaviṣayatvena svābhāvikanirdharmakatvaśruterna virodhaḥ| na caupādhikatvasya sopādhikādhyastarūpatve śrutyaprāmāṇyāpattiḥ, vakṣyamāṇasatyatvaśrutivirodhaḥ, upādhikalpitarūpatve tūktanityatvaśrutivirodhaḥ, antaḥkaraṇādirūpopādhisṛṣṭeḥ prāgeva īkṣitṛtvādiśruterupādhyasaṃbhavaśceti vācyam, māyāvidarśitamāyānuvādivākyavat svato bhramajanakatvābhāvenāprāmāṇyānāpatteḥ, satyatvaśruteranyathā neṣyamāṇatvāt, nityatvaśruteranyathārthasyokteḥ, sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvamantaḥkaraṇābhāve'pi avidyāyā upādheḥ sattvācca| na caupādhikatve `svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā cetyanena virodhaḥ, asmadādāviva bhautikopādhikatvābhāvena yogiṣviva yogārjitatvābhāvena svābhāvikatvokteḥ| na ca saṅkocakābhāvaḥ, nirguṇavākyasyaiva saṅkocakatvāt| na ca- svābhāvikajñānasamabhivyāhāravirodhaḥ, sārvajñyādirūpāvidyāpariṇatasyaiva jñānapadena vivakṣitatvādvādhakasattvā sattvābhyāṃ samabhivyāhāre'pi vairūpyāṅgīkaraṇāt pāvako brāhmaṇa itivat| kiṃ ca saguṇavākyānāṃ na guṇasatyatvabodhakatvam, satyatvasyāpadārthatvāt| na ca nityatvoktisāmarthyādviṣayābādhalakṣaṇasya prāmāṇyasyautsargikatvāt `satyaḥ so'sya mahime'tyādiśruteḥ svarūpataśca tatsiddhiriti- vācyam, prathamasyānyathāsiddheruktatvādutsargākhyatarkasya vyavahārābādhamādāyaivopapāditatvātsatyaḥ so'sya mahime'tyādau mahimnaḥ svarūparūpatvādavirodhād, dharmatve tu brahmasākṣātkāretarānivartyatvaguṇayogena satyapadapravṛttyupapatteḥ| na ca evaṃ `satyaṃ jñānaṃ' `tattvamasī'tyādiśrutyuktabrahmasatyatvaikyādikamapi tāttvikaṃ na syāditi vācyam| nirguṇaśrutivirodhasya tatrevātrābhāvāt| nanu- śrutyorvirodhe naikasyā atāttvikaviṣayatvam, śāstrāvirodhe saṅkocavikalpādinā ubhayaprāmāṇyasya pūrvatantre vyākaraṇe ca nirṇītatvāt| tathā hi- daśamādhyāyasthe `prāptabādhe prakṛtivat kuryā'dityādirūpaklṛptasya codakasya kṛṣṇalādāvavaghātavarjamityādirūpaḥ saṅkoca eva| evaṃ tārtīyīke'pi aprāptabādhe gārhapatyamiti dvitīyāśrutyanusāreṇa indraśabdayuktamantraliṅgasya gārhapatye gauṇatvādikameva| vyākaraṇe'pi yatra pareṇa pūrvasya nityenānityasyetyādibādha uktaḥ, tatrāpi saṅkoca eva| daśame vikṛtibhūtamahāpitṛyajñaprakaraṇasthe `nārṣeyaṃ vṛṇīte' ityādivākye prakṛtivatkuryādārṣeyavaraṇavarjamiti mahāpitṛyajñīyaprakṛtivacchabdaikavākyatayā paryudāsārthatvamevetyuktam| yatra tu prakṛtibhūtadarśapūrṇamāsaprakaraṇasthājyabhāgavidhāyakavākyasannihite `na tau paśau karotī'tyādau pāśukaprakṛtivacchabdaikavākyatā'yogena paryudāsārthatvāsaṃbhavāt `prakṛtivatkuryādājyabhāgau tu na kuryā'diti vākyabhedena prasajyapratiṣedhārthakatvamevetyuktam, tatra paśāvājyabhāgayoranyenāprasakteḥ śāstraprasaktasya sarvathā bādhāyogādvikalpa ityuktam| tathā coktaṃ- ko hi mīmāṃsako brūyādvirodhe śāstrayormithaḥ| ekaṃ pramāṇamitarat tvapramāṇaṃ bhavediti|| iti cenna, tatra śāstrayoḥ prāmāṇye samānakakṣyatayā ekatarasyātyantikabādhāyogātsaṅkocena vikalpena vā pākṣikaprāmāṇyamāśritam, iha tvekatarasya tatparatayā prabalatvāditarasya cātatparatvena durbalatayā vaiṣamyāt| yattu `na tau paśau karotī'tyādau vikalpa uktaḥ, tanna, paśuprakaraṇasthasya pāśukaprakṛtivacchabdaikavākyatayā paryudāsārthatvād, darśapūrṇamāsaprakaraṇasthasya tu `paśāvājyabhāgau na staḥ, atra tau sta' iti stutyarthatvād, vārttikakārairvikalpe svīkṛte'pi na doṣaḥ, ubhayatra tātparyasattvena viśeṣāt| yattu- atrāpi `vikāraśabdānneti cenna prācuryād' `upadeśabhedānneti cennobhayasminnapyavirodhāt' gauṇyasaṃbhavā'dityādau śāstrayorvirodhe tāttvikārthāntaraparatoktā na tvāropitārthatā, anyathekṣatyādyadhikaraṇeṣu siddhāntasādhakānāmīkṣaṇādīnāṃ sāṅkhyādyabhimatapradhānādāvāropasaṃbhavena pradhānanirākaraṇādi na siddhyediti, tanna| vikāra śabdādityādau na virodhena tāttvikārthāntaraparatvamarthaḥ, kintu svapradhāne brahmaṇi avayavatvāsaṃbhavena pucchapadamucaritamityarthaḥ| taduktaṃ ṭīkāyāṃ- pucche'dhikaraṇa iti| gauṇyasaṃbhavāditi pūrvapakṣasūtre'pi `ātmana ākāśaḥ saṃbhūta' iti śrutistu gauṇī| ākāśotpattikāraṇāsaṃbhavādityarthaḥ, na tu tāttvikārthāntaraviṣayatvam| `upadeśabhedādi'tyādau dividiva iti saptamīpañcamībhyāmādhāratvāvadhitvayoḥ pratīterupadeśabhedena pūrvanirdiṣṭabrahmaṇaḥ pratyabhijñānamastīti prāpte ekasminnapi śyene `vṛkṣāgre śyenaḥ vṛkṣāgrācchyena' iti nirdeśadarśanād ekasminneva brahmaṇi ubhayarūpāvirodha ityarthaḥ, na tu tāttvikārthāntaraparatvam| na cāropitamīkṣaṇaṃ pradhāne saṃbhavati, yogyatāmādāyaivāropadarśanāt| na hi rājāmātye rājatvāropa iti stambhādāvapi tadāropaḥ| tathā ca cetana eva īkṣitṛtvadarśanāccetane brahmaṇi tadāropo yujyate nācetana iti na siddhāntakṣatiḥ| kiṃ ca niṣedhyasamarpakatayaikavākyatayaiva prāmāṇyasaṃbhave na vākyabhedena guṇaprāpakatā yuktā| ata eva na ko hi mīmāṃsaka ityādinā virodhaḥ| nanu- mṛḍamṛdetyāderyathā `na ktvā seḍi'ti niṣedhaniṣedhakatvaṃ, tadvat saguṇavākyānāmapi nirguṇavākyabādhakatvaṃ kiṃ na syāditi cenna, dṛṣṭānte paryudāsādhikaraṇanyāyena mṛḍamṛdetyādyuttaravihitāpyaseṭkatvāpratyakittvaniṣedhaparatvenaikavākyatāyāṃ vākyabhedena niṣedhaniṣedhakatvākalpanāt| na ca prakṛte'pi paryudāsārthakatvam, neti netīti vīpsāyāḥ prasaktasarvaniṣedhakatayā viśeṣapariśeṣāyogena paryudāsasyāśrayitumaśakyatvāt| yattu jagatkartṛtvenākṣiptasārvajñyāderniṣedhāyānuvāde śrutena jñānanivartyatvena jagadāropādhiṣṭhānatvena `sa evedaṃ sarvamātmaivedaṃ sarvami'ti śrutena jīvabrahmaṇoḥ sārvātmyena cākṣiptaṃ viśvamithyātvaṃ brahmasattvaṃ jīvabrahmaikyaṃ ca viśvaṃ satyamityanena asadvā ityanena `dvā suparṇe'tyanena ca niṣeddhuṃ `neha nānetyanena' satyaṃ jñānamityanena' tattvamasītyanena cānūdyata iti syāditi, tanna, `viśvaṃ satyaṃ' `dvā suparṇe'tyatra ca niṣedhadyotakapadābhāvena niṣedhakatvāsaṃbhavād, asadvā ityatra tu nañsattve'pi nāmapadasamabhivyāhṛtatvena niṣedhakatvāsambhavād, `dvā suparṇe'tyasya paiṅgirahasya brāhmaṇe buddhijīvaparatayā vyākṛtatvena jīvabrahmabhedābodhakatvāt, phalato niṣedhatvopapādane dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayorvaiṣamyāt| tathā hi- sārvajñyasya niṣedhapratiyogitayā mithyābhūtatve'pi nākṣepānupapattiḥ, āropinenāpyākṣepakajagatkartṛtvanirvāhād, ākṣiptaviśvamithyātvabrahma sattvajīvabrahmaikyānāṃ niṣedhe tu jñānanivartyatvādīnāṃ trayāṇāmākṣepakāṇāmasaṃbhavaḥ syāt, satyasya jñānādanivṛtteḥ, asatyasya adhiṣṭhānatvāyogād, bhede sārvātmyāyogācca| etena advaitaśruternirguṇaśrutyantarasya vā tātparyaparijñānaprāptanirguṇatvameva saguṇavākyena niṣeddhuṃ nirguṇavākyenānūdyata iti nirastam, tātparyaparijñānaprāptatve niṣedhārthamanuvādāyogāt| nanu `sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaścetyādinā draṣṭṛtvādiguṇavidhānāt na tena tanniṣedhaḥ, tadarthaṃ ca saguṇavākyaṃ nānuvādakam, anyathā sārvajñyādervyāvahārikatvamapi na syāt, na hi niṣiddhe brahmahananādāvavāntaratātparyam| na ca aupaniṣadasya brahmaṇaḥ sārvajñyādikamanumānādisiddhamiti cenna, avidyāsiddhasākṣitvādyanuvādena taṭasthalakṣaṇadvārā brahmaparatayā guṇaparatvābhāvād guṇaniṣedhakatopapatteḥ| na ca niṣiddhe brahmahananādāvavāntaratātparyābhāvavadatrāpi tadabhāve sārvajñyaṃ vyāvahārikamapi na syāditi vācyam, devatāvigrahādau vidhistutidvāratayopātte pramāṇāntaraprāptivirodhayorabhāvāt, tadatyāgamātreṇa titsiddhivadatrāpi niṣedhaupayikatayopāttasya sārvajñyādermānāntarādaprāptasya vyāvahārikapramāṇāniṣiddhatayā vyāvahāradaśāyāmatyāgamātreṇa vyāvahārikatvopapatteḥ| brahmahananādikaṃ tu mānāntaraprāptamiti viśeṣaḥ| na ca tadbodhakatvaṃ tattātparyaniyatam, viśiṣṭavidherviśeṣaṇabodhakatve'pi viśeṣaṇe atātparyād, viśiṣṭasyātirekād, anyaśeṣatayopātte'pi sārvajñyādau tātparye vākyabhedāpatteḥ| na ca tarhi upāsanāyāḥ kāryatve viṣṇorātmatva eva ca| ubhayatrāpi tātparyamātmopāsādike vidhau|| iti smṛtivirodha iti vācyam, devatādhikaraṇanyāyenobhayasiddhiparatvād ubhayatra tātparyaṃ| smṛterapramāṇatvāt, yaḥ sarvajña ityādāvupāsanāprakaraṇasthatvābhāve'pi taṭasthalakṣaṇadvārā brahmapratipādane tātparyeṇa viśeṣaṇe atātparyād, anyathā ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñāvirodhāpatteḥ| na ca- `ātmetyevopāsīte'tyatrādvaitasyāpyupāsyatvena upāsanāśeṣatayā advaitāsiddhiḥ syāditi vācyam, anena hyetatsarvaṃ vede'tyuttara vākyasthavidisamānārthatayā upāstiśabdasya kriyāvācakatvābhāvāt| na ca jñāne vidhiḥ, tasya nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt| na ca vidhiśrutyānarthakyam, bāhyaviṣayāt parāvṛttya cittasya pratyagātmapravaṇatāsampādakatvāt| atha yo'nyāṃ devatāmupāsta' ityāderna sa vedetyuttaravākyaparyālocanayā bhedadarśananindāparatayā upāstiparatāśaṅkaiva nāsti| na copakramānusāreṇa upasaṃhāranayanam, anena hyetatsarvaṃ vedetyekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñāvirodhenopasaṃhārasyaiva prābalyāt| yattu guṇopasaṃhārapāde `ānandādayaḥ pradhānasye'ti sūtre `ānandaṃ brahme'tyādiśrutānāmānandādīnāṃ `vyatihāra' iti sūtre `tadyo'hamiti śrutyuktasya jīve īśvaratvasya īśvare vā jīvatvasya upāsyatayoktatvāduttaratāpanīyādau nirguṇopāsteruktatve'pi yathānandāderaikyasya nirguṇasya ca siddhiḥ, tathā satyakāmatvāderapi tāttvikatāstviti, tanna, ānandādaya' iti sūtreṇa lakṣyākhaṇḍavākyārthasiddhyarthaṃ vācyavākyārthopasaṃhārasya kriyamāṇatvena upāsyatvānukteḥ| vyatihārasūtre ca `tadyo'haṃ so'sau yo'sau so'ha'mityuktasya jīve īśvarābhedadhyānasyeśvare vā jīvābhedadhyānasyopāsanā prakaraṇapaṭhitaśrutyuktasya jīveśvarābhedaḥ saguṇopāsanarūpeṇāpi dṛḍhīkartavya ityevaṃ paratayā aikyasya upāsanāviṣayatve'pi na satyakāmatvādivadatāttvikatvam| na caikyavat satyakāmatvādīnāṃ tāttvikatā, anupāsanāprakaraṇasthatatparavākyabodhitatvābodhitatvābhyāṃ viśeṣād, uttaratāpanīyādau śrutopāsterjñānaparatvāt, upāsterviśiṣṭaviṣayatvena nirviśeṣaviṣayatvābhāvāt| yattu yathā dhyānārthe'pi satyakāmādiguṇopadeśe tadguṇa īśvaraḥ prasidhyati, tadvadaikyamiti bhāṣyaparyālocanayā aikyavatsatyakāmatvādisiddhiriti| tanna | tatra saguṇo yaḥ sa īśvaraḥ prasidhyatītyarthaḥ, na tu guṇasyāpi prasiddhiḥ, nirguṇaśrutyanusāreṇātadguṇasaṃvijñānabahuvrīhāveva tātparyāt| tathā caikyasiddhāvīśvarasya nidarśanatvam, na tu guṇasya| evamevārthasiddhaṃ bhavannopekṣāmahe| `satyakāmādiguṇopadeśāt tadguṇeśvarādisiddhaḥ' iti ṭīkā neyā| nanu- ānandādivākyasatyakāmādivākyayormānāntarāvirodhe tadaprāptau upāsanāvidhyaśravaṇe nirguṇaśrutivirodhe ca tulye'pi ānandādayastāttvikāḥ, satyakāmatvādayastvatāttvikā iti kathaṃ vyavastheti- cenna, ānandādīnāṃ brahmarūpatvena nirguṇaśrutivirodhābhāvasya vyavasthāpakatvāt| na ca evaṃ balaśaktyādīnāmapi `jñānātmako bhagavān balātmako bhagavāniti śruteḥ samastakalyāṇaguṇātmaka iti śruteśca brahmābheda iti vācyam, asmākamapi brahmātiriktaguṇasadbhāva pradveṣād, abhede guṇaguṇibhāvāṅgīkārasya pāribhāṣikatvāt| yattu saguṇopāsterbhramatve nirguṇopāsterapi bhramatayā samyakphalāsiddhirbrahmāsiddhiśca syāt| na ca- nirguṇopāsanaṃ yadyapi bhramastathāpi maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇibhrama iva samyakphalapradam| taduktaṃ- svayaṃ bhramo'pi saṃvādī yathā samyakphalapradaḥ| brahmatattvopāsanāpi tathā muktiphalapradā|| iti | nāpi brahmāsiddhiḥ, upāsanasya bhramatve'pi śabdājjāyamānasya jñānasya pramātvāditivācyam, prakṛte'pi tathātvāpatteḥ, maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇitvasyaiva brahmaṇo mithyātvābhāvena dhyānasyāpi satyabrahmaviṣayatvācceti| tanna| saguṇopāsterviśiṣṭaviṣayatvena bhramatve'pi nirguṇādyupāsternirviśeṣaviṣayatayā bhramatvābhāvāt| evameva śābdasaguṇanirguṇajñānayorapi, saguṇavākyasya viśeṣyāṃśasatyaviṣayatve'pi viśeṣaṇāṃśāsatyaviṣayatvāt| ata eva brahmaviṣayaśābdadhījanyasya tadaparokṣadhījanakasya brahmadhyānasyābrahmaviṣayatve śravaṇādīnāmapi tathātvāpattiriti nirastam, teṣāṃ viśiṣṭāviṣayatvād, upāsteśca viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt| na ca īkṣatikarmetisūtre īkṣatidhyānayorekaḥ kāryakāraṇabhūtayoḥ| artha autsargikaṃ tattvaviṣayatvaṃ tathekṣateḥ|| iti bhāmatyāṃ `parāt paraṃ puriśayaṃ puruṣamīkṣate itīkṣatikarmaṇaḥ parabrahmaṇa eva paraṃ puruṣamabhidhyāyīteti abhidhyātavyatvenoktyā tadvirodha iti vācyam, trimātroṅkārāvalambanopādhiviśiṣṭasyaiva dhyeyatvoktyā śuddhaviṣayatvābhāvena virodhābhāvād, viśeṣyāṃśamādāya īkṣatisamānaviṣayatvopapatteśca| yattu aikyādyupāsanasya apramāpravāharūpatvamāśaṅkya saguṇopāsanasamatvamuktam, tadayuktam, saguṇaprakaraṇasthaikyavākyajanyaikyajñānasya saguṇopāstyantargatatayā viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt, svatantraikyajanyaikyajñānasya nirviśeṣaviṣayatvena viśiṣṭaviṣayasaguṇopāstivaiṣamyāt| na ca- aikyādervidhyavidhirūpavākyadvayabodhitatvena dhyeyatvajñeyatvavatsārvajñyāderupāsti- vidhiviṣayasyāpi avidhirūpavastutattvaviṣayaḥ sarvajña ityādivākyabodhitatvena jñeyatvamapyastīti vācyam; tasya taṭasthalakṣaṇadvārā parabrahmapratipattyupāyatvena tattvamasītyāderiva tatparatvābhāvāt| ata eva- brahmaṇi kartṛtvādīnāmāropyāposyatve nāmni brahmavākyānāmiva brahmaṇyapi kāraṇavākyānāṃ samanvayasyāvaktavyatvena samanvayādyādhyāyānārambhāpāta iti- apāstam; nāmno brahmavikāratayā asamanvaye'pi brahmaṇo'vikāratayā mumukṣujñeyatvena kāraṇavākyānāṃ taṭasthalakṣaṇakartṛtvādibodhanadvārā tatraiva tātparyasaṃbhavena samanvayāderāvaśyakatayā tadadhyāyārambhasaṃbhavāt| na ca - ya ātmā'pahatapāpmetyārabhya satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ so nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavya' sati satyakāmatvādīnāmapahatapāpmatvādibhiḥ saha jijñāsyatvaśravaṇāt jñeyatvamiti vācyam; apahatapāpmatvādīnāṃ svarūpatayā jijñāsyakoṭipraveśe'pi satyakāmatvādīnāṃ svarūpabahirbhāvena jijñāsyatvāyogāt tacchabdena teṣāmaparāmarśād asvarūpatve teṣāmapyaparāmarśe viśeṣyāṃ śamātraparāmarśaḥ yaścitragurbahudhanastamānayetyādivat| ata eva `eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipati'rityādidharmānuktvā teṣāṃ `tametaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣantī'tyādau mumukṣajñeyatvenokteḥ `yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasyaiṣa mahimā bhuvītyuktvā `tadvijñānena paripaśyanti dhīrā' ityaparokṣapramāviṣayatvasyokteḥ `turīyaṃ sarvadṛksade'ti turīyasārvajñyaśruteśca sarvajñatvādīnāṃ satyatvādisiddhiriti- nirastam| yattvapahatapāpmatvādīnāmupāsyatve teṣāṃ bhūtākāśe'pi sambhavena daharākāśasya brahmatvapratipādakadaharādhikaraṇavirodha iti, tanna; cetanadharmātyantābhāvasya pāpmādivirahasyācetane sambhave'pi kāmasaṅkalpāderacetane saṃbhāvayitumaśakyatvena virodhābhāvāt| yattu `satyaḥ so'sya mahīme'tyatra homamātrānuvādenāhavanīyasyeva sa iti śrutyuktamahimamātrānuvādena satyatvavidhānāt sārvajñyādikamapi satyam| `satyaḥ so'sya mahime'tyāderaindrasūktasthatve'pi `tattvāyāmi suvīrya tad brahma pūrvacittaya' iti brahmaśrutyā `indraḥ sūryamarocayat| indre hi viśvā bhuvanāni yemira' ityādisūryaprakāśakatvaliṅgena ca jyotiradhikaraṇanyāyena sūktasya parameśvaraparatvavyavasthiteriti, tanna, nirguṇatvaśrutivirodhena svarūpamahattvasyaiva satyatvokteḥ, ṣaṣṭhyā upacaritatvād, dharmāṇāmapi vyāvahārikasatyatvokteḥ| na ca brahmasattvamapi tathā; satyasya satyamiti niratiśayasattvapratipādanavirodhād, adhiṣṭhānatvānupapatteśca| na ca tata eva saviśeṣatvam; nirviśeṣatve'pi tattvasyopapāditatvāt| na ca- `pṛthagātmāna'mityādi śrutiṣu- yo māmaśeṣadoṣojjhaṃ guṇasarvasvabṛṃhitam| jānātyasmai prasanno'haṃ dadyāṃ muktiṃ na cānyathā|| bhoktāraṃ yajñatapasāṃ sarvalokamaheśvaram| suhṛdaṃ sarvabhūtānāṃ jñātvā māṃ śāntimṛcchati|| ityādismṛtiṣu ca saviśeṣajñānādeva mokṣokteḥ saprakārakajñānasyaiva mocakatvamiti- vācyam; paramamuktihetunirguṇasākṣātkāropayogisattvaśudvyupāyasaguṇopāsanā vidhyarthavādatayā sākṣānmuktihetutvāpratipādakatvāt| na ca nirguṇajñānānmuktiśrutirapi tathā; tatparatvātatparatvābhyāṃ vaiṣamyāt, saguṇajñānasya phalāntaraśravaṇācca| yadyapi "nāsyā brahmavitkule bhavatī'tyādiphalāntaraśravaṇaṃ nirguṇajñāne'pi, stutyarthatayopapādanamapi samānam, saṃyogapṛthaktvanyāyena ubhayaphalatvoktirapi samānā; tathāpi adhiṣṭhānatattvāvagāhitvānavagāhitvābhyāṃ nirguṇasaguṇajñānayorviśeṣāt, saguṇajñānajanyamukteravāntaramuktitvācca| na ca- puṇyapāpe vidhūye'ti sarvakarmanivṛtyukteḥ paramamuktitvameveti- vācyam; asya brahmatattvasākṣātkārahetvatiriktakarmaparatvāt, avidyānāśābhāvācca paramamuktitvāsiddheḥ| na ca- nirguṇajñānajanyāyā api mukteravāntaratvam, `asanneveti śrutyuktaśūnyatāyāḥ paramamuktitvamiti- vācyam; śūnyatāyā asukharūpatvenāpuruṣārthatvāt, asannevetyādivākyasya śūnyatvāpratipādakatvācca| yattu guṇaviśeṣavidhisannihitasya sāmānyaniṣedhakasya niṣprapañcavākyasya vihitaguṇaniṣedhakatvaṃ nāstīti, tanna; bādhakasya niṣedhakaprāmāṇyasamakakṣyatva eva saṅkocādatra tadabhāvāt| yattūpāsanāprakaraṇasthatvamātreṇa upāsyatve udgīthopāsanāsthasya `sa eṣo'nanta' iti śrutānantatvāderbhūtākāśa upāsanāmātramiti suvavacatvenākāśādyadhikaraṇe anantatvādiliṅgairbrahmatvoktyayoga iti, tanna; upāsanāprakaraṇasthatve'pi nirguṇaśrutivirodhābhāvena tāttvikatvāṅgīkārāt, tasya cākāśādāvasaṃbhavena tadadhikaraṇārambhasaṃbhavāt| yattu satyakāmatvāderanupāstiprakaraṇe śravaṇamiti tanna; pūṣādyanumantraṇamantravat prakaraṇādutkṛṣṭatvasya dvādaśopasattāvākyavat stāvakatvasya vā sambhavāt| yattu vedhādyarthabhedādityatra `sarvaṃ pravidhye'tyādimantrāṇāmupāsanāprakaraṇādutkarṣasyoktatvena tannyāyenānantādivākyasyotkarṣaḥ syāt, tasya vākyasyopāstiparatve vastutattvaparatve ca saguṇavākyasyāpi tathā syāditi, tanna; svarūpaparasatyaṃ jñānamanantamityādivākye anantatvādeḥ svata eva sattvena utkarṣe prayojanābhāvāt, tasya vastu tattvamātraparatvena ubhayaparatvābhāvācca, upāstiprakaraṇasthānantavākyasya ubhayaparatve'pi nirguṇaśrutivirodhena saguṇavākyasyobhayaparatvābhāvāt| na caivaṃ sārvajñyādīnāṃ vāgdhenutvādivat prātītikatvāpattiḥ, vāgdhenutvāderbuddhipūrvakāropaviṣayatayā prātītikatve'pi satyakāmatvāderīśvarādanyatrāsaṃbhavena buddhipūrvakāropaviṣayatvābhāvāt| nanu- asadupāsanā na ghaṭate, `nāvidyamānaṃ bruvate vedā dhyātuṃ na vaidikāḥ| na caramantyaho asadupāsanayātmahana' ityādismṛtyā `acetanāsatyāyogyānyanupāsyānya phalatvaviparyayābhyā'miti saṅkarṣaṇasūtreṇāpi niṣedhāditi cenna, smṛtisūtrayoratyantāsadupāstiniṣedhaparatayā tadvirodhābhāvād, `vācaṃ dhenumupāsīte'tyādau prātītikasyāpyupāsyatvadarśanācca| na ca tatra `rātriṃ dhenumivāyatīmiti śrutyantarāddhenuśabdo gauṇaḥ, `yoṣitamagniṃ dhyāyīte'tyātrāpi `reto juhvatī'ti śruteḥ retorūpāhutyādhāratvenāgniśabdo gauṇāḥ, bhāṣyoktarītyā yaugiko vā, na tvāropa iti vācyam, āropeṇa mukhyatvasaṃbhave gauṇatāyā anyāyyatvāt| na ca gauṇyucchedaḥ, yatropasanāyā aśravaṇaṃ tatrāropasya niṣprayojanatvena goṇyupapatteḥ, rūḍhārthasya kathamapi saṃbhave yaugikārthatvasyānyāyyatvācca| etena- `nāma brahme'tyatra `nāmābhimāninī coṣāḥ tasyāḥ brahma hariṃ smare'diti smṛtyaiva brahmādhiṣṭhāne nāmādau gauṇo brahmaśabdaḥ, nāmeti prathamavacanaṃ vasanto māruta itivat saptamyarthe, brahmeti prathamā vā pañcamyarthe, `brāhmaṇo'sya mukhamāsī'ditivat, supāṃ sulugi'ti sūtrād, anyathā `śrutaṃ hyeva me bhagavaddṛśebhyastarati śokamātmavi'diti pṛṣṭavantaṃ nāradaṃ prati nāmopāstyuktirayuktā syāt, pratimāyāmapi devatātattvabuddhita eva phalam, na tu devatā'tattvabuddhitaḥ, `śilā devate'ti jñānasya bhauma ijyadhīrityādinā niṣedhāditi nirastam, āropeṇa mukhyatvasaṃbhave gauṇatvasyānyāyyatvāt, samānavibhaktikatvābhāve iti śabdānanvayaprasaṅgāt| evaṃ pratimādāvapi devatātvāropeṇa mukhyatve gauṇatvamanyāyyameva| na ca bhauma ijyadhīriti niṣedhānna tathā, tasya bhaumātiriktaścetano devo nāstīti bhramavyudāsaparatvenāropāniṣedhakatvād, anātmopāstestu mukhyaṃ brahmopadeṣṭumeva śākhācandranyāyenāvatāritatvāt, `tadeva brahmatvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate' iti guṇaviśiṣṭasya upāsyasya brahmatvaniṣedhācca| na ca `anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhī'ti śrutau aśrautajñānasyākārtsnyena jñānasya vā niṣedha iti `tadeva brahme'tyādāvapi aśrautadhyānasyākārtsyena dhyānasya vā niṣedhena nopāsyasya brahmatvaniṣedhaḥ, anyathā `tasyābhidhyānādi'ti śrutivirodha iti vācyam, anyadevetyādau viditāt prameyād ghaṭāderaprameyācchaśaviṣaṇādevaiṃlakṣaṇyena svaprakāśatvapratipādanaparatayā tvaduktārthādṛṣṭāntatvāt| upāsye brahmatvaniṣedhe'pi na "tasyābhidhyānā'diti śrutivirodhaḥ, abhidhyānaśabdasya nididhyāsanavācakatvād, dhyānaparatve'pi kramamuktyarthatvena virodhābhāvāt| tasmāt sādhakābhāvānnirguṇaṃ brahma, saguṇatve bādhakasadbhāvācca| na cāsiddhiḥ, mithyātvaśruternirguṇaśruteśca bādhakatvāt, mithyātvaśruterabādhakatvaprakārasya mithyātvavāde akhaṇḍārthavāde ca nirāsāt| nanu- nirguṇavākyaṃ saguṇavākyaṃ bādhate, na tu saguṇavākyaṃ taditi kimatra niyākam ? na ca niṣedhakatayā nirguṇavākyaṃ prabalam, `asadvā' ityādivākyasya sadevetyādivākyāt prābalyāpatteriti- cenna, apacchedanyāyena prābalyasya prāgevokteḥ| niṣedhatvācca prābalyam, `asadvā' ityatrāsacchabdasyānabhivyaktaparatvenāniṣedhatvācca naitannyāyena prābalyam| nirguṇavākyasya puruṣārthaparyavasāyitayā tatparatvena prābalyāt saguṇavākyasya tatsannidhipaṭhitasya `phalavatsannidhā'viti nyāyena tadanuguṇatayā neyatvāt| na ca saguṇajñānasya mocakatvam, tasya prāgeva nirāsāt| ata eva- saguṇatvanirguṇatvayorvirodhena samuccayāyogād, anuṣṭhāna iva ca vastuni vikalpāyogād ekasya pratītārthatyāgarūpe bādhe vaktavye nirguṇavākyasyaiva sa yuktaḥ, na tu prabalasya saguṇavākyasyeti nirastam, prābalyāsiddheḥ| na ca- upakramādhikaraṇanyāyenānupajātavirodhatvāt nirguṇaśruteḥ pratiyogijñānāpekṣatayā vilambitatvena liṅgāt śruteriva śīghragāmitvāt pade juhotītivadviśeṣaviṣayatvācca saguṇavākyasya prābalyamiti vācyam, upakramādhikaraṇanyāyasyānyathāsiddhopasaṃhāraviṣayatvāt, prakṛte ca tadabhāvāt| saguṇavākyasya pratiyogyupasthāpakatayā śīghragāmitvena prābalye grahaṇavākyasyāpi prābalyāpattyā vikalpābhāvaprasaṅgāt, sāmānyaviṣayapramāṇasamakakṣyasyaiva viśeṣaviṣayasya prābalyāt, prakṛte ca tadabhāvāt| etena `dīkṣaṇīyāyāmanubrūyā'ditivat niravakāśatvena prābalyam, nirguṇaśrutirhi'devātmaśaktiṃ svaguṇairnigūḍhāṃ `daivī hyeṣā guṇamayī' tyādiśrutismṛtiṣviva sattvādiguṇe sāvakāśeti nirastam, sāvakāśaniravakāśanyāyasya samakakṣyaviṣayatvācca| ata eva bahutvādapi na prābalyam, `śatamapyandhānāṃ na paśyatī'ti nyāyācca| na ca pravṛttinimittāpekṣaiḥ brahmādiśabdairdharmiṇaṃ nirdiśya kriyamāṇaṃ dharmaniṣedhaṃ pratyupajīvyatayā guṇasamarpakāṇāṃ prābalyam, grahaikatvavaduddeśyaviśeṣaṇatayā pravṛttinimittānāmavivakṣitatvāt| na ca grahaikatvanyāye uddeśyasvarūpe labdhe yadadhikaṃ tasyaivāvivakṣeti sthitiḥ, anyathā grahatvasyāpyavivakṣā syāt| ata evoktaṃ havirārtinaye `mṛṣyāmahe haviṣā viśeṣaṇam, ubhayatvaṃ tu na mṛṣyāmaha' itīti vācyam| yacchabdo yatra pravṛtti nimittamarpayan dharmiṇamupasthāpayati tatrāyaṃ nyāyaḥ, yastu lakṣaṇayopasthāpayati, tatra nāyaṃ pravartate| na ca- lakṣakeṇāpi śabdena itaravyāvṛttamasaṅkorṇameva vastusvarūpamuddeṣṭavyam, anyathā yatra kvacana dharmaniṣedhaḥ syāditi- vācyam, gaṅgāyāmityādāvitaranadītiravyāvṛttatīralābhavadatrāpi svato vyāvṛttavastuna evoddeśyatvasaṃbhavāt kiṃ dharmasamarpaṇena ? na ca- nirguṇavākyasya chāgapaśunyāyena `traiguṇyavarjitaṃ' `vinā heyairguṇādibhi'rityādiviśeṣopasaṃhāra iti vācyam, `neti netī'tyādivīpsābalena prasaktasarvaniṣedhe pratīte katipayaviśeṣapariśeṣasya kartumaśakyatvāt| ata eva `kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatā'mitivat traiguṇyādiniṣedhasyaiva sāmānyaviṣayatvam, sārvajñyādau śruteramānatvenāvirodhādatrāpi kākapada ivi mānāntarānugrahasya tulyatvāt, tathāpi viśeṣopasaṃhāre `na hiṃsyātsarvā bhūtānī'tyasya `brāhmaṇo na hantavya' ityatropasaṃhārāpātāt, vyarthahiṃsāyāṃ vidhyabhāvavat sārvajñyādiguṇeṣvapi vidhyabhāvasya samānatvāt niṣedha sāmyopapatteḥ| ata eva- `dharmān pṛthak paśyan'- ityādiśruteḥ `saviśeṣaṇe hī'ti nyāyena guṇānāṃ pārthakyasyaiva niṣedhāt tatsāmānyādanyatrāpi tathaiva niṣedho yukta iti nirastam; saviśeṣaṇe hīti nyāyasya viśeṣyabādhakāvatāra eva pravṛtteḥ, prakṛte ca bādhakābhāvāt, sārvajñyaśruteḥ bādhakatvanirāsāt, pārthakyaniṣedhe brahmamātrapariśeṣāt nāmāntareṇādvaitavādasyaivokteśca| yattu jñānānandayorabhede ekatarapariśeṣābhāvādatrāpi dharmadharmiṇoḥ naikatarapariśeṣaḥ, anyathā ānandasphuraṇayoranyatarābhāvāt muktirapumarthaḥ syāditi, tanna; jñānānandavyaktyorasti bhedagarbhekataraśabdasyāpravṛttiḥ| evameva tvannaye guṇaguṇivyaktyorabhedasambhavād asya paribhāṣāmātratvāt| yattu sākṣī cetetyasya pūrvaṃ paścādapi guṇoktestanmadhyasthaṃ nirguṇavākyamapi upāṃśuyājanyāyena tadanugaṇatayā neyamiti, tanna; guṇān taṭasthīkṛtya teṣāṃ brahmaparatvena guṇe tātparyābhāvāt| ata eva- nirguṇaśabdena guṇamātraniṣedho na yuktaḥ, sākṣyādipadena draṣṭratvādividhānavyāghātāt saṅkoca eveti nirastam| draṣṭratvādāvatrāpi atātparyāt| tathāca draṣṭṛtvādidvārakabrahmarūpayuktārthataiṣā| āgamasya tatraiva prāmāṇyasaṃbhavāt| evaṃ ca `yukto'yuktaśca yatrārthaḥ āgamasya pratīyate| syāttatra yukta evārtha' ityādyasmanmata evopapannataram| tasmādupakramādinyāyānāmanyaviṣayatvāt na tadbalena saguṇatvasiddhiḥ| yattu `antastaddharmopadeśād', `antaryāmyadhidaivādiṣu taddharmavyapadeśā'dityādi sūtreṣu dharmāṇāṃ tattadadhikaraṇasiddhāntasādhakatayā ādṛtatvāt saguṇatvasiddhiriti, tanna; āropitabrahmamātrasaṃbandhiguṇopādānena siddhāntasiddhyupapatterguṇatāttvikatve audāsīnyāt| yacca ahiṃsāgnīṣomīyavākyayoriva saguṇanirguṇavākyayorapi bhinnaviṣayatayā'virodhe saṃbhavatyapi saguṇavākyasyāmānatvābhidhānaṃ saugatasauhṛdāditi, tanna; nirguṇavākyasya tatparatvena prabalatayā bādhasyāvaśyakatve'pi mānatvābhidhānasya brahmavādividveṣamātratvāt| tasmānnirguṇavākyabādhāt saguṇavākyamatatparam| anubhūtiḥ; nirviśeṣā, anubhūtitvāditi vyatirekyanumānamapi bādhakam| na cātrā prasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam; yadvyatireke'samīhitaprasaktiḥ tat mānayogyamiti sāmānyataḥ prasiddheḥ| viśeṣatvamabhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakam, abhāvapratiyogimātravṛttitvād, ghaṭatvavaditi viśiṣyāpi sattvāt nāpi svavyāghātaḥ nirviśeṣatvasya svarūpatvena viśeṣatvānaṅgīkārāt| na ca svarūpasya prāgeva siddheḥ syādanumitervaiyarthyam, tena rūpeṇa jñānasyoddeśyatvāt| nāpi śrutibādhaḥ, prāgeva nirāsāt, pratyuta bahutaraśrutyanugrahaḥ| ata eva nābhāsasāmyam| nāpyaprayojakatvam, bhinnatve abhinnatve saṃbandhatve cātiprasaṅgānavasthābhyāṃ dharmadharmibhāvānupapattereva vipakṣabādhakatvāt| na ca saṃbandhasya mithyātvavat svanirvāhakatvānnānavasthā, abhedavāde atiriktasya vaktumaśakyatvāt| na ca- dharmābhāvarūpadharmabhāvatvābhāvābhyāṃ vyāghātena kutarkatāsyeti vācyam, dharmābhāvasya svarūpatayaiva sattvāṅgīkāreṇa vyāghātābhāvād, abhede'pi bhedakalpanayā dharmadharmibhāvavyavahārasya tvayāpīṣṭatvāt| na ca- evamānandasya jñānamātratve duḥkhajñānamapyānandaḥ syād, bhinnatve akhaṇḍatvahāniḥ, evameva brahmaṇo jagadabhinnatve mithyātvāpattiḥ bhinnatve bhedasatyatvamityāditarkabādhāt tvadabhimataṃ brahmāpi na sidhyediti śrutibādhāttarkāṇāmābhāsatvaṃ manmate samānamiti- vācyam, duḥkhajñānasya vṛttirūpatayā ānandasya nityacinmātrānatireke atiprasaṅgābhāvād; ārambhaṇādhikaraṇanyāyena brahmavyatirekeṇa jagataḥ abhāvād bhedābhedavikalpasyānavakāśāt saguṇaśruteratatparatayā śrutibādhasāmyokterayukteḥ, nirguṇaśrutestu tatparatayā tadanugṛhītatarke śuṣkatvābhāvācca| yattu nirviśeṣatvasya bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ mūko'hamitivat svavyāghātaḥ, yadi nirviśeṣatvarūpaviśeṣo'pyanenaiva niṣidhyate; tarhīyamapi vacanakriyā mūko'hamityanenaiva niṣidhyata iti samamiti| tanna| nirviśeṣatvasya viśeṣarūpatve viśeṣatvenaiva rūpeṇa tanniṣedhasyādvitīyavākye dvitīyābhāvarūpadvitīyaniṣedhasyevopapatteḥ| anyathā viśeṣatvāvacchinnaniṣedhapratīteranupapatteḥ| abhāvānatireke tu svarūpānatirekitayā mūko'hamitivatsvavacanavyāghātābhāvasyaivoktatvācca| mūko'hamityatra vaktṛtvatadabhāvayorekarūpeṇa niṣedhābhāvād vyāghātopapatteḥ| nanu- brahmaṇaḥ śūnyānirvācyavyāvartakaviśeṣābhāve tucchatvamithyātvādyāpatteḥ tatsattve saviśeṣatvamiti cet, vyāvarttyasamānasattākaviśeṣābhāve'pi vyāvṛttibodhasamānasattākadharmeṇa bhinnatvanirviśeṣatvayorupapatteḥ| ata eva brahmaṇo nirviśeṣatve vicāraviṣayatvānupapattiḥ| idamitthamiti jñānaṃ jijñāsāyāḥ prayojanam| itthaṃbhāvo hi dharmo'sya na cenna pratiyogitā|| iti nirastam, vicārakāle āropitadharmasaṃbhavāt| vicārottarakāle ca itthamiti vyavahārasya svarūpavyāvṛttyādeśca kalpitapārthakyamādāyopapatteḥ| nanu- dharmāropārthamapi kecana dharmāḥ satyāḥ svīkartavyāḥ, idaṃ tvādinā jñāta eva rūpyādyāropadarśanāt| taduktam- dharmāropo'pi sāmānyadharmādīnāṃ hi darśane| sarvadharmavihīnasya dharmāropaḥ kva dṛśyate|| iti cenna, idantvāderapi satyatvāsaṃpratipatteḥ, śuddhe'pyadhyāsasyopapāditatvācca, āropyavilakṣaṇadharmavattvasyānādyavidyāsaṃbaṃdhenaivopapatteḥ| ata eva abhāvarūpadharmāṅgīkāre bhāvo'pyastu, prāmāṇikatvāviśeṣāditi nirastam; svarūpātirekiṇo'bhāvasyāpyanaṅgīkārād, dharmamātre prāmāṇikatvasya nirākṛtatvācca| tasmānnirviśeṣaṃ paraṃ brahma| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇo nirviśeṣatvanirguṇatvopapattiḥ|| 4 || 5. nirguṇe pramāṇabhaṅgaḥ nanu- nirviśeṣe kiṃ pramāṇamiti cet, sphūrtyarthaṃ vā ajñānanivṛttyarthaṃ vā pramāṇapraśnaḥ| ādye svaprakāśatayā pramāṇavaiyarthyam| na ca vipratipanne svataḥsiddhervaktuṃ śakyatayā atiprasaṅgaḥ, abhāvavyāvṛttibodhakapramāṇasattvāsattvābhyāṃ viśeṣād; dvitīye upaniṣada eva pramāṇatvāt| ata eva pratyakṣamanumānaṃ vetyādivikalpasya nāvakāśaḥ| nanu- kathaṃ tatropaniṣat mānam ? jātiguṇakriyādirūpanimittābhāvena mukhyavṛtterayogād asvīkārācca, āropitanimittaviṣayapratītenirviśeṣe prāmāṇyāyogād, gauṇyāśca mukhyārthaguṇayuktatayaiva lakṣaṇāyāśca śakyārthasaṃbandhitāvacchedaka rūpavattayaiva svārthopasthāpakatvāt, padasyānvayitāvacchedakarūpeṇa svārthopasthāpakatayā nirviśeṣe vṛttimātrāyogāt, padavidhayā vākyavidhayā copaniṣad mānaṃ na nirviśeṣe, saṃsargāgocaratvācceti- cenna, mukhyagauṇyasaṃbhave'pi lakṣaṇāyāḥ saṃbhavāt| na ca lakṣakapade śakyārthasambandhitvāvacchedakarūpavattayā padamātre'nvayitāvacchedakarūpavattayā ca upasthitiniyamaḥ, saṃsargabodhakavākyasthapadānāmeva tathātvam| na ca saṃsargāgocaratve pramāṇavākyatvānupapattiḥ, asandigdhāviparyastabodhakatayā nirvikalpakatve'pi prāmāṇyasyākāṅkṣādimattayā vākyatvasya copapattervṛttimantareṇāpi suptotthāpakavākyasyeva vedāntavākyasya nirviśeṣe prāmāṇyasya vārtikakṛdbhirupapāditatvācca| tathā hi- agṛhītvaiva sambandhamabhidhānābhidheyayoḥ| hitvā nidrāṃ prabudhyante suṣupte bodhitāḥ paraiḥ|| jāgradvanna hi sambandhaṃ suṣupte vetti kaścana|| ityādinā granthena vināpi sambandhaṃ vākyasya prāmāṇyamupapāditam| lakṣaṇāpakṣe'pi tātparyaviśeṣāgraheṇaivātiprasaṅgabhaṅgo vācyaḥ| śakyasambandhasyānekatra saṃbhavāt, tātparyaviśeṣagrahaśca puruṣaviśeṣasya bhavati, na sarvasya, puruṣagato viśeṣaḥ antaḥkaraṇaśuddhirūpaḥ pratibandhābhāvaḥ| antaḥkaraṇaśuddhirūpasya pāpasya ca pratibandhakatvaṃ `jñānamutpadyate puṃsāṃ kṣayāt pāpasya karmaṇa' ityādiśāstrasiddham| tathāca pratibandhakṣaye vināpi saṃbandhaṃ śūdbādātmasākṣātkāraḥ iti niravadyam| vistṛtamidamasmābhiḥgītā nibandhane| na ca- anirdhāritaikakoṭiprakārakaniścayaṃ pratyeva dharmijñānādhīnavicārasya janakatvāt kathaṃ vicārasaghrīcīnavedāntavākyajñānasya niṣprakārakatvamiti vācyam| saṃśayanivṛttikṣamajñānasyaiva vicāraphalatvāt| tasyāśca virodhikoṭipratikṣepakopalakṣitadharmijñānādapyupapatternatadarthaṃ sapramāṇakatvaniyamaḥ| na ca gauravam, pramāṇavato gauravasya nyāyyatvāt| na ca- nirviśeṣaviṣayakasya jñānasya niṣprakārakatve nirviśeṣatvāsiddhyā tatsiddhyā tatsiddhyarthaṃ viśeṣābhāvarūpaviśeṣaviṣayatvasyāvaśyakatvamiti vācyam, viśeṣābhāvasya svarūpatayā tatsphūrtau pramāṇānapekṣatvāt, akhaṇḍārthasiddhyanukūlapṛthagjāta padārthopasthiti viṣayatvamātreṇa viśiṣṭavyavahāropapatteḥ| tasmātsaguṇatve sādhakābhāvād bādhakasadbhāvācca nirguṇatve tadabhāvāt nirguṇameva brahmeti siddham| iti advaitasiddhau brahmaṇo nirguṇatve pramāṇopapattiḥ|| 5 || 6. brahmaṇo nirākāratvabhaṅgaḥ evaṃ nirākāramapi| nanu- `ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastād', `yadā paśyaḥ paśyate rukmavarṇam, `ṛtaṃ satyaṃ paraṃ brahma puruṣaṃ kṛṣṇapiṅgalam', `viśvataścakṣuḥ,' sahasraśīrṣā'- ityādiśrutibhiḥ `paśya me pārtha rūpāṇi', `sarvataḥ pāṇipādaṃ tad- ityādismṛtibhiḥ brahma, savigraham, sraṣṭṛtvāt, pālayitṛtvādupadeṣṭṛtvādityādyanumānaiśca vigrahasiddhiriti- cenna, ādityavarṇamityasyāvidyāvilakṣaṇasvaprakāśasvarūpa pratipādanaparatayā upāsyaparatayā copapatteḥ| na ca tamasaḥ paratvokyopāsanāparatvānupapattiḥ, upāsyavigrahopalakṣitasya tamasaḥ paratvokteḥ na tu rūpaviśiṣṭasya| na ca- `eṣo'ntarāditye hiraṇmayaḥ puruṣo dṛśyata' ityatra vartamānatvenāparokṣajñānaviṣayatvokteranāropyatvam, na hi yoṣito'gnitvaṃ dṛśyata ityucyata iti vācyam, pratīkopāsane upāsyasākṣātkāraniyamābhāve'pi saguṇopāsane upāsyasākṣātkārasya tasya syādaddheti śrutisiddhasya niyatatvena tasyaiva darśanaśabdenābhidhānād, viśvataścakṣurityādiśrutismṛtīnāṃ sarvātmakatayā sarvāntaryāmitayā ca niyamyajīvaśarīracakṣuḥ pāṇiśiraḥprabhṛtyanuvāditvopapatteḥ, sarvataḥ pāṇipādatvādestu asaṃbhavāt, tvayāpyevameva vaktavyatvāt| anyathā deśaviśeṣāvacchedena paramamuktipratipādanaṃ gamyatvapraveṣṭṛtvādyupapādanaṃ ca tvadīyamasaṅgataṃ syāt| anumāne'pyevameva siddhasādhanam| `vikaraṇatvānneti cettadukta'miti sūtre avidyāpariṇāmasya karaṇasthānīyasyāṅgīkārādavirodhāt| yattu- `tadevānuprāviśad brahmavidāpnoti para'mityādiśrutisiddhaṃ sarvagatasya brahmaṇaḥ praveṣṭṛtvaṃ gamyatvaṃ ca vigrahaṃ vinā na yujyate iti, tanna; svasṛṣṭakāryābhivyaktatvasyaivānupraveśaśabdārthatayā vyāpakasya mukhyapraveśāsaṃbhavāt, svataḥ prāptasyāpi avidyātirodhānanivṛttyapekṣayā prāpyatvopacāreṇa vigrahānākṣepakatvāt| yattu `tamevaṃ vidvānamṛta iha bhavati yadā paśya ityādiśrutau sarvanāmnā savigrahasyaiva parāmarśāt tajjñānasyaiva mocakatve savigrahatvamiti, tanna; saguṇavidyāyāḥ kramamuktyarthatvenānyathāsiddheḥ, sākṣānmuktijanakatvapakṣe tadupalakṣitātmajñānasyaiva mocakatvāt| ata eva - devā apyasya rupasya nityaṃ darśanakāṅkṣiṇaḥ' - ityādismṛtirapi vyākhyātā| kiṃ ca vigrahaḥ kiṃ bhautikaḥ ? abhautiko vā ? abhautiko'pi māyikaḥ ? amāyiko vā ? amāyiko'pi brahmabhainna ? abhinno vā ? bhautikamāyikāvapi karmārjitau ? parakarmarjitau vā ? ādye saṃsāritvāpattiḥ, dvitīye iṣṭāpattiḥ| brahmabhinnatve tavāpasiddhāntaḥ neti netītitrutivirodhaḥ, `apāṇipāda' ityādi śrutivirodhaśca| abhautikāmāyikabrahmābhinnadehāṅgīkāre uktaśrutivirodhaḥ, cārvākamatapraveśaśca, pramāṇābhāvaśca, pramāṇābhāvaśca| na ca `nābhyā āsīdantarikṣa'miti bhūtakāraṇatvoktyā abhautikatvāsiddhiḥ, agnirmūrddhe'tyādiśrutiparyālocanayāntarikṣādīnāṃ nābhitvādiparikalpanayā virāḍdehapratipādakatayā śarīrasya bhūtakāraṇatvāpratipādakatvāt, tamasaḥ parastādityādeśca virāḍdehopalakṣitabrahmaparatayā vigrahasya tamasaḥ paratvāpratipādakatvāt| na ca `eko nārāyaṇa āsīt na brahmā na ca śaṅkara' iti śrutyā mahāpralaye nārāyaṇasthityukyā nityavigrahasiddhiḥ nārāyaṇaśabdasya `sadeva somyemagra āsī'diti śrutyanusāreṇa māyopahitabrahmaparatvena vigrahaparatvābhāvāt| na caitāvatā cetanāntarasādhāraṇyam; akhaṇḍamāyopahitatvasyaiva vyāvartakatvāt| na ca `nityonityānāṃ cetanaścetanānā'miti vigrahanityatvābhāve viśeṣoktivirodhaḥ, vigrahānaṅgīkāre'pi svarūpacaitanyamādāyopapatteḥ| nāpi `purākalpāpāye svakṛtamudarīkṛtya vikṛta'mityādau mahāpralaye dehasya sākṣātsthityuktyā nityavigrahasiddhiḥ, sarvavikāramūlakāraṇāvidyāyāḥ saṃskārātmanāvasthānasya udarīkaraṇaśabdārthatvāt| na ca mukhyārthatyāgaḥ, tvayāpyasyārthasyaiva vaktavyatvād, anyathā sakalasya brahmāṇḍasya tadanupraveśamātreṇa pralayāsiddheḥ| yattu- sarve nityāḥ śāśvatāśca dehāstasya mahātmanaḥ| paramānandasandohā jñānamātrāśca sarvadā|| ityādau sākṣānnityatvoktivirodhaḥ iti, tanna, pralayaparyantasthāyiduḥkhabhogānāyatana jñānamātrapradhānadehaparatayā tvadvivakṣitaparatvābhāvāt| ata eva jaḍastato bhinnaśca| na ca "ānandarūpamamṛtaṃ yadvibhāti", "āpraṇakhāt sarva evānandaḥ", "modo dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ," "tadātmako bhagavān yadātmikā vyaktiḥ, kimātmako bhagavān ? jñānātmaka aiśvaryātmaka" ityādiśruterbhedābhāve'pi ahikuṇḍalanyāyena viśeṣabalādvigrahavattvopapattiriti- vācyam, ātmano jñānānandarūpatvapratipādanaparatvena vigrahāpratipādakatvāt| `vicitraśaktiḥ puruṣaḥ purāṇa' ityādivākyasya `ātmani caivaṃ vicitrāśca hī'ti sūtrasya ca māyāśaktivaicitryapratipādakatvenātmaśaktyapratipādakatvād, āpraṇakhādityādeśca līlāvigrahāvacchedena duḥkhādyabhoktṛtayopapatteḥ| modo dakṣiṇa ityāderānandamaya kośapratipādakatayā brahmaparatvābhāvāt| na hi śrutyuktatvamātreṇa brahmaṇo vigraharūpatā, `brahmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ puruṣa evedaṃ sarva'mityādi śrutyā prapañcarūpatāpi brahmaṇyāpadyeta| svarūpānanda eva nityatvavadaparādhīnatvavacca vigrahatvakalpanasya paribhāṣāmātratvāt| manmate'pi brahmātiriktasya brahmasattāsamānasattākatvābhimatasya brahmaṇi niṣedhāṅgīkārāt| na ca- naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneye'ti tarkāgamyatvoktyā ātmana eva vigrahavattvamiti vācyam, nirviśeṣātmana eva tarkāgamyatvoktyā ātmano vigrahavattvasya tarkāgamyatvānukterarūpatvena cākṣuṣatvāprasaktyā piśācādivadantardhānaśaktyānupalambhasamarthanasyāprasaktasamarthanatvād, vigrahapakṣe `apāṇipāda' ityādiśrutivirodhasyoktatvācca| na ca- `aduḥkhamasukha'mityādau prākṛtasukhaniṣedhavadatrāpi prākṛtāvayavaniṣedhaparatā, anyathā `śṛṇoti paśyatī'ti vākyaśeṣavirodhaḥ syāditi vācyam, ānandādirūpatāpratipādakaśrutivirodhena tatra saṅkocavadatra saṅkocakāraṇābhāvāt, śravaṇadarśanayoḥ śabdarūpasākṣitvamātreṇa upapatterna tadvirodhaḥ| anyathā tvanmate'pi brahmaṇi cakṣurādisādhyajñānānaṅgīkāreṇa tadvirodho duṣpariharaḥ syāt| ata eva- `arūpo'prākṛtaśce'ti smṛtyaivārūpaśrutigatyukteḥ nārūpamityanena rūpamātraniṣedha iti- nirastam, smṛterupāsyaparatvena jñeyabrahmapratipādikāyāḥ śruteḥ saṅkoce kāraṇābhāvāt, śrutismṛtyoratulyabalatvācca, pratyuta `yattadadreśya'mityādinā paravidyāviṣayasya vigrahavattvaprati pādanavirodhācca| kiñca bhagavadvigraho na nityaḥ, mahattve sati rūpavattvād, vigrahatvādvā, nityatābodhakatvābhimataśruteranyathāsiddheruktatvācca| na ca prākṛtatvamupādhiḥ, sādhanavyāpakatvāt| sāvayavatvādapi na nityatvam| na ca śrutibalāt kvacit sāvayavo'pi nityaḥ, śrutyanyathāsiddheruktatvāt| nanu- avayava upādānaṃ cet, brahmavigrahe nāstyeva; ekadeśamātraṃ ced, gaganātmādau vyabhicāraḥ, tayorapyekadeśasattvāt| na copādānātiriktasyaikadeśasyaivābhāvaḥ, upādānatantvanyahastavitastyādi parimāṇasyaikadeśasya pāṭādāvanubhavāditi- cenna, upādānatantūnāmeva hastavitastyādiparimāṇavatāmanubhavāt| gaganādau saṃyogitvādinā yadekadeśasādhanaṃ tadiṣṭameva, asmābhistatra sāvayavatvānityatvayoraṅgīkārāt| yattu ātmani sukhaduḥkhayordeśabhedena pratīterekadeśasādhanam, tanna, sukhaduḥkhayorantaḥ karaṇagatatayā tadgatatvābhāvāt| na ca- "gauranādyantavatītyādi" śrutyā anādinityā api prakṛteḥ sattvarajastamorūpaikadeśadarśanād vyabhicāra iti vācyam, prakṛtau nityatvābhāvādavidyātiriktaprakṛterabhāvācca| na cāvidyāyāmeva vyabhicāraḥ, tasyā apyanityatvena vyabhicārābhāvāt| na ca- jīvānāmapi `droṇaṃ bṛhaspaterbhāgaṃ drauṇiṃ rudrāṃśasaṃbhavam| durvāsāḥ śaṅkarasyāṃśa' ityādināṃśokteḥ, yasyāyutāyutāṃśe'pi viśvaśaktiravasthitā| parabrahmasvarūpasya praṇamāmi tamavyayam|| viṣṭabhyāhamidaṃ kṛtsnamekāṃśena sthito jagat| ityādinā īśvarasyāpyaṃśokterjīveśayorvyabhicāra iti- vācyam, ātmanoṃ'śasyaupādhikatayā svābhāvikatvābhāvāt, tvanmate jīvānāmaṇurūpatayā svābhāvikāṃśābhāvena kālpanikāṃśasyaiva vaktavyatvāt| etena bhagavallokāderapi nityatvamapāstam| na ca- `ato hi vaiṣṇavā lokā nityāste cetanātmakāḥ| matprasādātparāṃ śāntiṃ sthānaṃ prāpsyasi śāśvatam|| ityādyāgamavirodhaḥ, tasyāvāntarapralayasthatvaparatvāt| tasmānnirguṇaṃ nirākāraṃ brahmeti siddham|| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇo nirākāratvasiddhiḥ|| 6 || 7. paramate brahmaṇo jñānatvānandatvādvitīyatvanityatva-sākṣitvabhaṅgaḥ vaṃśīvibhūṣitakarānnavanīradābhāt pītāmbarādaruṇabimbaphalādharoṣṭhāt| pūrṇendusundaramukhādaravindanetrāt kṛṣṇātparaṃ kimapi tattvamahaṃ na jāne|| (1) nanu- nirviśeṣaṃ ced brahma, tarhi brahmaivekaṃ jñānātmakamānandātmakamadvitīyaṃ nityaṃ sākṣi ceti nopapadyate| tathā hi- tatra tāvat jñānatvaṃ kiṃ jātiviśeṣo vā ? sākṣādvyavahārajanakatvaṃ vā ? jaḍavirodhitvaṃ vā ? jaḍānyatvaṃ vā ? ajñānavirodhitvaṃ vā ? arthaprakāśātmakatvaṃ vā ? parāṅgīkṛtaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, vṛttipratibimbatajñānābhāseṣu tatsambhave'pyakhaṇḍarūpabrahmajñāne tadayogāt| na dvitīyaḥ, phalopadhānasya suṣuptyādāvabhāvāt, śaktyādirūpasvarūpayogyatāyā api muktāvabhāvāt| na tṛtīyaḥ, svarūpajñānasya nityatvena tadviruddhasya jaḍasya nityanivṛttyāpātāt| na caturthaḥ, `satyaṃ jñāna'mityādau anṛtavyāvṛtterārthikatvoktivirodhāt| na ca pañcamaḥ, ajñānasya nityanivṛttyāpātāt| na ṣaṣṭhaḥ mokṣe anyārthollekhābhāvāt, svarūpollekhe ca svaviṣayatvāpātāt| na saptamaḥ, parāṅgīkṛtajātervyavahārahetutvādervā tvanmate asaṃbhavāditi cenna, arthaprakāśatvameva jñānatvam| muktāvarthābhāve'pi tatsaṃsṛṣṭaprakāśatvasya kadācidartha saṃbandhenāpyanapāyāt, ata eva- `arthaprakāśarūpatvaṃ jñānatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ katham| anyārthābhāvato mokṣe svena svasyāpyavedanāt||' iti nirastam| (2) yattu- ānandatvaṃ jātiviśeṣo vā ? anukūlatayā vedanīyatvaṃ vā ? anukūlavedanatvaṃ vā ? anukūlatvamātraṃ vā ? jñānātmakatvameva vā ? duḥkhavirodhitvaṃ vā ? duḥkhābhāvopalakṣitasvarūpatvaṃ vā ? parāṅgīkṛtaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, akhaṇḍasvarūpānande tadabhāvāt| na dvitīyaḥ, mokṣe vediturabhāvād, ātmano'vedyatvācca| kiṃ ca ānukūlyaṃ kiñcitsāpekṣam, na cānyaṃ prati tadyuktamiti svaṃ pratyeva vaktavyatvena saviśeṣatvāpātāt| ata eva na tṛtīyaḥ| kiṃ ca vedanasvabhāvādadhikasyānukūlasya svābhāvikatve sakhaṇḍatvāpātaḥ, aupādhikatve kadācidānandanivṛttyāpātaḥ, na caturthaḥ, uktarītyā ānukūlyāsambhavāt| ata eva- nirupādhīṣṭatvamānandatvamiti- nirastam| na pañcamaḥ, duḥkhādijñānasyāpi ānandatvāpātāt| viṣayānullekhijñānaṃ tatheti cenna, jñānasya saviṣayatvaniyamād, `vijñānamānandaṃ brahmetyādau vijñānapadenaiva duḥkhavyāvṛttisiddhāvānandapadavaiyarthyāpātācca| na ṣaṣṭhaḥ, virodhasya nivartakatvādirūpatve duḥkhasya nityanivṛttyāpatteḥ tādātmyāyogyatvarūpatve ghaṭādāvapyānandatvāpātād, `vijñānamānandaṃ brahme'tyādau duḥkhavyāvṛtterārthikatvoktyayogācca| na saptamaḥ, vaiśeṣikamokṣavat tvaduktasya duḥkhasyābhāve satyapi ānandābhāvenāpumarthatvasya tvanmokṣe'pyāpātāt| nāṣṭamaḥ, parāṅgīkṛtasya nirupādhyanukūlavedanīyatvādestvanmate asaṃbhavāt| yadi cānandatvāderdurnirūpatve'pi tadadhikaraṇaṃ brahmābādhyamānandādyātmakaṃ ca, tarhi satyatvāderdurnirūpatve'pi tadadhikaraṇaṃ jagadabādhyaṃ sadātmakaṃ ca syāditi cenna, ānandatvasya nirupādhikeṣṭatvarūpatvāt| na ca duḥkhābhāve ativyāptiḥ, duḥkhābhāvasyāpi sukhaśeṣatvād, abhāvasya virodhibhāvāntaratvābhyupagamāt| na ca muktāvicchāpāye ānandāpāyāpattiḥ iṣṭatvopalakṣitasya svarūpasyānapāyād, upalakṣye ca tadavacchedakasattvasyātantratvāt| na ca- nirupādhikeṣṭatvaṃ svābhāvikamaupādhikaṃ vā, nāntyaḥ, brahmaṇaḥ ānandarūpatvāpatteḥ, ādye jñānātireki, tadanatireki vā, ādye sakhaṇḍatvāpattiḥ, dvitīye ānandapadavaiyarthyamiti vācyam, jñānānandayorabhede'pi kalpitajātibhedanibandhanapravṛttikatayā padadvayaprayogasya vyāvṛttibhedena sāphalyāt| etena viṣayānullekhijñānamevānanda ityapi yuktam, jñāne viṣayollekhaniyamasya prāgeva nirāsāt| evaṃ cānandatvasya sunirūpatayā na tannyāyena jagataśca sadātmakatvāpādanamiti| kiṃ ca jagati sadādyātmakatve bādhakaṃ dṛśyatvādikam, na tvānande, tasya dṛganatirekāt| etena- `nirupādhyanukūlatvavedanīyaṃ sukhaṃ matam| nirviśeṣamavedyaṃ ca kathaṃ brahma sukhātmakam||' iti- nirastam, paramapremāspadatvena vedyatvāt, sukhavedanabhedābhāvāt, vedanābhāvenāsukhatvāpādanānupapatteḥ| (3) nanu- advitīyatvaṃ dvitīyābhāvaviśiṣṭatvam ? tadupalakṣitatvaṃ vā ? ubhayathāpi viśeṣaṇamupalakṣaṇaṃ vā dvitīyābhāvaḥ prāmāṇikaścet, tadā tena sadvitīyatvāpattiḥ aprāmāṇikaścet, tadā dvitīyena sadvitīyatvāpattiḥ| na cābhāve dvitīye'pi na bhāvādvaitahāniḥ, abhāvavad dṛśyasya dharmāderapyevaṃ prāmāṇikatve bādhakābhāvāditi cenna, prābhākararītyā dvitīyābhāvasyādhikaraṇānatiriktatvena prāmāṇikatve'pi tena sadvitīyatvābhāvāt| na ca- evamanupalabdheḥ pārthakyena pramāṇatvoktirayuktā, prameyānatirekāditi- vācyam, atiriktābhāvavādimata eva tadukteḥ, atiriktābhāvānabhyupame'pi abhāvatvaprakārakajñāne tatprāmāṇyopapatteśca| na cāmṛtavyāvṛtterapi brahmamātratayā bhedasatyatvāpattiḥ, iṣṭāpatteḥ anṛtanirūpitatvaṃ paramanṛtamithyātvānmithyā| bhedo brahmābhinnatayā satya eveti| na ca prābhākaramate pratiyogimadadhikaraṇavyāvṛttyarthaṃ kaivalyādiviśeṣo'vaśyamadhikaraṇe vaktavyaḥ, tathā ca sa evābhāvaḥ, anyathā teṣāmapyanupapattireveti vācyam, yasmin kadāpi na pratiyogisambandhaḥ, tasmin svarūparūpo'bheda eva kaivalyam| yasmiṃśca kadācit so'pi, tadā tasmin pratiyogimadadhikaraṇakālabhinna kālāvacchinnamadhikaraṇamiti na kaivalyasyādhikaraṇātirekaḥ, na vānupapattiriti| na ca evaṃ guṇaguṇyabhedavādimate śauklyāderiva śaktyāderapi bhāvarūpadharmasya brahmābhedo'stviti vācyam, śaktyādinā sahābhedagrāhakamānābhāvāt| astu vā dvitīyābhāvapalakṣitasvarūpatvam advitīyatvam, tasya ca prāmāṇikatve'pi tatpratiyogino dvitīyasya svapnopabhuktanigaraṇādāviva prāmāṇikatvānāpatteḥ| etena- dvitīyābhāvasya prāgabhāvāditve dvitīyasyānityatvamātraṃ syāt, na tu mithyātvam, atyantābhāvatve tūpalakṣaṇatvānupapattiḥ, sadātanatvāt, śrutitātparyaviṣayatvādikāryānanvayitvena upalakṣaṇatve atyantābhāvāsiddhiḥ| evaṃ ca- `dvaitābhāvastāttvikaścet tena syāt sadvitīyatā| atāttvikaśced dvaitena sadvitīyatvamāpatet|' iti parāstam, svarūpātirekitayā tatpramāyā anuddeśyatvāt, tadvodhasyāvāntaratātparyeṇa yathākathañcitsaṃbhavāt, tāttvikatve brahmānatirekāt, atāttvikatve svapnanigaraṇanyāyasyoktatvāt| upapāditaṃ caitadvistareṇa prāgiti śivam| (4) nanu- brahmaṇa eva yannityatvamabhimatam, tat kiṃ sarvakālasambandhatvaṃ vā ? kālāvacchedarāhityaṃ vā ? dhvaṃsāpratiyogitvaṃ vā ? ubhayāvadhirāhityaṃ vā ? nādyau, avidyāyāṃ kāle cātivyāpteḥ, avidyāyāḥ sarvakālopādānatvena tatsaṃbandhaniyamādidānīmeva nānyadetyevaṃ rūpatadavacchedarahitatvācca| na tṛtīyaḥ, dhvaṃse'tivyāpteḥ| na ca dhvaṃso'pi dhvaṃsapratiyogī, pratiyogyanunmajjanaṃ tu prāgabhāvanivṛttirūpasya ghaṭasya nivṛttāvapi prāgabhāvānunmajjanavadyuktamiti vācyam, evaṃ sati mokṣe'pyātmānyasya kasyacid dhvaṃsasya vaktavyatayā lāghavārthamādyadhvaṃsanityatāyā eva yuktatvāt| na ca- dhvaṃsasya nityatve'pi bhāveṣu brahmaiva nityamiti- vācyam, niṣpratiyogikatvena bhāvasya dhvaṃsatvāderapi nityatvāvaśyaṃ bhāvāt| na caturthaḥ, evaṃ paribhāṣāyāmapi brahmaṇa eva nityatvamityetatphalasya muktāvanyābhāvasyāsiddhiriti cenna, caturthapakṣasya kṣodasahatvāt| na ca- antyāvadhirahitasya brahmānyasya muktāvasattvaṃ na siddhamiti- vācyam, viśeṣaṇāntarasyaiva siddheḥ| ata eva- kāle kālāparicchenne dhvaṃse cādhvaṃsayogini| nitye sati kathaṃ nityaṃ brahmaiveti mataṃ tava|| iti- nirastam, kālasyāpyāvidyakatvenāntyāvadhimattvād, dhvaṃsasyādhvaṃsapratiyogitve'pi ādyāvadhimattvācca| na ca tāvatā sadvitīyatvam, tāttvikasya dvitīyasyaivamapyabhāvāt| na caivamatāttvikatve dhvaṃsanivṛttiḥ, iṣṭatvāt| na ca pratiyogyunmajjanam, tādṛgdhvaṃsopalakṣitasvarūpasyaiva virodhitvāt prāgabhāvasya pratiyogidhvaṃsādāviva| (5) nanu- kathaṃ dṛggrūpasya brahmaṇaḥ sākṣād dṛṣṭṛtvarūpaṃ sākṣitvam ? `sākṣād draṣṭarisaṃjñāyā'mityānuśāsanāditi cet, avidyātatkāryānyatarapratiphalitacaitanyasyaiva sākṣitvāt| tathā ca dṛgrūpasyāpi upādhinā draṣṭṛtvam| nacopādherapi sākṣyadhīnasiddhikaprātītikāvidyākāryatvena cakrakādyāpattiḥ, utpattijñaptipratibandhasyābhāvādavidyātadupādhika draṣṭṛtvayorubhayorapyanāditvāt| nanu- sākṣī jīvakoṭirvā, brahmakoṭirvā, ubhayānugataṃ cinmātraṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, jīvo buddhyupādhiko'ṇuriti pakṣe idamaṃśāvacchitra cidvedyasya śuktirūpyasya sākṣivedyatvāyogāccakrakādyāpātāt| ajñānopādhikaḥ sarvagata iti pakṣe'pyajñānasyāpi sākṣyadhīnasiddhikatvenānyonyāśrayāt| na dvitīyaḥ, brahmaṇa eva sākṣivedyaduḥkhādidhīḥ, na jīvasyeti vaiparītyāpātād, anyathā anavacchinnānandadhīrapi jīvasyeti syāt| brahmacaitanyaṃ ghaṭādiprakāśakamiti mate ajñānābhibhavadvārā tasya jīvacaitanyābhedābhivyañjakāntaḥkaraṇavṛtti vattādṛśavṛttyabhāvācca| na tṛtīyaḥ, īśvareṇeva cinmātreṇāpi saṃsāriduḥkhasya tadgatatvenā grahaṇe'pi yadbhāgo muktastasya cinmātrasya duḥkhādyullekharūpopaplavāpāyāt| suptamaitraṃ prati maitrīyājñānādermaitrīyatayeva jāgraccaitrīyaduḥkhāderapi caitrīyatayā suptamaitraṃ prati pratītiprasaṅgeṇa maitreṇaitāvantaṃ kālaṃ duḥkhaṃ nāvediṣamiti parāmarśāyogāditi cenna, śuddhabrahmātiriktasya buddhyupādhikajīvātiriktasya sākṣiṇo'ṅgīkṛtatvena tatpakṣoktadoṣābhāvāt| tathā cāvidyāvṛttipratiphalitaṃ caitanyaṃ sākṣi, suṣuptāvapyavidyāvṛttisvīkārasya prāgukteḥ| na cānyonyāśrayaḥ, prāgeva nirāsāt, śuddhasya sākṣitvābhāvena muktopaplavāpātābhāvāt| yastu suptamaitre caitraḥ duḥkhagrahaṇāpattyā etāvantaṃ kālaṃ duḥkhaṃ nāvediṣamiti parāmarśāvarodha uktaḥ tanna, sākṣiṇaḥ sarvajīvasādhāraṇye'pi tattajjīvacaitanyābhedenābhivyaktasya tattadduḥkhādibhāsakatayā atiprasaṅgābhāvāt| yacca sukhādeḥ svānantarabhāvyavidyāvṛttiprati phalitacidvedyatve jñātaikasattvāyoga iti, tanna, mānasatvavādimate'pyasya samānatvāt| na hi tanmate jñātaikasthitikatvātiriktaṃ jñātaikasattvamasti, duḥkhādisamasamayotpannavṛttyāpi jñātaikasattvopapatteśca| tasmāt jñānānandaikarūpamadvitīyaṃ nityaṃ sākṣi ca brahmeti siddham| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇo jñānatvānandatvādvitīyatvanityatvasākṣitvopapattiḥ|| 7 || 8. brahmaṇaḥ upādānatvabhaṅgaḥ nanu- nirviśeṣaṃ ced brahma, kathaṃ tadeva nimittamupādānamiti abhinnanimittopādānakatvaṃ jagataḥ ? vikāravatkāraṇasyaivopādānatvād, brahmaṇo'vikāratvād, anyathā `nirvikāro'kṣaraḥ śuddha' ityādi śrutivirodhāpatteriti cenna| pariṇāmitayopādānatvābhāve'pi vivartādhiṣṭhānatayopādānatvasaṃbhavāt| vivartādhiṣṭhānatvaṃ ca vivartakāraṇājñānaviṣayatvameva| taduktaṃ vārtikakṛdbhiḥ- asya dvaitendrajālasya yadupādānakāraṇam| ajñānaṃ tadupāśritya brahma kāraṇamucyate|| iti | na copādānalakṣaṇābhāvaḥ, ātmani kāryajanihetutvasyaiva upādānalakṣaṇatvāt, tasya ca pariṇāmyapariṇāmyubhayasādhāraṇatvāt| nanu- brahmaivopādānam ? utājñānamapi ? ādye satyopādānatve satyatvāpattyā ajñānopādānakatvakalpanavirodhaḥ, dvitīye sūtradvayasya rajjuṃ pratīva brahmājñānayoḥ samaprādhānyena vā upādānatvam, nirvikāraśrutistu kevalabrahmapareti vivakṣitam ? uta māyāśaktimad brahma upādānam, nirvikāra śrutistu tadanuparaktabrahmaviṣayeti vivakṣitam ? uta māyādvārā brahma kāraṇam, aṃśuriva tantudvārā paṭaṃ prati| nirvikāraśrutistu advārakavikāraniṣedhiketi vivakṣitam ? nādyaḥ, ubhayoḥ samatayaiva vikāritvena brahmaṇo viśiṣya nirvikāratvoktyayogāt, sitāsitasūtrārabdhapaṭe sitāsitatvavajjagati pāramārthikatvānirvacanīyatvayorāpātād, brahmasvabhāvasya pāramārthikatvasya upādeyadhīmātrasthatve avidyāsvabhāvasyānirvācyasyāpi dhīmātrasthatvāpātāt, tanmātropādānakatvasya tattatsattvaprayojakatve anirvācyatvasyāpyabhāvaprasaṅgāt, tanmātropādānakatvābhāvāt| dvitīye brahmaṇo māyākhyahetūparāgamapekṣya vikāritve mṛdādivat pariṇāmitvāpattiḥ, viśiṣṭasya brahmatve nirvikāra śrutivirodhaḥ| abrahmatve brahmaṇaḥ kāryatvā siddhiḥ| viśiṣṭasya mṛdādivaddharmisamasattākarūpāntarā pattirūpapariṇāmādvivartamatahāniśca| na ca- viśiṣṭāpekṣayā pariṇāmatvaṃ śuddhāpekṣayā vivartatvamiti- vācyam, śuddhe'pi vivartārthamāropitavikārasyāvaśyakatvena nirvikāraśruteḥ tatparatvābhāvaprasaṅgāt| tasyā viśeṣye tāttvikavikārābhāvaparatve viśiṣṭe vikāroktyayogaḥ, tattvato nirvikāre āropitavikārāvirodhāt| na tṛtīyaḥ, aṃśostantuṃ pratīva brahmaṇo māyāṃ pratyupādānatvābhāvāditi cenna, ubhayāpariṇāmitvena tayoḥ kāraṇatvāṅgīkārāt| na ca tatpakṣoktadoṣāvakāśaḥ, ubhayoḥ pariṇāmitayā kāraṇatvānaṅgīkārāt, kiṃtvajñānasyaiva| ata evāsādhāraṇyena nirvikāratvamapi| na hyavidyāsāhitye'pi brahma pariṇamate, kintu vivartata iti| na cāvidyāpariṇāmatve'pi satyatvāpattiḥ, pariṇāmyupādānasamasattākatvarūpasya satyatvasya pariṇāmatvanirvāhakatvād, brahmasamasattākatvābhāvena tadapekṣayā pariṇāmatvābhāvāt, svasamānasattākavikārāhetutayā nirvikāratvopapatteśca| na ca satyopādānatve satyatvāpattiḥ, pariṇāmyupādānadharmāṇāmeva mṛttvasuvarṇatvādīnāṃ kārye'nvayadarśanāt satyopādānatve'pyasatyatvopapatteḥ| na ca- satyāsatyadhūmānugatadhūmatvasyeva satyāsatyānugatopādānatvasyaikasyābhāva iti- vācyam, svaniṣṭhakāryajanihetutvasyoktatvāt| na hi satyāsatyatvavaidharmyaṃsādharmyavirodhi, anyathā kiñcidvaidharmyasyaiva sādharmyavirodhitve sādharmyakathocchedāpatteḥ, anābhāsaviṣayasaṃskārajanyajñānaviṣayatvāderābhāsā nābhāsasādhāraṇasya dṛṣṭānte'pi sattvācca| nanu- avidyopādānatvakalpanā na yuktā, brahmaṇa eva rūpyākāśādyupādānatvasaṃbhavād, avidyānvayavyatirekasya nimittatāmātreṇānyathāsiddheriti- cenna, ghaṭakuṇḍalādeḥ pariṇāmyapekṣādarśanena gaganādāvapyavidyāyāḥ pariṇāmyupādānatvasyāvaśyakatvāt| na ca- asatyasya rūpyādeḥ satyarūpāpattimatpariṇāmyapekṣā nāstīti na sarvatropādeye tadapekṣāniyama iti vācyam, svaviṣayakājñānānapekṣasya tadbhāva ityeva satyarūpāpapattipadena vivakṣitatvāt| na hi brahmājñānasya rūpyādibhāvāpattau svaviṣayakājñānaṃ vyavadhāyakamasti| kiñca vikāritvenāpyavidyāyā upādānatvakalpanam| na ca- brahmaṇa evātāttvikavikārasaṃbhavāt, na tatkalpanamiti vācyam, tadviṣayakājñānapariṇāmatvavyatirekeṇa vikāre atāttvikatvānirvāhāt| kiṃ ca kāryāpekṣitasvasamānasattākopādānatvenāpya vidyopādānatvam| samānasattākatvaṃ ca rūpyasthale sattvadvaividhyena vā brahmajñānetarabādhyatvarūpaprātibhāsikatvamādāya vopapadyate| tasmādrūpyatattādātmyayoravidyāvikāratve'pi idamo rūpyarūpāpattirūpo vikāraḥ katham? idaṃ rūpyarūpamāpannamityapratīteḥ, āropitasyāropaṃ vinā ayogāditi nirastam| rūpyākārapariṇatājñānādhiṣṭhānacaitanyāvacchedakamātratayedamorūpyāpatteranaṅgīkārāt| yattu kimidamupādānatvam ? rūpāntarāpattipratītiṃ prati viṣayatvaṃ vā ? rūpāntarābhedadhīviṣayatvaṃ vā ? kāryābhedadhīviṣayatvaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, asiddheḥ, `śuktī rūpyabhāvamāpannā brahmākāśabhāvamāpanna'mityapratīteḥ| na dvitīyaḥ, tattvaṃ padārthayoḥ kṣīranīrayormuṇḍagotvayoścopādānaupādeyatāpatteḥ| na tṛtīyaḥ, sadṛśe sannihite nimitte'pi kāryābhedabhramasaṃbhavenātivyāpteriti, tadanuktopālambhanatayā apāstam| yadapi bhramādhiṣṭhānatvena brahmaṇo nopādānatvam, atītāsatoranupādānayorapi bhramādhiṣṭhānatvadarśanād, bhramādhiṣṭhāne'pi śuktyādāvupādānatvāvyavahārācceti, tanna, caitanyasyaivādhiṣṭhānatvenātītāderanadhiṣṭhānatvāt| kiṃ ca na hi vyavahārābhāvamātreṇa vastuvyatirekaḥ vṛkṣādiṣu pṛthivīti vyavahārābhāve'pi pṛthivītvasattvāt| yattu māyopādānamīśvaro nimittaṃ śuddhaṃ brahmādhiṣṭhānamiti pakṣe abhinnanimittopādānatvābhāvena tvanmate tadarthasya prakṛtyadhikaraṇāderanupapattiriti, tanna, ekasyaivāvidyopahitatvenopādānatvasyāvidyāpariṇāmecchākṛtyādyāśrayatvena nimittattvasyāpi saṃbhavāt| iti advaitasiddhau brahmaṇo jagadupādānatvopapattiḥ|| 8 || 9. brahmaṇo nimittatvabhaṅgaḥ nanu- evaṃ kulālādivadupādānagocaraprayatnādimattvaṃ kartṛtvamuktaṃ syāt, tacca kāryasya kalpitatve na ghaṭate, kulālāderakalpitaṃ pratyeva kartṛtvṛdarśanāt, kalpitaṃ ca rūpyādikaṃ prati bhrāntasyānyasya vā kartṛtvādarśanācceti cenna, kulālakāryaghaṭādāvapyakalpitatvasyā sampratipatteḥ, rūpyāderapyakartṛtvāsiddheśca, tatrāpi sākṣiṇa eva kartṛtvāt, na hyadarśanamātreṇa kartrapalāpaḥ, tvanmate'pi sarvajñakarturasiddhyāpatteḥ| etenādhiṣṭānatvaṃ na kartṛtvam, evaṃ satyatiriktopādānatvābhāvena kartṛtvopādānatvayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyoktyayogāt, nāpi bhrāntavadadhyāsadraṣṭatvam, bhrāntasya prekṣāpūrvakamāropitakartṛtvasyābhāvāt| nāpi bhrāntavadadhyāsadraṣṭṛtvam, bhrāntasya prekṣāpūrvakamāropitakartṛtvasyābhāvāt| nāpi māyāvivadvyāmohakatvameva kartṛtvam, vyāmohanīyajīvādarśane vyāmohakatvābhāvāt, taddarśane bhrāntyāpatteḥ, vyāmohakatvasyāpyāropitatvenānyonyāśrayācca, `nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇī'ti śrutyanupapatteśca| na hi māyāvī jagadādikaṃ karavāṇīti saṅkalpya karoti, kintu darśayānīti saṅkalpya darśayati| pakṣatraye'pi janmādi sūtre'rthalabdhasārvajñyādisphuraṇārthaṃ `śāstrayonitvā'diti sūtramiti yat paramataṃ, tadbhaṅgaḥ syād, bhramādhiṣṭhānatvādinā sārvajñyālābhāt| nāpyupādānagocaraprayatnādimattvam, kalpitaṃ prati tadayogāt| tasmāt- adhiṣṭhāne tathā bhrānte bhrāmake ca na kartṛtā| laukikī kṛtimattā tu na dṛṣṭā kalpitaṃ prati|| iti nirastam, abhimatacaturthapakṣasya samarthitatvāt| yattūktaṃ tṛtīyapakṣe vyāmugdhajīvadraṣṭṛtve bhrāntatvāpattiriti, tad bhūṣaṇameva, bhrāntijñasyābhrāntatvāt| yadapi māyāvinaḥ saṅkalpapūrvakakartṛtvādarśanena vyākaravāṇīti śrutyanupapattiriti, tanna, tādṛśasaṅkalpādarśanasya māyāvinyasaṃpratipatteḥ| yadapyuktaṃ janmādisūtrārthasiddhasārvajñyasphorakaṃ `śāstrayonitvā'diti sūtramiti paramatabhaṅgaḥ syāditi, tanna, māyāvitve'pi srakṣyamāṇamāyikaviśvākāramāyā sattvāṃśapariṇāmādhāratayā sārvajñyalābhāt| tasmād brahmaṇo nimittatvamupādānatvaṃ ca| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇo viśvakartṛtopapattiḥ|| 9 || 10. brahmaṇaḥ upādānatve pramāṇabhaṅgaḥ `yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyanta' iti `janikartuḥ prakṛti'riti sūtraprakṛtyarthavihitapañcamīśrutyā `yat prayantyabhisaṃviśantī'ti sthitilayādhāratvaliṅgāccopādānatvasiddhiḥ, `tadaikṣata vyākaravāṇī'ti īkṣaṇādyādhāratayā kartṛtvasiddhiśca| atha- vṛttau `putrāt pramodo jāyata' ityādāvanupādāne'pi pañcamīdarśanāt prakṛtipadaṃ hetumātraparamityuktam, nyāse'pi idamevāśritya `asati prakṛtigrahaṇe upādānasyaivāpādānasaṃjñā syāt, pratyāsatteḥ, netarasya| prakṛtigrahaṇāt kāraṇamātrasya bhavatīti prakṛtipadamanupādāne'pi apādānasaṃjñāsiddhyartha'mityuktam, mahābhāṣye'pi `ayamapi yogaḥ śakyo'vaktum golomājalomāvilomabhyo dūrvā jāyante apakrāmanti tāstebhya' ityādinā lomādīnāṃ dūrvādīn pratyavadhitvād `dhruvamapāye'pādāna'mityanenaivāpādānasaṃjñāsiddheḥ idaṃ sūtramanārambhaṇīyamiti sūtraṃ pratyākhyātam| kaiyaṭe'pi apakramaṇāvadhitve lomādiṣu kāryasya pratītirna saṃbhavatīti āśaṅkya bilānniṣkrāmato dīrghabhogasya bhoginaḥ avacchinnatayā tatropalabdhivat kāryasyāpi dūrvādestatropalabdhirityavadhitvameva tatropapāditam| tataśca matadvaye'pi `janikartuḥ prakṛti'rityanena upādāna eva pañcamīti niyamo na sidhyatīti cet, maivam, paśunā yajete'tyādau paśuśabdasya paśumātravācakatve'pi `chāgasya vapāyā' iti vākyaśeṣānusāreṇa paśuviśeṣaparatvavadatrāpi kāraṇamātrārthatve'pi upādānaparatvopapatteḥ| avadhipañcamīpakṣe `śṛṅgācchara' ityādau śṛṅgādipadasya niyāmakābhāvāt nimittaparatve'pi prakṛte niyāmakasattvena nimittaparatvābhāvāt| ata eva `ātmana ākāśaḥ saṃbhūta' ityādāvapi prakṛtipañcamī| `sacca tyaccābhava'diti vākyaśeṣeṇa `so'kāmayatetyetacchākhāntarasthitavākyena ca pratītisāmānādhikaraṇyasya niyāmakatvāt| na ca- `sa tapo'tapyata, sa tapastaptvā idaṃ sarvamasṛjata, tatsṛṣṭvā, tadevānuprāviśat, tadanupraviśya sacca tyaccābhava'dityādiśrutyā sadādibhavanasya jagatsṛṣṭitadanupraveśānantarabhāvitvena jagatsṛṣṭitvānupapattau parameśvarasya sattvādiguṇābhivyaktiparatvena brahmopādānatve nāsya prāmāṇyam, anyathā kathamabhavadityuktaṃ syāt ? na hi śuktiḥ rūpyamabhavadityucyata iti vācyam, sadādibhavanasyaiva jagatsṛṣṭirūpatayā tadānantaryābhāvāt, tadanupraviśyetyasya mukhaṃ vyādāyetivadupapatteḥ| na cedaṃ sarvamasṛjatetyanena paunaruktyam, nimittatvamātrabhrāntivyudāsaparatvāt| yacca śuktiḥ rūpyamabhavadityanubhavādarśanamuktam, tacchukteranupādānatvaprayuktamiti tadadarśanasyānudāharaṇatvāt| na ca mūrtāmūrtaprapañcasya sattyatpadābhyāmevoktatvena niruktādipadavaiyarthyamiti śaṅkyam, saṅgrahavivaraṇarūpatayopapatteḥ| nanu- `so'kāmata bahusyā'miti vākyaṃ na sṛjyasāhacaryamāha yena tatsamānādhikaraṇyamīśvarasya pratīyate kintu parameśvarasya `ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate yadekamavyakta'mityādiśrutisiddhatattadanantapadārthaprerakānantarūpairbahubhāvasaṅkalpamāha| naca svasyānantarūpairbahubhāvaṃ saṅkalpya `idaṃ sarvamasṛjate'ti jagatsarjanānupapattiḥ, niyāmakarūpabahubhāvasya niyamyasāpekṣatvāt, niyamyaṃ sarvaṃ sṛṣṭvā niyāmakarūpaiḥ praveśoktyupapatteḥ| anyathā syāmiti sattvoktirna syāt, sṛṣṭeḥ prāgantaḥkaraṇābhāvena tadviśiṣṭāhamarthābhāvena uttamapuruṣānupapattiśca syāditi cenna, syāmityanena sukhī syāmityādivad bhāvisattvoktau tadanupapattyasaṃbhavāt| anyathā saṅkalpaviṣayatvānupapatteḥ, siddhe icchāvirahāt| idameva ca bahupadasya sṛjyaparatve vinigamakam, niyāmakarūpāṇāṃ ca tavāpi mate īśvarābhinnatayā siddhatvāt| tathā cecchāyā niyamya eva tvanmate'pi paryavasānāt| tathācecchāyāstejaḥprabhṛtiviṣayatvena bahu syāmiti saṅkalpya tejaḥprabhṛtisarjanaṃ guruḥ syāmiti saṅkalpya śiṣyasampādanādivaditi nirastam| yaccoktamuttamapuruṣānupapattiriti, tanna, tādṛśāvidyāpariṇāmaviśiṣṭe ahamiti prayogasaṃbhavena uttamapuruṣopapatteḥ| evameva `tadaikṣata bahusyā'mityādyatramānaṃ bodhyam| nanu ca- yattejaḥprabhṛti sṛjyaṃ, tadātmanā hi tvayā bahubhāvo vācyaḥ| teṣāṃ tu tejaādīnāmīkṣitṛtvasraṣṭṛtvadevatātmatvaśravaṇāttāni cetanāni| na ca cetanaṃ pratyupādānaṃ nāmeti cet, satyam, sṛjyānāmīkṣitṛtvādyasaṃbhavena īkṣaṇādikartṛpratipādakatejaādipadaisteja ādyavacchinna ātmā bodhyate| pūrvapūrvakāryavacchinnasya tasyaivottarottarakāryanimittatvāt| tathā cāvacchedake teja ādau na caitanyanibandhanadoṣāvakāśaḥ| `asadvā idamagra āsīt| tato vai sadajāyata| tadātmānaṃ svayamakurute'tyādyapyuktārthe pramāṇam| na cātmanaḥ karaṇe akuruteti sattvoktyanupapattiḥ, ākāśādyātmanā kriyamāṇatve'pi svarūpeṇa sattvopapatteḥ| etadarthamevātmānamākāśādyātmanā akurutetyaśrūyamāṇo'pyarthaḥ kalpyate| evaṃ tadātmānaṃ sṛjāmyaha'mityādismṛtiṣu dharmasthāpakaśarīrādyātmaneti vyākhyeyam| na ca- `tato vai sadajāyate'ti tacchabdopāttabrahmaṇaḥ prapañcotpatteḥ prāk siddhatvāttadātmānamiti vyarthamiti vācyam, nimittatve pūrvavākyena labdhe'pi upādānatvabodhanenāsyāpi saphalatvāt| nanu- yaduktaṃ brahmaṇyeva sṛṣṭilayaśravaṇād brahmopādānamiti, tanna, ūrṇanābhau tantunimitte tantulayasya darśanāt, tatra hi yathā putraṃ prati pitṛdehadhātorupādānatve'pi na pitā tadupādānam, kintu nimittamātraṃ, tathā ūrṇanābhidhātostadupādānatve'pi tasya nimittatvameva, brahmaṇo'pi ūrṇanābhivadeva saṃhartṛtvasya yathorṇanābhirityādinā śravaṇācceti cenna| yadyapyūrṇanābherna tantūpādānatvam, tasminnaṣṭe'pi tantūpalambhāt, kintu bhuktāhārasyaiva, tathāpi tatra na tantorlayaḥ, kintu bahiṣṭhasyāntaḥpraveśamātram| ata eva `yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ce'tyuktam| na ca- brahmaṇastannyāyena saṃhartṛtvoktyā tadvadeva tadastviti vācyam| `tajjalānityādinā tatra layaśravaṇāt, tirobhāvamātre ca tasya nidarśanatvāt, sarvasāmyasya dṛṣṭāntatvāprayojakatvāt| `tadbhūtayoni'miti yoni śrutyā copādānatvam| na ca `yoniṣṭa indra sadane'tyādau nimitte'pi yoniśabdaprayogāt na tenopādānatāsiddhiḥ, `mukhyastu śabdasvarasā'diti nyāyena kadācidanyatra kathañcinnimitte prayoge'pi autsargikamukhyārthatyāgasya prakṛte'yogāt| ekavijñānena sarvavijñānaśrutirapyupādānatve mānam| yathā ca na sādṛśyaprādhānyābhyāmupapattiḥ tathoktaṃ prāk| `sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahme'ti sāmānādhikaraṇyaśrutirapi tatra mānam| na ca- `sarvaṃsamāpnoṣi tato'si sarva' iti smṛtyā'nyathāvyākhyātatvānna tatra mānateti vācyam, adhiṣṭhānatayā sarvavyāpitvasya sarvaśabdaprayoganimittatvād, anyathā ākāśe'pi sarvapadaprayogāpatteḥ| anupādānatve prakṛtyadhikaraṇavirodhāpatteśca upādānatvam| śrutyanugṛhītānumānamapyatra vivaraṇoktamadhyavaseyam| tathā hi- `mahābhūtāni, sadvastuprakṛtikāni, satsvabhāvānuraktatve sati vividhavikāratvāt, mṛdanusyūtaghaṭādidavadi'ti| na ca vivartamate upādānatvānupapattiḥ, satpradhānaprakṛtikatvenārthāntaratā vā, ādāveva tadupādānatvasya sthāpitatvāt| prakṛteḥ sattvābhāvasya prasādhitatvenārthāntaratā vā, ādāveva tadupādānatvasya sthāpitatvāt| prakṛteḥ sattvābhāvasya prasādhitatvenārthāntarānavakāśācca| na ca `khaṇḍo gaurmuṇḍo gau'riti gotvānuraktakhaṇḍādau vyabhicāraḥ tadanuraktatve sati sadvikāratvādityatra tātparyāt, sadatiriktagotvādyanabhyupagamācca| ata eva- `san ghaṭa' iti vadatredānīmasan ghaṭaḥ asannṛśṛṅgamityādipratītyanusāreṇa ghaṭanṛśṛṅgāderasadupādānatvāpattiriti nirastam| nāpi, brahma na dravyopādānam, cetanatvāccaitravat, jagannānandaprakṛtikam, tatsvabhāvānuraktatvāt, yad yatsvabhāvānanuraktaṃ tat na tatprakṛtikaṃ, yathā ghaṭasvabhāvānanuraktaṃ paṭādi na ghaṭopādānakamityādinā satpratipakṣatvam, vyāptipakṣadharmatayorāpātapratītyā sāmye'pi śrutyanugraheṇa sthāpanāyā balavattvāt| dvitīyānumāne kapālasvabhāvānanurakte ghaṭe vyabhicāraḥ, `kapālaṃ ghaṭa' ityapratīteḥ| na ca- mṛttvena tadanuraktatvamastīti- vācyam, sattvenātrāpyanuraktatvasya samānatvāt| evaṃ ca jagadabhinnanimittopādānakam, prekṣāpūrvakajanitakāryatvātsukhaduḥkhādivadityabhinnanimittopādānaṃ brahma sidhyati| na ca vyarthaviśeṣaṇatvam, prekṣāpūrvakatvāt kāryatvāditi hetudvaye tātparyāt| na ca- tvanmate duḥkhādīnāmantaḥkaraṇopādānakatvena sādhyavaikalyamiti vācyam, asmanmate antaḥkaraṇasya pariṇāmyupādānatve'pi antaḥkaraṇarūpeṇa pariṇatājñānādhāratayā vivartopādānatvasyānapāyāt, kāryatvāditi hetau sarvakāryanimittakālaghaṭasaṃyogasya ubhayavādisampratipannasya dṛṣṭāntasya lābhācca| na ca jagadupādānaṃ, na kartṛ, dravyopādānatvāt, mṛdvat, jagatkartā vā na dravyopādānam, kartṛtvāt, kulālādivadityādinā satpratipakṣatvam, śrutivirodhena hīnabalatvāt, ādye'numāne jaḍatvasya dvitīyānumāne sarvānantaryāmitvasya copādhitvāt, bādhonnītatayā pakṣetaratve'pi doṣatvāt| tasmājjagadupādānaṃ brahma kartṛ ceti siddham| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇo jagadabhinnanimittopādānatve pramāṇopapattiḥ|| 10 || 11. svaprakāśatvalakṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ nanu- pariṇamamānāvidyādhiṣṭhānatvenopādānatvaṃ vācyam, adhiṣṭhānatvaṃ tu nāvedyasya, tadvedanārthaṃ pramāṇāpekṣāyāmanyonyāśrayāt| na ca- svaprakāśatadapekṣamevādhiṣṭhānatvamitivācyam, svaprakāśatāyā vaktumaśakyatvāt| tathā hi- kimidaṃ svaprakāśatvaṃ ? vṛttyavyāpyatvaṃ vā ? phalāvyāpyatvaṃ vā ? avedyatve satyaparokṣavyavahāraviṣayatvaṃ vā ? tadyogyatvaṃ vā ? tadyogyatvātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇatvaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, brahmaṇo'pyāvaraṇabhaṅgāya caramavṛttivyāpyatvāt| na dvitīyaḥ, atītādau nityātīndraye cātivyāpteḥ| na tṛtīyaḥ, suṣuptyādau vyavahārābhāvenāvyāpteḥ| na caturthaḥ, yogyatvarūpadharmasya mokṣakāle'bhāvena tadā brahmaṇyavyāpteḥ| nāpi pañcamaḥ, anadhikaraṇatvasyāpi dharmatvena mokṣadaśāyāṃ tasyāpyabhāvenāvyāpteḥ| ata eva na tādṛganadhikaraṇatvopalakṣitamapi tat, tasyāpi dharmatve muktāvabhāvāditi cenna, pañcamapakṣasyaiva kṣodasahatvāt| na ca mokṣe'vyāptiḥ, anadhikaraṇatvasya svarūpatayā tadāpi sattvāt| na ca svarūpatve lakṣaṇatvānupapattiḥ, tvannaye brahmābhinnānandādau guṇatvavyavahāravat svarūpabhūte'pyanadhikaraṇatve lakṣaṇatvavyavahārāt| na ca- tvanmate yogyatvamapi brahmaṇi mithyeti tadatyantābhāvo'pi vācyaḥ, tathā ca kathaṃ tadatyantābhāvānadhikaraṇatvamitivācyam, yogyatvavirodhyatyantābhāvasya vivakṣitatvāt, svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāvasya mithyātvaprayojakasya svāśrayaniṣṭhatvenaivāvirodhitvāt| yadvā- vyāvahārikātyantābhāvo vivakṣitaḥ, brahmaṇi ca yogyatātyantābhāvasya brahmasvarūpatvena tāttvikatvāt| nāpyavedyatvāniruktiḥ, phalāvyāpyatvasyaiva tattvāt, āvaraṇabhaṅge cita eva phalatvāt| na ca- evaṃ ghaṭāderapi vṛttivedyatayā phalaviṣayatvābhāvād rūpyasukhāderapi aparokṣavyavahārayogyatayā viśiṣṭalakṣaṇasyātivyāptiriti vācyam, ghaṭādau phalavyāpyatvasya samarthitatvādrūpyasukhādau sākṣibhāsyatayā'parokṣavyavahāre'pi pramāṇajanyāparokṣa vṛttiviṣayatvābhāvāt| tathā ca phalāvyāpyatvasamānādhikaraṇatadvattvasya paryavasitatayā sakaladoṣanirāsāt| na ca brahmaṇo'pi vṛttipratibimbitacidrūpaphalabhāsyatvenāsaṃbhavaḥ, tasya phalarūpatvena tadviṣayatvābhāvāt| na ca citsukhācāryaiḥ tatsvabhāvasyāpi sphuraṇasya tadviṣayatvamityukterasaṃbhavaḥ, tasyācāryavacasastatprayuktavyavahāraviṣayatayā tadviṣayatvopacāranibandhanatvāt| ayamatra niṣkarṣaḥ-vṛttipratibimbitacijjanyātiśayayogitvaṃ vṛttyā tatpratiphalitacitā vā abhivyaktādhiṣṭhānacidviṣayatvaṃ vā phalavyāpyatvam| cijjanyātiśayaśca nāvaraṇabhaṅgaḥ, nāpi vyavahāro vivakṣitaḥ, kintu bhagnāvaraṇacitsaṃbandhaḥ| sa ca ghaṭādāvasti, nātmani, saṃbandhasya bhedagarbhatvāt| evamuktacidviṣayatvamapi bhedaghaṭitaṃ ghaṭādāvasti, nātmanīti sthitaṃ pratikarmavyavasthāyām| nāpyaparokṣa vyāvahāro durvacaḥ aparokṣa iti śabdaprayogasyaiva vivakṣitatvāt| na cālaukikapratyakṣaviṣayadharmādharmādau tādṛśavyavahārayogitayā ativyāptiḥ, yogajadharmātiriktālaukikapratyāsatteranaṅgīkārāt, tasyāpi svayogyavyavahita eva sāmarthyāpādakatvāt, na tu dharmādau| taduktaṃ `yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭa' ityādi| etena- kaścāyamaparokṣavyavahāro nāma ? aparokṣajñānajanyo vā ? aparokṣavastuviṣayo vā ? aparokṣa ityākāro vā ? nādyaḥ, dharmādāvapyaparokṣayogijñānānuvyavasāyavyāptijñānajanyavyavahārasattvenātivyāpteḥ, na dvitīyaḥ, vastuna āparokṣyam aparokṣajñānaviṣayatvaṃ cet, ātmano'pi ghaṭādivad vedyatvāpātāt| aparokṣavyavahāraviṣayatvaṃ cet, vastuvyavahārayorāparokṣye anyonyasāpekṣatayā'nyonyāśrayāt| na tṛtīyaḥ, nirākāraśuddhabrahmaviṣayasyākhaṇḍārthaniṣṭhavedānta janyavyavahārasyāparokṣa ityākārāyogāditinirastam, vyavahārapadenābhivadanasya vivakṣitatvena caramavṛttestadanākāratve'pi kṣatyabhāvāt| na cānupalabdhigamyatayā avedye aparokṣe lokavyavahārasattvenābhāve'tivyāptiḥ, prāmāṇikavyavahārasya vivakṣitatvāt| nanu- aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvaṃ na tāvatsarvān prati, caitrājñāne maitrasya tadabhāvāt| nāpi jñānaṃ prati, tasyāvyavahartṛtvāt| nāpi jñānāśrayaṃ prati, jñānasya cito'nāśritatvāditi- cenna, pramātāraṃ yaṃ kañcit pratyevāparokṣavyavahārayogyatvaṃ vivakṣitam| pramātā cāhamartha eva sarvasaṃmataḥ| yattūktaṃ caitrasya jñāne maitrasyāvyavahāra iti, tasya caitrajñānanimittako maitrasyāvyavahāra iti vārthaḥ ? caitrajñānaviṣayako maitrasyāvyavahāra iti vārthaḥ ? ādye caitrajñānena maitrasyāvyavahāre'pi svajñānenaiva ghaṭe brahmaṇi cāparokṣavyavahārasaṃbhavena vyarthaviśeṣaṇatvāsaṃbhavayorabhāvāt| dvitīye caitrajñāne tādṛgvyavahārābhāve'pi kṣatyabhāvāt| asmākamapi hi citireva svaprakāśā, na tu caitra jñānatvena vyapadiśyamānavṛttyupahitacidapi, vṛtterasvaprakāśatvāt| evaṃ ca sarvapramātṝn prati tādṛgvyavahāraviṣayatāyogyatvamapi saṅgacchata eva| nanu- avedyatve satyaparokṣa vyavahāraviṣayatvaṃ tadyogyatvaṃ ca vyāhatam, tadaparokṣavyavahāre tadviṣayakasphuraṇasya hetutvāditi cenna, anyatra tadviṣayasya tadvyavahārajanakatve'pi sphuraṇasya svāviṣayasya svasmin vyavahārajanakatvam, svabhāvabhedāt| na ca ghaṭādāvapi tathaivāstu, teṣāmasphuraṇarūpatvena tadviṣayatvaṃ vinā niyāmakāntarābhāvāt, tārkikakalpitasyānuvyavasāyasyāpi ghaṭajñānajñānatvāpekṣayā laghunā ghaṭajñānatvenaiva ghaṭajñānavyavahārahetutvakalpanācca| nanu- anavasthābhiyā sphuraṇāntarānaṅgīkārāt svasyasvaviṣayatvamastu, anyatra klṛptasya tadviṣayatvasya niyāmakasya tyaktumayuktatvād, anyathā prameyatvasya svavṛttitvaṃ vinaiva svata eva prameyamiti vyavahārajanakatvopapattyā kevalānvayitvabhaṅgaprasaṅga iti cenna, anavasthayā sphuraṇāntaratyāgavadabhede bhedaniyatasya viṣayiviṣayabhāvasyāpyayuktatayā tyāgopapatteḥ, prameyatvādau kevalānvayitvabhaṅgasyeṣṭatvāt| na ca- evaṃ gatirapi grāma iva svasminnapi svakāryaṃ karotviti vācyam, bhedāviśeṣāttanturiva mṛdapi paṭaṃ karotvityasyāpyāpatteḥ| svabhāvabhedena parihāraśca sarvatra samānaḥ| yadvā- cidaviṣayasvarūpatvameva svaprakāśatvam, cidanyasya sarvasya cidviṣayatvāttucchasya ni, svarūpatvena nātivyāptiśaṅkā| nāpyasaṃbhavaḥ, svātmani vṛttivirodhena chidāyā acchedyatvavat svasya svavedyatvāyogāt| na ca- evaṃ mithyātvānumiterapi asvaviṣayatvāpattiriti vācyam, svaparasādhāraṇasyaikasya viṣayatāniyāmakasya tatra sattvena viśeṣāt| ata eva yathā chidādau paraśusaṃyogo na svaparasādhāraṇa iti svasmin vṛttivirodhaḥ, tathā prakṛte'pi| na ca tarhi chidākāryasya chidāyāmiva cijjanyavyavahārasya cityanāpattiriti vācyam, phaladarśanasyaiva chidāpekṣayā svabhāvabhedaniyāmakatvāt| yadvā- svavyavahāre svātiriktasaṃvidanapekṣatvaṃ svāvacchinnasaṃvidanapekṣatvaṃ vā svaprakāśatvam| na ca svavedyatve'pyupapattyā svābhimataprakāśatvānupapattiḥ, svavedyatvasya bādhitatvena tadādāyopapattyasaṃbhavāt| nanu svaprakāśatvadharmasya tāttvikatve advaitavyāghātaḥ, atāttvikatve asvaprakāśatvasyaiva tāttvikatvāpattyā tatsādhakānumānāderbādha iti- cenna, svarūpatvasyoktatvāt| na ca- paroṣāmidamiṣṭam, vedyatvavirodhisvarūpasya parairanaṅgīkārāt| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmasvaprakāśatvalakṣaṇopapattiḥ|| 11 || 12. ātmanaḥ parābhimatasvaprakāśatvabhaṅgaḥ na ca pramāṇābhāvaḥ, anubhūtitvahetorvyatirekiṇa eva pramāṇatvāt| nanu- atra sādhyāprasiddhiḥ, na ca- vedyatvaṃ kiñcinniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogi, dharmatvādityanumānena sāmānyataḥ prasiddhiriti- vācyam, avedyatvaprasiddhāvapi viśiṣṭasādhyāprasiddheḥ tadavasthatvāt| na cānubhūtitvenāpi tāvadeva sādhyam, vedyatvasya vṛttivyāpyatvarūpatve tadabhāvasya caramavṛttivyāpyānubhūtau bādhāt, phalavyāpyatvarūpatve tu tadabhāvasya mama ghaṭādau, tava dharmādau śuktirūpyādau, ca pakṣabhinne prasiddhatvenāsādhāraṇānekāntikatāpatteḥ asvaprakāśatvarūpatve pratiyogyaprasiddhyā'prasiddhireva| kiñcātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ kutaścidvyāvartate cet, tatraiva vyabhicāraḥ, na cedatra vyabhicāra iti cenna, cidaviṣayasvarūpatvarūpaṃ svaprakāśatvamanubhūtitvena yadā sādhyate, tadā vedyatvaṃ cidviṣayatvameva cidanyamātravṛtti pakṣaḥ, atyantābhāvapratiyogisvarūpatvaṃ sādhyam| yathā ca vṛttipratiphalitacidviṣayatā ghaṭādau na brahmaṇi, tathopapāditamiti nāsādhāraṇyabādhau| nāpyatyantābhāvapratiyogitvasyātyantābhāva pratiyogitve vyabhicāraḥ, atyantābhāvapratiyogitvasya mithyātvenātyantābhāvapratiyoginyeva atyantābhāvapratiyogitayā yanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ tasya kevalānvayitvābhāvāt| na ca evaṃ brahmaṇi cidviṣayatve'pi tadatyantābhāvopapattyā'rthāntaraṃ ghaṭādāvapyevaṃ sādhyasattvenāsādhāraṇyaṃ ceti vācyam, cidviṣayatvavirodhyatyantābhāvapratiyogitvarūpasya sādhyatvānnārthāntarāsādhāraṇye, ghaṭādau tayoḥ sahāvasthityā avirodhād, brahmaṇi virodhāt| na ca tarhi virodhitvāṃśamādāya punaraprasiddhiḥ| vedyatvaṃ, virodhyatyantābhāvapratiyogi, atyantābhāvapratiyogitvād, ghaṭavaditi prasiddhisaṃbhavāt| yadā tu avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra yogyatvarūpaṃ svaprakāśatvaṃ pūrvānumāne sādhyam, tadā phalavyāpyatvarūpaṃ vedyatvaṃ pakṣaḥ, aparokṣavyavahārayogyakiñcinniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ sādhyam| tathā cāparokṣavyavahārayogyatvasamānādhikaraṇā vedyatvasya sāmānyataḥ prasiddhyā nāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvāsādhāraṇye| atyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ kiñcinniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogotyādi vikalpanibandhanadoṣaḥ parihṛta eva| etena- ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ, etadghaṭānyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇānyaḥ, padārthatvādityādimahāvidyayāpi sādhyaprasiddhiḥ| na ca vedyatvāniruktiḥ, cidaviṣayatvamātrasya svaprakāśarūpatve cidviṣayatvasyaiva vedyatvarūpatā, prathamapakṣe tu phalavyāpyatvameva vedyatvam| na ca tarhyatīndriyānyatvenārthāntaraṃ siddhasādhanaṃ vā, aparokṣavyavahāraviṣayatva samānādhikaraṇasyaiva vivakṣitatvāt| na cāyaṃ ghaṭaḥ, etaddhaṭatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇānyatvānadhikaraṇam, padārthatvāditi prakaraṇasamatā, śrutyādi rūpānukūlatarkasadbhāvena sthāpanāyā adhikabalatvāt, pratipakṣanibandhanasādhyasandehe'pi saṃśayarūpasādhyaprasiddheranivāraṇācca| nāpyasiddhiḥ, anubhūtitvajāteḥ kalpitavyaktibhedamādāya śuddhe'pi sattvāt| na ca jāterdharmisamasattākabhedavadvyaktisāpekṣatvaniyamaḥ, jātyanyūnasattākabhedavadvyaktisāpekṣatayaivātiprasaṅganirāse dharmisamasattākabhedavadvyakti sāpekṣatvasya gauravakaratvāt, samatvasyānyūnānatiriktārthakatvāt| na cānubhāvyābhāve anubhūtitvāyogaḥ, kadācidanubhāvyasattvenaiva tadupapatteḥ, anyathā āsīdityādivākya janyajñānasyānanubhūtitvāpatteḥ| na ca- anubhūtitvaṃ vipakṣādavyāvṛttam, anubhūti śabdavācyānātmani sattvāditi vācyam, anātmani anubhūtiśabdavācyatvasyaivābhāvāt, vṛttau jñānapadasyevānubhūtipadasya gauṇatvāt| ata eva parokṣānubhavasya pakṣatve bādhaḥ, aparokṣasya pakṣatve tatra vyabhicāra iti- nirastam, cittvarūpānubhūtitvasya vivakṣitatvāt| na cāprayojakatvam, śrutyanugrahasattvāt| na ca- aparokṣānubhavamapyaparokṣato jānāmītyātmano vedyatvagrāhiṇā pratyakṣeṇa tadātmānamevāvediti śrutyā ca bādha iti vācyam, ādyasya sākṣyanubhavasya vṛttirūpaguṇānubhavaviṣayatvāt| na ca- `jānāmī'ti jñaptiviṣayatvamevānubhūyata iti vācyam, ahamarthasya jñaptyāśrayatvāyogena jñānapadasya vṛttau gauṇatvād, `duḥkhaṃ jānāmī'tyādāvapi duḥkhādyākārāvidyāvṛttereva vivakṣitatvācca, dvitīyasya cāhamarthaviṣayatvāttadanātmatvasyoktatvāt, śruteścopaniṣajjanyavṛttirūpa vittiviṣayatvāvagāhitayā cidviṣayatvasya phalavyāpyatvasyāviṣayīkaraṇāt| nāpyanubhūtiḥ sphuraṇaviṣayaḥ aparokṣavyavahāraviṣayatvād ghaṭavat, caitrīyānubhūtiḥ, caitrāparokṣavyavahārayogyāparokṣajñaptiviṣayaḥ caitrāparokṣavyavahāraviṣayatvād, ghaṭavat, caitrīyānubhūtiścaitrāparokṣavyavahārayogyāparokṣajñaptyaviṣayo nāvatiṣṭhate, caitraṃ pratyaprakāśamānatvarahitatvāt, caitrecchāvaditi sapratipakṣatvam| sphuraṇaprayuktavyavahāraśālitvarūpasya viṣayatvasya mayāpyaṅgīkāreṇa siddhasādhanāt, tadanyasya svasminvṛttivirodhena bādhāt, jaḍatvasyopādhitvācca, paravedyatve anavasthānāt svavedyatvasya viruddhatvāt| nanu- svasmin svavedyatvaṃ kathaṃ viruddham ? na tāvatsvajanakendriyāsannikṛṣṭatvāt, svājanakatvādvā; nityacidviṣayatvasya taddvayaṃ vinaiva ghaṭādau sattvāt| nāpi viṣayaviṣayibhāvasaṃbandhasya dviṣṭhatvāt, atītāropitātyantāsatāṃ jñānadarśanena tasya ubhayāniṣṭhatvāt| nāpi kriyātvakarmatvayorvirodhāt, kṛtyādiviśeṣasya kāryatvādidarśanāt| nāpi viṣayiṇo viṣayatve kartuḥ karmatāpātāt, mithyātvānumityāderviṣayiṇyā eva viṣayatvadarśanāt| māmahaṃ jānāmītyanubhavadarśanena ca `tadātmānamevāve'diti śrutyā ca kartuḥ karmatvāvirodhāt| evaṃ ca parasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ na karmatvam, kintu kriyāviṣayatvādikam, taccābhede'pyupapādyamiti cet| maivam| viṣayaviṣayibhāvasya saṃbandhatvena bhedaniyatatayā svasmin svavedyatvasya viruddhatvāt| na hyuktātītādisthale bhedo nāsti| ata eva kṛtiḥ kṛtyantaraṃ prati, icchā icchāntaraṃ prati, vyavahṛtiḥ vyavahṛtyantaraṃ prati, abhidhā abhidhāntaraṃ pratyeva viṣayaḥ, na tu svātmānaṃ pratīti na svaviṣayatve kiñcidudāharaṇamasti| nanu- gatyādau gatyantarāviṣayatve'pi vastūnāṃ vicitrasvabhāvatvāt kṛtyādau kṛtyantarādiviṣayatvavad anubhūterapi svaviṣayatvamastu| anyathā svasmin vyavahārajanakatvamapi na syāt, vyāptijñānānumityādeḥ svāviṣayatve sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāptiranumitimithyātvaṃ ca na syāditi cenna| vyavahāropapādanārthaṃ svaviṣayatvasvabhāvakalpanāpekṣayā svāviṣayatve'pi svavyavahārajanakatvasvabhāvatvameva kalpyatām, lāghavāt, tāvataiva tadupapatteḥ vyāptyanumityādestu avacchedakaikyalābhāttathātvamityuktatvācca| evaṃ ca kriyākarmatvavirodhādapi na svasmin svavedyatvam| mithyātvānumiteśca na svakarmatā, parokṣasyākarmatvāt| yaduktaṃ kartureva karmatvaṃ, tadayuktam, udāhṛtamithyātvānumityāderakarmatvāt, māmahaṃ jānāmītyādau sākṣiṇaḥ kartṛtvādahamarthasya karmatvāt tadātmānamityādau cāhamarthasya kartṛtvāccit karma abhede taddvayādarśanāt| ata eva na bhedaghaṭitakarmalakṣaṇaparityāgaḥ, kriyāviṣayatvaṃ tu na karmatvam, āsanādikriyāyā api ādhārādiviṣayatvena sakarmakatvāpatteḥ| atha- avedyatve'vedyatvasādhakapramāṇavedyatvāvedyatvābhyāṃ vyāghātaḥ, vedāntānāṃ brahmaṇi prāmāṇyāyogaḥ, brahmavicāravidhivaiyarthyaṃ, brahmājñānanivṛttyayogaḥ ityādipratikūlatarkaparāhatiriti cenna, cidaviṣayatvaṃ phalāvyāpyatvaṃ vā avedyatvam, tasya tatsādhakapramāṇajanyavṛttivedyatvena vyāhatyabhāvād, vṛttiviṣayatvamātreṇaiva vedāntaprāmāṇyavicāravidhyajñānanivṛttīnāṃ saṃbhavācca| etena- ajñānanivartakatvamātreṇa vedāntaprāmāṇye ātmano'siddhiprasaṅga iti nirastam, ātmanaḥ svataḥ siddhatvāt| nanu svata ityasya svenaivetyarthe svaviṣayakatvāpattiḥ, pramāṇaṃ vinetyartha upāyāntarasyānupanyāsenāsiddhyāpattiḥ, anyathā nṛśṛṅgāderapi siddhyāpāta iti cenna, mānānapekṣasiddhereva svataḥ siddhiśabdārthatvāt| na ca nṛśṛṅgādāvevaṃ prasaṅgaḥ, tadasattvavyāvṛttiphalakapramāṇābhāvāt, prakṛte ca vṛttiviṣayatāmātreṇa tatsattvāt, siddhirūpātmani siddha iti vyavahārasya siddhiprayuktavyavahāraviṣayatayā gauṇatvāt| na caivaṃ muktau vedyābhāve vittitvānupapattiḥ, anubhūtinyāyasyātrāpi sulabhatvāt| na ca svāviṣayatve svaviṣayakasaṃśayanivartakatvāyogaḥ, svamahimnaiva svadharmiṇi vyavahāravat saṃśayādivirodhitvopapatteḥ| na cānanugamaḥ, tava viṣayatāyāmivānanugatasyaiva niyāmakatvātsvakarmatvābhāve'pi svanirvāhakatayā svasmin vyavahārādyupapatteśca| na ca svanirvāhakapadena nirvahaṇakriyākartṛtvakarmatvoktyā virodhaḥ, svātiriktanirvāhakānapekṣatvamātreṇa svanirvāhakatvopacārāt| `svayaṃ dāsāstapasvina' ityādau svātiriktadāsābhāvamātreṇa svadāsatvavyapadeśavat| na ca- svanirvāhakādhyayanavidhidīpaprabhādau svasmin kāryakaratvaṃ svaviṣayatvena vyāptamityatrāpi tatheti vācyam, adhyayanavidhāvekāvacchedaka mātreṇātmāśrayānavakāśāt, dīpaprabhādau svaviṣayatvāsiddheḥ| taduktaṃ khaṇḍane- `gāṅkuṭādibhya' ityatra bahuvrīhiḥ svāviṣaye kuṭe'pi svakāryaṃ karoti| tathehāpī'ti| na ca- `udbhūtāvayavabhedaḥ samudāyaḥ samāsārtha' iti kaiyaṭoktarītyā kuṭaghaṭitasamudāya eva bahuvrīhiviṣayaḥ sa ca vaiyākaraṇānāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ ca śaktyā anyeṣāṃ lakṣaṇayetyanyadetat, yathā `caitraśālīyā ānīyantā'mityatra upalakṣaṇasyāpi caitrasya svaśālāsthasya tacchabdaviṣayatvaṃ, tathā kuṭasyāpi kuṭādivadanyapadārthabhūtasamudāyāntargatasya bahuvrīhiviṣayatvopapatteḥ| tathā ca dṛṣṭāntāsiddhiriti- vācyam, svāviṣaya ityasya autsargikaviṣayānyapadārthabhinna ityarthakatvam| tathā ca svapadārthasaṃbandhādananyatreva svapadārthe'pi yathā tatra phalam, tathā svasaṃbandhādanyatreva svasminnapi citphalamityatra dṛṣṭāntaparyavasānāt| svaviṣayavyatirekeṇa samudāyaprayojakarūpeṇa viṣayatve'pi samudāyitāprayojakarūpeṇāviṣayatvāt svāviṣayatvoktervā| nanu- etāvatā svasmādanyatra vyavahārajanane tadviṣayatvaṃ svasmin svābheda eveti paryavasito'rthaḥ sa cāyuktaḥ, pakṣādanyatraivāyaṃ niyama ityasya sarvatra suvacatvāt, svābhede satyapi svaviṣaya iva svasminviṣayatvavyatirekeṇa dveṣa icchāvirodhitvasyājñāne svāvārakatvasya smṛtyādirūpe parokṣajñāne svavyavahārajanakatvasya maitracaitanye suṣuptau caitracaitanyena pāramārthikakālpanikabhedayoḥ rāhitye'pi tadvyavahārajanakatvasyādarśanācca| ātmānaṃ jānāmītyātmābhinnajñāne svaviṣayatvānubhavācceti cenna, tarhi dveṣādau svābhede'pi svaviṣayatvādarśanāt prakṛte'pi tathā syāt| atha- vyavahārarūpaphaladarśanāt prakṛta eva svābhedasyānyatrādṛṣṭamapi svaviṣayatāniyāmakatvaṃ kalpyata iti cet, tarhi svavyavahārūpaphaladarśanādatraiva svābhedasya svakāryajanakatāniyāmakatvam, na dveṣādau, tathā phalādarśanāditi samaḥ samādhiḥ| na ca- atra gṛhītatadviṣayatvasya tūṣṇīṃ tyāge sarvatraivaṃ prasaṅga iti vācyam, tadviṣayatvatyāgabījasya bādhakasya prāgevoktatvāt, sarvatra tasyābhāvāt| yattūktaṃ maitracaitanya ityādi, tanna, tadaikavirahakāle maitracaitanya ityasyaivābhāvāt, sākṣicaitanyena vyavahārāpādanasyeṣṭatvāt| yadi ca saṃskārātmanā'vasthitāḥ ntakaraṇaṃ tadāpi bhedakam, tadā bhedasyaiva sattvācca| yattūktamātmānamityādi, tadapi na, ahamarthāśritavṛttirūpajñānaviṣayatvasyaiva tatrānubhavāt| na ca ghaṭaḥ svaprakāśaḥ, ghaṭatvādityābhāsasāmyam, prayojakatvaparihāreṇa parihṛtatvād, ghaṭe sphuraṇābhedatadviṣayatvayorabhāve vyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgena sāmyābhāvācca| nanu- anubhūtipadena vṛtteḥ pakṣatve bādhaḥ, tadanyasyāśrayāsiddhiriti cenna, vṛtterjaḍatayā aprakāśatve prakāśatvaṃ yatra viśrāmyati tasyaiva pakṣatvāt, pratikarmavyavasthāyāmeva vṛttyatiriktānubhavasya sādhanācca| evaṃ ca- tvadīyāparokṣavyavahārayogyatvajñānaṃ, tvadīyāparokṣavyavahārayogyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇaṃ, jñānatvāt, madīyajñānavat| vivādapadāni jñānāni, ghaṭajñānānyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇāni, jñānatvād, ghaṭajñānavadityapi sādhu| na ca- tvajjñānaṃ, tvadaparokṣavyavahārayogyatve sati avedyatvānadhikaraṇaṃ, jñānatvāt, madīyajñānavat| ghaṭajñānaṃ, paṭajñānānyatve sati cidaviṣayatvānadhikaraṇaṃ, jñānatvāt, paṭajñānavaditi| ca yathāyogyaṃ prakaraṇasamateti vācyam, vipakṣe bādhakasyoktatvena sthāpanāyā adhikabalatvāt| ityadvaitasiddhāvanubhūteḥ svaprakāśatvopapattiḥ| evaṃ ca cidabhinnasyātmano'pi svaprakāśatvaṃ cidrūpatvāt sādhanīyam| yathā ca nātmani cidrūpatvāsiddhiḥ, tathopapāditam| upapādayiṣyate ca śrutyā| na ca `vijñātā prajñāte'ti śrutivavirodha, vakṣyamāṇāneka śrutivirodhena tasyāḥ vṛttirūpajñānāśrayatvaparatvāt| yattu vidyasāgaroktaṃ `vimataṃ jñānaṃ bhinnāśrayaviṣayakaṃ jñānatvāt, jñānāntaravat| vimataṃ, na svāśrayaviṣayakaṃ, guṇatvāt, agnyauṣṇyādivadi'ti svaprakāśatvasādhanaṃ, tat pararītyā| asmanmate svaprakāśe jñānatvasyātmanyabhāvāt tādṛgjñāne guṇatvābhāvācca, `māmahaṃ jānāmī'ti pratyakṣasya vṛttiviṣayatayopapāditatvena virodhābhāvāt| na ca- ajñāna iva svāśrayaviṣayatvopapattyā aprayojakamiti vācyam, vedyatve ātmano vedanābhāvādajñānadaśāyāmātmani saṃśayaviparyayavyatirekanirṇayaprasaṅgāt| na cātmanyahamanahaṃ veti kaścitsandigdhe, anya eveti vā viparyasyati| nāhamiti vā vyatirekaṃ nirṇayatītyasvaprakāśatve bādhakasattvāt| na ca- tvanmate sandehādyaviṣayasyāhamarthasyānātmatvāttadanyasmiñchabdaikagamyātmani sandehādisattvādaprayojakatvaṃ tadavasthameveti vācyam, ahamarthasya cidacidgranthirūpatayā ahaṃtvāvacchedenācidaṃśe sandehādyabhāvavat cidaṃśe'pi sandehādyabhāvāt| na ca śabdajāntaḥkaraṇaviṣayatadvṛttau vyabhicāri jñānatvamiti- vācyam, tasya sphuraṇārthakatvāt| na ca dvitīyahetostejorūpasya ghaṭa iva svāśraye'pi tamonivartakatayā tadviṣaye vyabhicāraḥ, rūpasya jñānādivat saviṣayatvābhāvāt| `atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyoti'rityādiśrutirapyatra pramāṇam| tathā hi- `astamita āditye yājñavalkye'tyādinā `kiṃ jyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa' ityantena jñānasādhanālokādyabhāve jīvasya kathaṃ sphuraṇamityukte ātmaivāsya jyotiḥ svayaṃ jyotirityādinā svātiriktānapekṣatayā svaprakāśatvamuktam| na cātmaśabdasya paramātmaparatvaṃ pūrvavākye ātmani nāḍīsambandhapratipādanāt| uttaravākye ca `katama ātmā yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyoti'rityuttaravākyaparyālocanayā saṃdaṃśanyāyena jīvaparatvāt| na ca dyubhyādyadhikaraṇanyāyenātmaśabdasya tatraiva mukhyatvam, pradhānādyanātmanirākaraṇārthatayā svaśabdādityātmaśabdaḥ| hetutvenokteḥ, na tu mukhyatvābhiprāyeṇa, jīvasyāprasakteḥ, mukhyatvasyobhayasādhāraṇyācca| ata eva- `atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svaya'mityupasaṃhārasya asyeti padānuṣaṅgeṇa ayamīśvaro jīvasya svayameva jyotirjñānaheturityevaṃ paratvaṃ- nirastam, uktanyāyena upakramavirodhāt| na ca- vācaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāsta iti jyotiḥśabdasya vāci jñānasādhane prayogādatratyajyotiḥśabdasyāpi jñānasādhanaparatvam, na tu jñānaparatvamiti- vācyam, laukikajyotiṣi rūḍhasya jyotiḥśabdasya vāci jñānasādhanatvena pravṛttivadatrāpi tamovirodhitvena rūpeṇājñānavirodhinyapi prayogasaṃbhavāt| na ca svaprakāśaparatve sadā svaprakāśatvena śrutāvatretyasya vaiyarthyam| jāgradavasthāyāmādityādijyotiḥ saṃbhavena durvivekatayāsyāmavasthāyāṃ suvivekatayā atreti viśeṣaṇasāphalyāt| na cāsyeti ṣaṣṭhyā viṣayatvābhidhānam, svayaṃdāsā ityādāvivānanyavedyatvaparatvāt| na cāmukhyārthatvāpattiḥ, mukhyaviṣayāsaṃbhaveneṣṭatvāt| na ca pradīpādau svaviṣayatvena svaprakāśatvavyavahāraḥ, sajātīyaprakāśāprakāśyaprakāśatvasyeva tatrāpi vyavahāranidānatvāt| ata eva na ghaṭādāvaprakāśe atiprasaṅgaḥ| vivaraṇānumānāni ca- ātmā svaprakāśaḥ svasattāyāṃ prakāśavyatirekavidhuratvāt, prakāśāśrayatvāt, prakāśakartṛtvāt, pradīpavat| nanu ca- avedyatvaṃ cet sādhyaṃ, sādhyavaikalyam, sajātīyaprakāśāprakāśyatvaṃ cedarthāntaram, ghaṭādāvivāsvaprakāśatve'pyupapatteḥ, jñānaprabhānugataprakāśatvāsiddhiśca, jñātaikasati duḥkhādāvādyahetorvyabhicāraḥ, dvitīyatṛtīyayostvanmata ātmanaḥ prakāśatvenāsiddhiriti cenna, svaprakāśyatvasya bādhitatayā tadaprakāśyatvena pakṣasya viśeṣitatayā vārthāntarābhāvāt| sajātīya prakāśāprakāśyaprakāśatvameva sādhyam| evaṃ ca na ghaṭādivadasvaprakāśatvenopapattiḥ, svāprakāśyasajātīyāprakāśyatvenāvedyatvasya lābhāt, vijātīyasyāprakāśatvāt| jñānaprabhānugataṃ ca prakāśatvamāvaraṇābhibhāvakatvam| tacca jñānasya cittvenānyatra tejoviśeṣatvādinetyanyadetat| āvaraṇatvaṃ cājñānatamasoḥ arthavyavahāraprati bandhakatvamanugatameva| taccājñānasya sākṣāt tamaso jñānapratibandhadvāretyanyadetat| na ca duḥkhe vyabhicāraḥ, tasyākṣaṇe prakāśavyatirekasattvāt, prakāśatvena viśeṣaṇācca| nāpi dvitīyatṛtīyayorasiddhiḥ, pararītyā tayorukteḥ, pratibimbasya bimbādhīnatayā tadāśritatvena bimbajñānahetutvopapatteśca| ata evātmā svānantarotpattikaprakāśāśrayo na, prakāśāśrayatvādādityavadityapi sādhu| na ca siddhasādhanam, ghaṭādiviṣayakajñānasya tvayāpi janyatvasvīkārāt| ānandabodhoktaṃ ca- vivādādhyāsitā saṃvit, svasamānāśrayasvasamānakāla svagocarajñānavirahaprayuktavyavahāravirahavatī na bhavati, saṃvittvādanantaravyavahinayamāṇasaṃvidvat| na ca- svavedyatvenopapattyā siddhasādhanam, asya paravedyatāṅgīkartṛviṣayatvāt, svāviṣayatvarūpapakṣaviśeṣaṇamahimnā tavānabhimataparyavasānāt| avedyatvaṃ tu brahmaṇaḥ śrutisiddhameva| na ca sākalyenāvedyatvaparā, saṅkoce kāraṇābhāvāt| etena jñātatāliṅgānumeyatve `ahaṃ sukhī'tivad ahaṃ janāmīti parokṣānubhavavirodhaḥ| gurumate ayaṃ ghaṭa ityasya janyasyaiva svaviṣayatve svajanakendriyasannikarṣāśrayatvaprasaṅgaḥ, vyavasāyānuvyavasāyayoḥ pārthakyānubhavavirodhaśca| nyāyamate anuvyavasāyasyāpi paravedyatve jñānasya pratyakṣātmaviśeṣaguṇatvena icchādivadavaśyavedyatvāt jñānadhārānubhavāpattiḥ, vicchede caramasya niṣprāmāṇikatvāpattiḥ, sāmānyapratyāsatterabhāvāt| evaṃ ca vyavasāyasukhādigocaraṃ svaviṣayaṃ nityameva jñānaṃ sidhyati| svaviṣayatāyāṃ ca na svajanakasannikarṣādyapekṣā sannikarṣādyanapekṣeśvarasarvaviṣayanityajñānavat| tathā caivaṃ prayogaḥ- `caitrasukhaduḥkhādikaṃ, caitrīyanityāparokṣajñānaviṣayaḥ, taṃ prati jñātaikasattvād, yadyaṃ prati jñātaikasat, tat taṃ prati tādṛgbhānaviṣayaḥ, yatheśvaraprayatna'iti nityajñānasiddhau `tat svaviṣayam, nityajñānatvāt, svavyavahāre anyānapekṣatvāt, svasaṃśayādivirodhitvācca, īśvarajñānavad'- iti| tasmādātmano nityaguṇabhūtaṃ jñānaṃ svaviṣayatvarūpasvaprakāśatvavad, ātmāpi, tadviṣayaḥ, yāvaddravyabhāvinā tenābhinnatvāt, māmahaṃ jānāmītyanubhavād, `ātmasvarūpā saṃvit svaviṣayā, svajanyavyavahāraviṣayatvāt'| `uktā saṃvit, svaviṣayiṇī, svasamānādhikaraṇasvatvaprakārakasvaviśeṣyakasaṃśayavirodhitvāt uktaviśeṣaṇavadviparyaya virodhitvādvā' iti- nirastam| ādyānumāne sākṣirūpāparokṣanityajñānaviṣayatvena siddhasādhanam, sahotpannajñānenāpi jñātaikasattvopapattyā jñānagatanityatātparyantasādhane tasyāsāmarthyaṃ ca| na ca caitrasya tādṛgjñānābhāve suptotthitasya parāmarśānupapattiḥ, saṃskāreṇa tadupapatteḥ, nityajñānasya parāmarśavirodhitvācca| svaviṣayatvānumāne ca dṛṣṭāntāsiddhiḥ, īśvare'pi svaviṣayakanityajñānāsiddheḥ aprayojakatvaṃ ca, svāviṣayatve'pi vyavahārāderupapāditatvāt| kiṃ ca caitranityajñānasya svaviṣayatve naikaṃ niyāmakam, īśvarajñānasya nyāyamate vastutvavat sarvaviṣayatvopapatteḥ, nāpyabhedaḥ, duḥkhādāvabhāvāt| nāpi samānādhikaraṇatvam, ātmanyabhāvād, dharmādau tatsadbhāvāccetyananugatameva vācyam| tathā ca kimaparāddhaṃ vyavasāyasvaprakāśatvavādinā guruṇā ? anyatra sannikarṣasya niyāmakatve'pi svasminnabhedasya saṃbhavāt| pārthakyānubhavānanubhavarūpasyānubhavakalahasya tvanmata samānatvāt| tasmādvyavahāra evānanugataṃ kāraṇamastu| tatprayojakānugamārthaṃ kimiti nirbandhaḥ ? paścādapyananugama eva paryavasānāt| evaṃ ca na svaviṣayatvarūpaṃ svaprakāśatvaṃ, kiṃtvavedyatve satyaparīkṣavyavahārayogyatvamiti siddham| ityadvaitasiddhau ātmanaḥ svaprakāśatvopapattiḥ|| 12 || 13. avācyatvabhaṅgaḥ nirdharmakatayā avedyatayā ca brahma ānandādipadalakṣyaṃ, na vācyam, pravṛttinimittābhāvāditi| nanu- avācyaśabdenocyate ced, vācyatvasiddhiḥ, lakṣyate ced, avācyarūpamukhyārthasyābhāvāt kathaṃ lakṣaṇā ? bhāve vā brahma nāvācyaṃ, kintu tīravadavācyarūpamukhyārthasaṃbandhimātramiti syāt| mukhyārthahīnasyāpi brahmalakṣakatve ghaṭapadamapi ghaṭalakṣakaṃ syāditi- cenna, avācyarūpamukhyārthābhāve'pi nañsamabhivyāhṛtavācyaśabdena vācyatvātyantābhāvabodhanadvārā svarūpe lakṣaṇayaiva paryavasānāt| evaṃ nirviśeṣapadamapi, akhaṇḍapadalakṣakatāyāmeva mukhyārthāvaśyambhāvaniyamāt| nanu- evaṃ lakṣyapadenāpi lakṣyatve tīrasyāgaṅgātvavat brahmaṇo'lakṣyatvāpattiriti cenna, iṣṭatvāt, sarvathā nirdharmakatvāt, lakṣyavyavahārasya ca vācyatvābhāvanibandhanatvāt, tathā pratipādikaṃ prāk| na caivaṃ lakṣyatvābhāvena vācyatvavyavahāraprasaṅgaḥ, gauṇasya tasyāpīṣṭatvāt satyajñānādipadānāṃ ca kalpitadharmavācināṃ brahmarūpavyaktilakṣakatayā'khaṇḍārthatvānapāyāt| na ca- sattvādidharmāśrayatayā lakṣyatvābhāve mañcasaṃbandhitvamātreṇa lakṣyasya puṃsaḥ amañcatvavat sattvādisaṃbandhitvamātreṇa lakṣyasya brahmaṇaḥ asattvādyāpattiriti vācyam, kalpitacandratvādijāteḥ paramārthacandrādivyaktitādātmyenācandratvā bhāvavadatrāpi sattvādyabhāvānāpatteḥ| taduktam- `lakṣyavyaktirapi brahme'ti| ata eva- svaprakāśāderabrahmatve yadyad, brahmatayeṣṭaṃ, tattadabrahmeti sādhu samarthito brahmavāda iti nirastam| yattu nirvaśeṣādipadānāṃ ca samāsapadatayā lakṣyādipadānāṃ yaugikatayā vākyatulyatvānna vācakateti vaktumaśakyam, anvitābhidhānapakṣe teṣāmapi vācakatvād, abhihitānvayapakṣe'pi vākya evābhihitānvayasvīkāreṇa prakṛtipratyayoranvitābhidhāyakatvād vākyatulyasyāpi vācakatvād brahmaṇaḥ padārthasaṃsargarūpatve sakhaṇḍatvāpattyā padārthatve vācyatvāparihārāditi| tanna| padalakṣyatve'pyapadārthatvopapatteḥ, akaṇḍatve'pi vākyārthatvasyopapāditatvādanvitābhidhāne anvitavācakasyāpi svarūpe lakṣaṇāṅgīkārāt| na ca tarhyavācyatvāsiddhiḥ, akhaṇḍabrahmasiddhyupāyatvena prāptasyāvācyatvādeḥ nivārakābhāvenānuṣaṅgikatayā siddheḥ| `yato vāco nivartante, aśabdamasparśa'mityādi śrutayaścātrānusandheyāḥ, avācyaśabdavadaśabdaśabde'pi vyāghātābhāvāt| na ceyaṃ śrutiradbhutatvābhiprāyā, śrūyamāṇārthatve bādhakābhāvāt| na ca `yato vāca' ityatrāpi manasā saheti śrutamato vṛtterivāntaḥkaraṇavṛttivyāpte brahmaṇi vāgvṛtterapi sarvathā niṣedhāyogaḥ, lakṣaṇāyāḥ svīkāreṇa śaktimātrasyaiva nirākaraṇāt| na ca ānandādyanekapadāmukhyārthatvāpekṣayā nivartanta ityekapadārthāmukhyatvameva yuktamiti- vācyam, brahmaṇo nirdharmakatayā tatra śaktyabhāvena bahutvasyāprayojakatvādvācyatvavirodhyarthadvāraivākhaṇḍārthaparatayā tadvirodhatādavasthyāt| ata eva kasmāducyate paraṃ brahmetyādiśruteḥ paramātmeti cāpyukta ityādismṛteśca tattacchabdabodhyatvamātreṇa vācyatvābhilāpaḥ, na tu śakyatvābhiprāyeṇeti tābhyāṃ na virodhaḥ| tātparyaviṣayo brahma vācyaṃ vastutvāllakṣyatvācca tīravaditi cet, nirdharmakatayā vācyatvabādhāt, tadunnītasadharmakatvādyupādhisaṃbhavācca| paramārthasatyapadādikaṃ kasyacidvācakam, padatvādityapi na, kimatra padatvam ? na tāvatsuptiṅantatvam, samāsapadasyāśaktatvena rājapuruṣādau vyabhicārāt, nāpi śaktatvam, sādhyāviśeṣād, avayavadvārā samāsapadasya vācakatvaṃ ced, iṣṭameva| nāpi satyajñānādivākyaṃ vācyārthatātparyavacchabdayuktaṃ vākyatvādityapi, viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣvetyādau vyabhicārāt| nanu- avācyatve lakṣyatvānupapattiḥ, vācyārthasaṃbandhitvena jñātasyaiva lakṣyatvāt, tajjñānaṃ ca na śabdabhinnena, upaniṣanmātragamyatvāt, nāpi svaprakāśatayā, nityasiddhe śabdavaiyarthyāt| avācyaśabdasya ca lakṣakasyaiva vaktavyatvāttatrāpi vācyasaṃbandhitvena jñeyatve anavastheti cenna, tathā jñānamupasthitāvupayogi| brahma svaprakāśatayā svata evopasthitamiti kiṃ tena ? na caivaṃ śabdavaiyarthyam āvaraṇābhibhāvakavṛttāvupayogāt| ata eva nānavasthā| tasmāt pravṛttinimittasya durnirūpatvādavācyatvam| taduktam- dṛṣṭā guṇakriyājātisaṃbandhāḥ śabdahetavaḥ| nātmanyanyatamo hyeṣāṃ tenātmā nābhidhīyate|| iti| na cāropitaguṇāśrayatayā vācyatā, tasya tātparyāviṣayatayā tātparyaviṣaye avācyatvasya sthitatvāt| na ca satyādipadānāṃ lakṣakatve siddhe nimittābhāvaḥ, tasmiṃśca lakṣakatvamiti parasparāśrayaḥ, nirviśeṣavākyena neti netītyanenaiva nimittābhāvasya siddhatvāt| na ca- nirviśeṣavākyasya svarūpamātraparatve pravṛttinimittāvirodhaḥ, nirviśeṣatvaviśiṣṭaparatve ca tasyaiva sattvena nirviśeṣapadavācyatvasyaiva prasaṅga iti vācyam, dvāratayā upasthitasya svaparavirodhitvānnirviśeṣasya vācyatvāsaṃbhavācca| tasmānnirviśeṣatvādeva jīvabrahmābhedaḥ siddhaḥ, bhedakāsaṃbhavāt| tathā ca| brahmaṇyavācye yo vidvānvācyatāmadhigacchati| sa nistrapo nimittānāṃ virahaiḥ pratibodhyatām|| ityadvaitasiddhau brahmaṇaḥ śabdāvācyatvopapattiḥ|| 13 || 14. sāmānyato bhedakhaṇḍanoddhāraḥ syādetad- idamayuktam, bhedasya pramāṇasiddhatvāt| na ca- bhedasya svarūpatve anapekṣatvāpattyā dharmatvam, tathā cānavasthā, stambhakumbhayoḥ parasparabhedagraho'nyonyabhedagrahasāpekṣa iti anyonyāśrayaśca, evaṃ ca bhedāsiddhiriti- vācyam, tat kiṃ bhede pratītireva nāsti ? kāraṇājanyā vā ? bādhyaviṣayā vā ? nādyaḥ, vikalpādikaraṇarūpa vyavahāraviplavāpatteḥ, na hi bhinnatayā ajñātena vikalpaḥ| na dvitīyaḥ, akāraṇakotpattervyāhatatvena nityatvāpattyā tannirāsakamokṣopāyānanusāraṇāpatteḥ| na tṛtīyaḥ, uktaśuṣkatarkasyābādhakatvāt| anyathā aikyasya svarūpatve anapekṣatvāpattiḥ, dharmatve advaitahānirityādinā aikyabuddhirapi bādhitaviṣayā syāt| na ca- mama vaitaṇḍikasya paramakṣamātraṃ khaṇḍanīyamiti- vācyam, svapakṣasattve'pi tava tathātve mamāpi tathātvāvirodhāt| na ca mama parapakṣakhaṇḍanamātreṇa svamatabhūtaikyasiddhiḥ, mamāpi tāvanmātreṇa svamatabhūtabhedasiddhisaṃbhavāt| na ca- māṃ prati bhedakhaṇḍanamātraniyoge mamaiva vaitaṇḍikatvamiti vācyam, māṃ pratyapyaikyakhaṇḍanamātraniyogasaṃbhavāt madhyasthasya tvadanadhīnatvāt| asvavyāghātakaireva tvayaikyaṃ dūṣyamiti yadā, tadā asvavyāghātakaireva tvayā bhedo dūṣya ityapi syāditi- cet, maivam, na hi vayaṃ bhedapratīteḥ svarūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ vāpalapāmaḥ| kintu bādhitaviṣayatvaṃ brūmaḥ, vyāptisadhrīcīnatayā aśuṣkastarkairevānanyaparayā śrutyā smṛtyā ca bhedasya bādhitatvāt, viṣayabhedādinā pratyakṣavirodhasya parihṛtatvena śrutyādāvupacaritārthatvābhāvāt| yattvabhedasyāpyevaṃ nirāsaḥ| na cābhedakhaṇḍanayuktīnāṃ svasya svābhedo'pi sidhyediti svavyāghātādābhāsatā, bhedakhaṇḍanayuktīnāmapi bhūṣaṇayuktyabhedena svavyāghātakatāyāḥ samānatvāditi, tanna, bhedakhaṇḍanayuktīnāṃ tattvato bhedanivārakatve'pi vyāvahārikabhedasyānirākaraṇena svāvyāghātakatopapatteḥ| na caivaṃ brahmaṇyanṛtabhedasya tattvato niṣedhe tatra tattādātmyāpattiḥ, ghaṭe kalpitaghaṭāntarabhedabhramasthale tattādātmyādarśanāt| na caivamabhedo'pi tattvato niṣedhyaḥ, tarhi svarūpāparyavasānena śūnyavādāpatteḥ| kiñca brahmātiriktamaikyamasmākaṃ nāstyeva| tasya ca tathā niṣedhe śrutivirodhaḥ| na ca- mama ghaṭātirikto bhedo nāsti, tasya niṣedhe pratyakṣavirodha iti- vācyam, pratyakṣasya pāramārthikasattvāviṣayatvenāvirodhitvasya prāgevoktatvāt| nanu- bhedabādhakaṃ na bhedaviṣayameva, tatsādhakatāpatteḥ, nāpyabhedaviṣayam, evaṃ hi tadanyaḥ tadvirodhi tadabhāvo vā nañartho viṣayo vācyaḥ| sarvathā ca bhedo duṣpariharaḥ, tadananyatve tadvirodhatadabhāvatvayorayogād, bhedābhāvagrāhiṇāpi pratiyogivilakṣaṇatayaivābhāvasya grahaṇācca, audāsīnyena pravṛttasya idamiti jñānavadabādhakatvācceti- cenna, pāramārthikatvākāreṇa bhedābhāvaviṣayasyaiva bādhakatvāt| na ca bhede duṣpariharatā, vyāvahārikabhedenaiva vyāvahārikatadvirodhitvatadabhāvatvayorupapatti saṃbhavāt, `yakṣānurūpo baliriti nyāyāt| bhedabhramādhiṣṭhānatattvagocaraṃ jñānaṃ bhramabādhakamityupapannam, uktarītyā bhedavailakṣaṇyena tadgrahaṇopapatteḥ| yattu `nāyaṃ bhedo nāstyatra bhedo'nyadeva bhedātmanā pratyabhā'dityevamākārakaṃ bādhakajñānaṃ vācyam `nedaṃ rajata'miti vat, idaṃ ca sarvathā bhedāvagāhīti kathaṃ tatra bādhakamiti, tanna, pratiyogitayā tadgrahaṇasya tadbādhakatvāvirodhitvāt| na ca- atra bhedo nāstīti dhīḥ sarvathā na bhedābhāvamavagāhata iti- vācyam, anyatra bhedasattve tadbhedasyātrāvaśyakatvenātra bhedo nāstītyasyaiva kutrāpi nāstītyatra paryavasānād ekameva nānātmanā abhādityādi bādhakamanusandheyam| koṭyorvyāvahārikabhedena tadvattayā grahaṇācca yathā bādhakatvayogaḥ, tathoktameva| etena- bhedād bhinnatayā svārthaṃ bādhadhīrgāhate na vā| ādye bhedaḥ sthiraḥ, antye tu na sā syāt bhedabādhikā|| iti- nirastam, svarūpeṇa sthairye'pi tattvato'sthiratvasaṃbhavāt| evaṃ cāklṛpta viṣayatvādanyonyāśrayatvāderuttthānam, utthitasya ca nābhāsatvam| kiṃ cāyaṃ deśyābhāso nirvacanavādinaḥ prati, nāsmān| vayaṃ hi bhāsamāno yo bhedaḥ sa svarūpādipakṣāntarbhāvabahirbhāvābhyāṃ vā anyena vā dharmāntareṇānirvācya iti brūmaḥ| na ca tarkābhāsenānirvācyatve aikyasyāpi tatprasaṅgaḥ, bhedabādhakasyānābhāsatāyā uktatvād, aikyabhedayoḥ śrutyanugrahānanugrahābhyāṃ viśeṣācca| nanu- brahmaṇyanṛtādivyāvṛttiḥ brahmajñānābādhyā vācyā, śūnyādyanātmakaghāṭadau śūnyāditaḥ svajñānābādhyabhedadarśanāditi- cet, brahmaghaṭayoradhiṣṭhanādhyastatvābhyāṃ viśeṣād, anṛtatvasya mṛṣātvena tadvyāvṛtterapi mṛṣātvasya yuktatvena ghaṭe tajjñānabādhyatvasya ubhayoḥ samānatvāt| na ca- evaṃ prātibhāsikarūpyādivyāvṛtterapi prātibhāsikatvāpattiḥ, tathā ca bhrāntibādhavyavasthā na syāditi- vācyam, viśeṣadarśanajanyatva tadajanyatvābhyāṃ bādhabhrāntivyavasthopapattyā prātibhāsikatvasyeṣṭatvāt| na caivaṃ satyādivākyasyānṛtavyāvṛttibodhakasyāprāmāṇyāpattiḥ, tasyā ārthatvāt| na ca- evaṃ vyāvṛttivanmṛṣāpratiyogikasyātyantābhāvasyāpi mṛṣātvenādhiṣṭhānajñānābādhyātyantābhāva pratiyogitvarūpamithyātvaṃ na syāditi- vācyam, adhiṣṭhānajñānabādhyatvasya tatrāviśeṣaṇatvāt| na ca- evamātmani dehabhedasya bādhyatve dehātmaikyasya mithyātvaṃ na syāditi- vācyam, bhedamithyātvasya pratiyogyaikyāmithyātvāprayojakatvasyoktatvāt| na ca- nityānityavastuvivekasya sādhanacatuṣṭayāntargatasya jñānaṃ bhramaḥ syāt, tathā ca tenānityaparihāreṇa nitye pravṛttirna syāditi- vācyam, hānopādānopayuktarūpāvagāhibuddhervyāvahārikaprāmāṇyaśālitayā vyavahārikahānopādānasya nivartayitumaśakyatvāt| etena- prapañce sadvailakṣaṇyasya mithyātve sadaikyāpattiḥ, jaganmithyātvapramāṇānāṃ cātattvāvedakatvāpāta iti- nirastam, mithyātvaniruktāvuktottaratvācca| etena- bhedādabhedasya bhedābhāve anyatarakhaṇḍanasādhanābhyāmubhayakhaṇḍanasādhane iti- nirastam, tāttvikabhedābhāve'pi kalpitabhedena vyavasthopapatteḥ| na ca kalpitenākalpitakāryapratibandhāyogaḥ, avidyayā svaprakāśarūpabrahmakāryapratibandhadarśanāt, kalpitakāntayā viśleṣakāryapratibandhadarśanācca| nanu- bhedasya vyāvahārikasattvārthamapi tvayā anyonyāśrayādikamuddharaṇīyam, parasparasāpekṣeṇa vyavahārasyāpyabhāvāt, na hi vyāvahārikamṛdaḥ svajanyaghaṭasāpekṣatvam| kiṃ cātra (1) na bhedamātreṇa taddarśanamātreṇa vā anyonyāśrayādyāpādanam, tathā sati vyāvahārikayorapi tayorasiddhiḥ syāt| (2) nāpi tatpratītivāstavatvena tadāpattiḥ, caramavṛttyavāstavatve'pi tadviṣayavāstavatvavadupapatteḥ vāstave anyonyāśrayādarśanena vyāptyasiddheśca| (3) na ca pramārūpatatpratītyā tadāpādanam, pratīti sāmānya eva tvayānyonyāśrayasyoktatvena pramātvaparyante tatra doṣābhāvāt| (4) nāpi tatpratīterdharmipratiyogisāpekṣatvena tadāpādanam, tāvatāpi tatsāpekṣatāmātrasyaiva nivṛttiriti- cenna, asmākamavidyāsāmarthyāt sarvānupapattividhūnanopapatteḥ| na hi māyāyāmasaṃbhāvanīyaṃ nāma| tathā ca parasparāśritamapi indrajālavaddarśayiṣyati| na ca- īśvarasāmarthyāttādṛśamapi satyaṃ syāditi vācyam, ubhayasiddhamṛṣābhūtendrajālasthale kāraṇādivyavasthollaṅghikāryādidarśanavadanyatra tathā adarśanāt, darśane ca mṛṣātva eva paryavasānāt| āpādanaṃ ca- bhedastatpratītiśca yadi māyikī na syāt, sarvavyavasthollaṅghinī na syāt, sarvavyavasthollaṅghinī ceyam| tasmānmāyikīti viparyayaparyavasānāt, māyike vyavasthollaṅghanasya darśanena vyāptisiddhiḥ| uktaśrutyā asvavyāghātakayuktyā ca bhedasya bādhādabhedasyābādhācca svābhedasvabhedayorvyāvahārikatve samāne'pi svābhedaṃ parityajya bheda eva sarvathā pradveṣo nākāraṇakaḥ| ityadvaitasiddhau sāmānyato bhedakhaṇḍanam|| 14 || 15. viśiṣya bhedakhaṇḍanoddhāraḥ nanu nirapekṣasvarūpatve sāpekṣatvānupapattiriti yaduktaṃ, tattābadayuktam, avidyānivṛtterjīvabrahmaikyasya ca tava mate matadvaye'pi sthitau vyaktisāpekṣasya jātimātrasya pratītau sāpekṣasya nīlataratvāderivārthaprakāśātmakajñānasya brahmaṇi brahmābhedasya `asti brahme'tyādau kālasāpekṣasyāstitvasya nirapekṣabrahmavyaktyādirūpatāyā darśanāditi- cenna, avidyānivṛttijīvabrahmaikyayoḥ pratītau sāpekṣatvasyāvidyakatayā tāttvikanirapekṣatvavirodhitvābhāvāt| jātimātrasya vyaktyabhedāsiddheḥ, vyaktisamānasattākaghaṭatvādau tadabhāvād, vyaktyasamānasattākasattādijātau tu sāpekṣatvasya kālpanikatvāt nīlaratvādervyaktirūpatvāsiddhau hetorabhāvādarthaprakāśātmakajñānasya brahmābhedasya ca sāpekṣatāyāḥ kālpanikatvāt| asti brahmetyādāvapyevameva| tathā ca tattvato nirapekṣasya sāmānādhikaraṇyāsiddhyā na tarkābhāsatāvyāptisiddhiḥ| ata eva- aikyasyāsvarūpatve advaitahāniḥ mithyātve bhedasya satyatvaprasaṅgaḥ, yatra yadadhyastaṃ, tatra tadvirodhi tajjñānābādhyam, yathā śuktāvarūpyatvam| yatra yadaikyaṃ bādhyaṃ, tatra tadbhedastajjñānābādhyaḥ| yathā dūrasthavanaspatyorbheda iti vā| yatra yadadhyastaṃ tatra tadvirodhi tāttvikam, yathā brahmaṇyanṛtatvasyādhyastatve satyatvaṃ tāttvikamiti vā vyāpteriti- nirastam, aikyasya brahmabhedānaṅgīkārāt, virodhyanurodhināṃ sarveṣāṃ brahmaṇi kalpitatvena tajjñānabādhyatvena vyāptīnāmasiddheḥ| nanu- aikyasya nirapekṣatve tattvaṃpadārthaparāṇāṃ `satyaṃ vijñānaghana' ityādīnāmaikya paramahāvākyaikavākyatvābhāvena vaiyarthyaṃ syāditi- cenna, aikyasya svaprakāśabrahmābhinnatayā sthitipratītyādau nirapekṣatve'pi yathā lakṣyārthabhedabhramanivartakavṛttijanane padārthasāpekṣatayā svarūpaparavākyānāmekavākyatāyāḥ sattvāt, bhedarūpapratiyogisāpekṣatvena tatra sāpekṣatvavyavahārāt| na ca ghaṭaḥ paṭo neti nañarthasya bhedasyeva tādātmyaniṣedharūpatvena vaiparītyam, tādātmyasya tanniṣṭhāsādhāraṇadharmarūpatve bhedasyābhedānapekṣatvāt, abhedarūpatve bhedasāpekṣatvenaiva tasya tadanapekṣatvāt| na caitāvatā aikyasya sāpekṣatvāpattiḥ, kālpanikasyeṣṭatvāt| ata eva- ajñānahānivad brahmarūpadhīvadabhedavatsvarūpatve'pi bhedasya sāpekṣatvaṃ hi yujyata iti- nirastam, tava sāpekṣatvayostāttvikatayā dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyāt| na ca bhede'pyevamevāstu, bhedasya niṣedhapratiyogitayā śrutatvena brahmarūpatvābhāvāt| na ca tatrābhedaśrutirasti| etena- svarūpeṇa nirapekṣasyāpyabhedasyābhedatvena sāpekṣatvavat svarūpeṇa nirapekṣasyāpi ghaṭasya bhedatvena sāpekṣatvamastu, avacchedakabhedena sapratiyogitvāpratiyogitve api yathā tadvaditi- nirastam, bhedasya svarūpato nirapekṣatve niṣpratiyogikatve ca parān pratīva svamapi prati aviśiṣṭatayā svavyāghātaḥ| na caivamabhedasyāpi svān pratīva parān prati tathā sati tathātvāpattiḥ, iṣṭāpatteḥ| ghaṭatvādinā bhedaḥ paraṃ kalpitaḥ, svarūpatastvabheda eva| tathā sati paratvaṃ paraṃ vyāhatam, na svarūpatvamapi| yattu sapratiyogikatvaniṣpratiyogikatvavyavasthā tu yadasādhāraṇyena svavācakapravṛttinimittāvacchedena pratītau pratiyogipratīti sāpekṣam tatsapratiyogikam, anyattu niṣpratiyogikamiti, tanna, bhedasya svarūpatve tadanyatvāsiddheḥ| etena- ekasyārthasya laghutvakaṭhinatvādinā ullekhena nirapekṣatve'pi agurutvādravatvādinā ullekhena sāpekṣatvamapi yathā, tathā ghaṭa ityullekhena nirapekṣasyāpi bheda ityullekhe sāpekṣatvopapattiriti- nirastam, śabdānullekhe'pi sāpekṣanirapekṣayoranubhavācca, layādivat nañanullekhamātreṇa dṛṣṭāntāsampratipatteśca| na ca- ekasyaiva gamanasya gacchaticalati śabdollekhābhyāmekasyaiva ca prayatnasya karoti pravartata iti śabdollekhābhyāṃ karmasāpekṣatvanirapekṣatvayoḥ śabdasvabhāvaprayuktidarśanādatrāpi ghaṭabhedaśabdollekhena sāpekṣatvanirapekṣatve syātāmiti- vācyam, arthagatasakarmakatvādīnāṃ śabdasvabhāvānadhīnatvāt| pratyuta ekasminneva tapadhātāvarthabhedena tayordarśanāt tapati ṛṣistapati pṛthivīṃ savite'tyādau| evaṃ ca dṛṣṭānteṣvarthabheda eva, phalaṃ dhātvartha iti mate saṃyogarūpārthabhedāt| matāntare tūttarasaṃyogāvacchinnaspandasya gamyarthatvaṃ, pūrvavibhāgaphalakaspandasya calatyarthatvam, anukūlayatnasya karotyarthatvaṃ, yatnamātrasya yatyarthatvamiti| na ca- bhedatvameva sāpekṣam, na tu bheda iti- vācyam, sāpekṣatayā viśeṣyasyaivānubhavād, anyathā ghaṭapratiyogikaṃ bhedatvamityullekhaḥ syāt| etena- `bhāvābhāvasvarūpatvānnānyonyabhāvatā pṛthak' ityukteḥ na svarūpamātraṃ bhedaḥ, kiṃtvanyonyābhāvaḥ, sa ca vastunaḥ saviśeṣābhinna ityukteśca ghaṭādireva bhāvābhāvarūpatayā bheda iti nirastam, ghaṭatadabhāvasthale bhāvatvābhāvatvayorviruddhatvena kalpanāt kathaṃ tadāśrayaikyam ? na ca avidyānivṛttyadvaitayorapi kathaṃ brahmaikyamiti- vācyam, asmanmate tatrābhāvatvasya kalpitatvena māyikatayā virodhābhāvāt, tava tu dvayorapi tāttvikatvena virodhasya duṣpariharatvāt| ata eva- tattādātmyāyogyatvaṃ vā tadaikyapramityaviṣayatvaṃ vā, yatra yaddarśanaṃ tatra tattādātmyādhyāsavirodhitatvaṃ vā, svavṛttiyatkiñciddharmānādhāraniṣṭha yatkiñciddharmānādhāratvasvarūpaṃ vā svāvṛttiyatkiñciddharmādhārāniṣṭhadharmādhāratva rūpaṃ vā svarūpatvaṃ tadbhedatvam, anādhāratvaṃ cādhāratvarāhityam, na tvādhārādanyatvamiti nānyonyāśraya iti- nirastam, svarūpatve sāpekṣatvānupapatteḥ, atireke anavasthānād, atyantābhāvānyonyābhāvayoraikyāpatteḥ, pramitidarśanādighaṭitatvena cakṣurādyagamyātāpatteśca| kiñca bhedasya ghaṭasvarūpatve tannirūpakapratiyogino'pi tatsvarūpatāpattiḥ, na hi bhedarūpamātraṃ ghaṭaḥ, kintu paṭapratiyogikabhedarūpa iti| nanu nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, bhedapratiyogina upalakṣaṇatvena svarūpatāyāmananvayād, anyathā duḥkhanivṛtteḥ pumarthatayā duḥkhasyāpi pumarthatvaṃ, doṣābhāvasya sādhakatāprayojakatve doṣasyāpi sadhākatāprayojakatvam, anṛtavyāvṛttyajñānanivṛttyorajñānādiprakāśarūpajñānasya ca brahmarūpatve anṛtādīnāmapi tadrūpatvam, ajñānanivṛttermokṣatve ajñānasya ca mokṣatvaṃ ca syāt| na ca lambakarṇādau karṇāderviśeṣaṇatayānvayadarśanādatrāpi tathā, citragvādiṣu ananvayāttathaiva kiṃ na syāt ? anyathodāhṛtasthale agateḥ| na ca pratiyogina upalakṣaṇatve tadajñāne'pi kākājñāne gṛhajñānavattajjñānāpattiḥ, iṣṭāpatteḥ, anyathodāhṛtāgateśca| kecitu pratiyogino'nanvaye'pi `śabdaḥ anitya' ityādau śabdatvāderviśeṣaṇatvamivātrāpi viśeṣaṇatvamityāhuriti- cenna, na hi vayaṃ paṭabhedo ghaṭasvarūpamityanvayapraviṣṭatvena pratiyogitayā nirūpakatvamātreṇa vā paṭasya ghaṭarūpatāmāpādayāmaḥ, kintu samānādhikaraṇapratītiviṣayasvarūpaṃ prati pratiyogitayā nirūpakatvena, abhedanirūpakapratiyogivat| na cājñānanivṛttyādayaḥ samānādhikaraṇapratītiviṣayāḥ bhedastu ghaṭaḥ paṭo neti samānādhikaraṇapratītiviṣayaḥ, anyathā samānādhikaraṇaniṣedhabuddhiviṣayatvaṃ bhedalakṣaṇaṃ na syāt| etena- puruṣārthe duḥkhamiva brahmaṇyajñānavattayā| mokṣe ca mohavannāntargataṃ kumbhādikaṃ paṭe|| taṭasthatve'pi kumbhāderapratītau na bhedadhīḥ| ajñānāderapratītau taddhānyādyapratītivat|| iti - nirastam | kiñca vidāraṇātmano bhedasya ghaṭasvarūpatve ghaṭasyāpi vidāraṇaṃ syāt evaṃ tadavayavānāmapīti paramāṇurapi naika iti śūnyatāpattiḥ, ekābhāve tatsamāhārarūpānekasyāpyabhāvāt| nanu- avidāraṇātmakasyābhedasya brahmarūpatve pāramārthikabrahmaṇo vyāvahārikaprātibhāsikaśūnyairapi avidāraṇe tadaikyamapi syāt| na ca jīvābheda eva svarūpam, na tu ghaṭādyabhedaḥ, tarhyatrāpi ghaṭādibhyo bheda eva paṭasvarūpam, na tu svasmāditi samamiti- cenna, svarūpatve bhedasya svajñānāpratibadhyajñānapratiyogikatve svarūpatvenābhedavat svapratiyogitvaniyamena svavidārakatvasyāvaśyakatvād, ghaṭadharmeṣu paṭapratiyogikabhedatvavad ghaṭapratiyogakabhedatvasyāpi abhyupagamāt, paṭād bhinno ghaṭa itivad ghaṭādbhinno ghaṭa iti pratītervajralepatvācca| yattu svasmādvidārakatve avayavānāṃ vibhāgena sūkṣmatvameva syāt, na tu śūnyatvam, na hi śūnyasaṃyogāt kiñcidutpannamiti, tanna, vibhājakatvaṃ na vidārakatvam, kiṃtvekatvavirodhitvam| tathā caikasyābhāve anekasya sutarāmabhāvācchūnyatāyāmeva paryavasānācca| etena vidārakalavitrādeḥ svasaṃbandhinyeva vidārakatvam, na tu svasminniti bhedaścetsvarūpaṃ, tadā svaṃ na vidārayet| kiñca bhedasya na vidārakatvam, bhāvavyutpattyā vidāraṇatvāt| tathā ca svarūpabhedena ghaṭasya na vidāraṇaṃ syāt, svavṛttivirodhāditi- nirastam, bhedasya vidāraṇarūpa vibhāgātmakatvena vibhāgasya vibhajyamānavṛttitvaniyamenāvayavānavasthayā śūnyatāpattestādavasthyāt| ata eva vibhāgarūpavidāraṇātmā na bhedaḥ, kiṃtvanyonyābhāvaḥ, dhātūnāmanekārthatvāt| taduktam- kriyāvācitvamākhyātumekaiko'rthaḥ pradarśyate| prayogato'nusartavyā anekārthā hi dhātavaḥ|| iti | anyathā saṃyuktayorbhinnāviti vyavahāro na syāditi- nirastam, anyonyābhāvasvarūpatve kapālādirūpāśrayapratiyogikabhedasya ghaṭādirūpāśritarūpatayā svapratiyogikabhedāśrayatvādekatvaṃ kapālādiṣu bhajyetetyavayavānavasthayā śūnyatāyāmeva paryavasānāt| ata eva- nānekatvaikārthasamavāyinā bhedena ekatvaṃ nirākṛtya tena punaranekatvanirākaraṇaṃ yujyate, upajīvyavirodhāditinirastam, anekatvamaspṛṣṭvaiva svapratiyogikabhedamātreṇa aikyavirahasyāpādyatvāt| ata evoktamācāryaiḥ- `abhedaikārthasamavāyinyā ekatāyā bhedena virodhā"diti| yaduktaṃ svasminvṛttivirodhāditi, tanna, vibhāgādirūpavyāpārasyānaṅgīkārād itaravirodhitādirūpavyāpārasya sarvatra sattvāt| kiñca svarūpatve bhedasya saṃśayādirna syāt, dharmijñāne bhedājñānābhāvāt, tadajñāne hetorevābhāvāt| nanu- abhedasyāpi svarūpatve saṃśayādyanupapattistavāpi samā, yadi cābhedatvenājñānāttathā, mamāpi bhedatvenājñānāttaditi- cenna, bhedasya svarūpatve śūnyatāpādakayuktyā koṭīnāmevocchedāt| na ca- abhedasyāpi svarūpatve bhedakoṭyucchedastavāpīti- vācyam, kalpitakoṭimādāya saṃśayopapatteḥ| na ca tavāpi bhedakasattvādikoṭiḥ kalpitā, śūnyatāpatterityuktatvāt| yattu prāk caitanye svayaṃbhāte'pi tadabhinnasyaikyasyānavacchinnasyānandasya cāprakāśavaddharmiṇaḥ prakāśe'pi tadabhinnasya bhedasyāprakāśo bhaviṣyati, kiñcaikyaprakāśe tatra vipratipattirna syāt, tadupadeśānarthakyaṃ ca syāditi, tanna, aikyādīnāṃ svaprakāśasvarūpatve'pi tasyājñānatatkāryavipratipattyādīn prati avirodhitayā tadgocaravirodhivṛttiparyantamuktānupapatyābhāvāt| na ca tarhi pratyagarthe'pi vipratipattiḥ syāt, cārvākādīnāṃ tasyā api darśanāt| tasmādajñānāśrayatvādinā pratyagarthaprakāśamupajīvyaṃ nāvidyāvṛṇoti, aikyādyaṃśaṃ tvāvṛṇotyeveti tatra vipratipattyādayaḥ| na ca- evaṃ sādṛśyādidoṣādatrāpi bhedāṃśa āvṛta iti- vācyam, koṭyanupasthiteḥ pradhānapūrvamāropavādinaḥ tava tadasaṃbhavāt| yattu svarūpabhedo bhedatvena bhāsata eva, prāyaḥ sarvabhinnatvenaiva pratīteḥ, anyathā sarvakoṭikaḥ saṃśayaḥ syāt| tatra ca ghaṭapratiyogikatvādirūpā anekadharmāḥ sādṛśyādivaśādagṛhītāḥ saṃśayaviṣayā bhaviṣyanti, na cānekanirūpyasya bhedasya nirūpakānekatvādanekatvāpattiḥ, tādṛśasyāpīśvarajñānāderanekadvaitanirūpyādvaitasya caikyadarśanād, eka nirūpyaprāgabhāvadhvaṃsayoranaikyadarśanācceti, tanna, na vayaṃ nirūpakabhedena bhedaṃ brūmaḥ, kintu pratiyogitāvacchedakabhedenābhāvabhedasyāvaśyakatayā, anyathā ekaghaṭapratiyogināṃ caturṇāṃ dhvaṃsādīnāmaikyāpatteḥ| na cādhikaraṇarūpābhāvavādināmadhikaraṇabhedenaivābhāvabhedaḥ, dhvaṃsaprāgabhāvayoraikyāpattau vilakṣaṇavyavahārānāpatteḥ| na caivamadvaite'pyaikyānupapattiḥ, brahmetaratvarūpapratiyogitāvacchedakasyaikyāt, pratiyogibhedābhedayoratantratvāt| yadapi bhedajñānaṃ na bhramavirodhi, kiṃtvadhiṣṭhāna āropyaviruddhadharmādijñānamiti, tanna, śābdābhedabhramasya śābdabhedajñānādanivṛttyāpatteḥ| yadapi kaiściduktam- adoṣamūlā tādrūpyeṇāpratītau pratītiḥ svarūpabhedalakṣaṇam, śukteśca śuktyātmanā apratītiḥ doṣamūleti na tatrātivyāptiḥ| adoṣamūletyasya yadyapi saptamyantaviśeṣaṇatvaṃ na saṃbhavati, tathāpi viśiṣṭaviśeṣaṇatvena tadviśeṣaṇatvaparyavasānāditi, tanna, tādrūpyeṇāpratītau pratīterabhedasādhāraṇyenādoṣamūlatvaparyantajñānaṃ bhedavyavahārakāraṇaṃ vācyam| tatrādoṣamūlatvaṃ phalaikonneyamiti cākṣuṣatvaṃ na syāt, pratītighaṭitatvāt, apratyayakāle ca bhedo na syāt| kiñca rajatātmanā śukteḥ pratītisamaye tatra tadbhedaste na syāt, adoṣamūletyasyābhāvaviśeṣaṇatvenāvyāptivāraṇe asāmarthyāt, viśeṣyānadhikaraṇasya sutarāṃ viśiṣṭānadhikaraṇatvāt| na hi puruṣahīne daṇḍipuruṣasaṃbhavaḥ| na cādoṣamūleti aśarīrajanyatvamityatra śarīramiva pratiyogiviśeṣaṇaṃ bādhitasaṃgrahāya, nañā samastapratīterasamastenānanvayāt| na hyabrāhmaṇaḥ samīcīna ityanena samīcīnaviprābhāvaḥ pratīyate| adoṣamūlatādātmyaprakārapratītyabhāvoktau ca śukte rūpyātmanā apratītikāle sāmagrīvirahāt śuktyātmanā cāpratītau svabhedāpatteḥ tādavasthyāt| na ca- tadāpi pratīyamānaśuktyātmanā pratīyamānatvamīśvarajñānamādāyāstyeveti- vācyam, evaṃ satyapratītidaśāviraheṇa pratīyamānapadavaiyarthyāt| na cānyonyābhāvatvaṃ tat| tasyānirūpaṇāt| taduktamācāryaiḥ- sāpekṣatvātsāvadheśca tatve'dvaitaprasaṅgataḥ| ekābhāvādasandehānna rūpaṃ vastuno bhidā|| iti | kiñca ghaṭasya bhedatve ekatarapariśeṣāpattiḥ| nanu- aikyasya jñānasyānandasya ca brahmasvarūpatve ekatarapariśeṣāpattistavāpi samānā, na ca vastuna ekatveneṣṭāpattiḥ prakṛte'pi sāmyāditi- cenna, ekatarapariśeṣāpattyā ghaṭa iti bheda iti vilakṣaṇa vyavahārābhāvasyāpādanāt| na ca pravṛttinimittaghaṭatvabhedatvayorbhedāttadupapattiḥ bhedatvasya nirvaktumaśakyatvāt| tathā hi- na tāvajjātiḥ, jātyādisādhāraṇatvāt, nopādhiḥ tādātmyāvacchinnapratiyogikābhāvatvādirūpaḥ, tādātmyasya bhedaviraharūpatve anyonyāśrayāt, tanniṣṭhāsādhāraṇadharmarūpatve tadavacchinnapratiyogikātyantābhāve'tivyāpteḥ, tasyāpi svarūpatve anugatavyavahārānāpatteḥ, na ca- jñānānandādāvapi vilakṣaṇavyavahāro na syāditi- vācyam, kalpitadharmabhedamādāyopapatteḥ| na ca- bhedatvamapi tathāstviti- vācyam, tarhyanirākāryo'si| kiñca bhedasya svarūpatve idaṃ bhinnamasya bheda iti saṃbandhitvena dhīrna syāt| na cānando brahmaṇa iti vadupapattiḥ, pramāṇasiddhe hyaikye bhedavyavahārasyaupacārikatvaṃ kalpyate rāhoḥ śira ityādivat| na ca prakṛte tathā, aikye mānābhāvād bādhakācca| na ca pakṣāntarānupapattereva pakṣāntaraparigrahaḥ, śaśaśṛṅgādau bhāvatvābhāvatvayoranyatarānupapattyā'nyataragrahaṇāpatteḥ| na ca tatrobhayatra bādhakādalīkatvenopapattiḥ, prakṛte'pyubhayatra bādhakādāvidyakatvenopapatteḥ saṃbhavāt| nanu- asti bhedasya svarūpatve jñānaṃ mṛd ghaṭa itivat ghaṭaḥ paṭātmako neti paṭatādātmyaniṣedharūpasya bhedasya ghaṭasāmānādhikaraṇyenābhedapratyakṣaṃ, tathā ghaṭabhedayorekaikasya pratītāvitarasya niyamena pratīyamānatvādikaṃ liṅgam| `satyaṃ bhedastu vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ nātra saṃśayaḥ- ityādyāgamaśceti- cenna, ghaṭaḥ paṭātmako netyāderanyonyābhāvabhedaviṣayatayā bhedābhedāviṣayatvād, anyathā nīlo ghaṭa ityāderapi rūpābhedaviṣayatvāpatteḥ| liṅgasya cābhedasiddheḥ pūrvamasiddhatvāt, sāmānyavyāpterjātivyaktyādau samānasaṃvitsaṃvedye vyabhicārādviśeṣavyāptāvapi pratiyogini vyabhicārācca, āgamasya cādhiṣṭhānātirekeṇāsattvaparatvāt| kiñca paṭād bhedaḥ ghaṭamātrarūpaṃ vā, ghaṭakuḍyādisarvarūpaṃ vā ? ādye kuḍyādiḥ paṭabhedo na syāt| dvitīye svarūpāṇāmananugatatvāt paṭabhedānugatapratītirna syāt| na ca paṭajñānecchādau yathā paṭaviṣayatvenānugatenānugatavyavahāraḥ, tathā paṭapratiyogikatvenātrāpyanugatavyavahāra iti- vācyam, etāvatā hi jñānādiṣu paṭaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ paṭaviṣayeccheti paṭhaviṣayatvāṃśe anugamavat paṭapratiyogikatvāṃśa evānugamaḥ syāt, na bhedāṃśe'pi| na ca bhedatvamapyekamityuktam| kiñcedamasmād bhinnamiti vā'syāmuṣmāt bheda iti vā dharmipratiyogighaṭitatvena bhedagrahaṇe parasparāśrayaḥ, dharmipratiyogijñāne bhedajñānaṃ tasmiṃśca satyasyāmuṣmāditi vilakṣaṇadharmipratiyogijñānamiti ghaṭapaṭau bhinnāviti| ghaṭapaṭaviśeṣaṇatayā tayoṃrbheda iti tadviśeṣyatayā vā grahaṇe'pi anyonyāśraya eva| ghaṭapaṭapratītau tadviśeṣyatvādinā bhedagrahaḥ, bhedagrahe ca dvitvāvacchinnaghaṭa paṭapratītiriti| na ca- bhedasya svarūpatvāt svarūpapratītereva bhedadhītvena dhīdvayābhāvānnoktadoṣa iti- śaṅkyam, svarūpajñānasya dvitīyatvābhāve'pi pratiyogijñānasya svarūpajñānātiriktasya dvitīyasyāpekṣaṇāt| na ca- sarvātmakamidamiti viparyayādarśanenedaṃ na sarvātmakamiti sāmānyataḥ sarvato vyāvṛttaṃ vastvanubhūyata iti pratiyogiviśeṣa jñānānapekṣaṇānannānyonyāśraya iti vācyam, sarvātmakaṃ netyatra sarvatvaṃ vā pratiyogitāvacchedakaṃ svetarasarvatvaṃ vā| ādye svasmāṃdvailakṣaṇye svāsiddhiprasaṅgāt, dvitīye anyonyāśrayasya spaṣṭatvāt| na ca- `sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahme'tyatra yathā brahmātmatvenāpratītaṃ sarvamucyate| tadvadatrāpi sarvasmādityanena tadātmakatvenājñātaṃ sarvaṃ vivakṣyata iti- vācyam, svagrahāt pūrvaṃ svasyāpi svātmanā'jñātatvāt svasya pratiyogitāpatteḥ, dṛṣṭānte sarvaśabdasyāsaṅkucitatve tavāsampratipattiśca| na ca- vastuto bhedāśrayasyābhedenājñātasya jñānaṃ pratiyogijñānatvena kāraṇam, na tu bhinnatvaprakārakajñānatveneti- vācyam, evaṃ hi candre dvitvabhramo na syāt, vastuto bhedābhāvāt| nanu- `astīdaṃ na jānāmi' `sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahme'tyādiṣu sākṣisiddhakālaviṣayasarvaiḥ saha vastvajñānābhedānāmivehāpi sākṣisiddhena pratiyoginā sahaiva vyāvṛtteḥ pratīternānyonyāśraya iti cenna, viśiṣṭajñānasya viśeṣaṇajñānājanyatve'pi pratiyogisavikalpakasyābhāvajñānaṃ pratyanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ janakatvāt| sākṣī ca pramāṇamanapekṣya pratiyogipaṭādikaṃ dharmibhinnatayā na gṛhṇātīti kathaṃ sākṣisiddhapratiyoginā bhedagrahopapattiḥ syāt ? taduktaṃ cintāmaṇau anyathā- nirvikalpakādapi ghaṭo nāstīti vṛttyāpatte'riti| na ca- etāvatā pratiyogitāvacchedakapaṭatvādiprakārakajñānamātramarthanīyam, na tu dharmibhinnatvajñānaparyantamiti- vācyam, dharmitāvacchedakabhedājñāne pratiyogitāvacchedakatayā abhāvanirūpakatvasyaivābhāvād, anyonyadharmabhedajñāne ca viśiṣya stambhāt kumbhasya bhedapratītau kumbhāt stambhasya bhedadhīrityanyonyāśrayatādavasthyāt| nanu- tvanmate'pi bimbabrahmajīvānāṃ pratibimbabrahmābhede `idamanenābhinnamasyāmuṣmādabhedaḥ etayorabheda' ityevaṃ pratītiḥ syāt| tathā ca dharmipratiyogibhāvadhīrdvitvāvacchinnadhīśca bhedajñānādhīneti tadviruddhābhedajñānānupapattiriti- cenna, kālpanikabhedajñānasya dharmipratiyogibhāvadvitvāvacchinnajñānanirvāhakasya tāttvikābhedajñānapratibandhakatvāyogāt| kiñcābhedajñāne na dharmirūpapratiyogijñānāpekṣā, tasya niṣpratiyogika vastusvarūpatvāt, sapratiyogikatvavyavahārastu nirūpakabhedasapratiyogikatvena| ata eva- jīvasya pratiyogitayā brahmābhedanirūpakatvaṃ tadabhinnatayā jñātasyaivetyanyonyāśrayaḥ, dharmiṇā sahābhedena pratītasyaivābhedapratiyogitvād, anyathā dahanasyāpi tuhinābhedasapratiyogitvāpatteriti- nirastam, bhedagrahasya tatra pratibandhakatvācca| ata eva- `tattvamasī'tyatra tvaṃpadavācyasya viśiṣṭasya brahmābhedapratiyogitvaprasaṅgavinivāraṇāya vidyamānābhedasyāsati pratibandhake abhedayogyacittvādirūpeṇa pratītirabhedadhīhetuḥ bhedabhrame tu doṣaḥ pratibandhaka iti nābedadhīriti parasiddhāntaṃ parikalpya svarūpabhedapakṣe vastuto'gyonyapratiyogikayorghaṭa paṭasvarūpabhedayoranyonyapratiyogitvayogyaghaṭapaṭatvādirūpeṇa pratītayorasati pratibandhe'nyonyapratiyogitayā viśiṣṭadhīḥ, dharmabhedapakṣe'pi vidyamānabhedasyāsati pratibandhake bhedayogyanīlapītatvādirūpeṇa pratītirbhedahetuḥ, dūrasthavanaspatyādau tu dūrādidoṣaḥ pratibandhaka iti na bhedadhīriti sāmyena samādhānaṃ nirastam, vaiṣamyasyoktatvāt| nanu- yathā gaurgavayasadṛśītyādau gavayādīnāṃ gavādibhyo bhedaḥ sanneva pratiyogitvahetuḥ, na tu jñātaḥ, na hi gaurgavayasadṛśīti pratyakṣadhīrapi niyamena gavayo gobhinna iti dhūpūrvikā'nubhūyate, sutarāṃ śābdadhīḥ, tatra bhedavāciśabdābhāvāt, tathā prakṛte'pi| anyathā caitrasya maitrapitṛtvādau jñāta eva maitrasya caitraputratvādijñānaṃ, gavayasya gosādṛśye jñāta eva gaurgavayasadṛśīti jñānamiti sapratiyogakapadārthamātre anyonyaśrayaḥ syāditi- cenna, iṣṭāpatteḥ, ata eva sapratiyogitvena niṣpratiyogitvena ca bhedasādṛśyādi durvacaṃ, sarvatra bādhakasattvāditi asmākaṃ siddhāntaḥ| yattūktam pratiyogidharmibhedagrahapūrvakatvaniyamo nānubhūyata iti, tadiṣṭameva, tasyaiva sapratiyogitve bādhakatvāt, pratyakṣa eva sapratiyogikapadārthagrahe eva manyonyāśrayasyāpādyatve śābde bhedavācakapadāsattvasyāsmān pratyadūṣaṇatvāt| evaṃ ca pratiyogidhīmātraṃ na bhedadhīhetuḥ, tannirvikalpakādapi tadāpatteḥ, kintu pratiyogitvena| tatrāpi nānyaṃ prati pratiyogitvena kintu bhedaṃ prati| tathā cānyonyāśrayaḥ| na ca sapratiyogikasādṛśyādāvevaṃ syāt, iṣṭāpatteḥ, abhedaśca na sapratiyogika ityuktatvācca| yattu yatra dharmipratiyoginau sannihitau, tatra dharmipratiyogisadbhāvayostadbhedasya ca yugapaddhīḥ, idamanena sadṛśamitivat| tathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasya ca yugaddhīḥ, imau sadṛśāvitivat, sarvasya yogyasya indriyasannikarṣeṇa yugapatsarvaviṣayaikajñānasaṃbhavāt| na hi manmate daṇḍīti dhīrapi daṇḍajñānasādhyā| uktaṃ caitat yatra dharmipratiyoginoranyatarasyāsannidhānaṃ, tatrāpi saṃskārasacivendriyasannikarṣeṇa evameva jñānamutpadyate, tadanena sadṛśamityādivat| anyathā abhedajñānamapi na syāt| tathā cānyonyāśrayaḥ| taduktam- dharmitvapratiyogitvatadbhāvā yugapadyadi| viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyaṃ ca tadbhāvaśyaiva gṛhyate|| iti | tanna, prameyatvādinā ghaṭe jñāte'pi ghaṭābhāva ityapratīteḥ ghaṭatvādinā ghaṭasya pūrvamavaśyaṃ jñeyatvena yugapadeva dharmipratiyogyādibuddhyasiddheḥ| na ca- tatra ghaṭatvādinā ghaṭasya pūrvamavaśyaṃ jñeyatvena yugapadeva dhaṟmipratiyogyādibuddhyasiddhiḥ| na ca- tatra ghaṭatvādijñānasāmagrīvilambādeva vilambaḥ, tatsattve iṣṭāpattiriti- vācyam, pratiyogyaviṣayakābhāvapratyayāpādanasyaivamapyaparihārāt| na ca tādṛkpratiyogigrahasāmagrīkāraṇam, tadapekṣayā pratiyogigrahasyaiva laghutvāt| nanu- anyatvāgrahaṇe proktaḥ kathamanyonyasaṃśrayaḥ| anyatvaṃ yadi siddhaṃ syāt kathamanyonyasaṃśrayaḥ|| ityubhayataḥpāśārajjuriti- cenna, na hyanyatvabuddhiṃ vyavahārakṣamāmapi nirākurmaḥ kiṃtvanāvidyakatve nopapadyata iti brūmaḥ| kiṃ ca bhedasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvenaiva jñeyatvāt tattadbhāvapratīteśca bhedapratītyadhīnatayā daṇḍacaitrādau dṛṣṭatvena bhedapratītiparamparānavasthā syāt| na ca- brahma jīvābhinnam, jaganmithyetyādāvapyabhedāderviśeṣaṇatayā bheda jñānasyāpekṣaṇīyatayā'navasthāpatteḥ, na prāthamikābhedādidhīriti tavāpi samānamiti- vācyam, avidyākalpitabhedenājñātenāpi viśeṣaṇatvādyupapatteḥ| na caivaṃ tavāpi, bhedabhedyayoḥ svarūpato bhedābhāvāt, bhedasyādhikaraṇānatirekāt, dharmo bheda iti pakṣe tu pratītyanavasthoddhāre'pi viṣayānavasthāyā duṣpariharatvāpatteḥ| na cāvidyakabhedapakṣe'pyanavasthādidoṣaḥ, anupapatteralaṅkāratvāt| ata eva abhinnaṃ brahmetyatrābedasya bhinnatayā jñātasya viśeṣaṇatvena tena saha brahmābhedabodhanānupapattiḥ, prācīnabhedadhiyā pratibandhāditi- nirastam, anirvacanīyabhedajñānasya tāttvikābhedajñānāpratibandhakatvāt| kiṃ ca dharmabhedapakṣe pratyakṣaṃ kiṃ bhedameva gocarayati ? uta vastvapi ? nādyaḥ, bheda ityevāpratīteḥ| dvitīye'pi kiṃ bhedapūrvakaṃ vastu gocarayet ? uta vastupūrvakaṃ bhedam, yugapadvā ubhayam ? nādyaḥ, bheda ityevāpratīteḥ, viramya vyāpārāyogācca| ata eva na dvitīyaḥ, na tṛtīyaḥ, vastugrahasya bhedagrahajanakatāyāḥ sthāpitatvāt| na ca vastumātrajñānānantarabhāvinā viśiṣṭajñānena yugapadubhayagrahaḥ, pratiyogitvādinā jñātasyaiva bhedadhīhetutvād, anyathā pañcamīprayogādyanupapatteḥ| tatra ca prāgukto doṣaḥ| ata eva- viśiṣṭadhiyo viśeṣaṇajñānajanyatvamate anayorbheda iti jñānānantaramimau bhinnāviti dhiyaḥ saṃbhavaḥ, viśeṣaṇajñānājanyatve'pi yugapadeva ubhayagocaradhiyaḥ saṃbhava iti- nirastam, anayorbheda ityādau ṣaṣṭhyollikhyamānasaṃbandhagrahārthaṃ bhedagrahasya pūrvamavaśyāpekṣaṇīyatayā anavasthāyā duṣpariharatvāt| na ca bimbapratibimbayorjīvabrahmaṇoścābhedagrāhipratyakṣaṃ śabdaśca kimabhedameva gocarayedityādivikalpasāmyam, abhedasya vastusvarūpatvenedṛgvikalpānavakāśāt| kiṃ ca bhedasyānyonyābhāvatve tatpratiyoginoḥ stambhakumbhayostādātmyasyāprāmāṇikatvenānyonyābhāvasyāprāmāṇikatvaṃ syāt| na ca dvaitāderaprāmāṇikatve tadvirahasyāprāmāṇikatvāpattiḥ, atirekapakṣe iṣṭāpatteḥ, anatirekapakṣe tvadhikaraṇaprāmāṇikatvasyaiva prāmāṇikatve tantratayā pratiyogyaprāmāṇikatve'pi prāmāṇikatvopapatteḥ| na ca- anyonyābhāve'pi tatpakṣe tathāṅgīkriyatāmiti- vācyam, tasyādhikaraṇarūpatāyāṃ śūnyavādādyāpatteruktatvāt| yattvaprāmāṇikasya niṣedhapratiyogitvamityuktaṃ paraiḥ, tanna vārayāmaḥ, kiṃtvadhikaraṇātireke niṣedhasyāprāmāṇikatvamātraṃ brūmaḥ| nanu- atra na kumbhastambhobhayatādātmyaṃ niṣedhapratiyogi, kiṃtu stambhatādātmyaṃ stambhe pramitaṃ kumbhagataṃ niṣidhyata iti na pratiyogyaprāmāṇikatvamiti- cenna, tādātmyamātrasya niṣedhapratiyogitve dūrasthavanaspatyeriva bādhottarakālamimau vanaspatī itivadime śuktirajate iti pratītyāpatteḥ| na cāsannidhānakṛto viśeṣaḥ, etāvatāpi śuktitadrajate iti pratītyāpatteḥ| yattvanyonyābhāvasaṃsargābhāvayorlakṣaṇaṃ yatrādhikaraṇe pratiyogitāvacchedakamāropya niṣedhāvagamaḥ, so'nyonyābhāvaḥ, yatrādhikaraṇe pratiyoginamāropya niṣedhāvabhāsaḥ, sa saṃsargābhāva iti, tanna, atīndriye bhede saṃsargābhāve ca tanmate avyāpteḥ| śabdajanyābhāvabuddhau vyabhicāreṇāropasyābhāvabuddhāvahetutvācca| kiñca bhede svetarabhedasya vaktavyatayā svavṛttivirodho'navasthā vā| na ca- brahmābhede'pi svābhedasya vaktavyatayā svavṛttitvaṃ samānamiti- vācyam, abhedasya svanirvāhakatvādityavehi| na ca bhede tathā, bhedādhikaraṇakabhedavyavahārasya svarūpeṇa nirvāhe ghaṭe'pi tathātve dharmapakṣakabhedānupapatteḥ| kiñca bhede bhedatvamupādhirūpaṃ jātirūpaṃ vā vācyam, tatra punarbhedo vācyaḥ, anyathā bhedatvasyānyasmād bhedo na syāt| tathā cānyonyavṛttyā svavṛttyāpatteḥ svavṛttitvavattasyāpi viruddhatvāt| na ca- abhede'pyabhedatvaṃ vācyam, tatra punarabhedo vācyaḥ, anyathā tasya svābhedo na syāditi tatrāpi tathātvāpattiḥ, prameyatvābhidheyatvādivadanyonyavṛttitvasyābhede adoṣatve bhede'pi sāmyamiti vācyam, asmākamabhedamātrasyābhedatvasya ca brahmābhedābhinnatayā anyonyamityasyaivābhāvenānyonyavṛttitvasyaivāpādayitumaśakyatvāt| na ca tarhi ghaṭe ghaṭābhedasya jīve jīvābhedasya vā jīvabrahmābhedatve vedāntavaiyarthyam, bhedabhramanivartakavṛttermahāvākyaṃ vinānupapatteruktatvāt| yattu prameyatvādau pramitatvādanyonyavṛttiradoṣa iti, tanna, ātmāśrayāditvadoṣeṇa tatrāpi pramitatvāsiddheḥ| ata eva na kaścit kevalānvayī| kiñca bhedaḥ kiṃ bhinne niviśate ? abhinne vā ? ādye ātmāśrayo'nyonyāśrayo vā| dvitīye virodhaḥ| na ca- abhedānirvācyatvādikaṃ kiṃ tadvati tadabhāvavati cetyādivikalpasyātrāpi sāmyamiti- vācyam, abhedasya svarūpatvena tatra tadvikalpānavakāśāt, anirvācyādāvasya vikalpasyānirvācyatva- prayojakasyāsmākamanukūlatvāt| na ca bhedo'pi svarūpam, prāgeva nirāsāt| na ca- bhedaḥ svāśrayatvayogye vartate, yogyatā ca pramārūpaphalaikonneyā iti- vācyam, yogyatāyā bhedaṃ vinā vaktumaśakyatvāt| na hyabhinne kadāpi tadyogyatā, dharmāntarasyāpi bhedamapuraskṛtya yogyatvāprayojakatvāt, bhedābhedāvajñātvā bhramapramārūpaphalabhedasyaivājñānena bhedayogyatāyāḥ pramārūpaphalabhedānunneyatvācca| asvavyāghātakaireva jātibhinnaiḥ saduttaraiḥ| nirastaṃ bhedamādāya svātmābhedo niṣīdati|| ityadvaitasiddhau viśeṣato bhedakhaṇḍanam|| 15 || 16. viśeṣasamarthanam nanu- asmākaṃ bhedo na svarūpamātram, kiṃ tvanyonyābhāvaḥ, sa ca vastunā saviśeṣābhinnaḥ, tataścābhinnātvānasthādiḥ| bhedapratinidherviśeṣasya vidyamānatvānna paryāyatvādikam, viśeṣaśca bhedahīne'pi ekatarapariśeṣābhāvādinirvāhaka iti- cenna, paryāyatvādipramājanakasya svarūpātiriktasya viśeṣasyāṅgīkāre tasyaiva bhedatvena bhedasya dharmabhedoktyayogād, viśeṣasyāpi bhedaḥ saviśeṣābhinna eva vācyaḥ| tathā cānavasthātādavasthyam| na ca vaiśeṣikābhimataviśeṣavattasya svaparanirvāhakatvam, etādṛśaviśeṣe mānābhāvāt| nanu- `vijñānamānandaṃ brahme'tyādivākyabodhyavijñānānandādīnāṃ tvanmate'pi bhedasya bhedābhedayorvā'khaṇḍārthakatvena `ekadhaivānudraṣṭavya'mityādi śrutivirodhena cāṅgīkartumaśakyatayā bhedapratinidherviśeṣasyāparyāyatvādyarthamavaśyaṃ svīkāra iti arthāpattireva mānamiti- cenna, bhede aikarasyaśrutivirodhavad atrāpi tattādavasthyāt| lakṣyārthābhede'pi vācyārthabhedenāparyāyatvasya vyāvartyabhedādavaiyarthyasya cānyathaivopapatteḥ| kiñca tavāpi jñānānandatvādinimittabhedādevāparyāyatvamastu, kiṃ viśeṣeṇa ? na ca- `evaṃ dharmā'niti śrutyā tayorapi bhedaniṣedhāt naivamiti- vācyam, tarhi viśeṣasyāpyāśritatvena dharmatayā'syāpi bhedaniṣedhāttenāpyanupapattiḥ| na ca- jñānatvānandatvayorarthaprakāśatvanirupādhikeṣṭhatvarūpayorarthaprakāśanirupādhikeṣṭarūpāśrayaviśeṣa āvaśyaka iti- vācyam, jñānatvānandatvayorjātirūpatvena uktarūpatvābhāvāt| na ca- ākāśaśabdāśrayaśabdayoḥ pravṛttinimittābhedena paryāyatvāpattiḥ, tatparihārāya viśeṣo vācya iti- vācyam, paryāyatve'pi sahaprayogasya vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāvādināpyupapatteḥ| na ca- evaṃ jñānānandayorekatarapariśeṣeṇa mokṣe ānandaprakāśo na syāditi- vācyam, tayorbhedābhāvena ekataratvasyaivābhāvāt, dvayorvacane tarabvidhānāt| etena- śodhitatatpadārthādaikyasya na bhedaḥ, nāpi bhedābhedau, kiṃtvatyantābhedaḥ, evaṃ ca viśeṣānaṅgīkāre svaprakāśacaitanyabhāne aikyābhānāpattiḥ, tatprakāśasya bhedabhramāvirodhitve'pyaikyaprakāśasya tadvirodhaḥ, tasya nirapekṣatve'pi aikyasya sāpekṣatvaṃ ca nopapadyata iti- nirastam, āvarakājñānakalpitāṃśamādāya sarvasyopapatteḥ| na ca- ekasyā eva śukterāvṛtānāvṛtatve śuktyaṃśabheda eva syāditi- vācyam, tadaṃśakalpakasya phalasyābhāvāt| nanu- `evaṃ dharmā'niti śrutirastu mānam, atra hi brahmadharmānuktvā bhedo niṣidhyate| na ca bhedapratinidherabhāve dharmadharmibhāvo dharmāṇāmanekatvaṃ ca yuktamiti- cenna, dharmānityasya niṣedhānuvādatvena dharmatvānekatvādau tātparyābhāvāt| na ca śrutito'nyato brahmadharmāḥ prāptāḥ, āvidyakamātrasya sākṣisiddhatayā prāpteḥ| nanu- guṇaguṇinorabhedapakṣe ghaṭopalambhe śuklādyanupalambhārthaṃ bhedābhedapakṣe tayoravirodhārtham atyantabhedapakṣe'pi samavāyaḥ sambandhaḥ, sattā satī, antyaviśeṣo vyāvṛttaḥ, kālaḥ sadāsti, deśaḥ sarvatrāstītyabādhitavyavahārārthaṃ viśeṣo'ṅgīkāryaḥ abhāvādāvapyastitvādirnābhāvādito bhinnaḥ, guṇādiṣvanantarbhāvena ṣaḍeva padārthā iti niyamabhaṅgāpatteḥ aniyamapakṣe'pyastitve'pyastitvāntaramityanavasthāpatteḥ tatrāpi so'ṅgīkārya iti- cenna, svabhāvaviśeṣādeva sarvasyopapatteḥ| na ca- tarhi viśeṣasyāṅgīkāreṇa manmatapraveśa iti- vācyam, tattadasādhāraṇasvarūpasyaiva svabhāvaviśeṣaśabdārthatvena tvaduktaviśeṣānukteḥ, tattadasādhāraṇarūpeṇa samavāyādeḥ svanirvāhakatvāt| ata eva- svanirvāhakatvaṃ hi svakarmakanirvahaṇakartṛtvam, taccaikasminviruddhamiti tadupapādanāyāpi viśeṣāṅgīkāra iti- nirastam, svanirvāhakaśabdasya svetarānapekṣa vyavahāraviṣayatvamātrārthakatvād, anyathā viśeṣo'pyanavasthābhiyā vastvabhinna iti tavāṅgīkāreṇa taddūṣaṇāpātāt, svarūpabhedapakṣoktaikatarapariśeṣādidūṣaṇatādavasthyāpatteśca| na ca- antyaviśeṣavadasya dharmigrāhakamānena tādṛksvabhāvatayā siddheḥ paryanuyogāyoga iti- vācyam, dṛṣṭānta iva dārṣṭāntike svarūpātirekasya tvayaivānaṅgīkāreṇa vaiṣamyāt| yattu yatraiva bhedābhāvo bhedakāryaṃ ca pramitaṃ, tatraiva viśeṣaḥ kalpyate, na tu pramitabhede ghaṭapaṭādau viśeṣamādāya bhedatyāgaḥ, na hi somābhāve pūtīka iti tallābhe'pi sa iti, tanna, mukhyatvaniyāmakasya tatrevātrābhāvād viśeṣabhedayorubhayorapi svarūpaparyavasannatvena tvadvāgbhaṅgeranavakāśāt| kiñca bhedaḥ svayameva svakāryaṃ karotu, abhedakāryārthaṃ tatpratinidhirastvityādyāpatteśca| na cānandādāvabhedavad bhedasya bodhābhāvaḥ, alaukikasthale dvayoḥ sāmyāt| nanu- anumānamatra mānam, tathā hi- (1) brahmasvarūpabhūtayorvijñānānandayorbrahmābhedayośca ekatarapariśeṣābhāvaḥ, prameyatvādeḥ svāśritatvādikaṃ vā bhedānyaniyamyam, bhedāniyamyatve sati niyamyatvād, yad yadaniyamyatve sati niyamyam, tat tadanyaniyamyam, yathā saṃmatam| (2) brarhmasvarūpabhūtaṃ vijñānānandādikaṃ vā, bhedānyaikatarāpariśeṣanirvāhakavad, bhedahīnatve sati ekatarāpariśeṣarūpanirvāhyavattvāt, yadyena hīnatve sati yannirvāhyavad, tattadanyanirvāhakavad, yathā sammatam| (3) svāśritaṃ prameyatvādikaṃ vā, bhedānyāśrayāśrayibhāvanirvāhakavad, bhedahīnatve satyāśrayāśrayibhāvarūpanirvāhyavattvād, yathā saṃmatamityādikamiti cenna, tvadabhimataviśeṣādanyasyaivāvidyādeḥ sarvatra niyāmakatvasaṃbhavenārthāntarād, āvidyakabhedaniyamyatvena bādhādasiddheśca| nanu- tathāpi pratyakṣamatra mānam, tathā hi- tantupaṭādibuddhīnāṃ bhinnaghaṭādi buddhito vailakṣaṇyaṃ tāvadanubhūyate, tacca na tāvatsaṃbandhaviṣayatvena, kuṇḍavadarādibuddhito vailakṣaṇyānubhavāt| nāpi saṃyogānyasaṃbandhaviṣayatvena, ghaṭatajjñānatadabhāvabuddhito'pi vailakṣaṇyānubhavāt| nāpi svarūpapratyāsattisaṃyogānyasaṃbandhaviṣayatvena, ghaṭataddharmikānyonyābhāvabuddherghaṭapaṭādibuddhito vailakṣaṇyābhāvāpātāt| nāpyayutasiddhiviṣayatvena, āśrayāśrayibhāvaniyamo hyayutasiddhiḥ, tatra ca tadānīṃtana āśrayāśrayibhāvaḥ kuṇḍabadarādāvapi bhāti, niyamastu na tantupaṭādibuddhāvapi, na hi tantupaṭādidhīḥ pratyakṣā, anayoḥ sambandhanāśo vā, vibhāgo vā, na bhaviṣyatītyākārā, na vā kuṇḍavadarādidhīstayoḥ sambandhanāśo vā, vibhāgo vā, bhaviṣyatītyākārikā| nāpi samavāyaviṣayatvena, uktanyāyena sambandhanityatvasya sambandhyayutasiddhatvasya vā tatra tatrāsphuraṇāt| tasmādabhedaviṣayatvenaiva vailakṣaṇyaṃ vācyam, ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ, gajādikaṃ senā, patrameva tāṭaṅka ityādau purovartinā ghaṭāderivātānavitānātmakāstantava eva paṭaḥ, śuklaḥ paṭa ityādāvapi tantvādinā paṭasyābhedapratīteḥ| na ca- atra paṭatvaśuklatvayorekasthatvameva bhātīti- vācyam, paṭaśuklayoraikyasyāpi tatrāntargateḥ, anyathā kvāpyabhedo na syāt| `ghaṭaḥ paṭo'neti dhīśca bhedaviṣayā na syāt| `daṇḍī caitra' ityādāvapi daṇḍinā caitrasyābhedo bhātyeva| na ca- śuklaḥ paṭa ityatra śuklavāneva iti pratīyata iti- vācyam, śuklaṃ rūpamityatra yat śuklaṃ tasyeveha pratīteḥ| anyathehāpi daṇḍītivat śuklīti syāt| matublopādikalpanaṃ śabdaviṣayakavyavahāre, na tu pratītau| paṭasya śauklyamityādidhīrna bhedaviṣayā, kintu sambandhaviṣayā satī sattetyādivad bhedābhāve'pi upapannā ca| paṭasya tantvanyatve ca gurutvadvayāpattiḥ| tantumati paṭavṛttiśca na syāt, mūrtānāṃ samānadeśatāvirodhāt| vyavahārārthakriyābhedādikaṃ tu patratāṭaṅkādivadyuktam| tasmāttantupaṭādibuddhirabhedaviṣayaiva| yadi caivaṃ kevalābhedaviṣayā, tarhi sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavahāraṃ na janayet, ghaṭaḥ kalaśa ityādyavyavahārāt| tena jñāyate adhiko'pyasya viṣayo'sti| na cāyaṃ bhedaḥ, ghaṭaḥ na śukla ityullekhāpātāt, bhedābhedāvirodhāya viśeṣasyāvaśyakatvācca| tasmādyo'dhiko viṣayaḥ, sa viśeṣa iti- cenna, satyapyabhede kālpanikabhedamādāya tathā vyavahāropapattyā viśeṣasyāsiddheḥ| na ca paṭo na śuklaḥ iti pratītyāpattiḥ, phalabalena kālpanikabhedasya sāmānādhikaraṇyādi vyavahāramātranirvāhakatvakalpanena viparītollekhanaṃ pratyahetutvāt| tasmādevaṃ viśeṣo'yaṃ na mānaviṣayaḥ sakhe| viṣādaṃ jahi matsiddhāvidyayā sarvasaṅgatiḥ|| ityadvaitasiddhau viśeṣakhaṇḍanam|| 16 || 17. bhedapañcake pratyakṣam evaṃ pratyakṣataḥ prāptabhedasyaiva nivāraṇāt| asākṣātkṛtajīveśabhedādau kā kathā tava|| tathā hi- īśvarasyāpratyakṣatvena taddharmikasya tatpratiyogikasya vā bhedasya grahītumaśakyatvāt| nanu- īśadharmikabhedasya jīvāpratyakṣatve'pi svadharmikabhedaḥ tathāpi tatpratyakṣaḥ, `nāhaṃ sarvajño nāhaṃ nirduḥkha' ityādyanubhavāt| na ca- yogyapratiyogikatvamabhāvayogyatve prayojakamiti- vācyam, stambhaḥ piśāco netyādipratyakṣarūpaphalabalena saṃsargābhāve tathātve'pi anyonyābhāve adhikaraṇayogyatāyā eva tantratvāt| vastutastu- saṃsargābhāve'pi na tanmātraṃ yogyatā, jalaparamāṇau yogyapṛthivītvābhāvagrahaprasaṅgāt, kintu yatra yatsattvamanupalabdhivirodhi, tatra tasyābhāvo yogya iti adhikaraṇaniyataiva sarvābhāvasādhāraṇī yogyatā| sā ca prakṛte'pyastyeva, anyathā abhedaśruteraprasaktapratiṣedhakatāpatteḥ| bhedaśruteśca tvaduktapratyakṣasiddhabhedānuvāditvaṃ na syāt| īśadharmikajīvabhede'pi `tānyahaṃ veda sarvāṇi na tvaṃ vettha parantapa| uttamaḥ puruṣastvanya' ityāditadvacanānumitapratyakṣasiddhatvameveti- cenna, uktānubhavasyāntaḥ- karaṇādyavacchinnacaitanyasya tadanavacchinnacaitanyapratiyogikabhedāvagāhitayā śuddhacaitanyadharmikanirduḥkhādipratiyogikabhedānavagāhitvāt| śrutirapyavacchinnabhedānuvādinī| bhedaniṣedhaśrutistu anumānādiprasaktabhedaniṣedhaparā| na ca `yo'hamasvāpsaṃ tasya mamājñānasaṃsārādi, so'haṃ nirduḥkho ne'ti suṣuptikālīnāntaḥkaraṇāvacchinnābhedenājñānādyāśrayābhedena ca pratyabhijñāyamāne śuddhe bhedapratītiḥ, saṃsārādhārasya tadanādhārāt bheda eva hyāvayorvivādaḥ, na tu caitanyasya caitanyāditi- vācyam, etāvatā ajñānāvacchinna eva bhedagraho na tu śuddhe| na hi suṣuptikāle antaḥkaraṇānavacchinnatvavadajñānānavacchinnatvamapyasti| yattu caitanyasya caitanyād bhedo nāstīti, tadasmākamanukūlam, caitanye svābhāvikasyābhedasyaivāsmadrahasyatvāt bhavatpratikūlaṃ ca| na hi bhavatāṃ caitramaitrādi caitanyānāmaikyamiti matam| ahamarthasya yathā na śuddhātmatvaṃ tathoktaṃ prāk| sākṣipratyakṣasyādhyastādisādhāraṇatayā tatsiddhatvamātreṇa bhede abādhitatvamasaṃbhāvitameva| etena- jīvānāṃ parasparaṃ bhede pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇamiti- nirastam, nāhaṃ caitra ityāderavacchinnabhedaviṣayatvāt| `ghaṭo na brahma, ghaṭo na paṭaḥ, nāhaṃ ghaṭa' ityādipratyakṣasya kalpitabhedaviṣayatvena tāttvikabhedāsiddheḥ| tasmāt bhedapañcake na pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam|| ityadvaitasiddhau bhedapañcake pratyakṣabhaṅgaḥ|| 17 || 18. jīvabrahmabhede anumānāni nāpyanumānam| (1) jīveśvarau, bhinnau, viruddhadharmādhikaraṇatvād, dahanatuhinavadityatra duḥkhāderantaḥkaraṇādidharmatvena svarūpāsiddheḥ, ekatraiva nirduḥkhatvaduḥkhavattvayoravacchedakabhedena dṛṣṭatayā dharmibhedāsādhakatvād, bhedamātre siddhasādhanāt, tāttvikabhede sādyavaikalyāt (2) brahma, tattvato jīvād bhinnam, sarvajñatvāt, vyatirekeṇa jīvavadityatrāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvāt brahma, dharmisattāsamānasattākabhedavaditi sādhyakaraṇe asādhāraṇyāt, (3) ātmatvaṃ, nānāvyaktiniṣṭham, jātitvāt, pṛthivītvavadityatrātmaikyavādinaṃ pratyasiddheḥ, kalpitavyaktiniṣṭhatvena siddhasādhanācca (4) duḥkhaṃ, guṇatvāvāntarajātyā sajātīyaśrayāt bhinnāśritam, guṇatvādrūpavadityatra śabde vyabhicārāt, duḥkhādīnāmantaḥkaraṇadharmatvena siddhasādhanācca (5) vimatāni śarīrāṇi, svasaṅkyā saṅkyeyātmavanti, śarīraratvāt, saṃmatavadityatra yogiśarīre vyabhicārāt| (6) ātmā, dharmisattāsamānasattākātmapratiyogikabhedavān, dravyatvād, ghaṭavat, (7) ātmā, dravyatvavyāpyajātyā nānā, aśrāvaṇaviśeṣaguṇādhikaraṇatvād, ghaṭavadityatra cātmano nirguṇatvenāsiddheḥ caitraścaitrapratiyogikoktabhedavān, uktahetoruktadṛṣṭāntavadityābhāsasāmyācca| etena- navīnānumānānyapi- nirastāni, (1) īśvaraḥ, jīvapratiyogikatāttvikabhedavān, sarvaśaktitvāt, sarvajñatvāt, sarvakāryakartṛtvāt, svatantratvādvā, vyatirekeṇa jīvavat| (2) jīvo vā, brahmapratiyogikatāttvikabhedavān, alpaśaktitvād, alpajñatvād, alpakartṛtvāt, saṃsāritvādvā, vyatirekeṇa brahmavad, ityādiṣu bhedasya svarūpatvena tadvattvasādhane bādhāt| na ca viśeṣamādāya tadupapādānam, tasya svarūpānatirekeṇa tadvattvasampādakatvāt, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatāpatteśca| na ca- jīvabrahmābhede'niṣṭaprasaktyā aṣṭadravyātiriktadravyatvāderiva tvatsiddhasvaprakāśatvādariva ca sādhyasya mānayogyatvasambhava iti- vācyam, tāttvikabhedavyatireke'pi upādhikalpitabhedena sarvāniṣṭaparihārasambhavāt| na ca- jīvo brahma vā, kiñciddharmikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedapratiyogī, adhiṣṭhānatvāt, śuktivaditi sāmānyataḥ sādhyaprasiddhiriti- vācyam, yatkiñcidabhāvapratiyogighaṭādijñānābādhyabhedapratiyogitvenātmajñānābādhyabhedāsiddheḥ, svapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedapratiyogitve sādye dṛṣṭānte svapadena śukterdārṣṭāntike svapadenātmana uktervyāptigrahānupapatteḥ| yattu jīvād bhinna ityeva sādhyam, mithyābhedena siddhasādhanaṃ paścānnirasanīyamiti, tanna, nirasanopāyasya nirasiṣyamāṇatvāt| na ca brahma jīvapratiyogikadharmisattāsamānasattākabhedavadityeva sādhyam, dharmipadena brahmaṇa uktāvaprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvatādavasthyāt, yatkiñciddharmyuktau ghaṭādidharmisamānasattvena siddhasādhanāt, vipakṣabādhakarūpaviśeṣābhāve pūrvoktāsādhāraṇyāpatteśca| yattu brahma jīvapratiyogikatāttvikābhedavanneti, tanna, evamapi tāttvikābhedasyātāttvikābhāvena siddhasādhanāt, abhāve'pi tāttvikatvaviśeṣaṇe aprasiddhitādavasthyāt| nanu- atra jīvapratiyogikatāttvikabhedasyānyonyābhāvarūpatvānnāprasiddhirdoṣaḥ, yatra hyabhāvavyāpakatayā hetvabhāvo gṛhyate, tatraiva sādhyaprasiddhiraṅgam, iha tu jīvatādātmyavyāpakatā hetvabhāvasya grāhyā, tadabhāvo hetunā sādhyata iti kiṃ sādhyaprasiddhyā ? tāṃ vināpi vyāptigrahopapatteḥ, sandeharūpapakṣatāsampattaye'pi na tadapekṣā, tasyāssiṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvarūpatvena sandehāghaṭitvād, `brahma tattvato jīvabhinnaṃ na ve'ti sandehābhāve'pi `jīvabrahmaṇorbhede tāttvikatvamasti na ve'ti sandehasambhavācca, prameyatvametanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogi na veti sandehavaditi- cet, na, evaṃ hi prasiddhetarabhedaḥ pṛthivyāmiva prasiddhajīvabhedo brahmaṇi siddhyatu, na tadgatatāttvakatvamapi, vyāpakavyatirekasya vyāpyavyatirekamātrasādhanasamarthatvād, anyathātiprasaṅgāt| yadapi bhedatāttvikatvaṃ dharminiṣṭhatvena udaśaṅki, tadapi sādhyāprasiddhyā duṣṭam| nāpi brahma, jīvād, bhinnam, duḥkhānanubhavitṛtvād, ghaṭavadityanvayi, sarvānubhavitari hetorasiddheḥ| svaniṣṭheti viśeṣaṇe jīve vyabhicāraḥ, duḥkhasyāntaḥkaraṇaniṣṭhatvāt, mithyābhedena siddhasādhanācca| na ca- bhede sādhye arthaśūnyabhrāntyā siddhasādhanoktyayoga iti- vācyam, bhrāntervastuśūnyatvasyaivābhāvāt| uktamidamanirvācyavāde| na caitadanumitiviṣayatayā prāmāṇikatvena siddhyataḥ kathaṃ mithyātvam ? anumitiviṣayatāyāḥ prāmāṇikatve atantratvāt| na caivaṃ mithyātvādyanumāne'pi kalpitamithyātvādinā siddhasādhanāpattiḥ, kalpitatvaṃ vyāvahārikatvamabhipretam ? prātibhāsikatvaṃ vā ? ādya iṣṭāpatteḥ, antye hetossvasamānasattākasādhyasādhakatayā prātibhāsikatvāprasakteḥ| etena- brahma, jīvapratiyogikadharmisattāsamānasattākabhedavad, duḥkhānanubhavitṛtvād, abhrāntatvād, asaṃsāritvād, ghaṭavat| jīvo vā, brahmapratiyogikatādṛgbhedavān, asarvaśaktyādibhya iti- nirastam, upahitasya pakṣatve dharmisamasattākatve siddhe'pi tāttvikatvāsiddheḥ siddhasādhanāt| śodhitatattvaṃpadārthayoḥ pakṣatve tayordharmitvābhāvena bādhāpatteḥ| na ca- dharmitvādharmitvābhyāṃ vyāghātaḥ, brahmaṇaḥ sarvaniṣedhasvarūpatvena vyāghātābhāvāt| na ca dharmiśabdenāśrayamātravivakṣā, dharmitvavadāśrayatvasyāpi tatrāsattvāt| yattu dharmiśabdasya pitrādiśabdavat sambandhiśabdatvena yatkiñciddharmisamasattākatayā na siddhasādhanamiti, tanna, śabdasvabhāvopanyāsasyānumānaṃ pratyanupayogāt| etena- dharmipadasthāne svapadamiti- apāstam, dharmipadatulyayogakṣematvāt| ata eva- dharmisattāsamānasattākapadasthāne pāramārthiketi vā, yāvatsvarūpamanuvartamāneti vā svājñānākāryeti vā, svajñānābādhyeti vā viśeṣaṇaṃ deyam, svapadasya samabhivyāhṛtatattadarthaparatvasya vyutpattisiddhatvāditinirastam, ādye sādhyavaikalyācca| na ca- ghaṭo jīvapratiyogikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedavān, jīvadharmikadharmijñānābādhyābhedāpratiyogitvād, yadyajjñānābādhyayaddharmikābhedāpratiyogi, tat tajjñānābādhyatatpratiyogikabhedavad, yathā dūrasthavanaspatyoreka ityādyanumānena sādhyasiddhernāprasiddhiriti- vācyam, yacchabdānanugatena pakṣadharmahetau vyāptyagrahād, dharmitvapratiyogitvādisāmānyākāreṇa vyāptigrahe viśiṣya sādhanāyogāt| na ca- evaṃ svaprāgabhāvavyatiriktetyādau kā gatiriti- vācyam, tatrāpyetaddūṣaṇasañcāreṇa vyatirekiṇi vānumānāntare vā tātparyāt| nāpi- brahma tattvato jīvābhinnaṃ neti sādhyam, evaṃ ca na sādhyavaikalyaśaṅkāpi, tvanmate'pi kalpitaghaṭe kalpitajīvāt tāttvikabhedavattāttvikābhedasyāpyabhāvāditi- vācyam, tāttvikābhedasyātāttvikenābhāvena siddhasādhanasyoktatvāt| nāpi- jīveśvarau, dharmijñānābādhyaparasparapratiyogikabhedavantau, viruddhadharmādhikaraṇatvāt, dahanatuhinavat| virodhaśca parasparātyantābhāvarūpatvam, tadvyāpyatvaṃ vā, kālabhedenāpi sāmānādhikaraṇyāyogyatvaṃ vā, saṃyogatadatyantābhāvayośca sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ matadvaye'pi neti na tadāśraye vyabhicāra iti- vācyam, dharmipadamādāya doṣasya prāgevoktatvād, avyāpyavṛttiduḥkhaśabdādyadhikaraṇe vyabhicārācca, jīvabrahmābhedasiddhau svatantratvāsvatantratvādīnāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyāyogyatvarūpavirodhasyaivāsiddhyā svarūpāsiddheḥ, kalpitasārvajñyāsārvajñyādivyavasthāyā varṇe hrasvatvadīrghatvādivyavasthāvat kalpitabhedenaivopapattyā svābhāvikabhedaṃ pratyaprayojakatvācca| na ca- "alpaśaktirasārvajñyaṃ pāratantryamapūrṇatā| upajīvakatvaṃ jīvatvamīśatvaṃ tadviparyayaḥ|| svābhāvikaṃ tayoretannānyathā tu kathañcana||" ityādiśrutyā sārvajñyādeḥ svābhāvikatvoktyā kalpitatvāsiddhiḥ, anādyavidyāsiddhatvenedānīntanatvābhāvena ca svābhāvikatvokteḥ, tacchabdenopahitayoreva parāmarśāt| na tatra svābhāvākitvoktivirodhaḥ, na hyupahite'pi sarvajñatvādikamāgantukam| nāpi brahma, svajñānābādhyajīvapratiyogikabhedavat, padārthatvād, ghaṭavat| cetanatvam, jīvatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākadharmijñānābādhyabhedavadvṛtti, sarvacetanavṛttitvāt cetanāvṛttitvarahitatvādvā, śabdārthatvavaditi- vācyam, svapadadharmipadānanugamatādavasthyād, antyahetorjīvatve vyabhicārācca, jaḍavṛttitvādyupādhisattvena vipakṣabādhakābhāvena cāprayojakatvāt| brahmaṇo jīvavatsaṃsāritvāpattāviṣṭāpattiḥ| kalpitabhedena vā parihāro vidheyaḥ| taduktam- `aprameye'numānasya pravṛttirna kathañcana| prameyasya tvanātmatvāt tatra bhedānumeṣyate||' śuddhacaitanye dharmānadhikaraṇatayānumānāprasaraḥ| yatra prasaraḥ, tatreṣṭāpattirityarthaḥ| na ca evamaikyānumānamapi katham ? bhavatpadyasya tadaikyānumitiḥ kathamiti paṭhituṃ śakyatvāditi- vācyam, śuddhacaitanyaikyasya śabdaikagamyatvena tatrānanumeyatvasyeṣṭatvāt| na ca tarhyaikyānumānopanyāsānarthakyam, tasya bhede tāttvikatvabhramamātranirāsaphalakatvāt| tasmāt| aprasiddhaviśeṣatvādanyathaivopapattitaḥ| sarvaśaktyalpaśaktyāderna bhede tantratā tataḥ|| ityadvaitasiddhau jīvabrahmabhedānumānabhaṅgaḥ|| 18 || 19. jīvānāmanyonyabheda'numānāni evaṃ jīvānāmapi na parasparabhedānumānam| (1) caitro maitrapratiyogikadharmijñānābādhyabhedavān, maitrapratiyogikatāttvikābhedavānneti vā, maitrānusaṃhitaduḥkhānanusandhātṛtvāt, maitrasmṛtasarvāsmartṛtvāt, maitrānubhūtasarvānanubhavitṛtvācca, ghaṭavadityatra prathamasādhye dharmipadavikalpena dvitīyasādhye tāttvikābhedasyātāttvikabhedena siddhasādhanād, upahitasya pakṣatve arthāntarāt, caitanyamātrapakṣatve hetvasiddhiḥ, sādhanaikadeśasyānanusandhānāderupādhitvasaṃbhavācca| (2) vimato bandhadhvaṃsaḥ, svapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnādhārapratiyogikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedavanniṣṭhaḥ, bandhadhvaṃsatvāt sammatavat| (3) jīvaḥ, saṃsārī, saṃsāradhvaṃsādhāro vā, svajñānābādhyajīvapratiyogikabhedavān, saṃsāripratiyogikasvajñānābādhyabhedavān vā, svajñānābādhyasaṃsāradhvaṃsādhikaraṇapratiyogikabhedavānvā, padārthatvād, ghaṭavat| vimata ānandaḥ, svaniṣṭhaduḥkhavirodhitvavyāpyadharmeṇa sajātīyapratiyogikasvajñānābādhyabhedavān, duḥkhavirodhitvād, duḥkhābhāvavad, ityādiṣu bandhapratiyogikabhedavati kālādau dhvaṃsasya vidyamānatvenārthāntarād, duḥkhanigaḍasādhāraṇabandhatvāsaṃbhavācca, svapadānanugamācca| caitrabandhadhvaṃsaḥ, caitrabandhādhārapratiyogikabhedavanniṣṭhaḥ, bandhadhvaṃsatvāt, saṃmatavadityābhāsasāmyācca, vipakṣabādhakābhāvācca| dhvaṃsapratiyogitāvacchedakaṃ na nānābandhānugatabandhatvam, tasya sāmānyābhāvatvābhāvāt| etena- (1) ātmamātrabhede ātmā, ātmapratiyogikasvajñānābādhyabhedavān, padārthatvād, ghaṭavat| ātmavaibhavapakṣe (2) ākāśaḥ, ātmapratiyogikadharmijñānābādhyabhedādhāraviśeṣaguṇavadvibhuvyatiriktaḥ, dravyatvāt, pṛthivīvat| (3) pṛthivītvaṃ jalatvatejastvavāyutvamanastvetaradravyatvasākṣādvyāpyajātibhinnam, prameyatvājjalatvavat| gaganatvajātipakṣe taditaratvamapi viśeṣaṇam| (4) sattā, dravyatvānyātmaniṣṭhajātyanyā, dravyatvaṃ vā sattānyātmaniṣṭhajātyanyat, meyatvād| ghaṭavat, ātmāṇutvamate (5) ātmā, dravyatva vyāpyajātimān, avibhudravyatvād, ghaṭavadityādibhirātmatvajātisiddhau tāttvikātmabhedasiddhiriti- nirastam; ādye jaḍatvamupādhiḥ, ātmapadayoḥ sthāne caitrapadaṃ prakṣipyābhāsasāmyaṃ ca| dvitīye śabdānāśrayatvamupādhiḥ, vibhāvātmānyatvaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ datvā ātmākāśabhinnasya vibhorviśeṣaguṇavataḥ sādhanaprasaṅgācca| jātipakṣakānumāneṣu kalpitavyaktibhedenāpi tasyāḥ jāterupapattyā tāttvikavyaktibhedaparyavasāyitvenārthāntarāt| na ca- jāteḥ dharmijñānābādhyabhedaṃ vinā'yogaḥ anyathā vyaktyabhedaḥ kvāpi jātibādhako na syāditi- vācyam, jātervyaktibhedasamānasattākatvaniyamena prātibhāsikabhedasya vyāvahārikajātiṃ prati na sādhakatvamiti vyaktyabhedasya jātibādhakatvasambhavāt|| ityadvaitasiddhau jīvabhedānumānabhaṅgaḥ|| 19 || 20. ātmabhede anukūlatarkāḥ nanu- yadyātmaikyaṃ syāt, caitreṇa sarvaduḥkhādyanusandhānaṃ syād iti- cenna, aupādhikabhedenānanusandhānopapatteḥ| nanu- hastapādādyupādhibhede'pyanusandhānadarśanād upādhibhedo'prayojakaḥ, na ca viśliṣṭopādhibhedastatra tantram, mātṛsukhādergarbhasthenānusandhānāpātāt| bhārate- `udyatāyudhadordaṇḍāḥ patitasvaśirokṣibhiḥ| paśyantaḥ pātayanti sma kabandhā apyarīnyudhi||' ityādinā viśleṣe'pyanusandhānokteśceti cenna, na hi vayaṃ yatkiṃcidupādhimātramananusandhānaprayojakaṃ brūmaḥ, kiṃtvantaḥkaraṇarūpopādhibhedamavidyābhedaṃ vā| sā ca bhedaḥ kabandhe yogini ca nāstyeva| tena tatrānusandhānaṃ caitramaitrayoścāstīti ananusandhānam| etenaśarīrarūpopādhibhedasyānanusandhānaprayojakatve bālyānubhūtasya yauvane jātismareṇa pūrvajanmānubhūtasya yoginā nānāśarīrānubhūtasya ca smaraṇaṃ na syāditi- nirastam, śarīrabhedasya tatrātantratvād, yogijātismṛrtṝṇāmantaḥkaraṇaikyāt| na ca- caitanyaikye antaḥkaraṇabhedasya nānanusandhānaprayojakatvam, cakṣurādikaraṇabhede'pyanusandhānadarśanāditi- vācyam, anyakaraṇabhedena tathā darśane'pyantaḥkaraṇabhedasya tadaikyādhyāsāpanne ananusandhānaprayojakatvaṃ kalpyate, anyathā brahmaikyasya jīve śrutisiddhatayā sarvānusandhānāpatteḥ| na ca- antaḥkaraṇasya pratyahaṃ suṣuptau vilayena pūrvadinānubhūtasyānanusandhānāpattiriti- vācyam, saṃskārātmanāvasthitasyaiva punarudbodhena tatrāntaḥkaraṇabhedābhāvāt| na ca- evaṃ suṣuptapralīnamuktānāmananusandhānaprayojakāntaḥkaraṇabhedābhāvāt saṃsāriduḥkhānusandhānāpattiriti- vācyam, teṣāmanusandhānaprayojakāntaḥkaraṇaikyādhyāsarūpasāmagrīvirahāt| na hi pratibandhakamātreṇa kāryavirahaḥ, kintu sāmagrīviraheṇāpi| na ca- evaṃ muktasya svarūpasukhānubhavo'pi na syāditi- vācyam, tasyājanyatvenāntaḥkaraṇānapekṣatvāt, jīvavibhājakopādhyajñānabhedābhedābhyāmanusandhānānanusandhānopapatteśca| na ca- jñānaprāgabhāvavadajñānasyāpi bhedābhedayostatrāprayojakatvam, yāvanti jñānāni tāvantyajñānānīti mate ekasminnapi jīve brahmaviṣayakājñānānāṃ bhinnatvenānusandhānavirahaprasaṅga iti- vācyam, jñānaprāgabhāvānāṃ jñānasamasaṅkhyājñānānāṃ ca jīvavibhājakatvābhāvenānusandhānādāvaprayojakatvāt| yattu- muktasyaiva saṃsāraduḥkhānusandhānāpattiḥ, avidyārūpopādhibhedānanusandhāne svarūpasukhasyāpyananubhavāpātaḥ- iti, tanna, vaiṣayikasukhādyanusandhāne tasya tantratvena svaprakāśasvarūpasphuraṇe tadanapekṣatvāt| nanu- evamanekāvidyāsaṃbandhasya duḥkhānusandhānasvarūpasyānarthasya ca viśiṣṭagatatve bandhamokṣayorvaiyadhikaraṇyāpātena śuddhagatatve vācye yacchuddhaṃ caitrīyaduḥkhānusandhātṛ, tadeva maitrīyaduḥkhānusandhātriti kathamanusandhānānanusandhānavyavastheti- cenna, avidyātmakabandhanivṛttyātmakamokṣasya śuddhagatatve'pi duḥkhādyanusandhātṛtvasya upahitavṛttitayā śuddhabhedāpādanāyogāt| na ca saṃsārasya śuddhagatatve brahmaṇo'pi saṃsāritvāpattiḥ, bimbapratibimbayoravadātatvaśyāmatvavad ghaṭākāśamahākāśayoḥ paricchinnatvāparicchinnatvavad ekasyaiva nabhasastattatkarṇapuṭāvacchedena tatra tatra śrotratāvacca aupādhikabhedena saṃsāritvāsaṃsāritvavyavasthopapatteḥ| ata eva- duḥkhānusandhānarūpasyānarthasya upahitaniṣṭhatvena tasya kalpitatvena baddhasya nivṛttireva, na tu mokṣa ityāpāta iti- nirastam, upādheḥ kalpitatvena nivṛttāvapyupadheyasyākalpitatayā tannivṛttyayogānmokṣānvayopapatteḥ| na ca pratibimbasya chāyāvadvastvantaratvenākāśasyāpi tvanmate'pi kāryadravyatayā sāvayavatvena taijasāhaṅkārakāryāṇāṃ śrotrāṇāṃ svata eva bhinnatvena dṛṣṭāntāsaṃmatiriti- vācyam, pratibimbe vastvantaratvasya nirasiṣyamāṇatvād, ākāśaśrotrabhāvasya pararītyā dṛṣṭāntatvād, `ātmendriyamanoyuktaṃ bhoktetyāhurmanīṣiṇa' iti śruterviśiṣṭasyaiva bhoktṛtvāttasya bhinnatvād vyavastheti kaumudyuktaprakāreṇāpi anusandhānānanusandhānopapatteśca| ata eva- śuddhacinmātragatatve tatra bhedāpratītyā bhedasya kalpitasyāpyabhāvaḥ, bhāve vā bhedasyaiva vyavasthārūpasvakāryakāriṇo vahnāvuṣṇatvavaddharmijñānābādhyatvam, abhedasya tvavyavasthārūpasvakāryākāriṇo'nuṣṇatvavanmithyātvamityāpātaḥ, āvidyakabhedahīnasya muktasya saṃsāriduḥkhānubhavāpātaśca iti- nirastam, vyavasthāyāḥ svasamānasattākabhedakāryatvena svādhikasattākabhedā'nākṣepakatvād, avyavasthāyāḥ śuddhacaitanyābhedākāryatvena tadakāritvaprayuktamithyātvasyāpādayitumaśakyatvāt, upādhyabhedasyaiva tatra tantratvāt| kiṃcopādhikalpitāṃśajīvānāṃ vānusandhānamāpādyate ? aṃśino brahmaṇo vā ? nādyaḥ, hastāvacchinnena pādāvacchinnaduḥkhādyananusandhānāt| na ca- na vayaṃ bhogāyatanānāṃ sāṅkaryamāpādayāmaḥ, yena pāde me vedanā śirasi me sukhamiti na syāta, kiṃtvanusandhānamātram, taccāṃśānāmastyevaṃ, anyathā caitradehalagnakaṇṭakoddharaṇāya maitrasyeva pādalagnakaṇṭakoddharaṇāya hastasya vyāpāro na syāditi- vācyam, pādāvacchinnaduḥkhasya hastāvacchinne anutpādanavat caitrīyaduḥkhādyanusaṃdhānasya maitre'nutpādaḥ| haste duḥkhaprayojakasāmagīvirahavat maitre anusandhānaprayojakopādhyaikyābhāvāt| tathā ca hastāvacchedenānusandhānamastyeveti na tatra vyāpārābhāvāpattiḥ| nāntyaḥ tasyābhoktṛtvena bhogāprasaṅgāt, duḥkhādijñānamātrasya ca sarvajñe tasminniṣṭatvāt| na ca bhoktṛjīvābhinnatvena brahmaṇo'pi bhoktṛtvāpattiḥ, bimbapratibimbavadvyavasthopapatteḥ, anusandhānasyāvacchinnagatatayā śuddhabrahmaṇyāpādanāyogācca| na caitāvatā bandhamokṣayorvaiyadhikaraṇyam, avidyātmakabandhasya śuddhagatatvena sāmānādhikaraṇyopapatteḥ avacchinnasyānusandhātṛtve'pyavasthātrayānusyūtāvidyāvacchinnadvārā śuddhe anusandhātṛtvasyeṣṭatvād, `anena jīvene'tyādiśruteḥ| kiñca yathā svakarṇapuṭaparicchinnanādopalambhe bhāgāntaravarttinādānupalambhaḥ, tathā sukhaduḥkhādyupalambhānupalambhau| na ca- ātmabhede karṇapuṭānāṃ tattadīyatvaniyāmakavadekātmavāde sarvadehānāṃ svīyatvena tattadīyatvaniyamābhāvena vyavasthānupapattiriti- vācyam, tavātmabhedenevāvacchedakajñānādibhedena mama vyavasthopapatteḥ| kiñca vyavasthayā bhedaṃ vadan praṣṭavyaḥ keyaṃ vyavasthā ? na tāvaddharmabhedaḥ, ekasminneva sukhaduḥkhadarśanena vyabhicārād, bhinnāśrayadharmoktau anyonyāśrayād, viruddhadharmoktau tu viruddhatvasya sahānavasthānarūpatve asiddheḥ, bādhyabādhakabhāvarūpatve tasyaikāśrayatvenopapattyā bhedāsādhakatvāt| nāpyanusandhānānanusandhāne, tayoruktena prakāreṇa upādhibhedenopapatterātmabhedāsādhakatvasyoktatvāt| ata eva bandhamuktyādivyavasthāpina svābhāvikabhedasādhanāya, tattadupādhyupagamāpagamābhyāmeva vyavasthopapatteḥ| na copādherapyupahitaniṣṭhatvenātmāśrayādirdoṣaḥ, upādheraviśeṣaṇatvena vyaktyantarānapekṣatvena cātmāśrayādicaturṇāmanavakāśāt| etena śuddhaniṣṭhatve kimekaikopādhyapagamo muktiḥ ? uta sarvopādhyapagamaḥ ? nādyaḥ, sadā muktireva, na tu bandha ityāpātāt| nāntyaḥ, adhunā bandhaḥ, eva na kasyāpi muktirityāpātāditi nirastam, yenopādhinā yasya caitanyasya paricchinnatvaṃ tasmin caitanye tadupādhyapagamasyaiva muktitve nānājīvavāde pūrvoktadoṣānavakāśāt| ekajīvavāde sarvopādhyapagamasyaiva muktitayā idānīṃ muktyabhāvasyeṣṭatvāt| nanu- upādheḥ kathaṃ bhedakatvam, tathā hi- upādhiḥ kimekadeśena sambadhyate ? kṛtsnena vā ? ādye tvanmate svābhāvikāṃśābhāvenaupādhikatvaṃ vācyam, tathā cānavasthā| antye na bhedakatā, kṛtsnasyaikopādhigrastatvāt| gaganādāvapi svābhāvikāṃśābhāve ghaṭādyupādhisambandho na syādeva| taduktam- na cedupādhisambandha ekadeśe'tha sarvagaḥ| ekadeśe'navasthā syāt sarvagaścenna bhedakaḥ|| iti- cenna, sarvavikalpāsahatvena mithyābhūtasyaivopādhermithyābhedaprayojakatvasya prāgevopapādanāt| yathā cātmanāṃ sarvagatānāṃ bhede vyavasthānupapattiḥ, tathā prapañcitaṃ bhāṣyakṛdbhiḥ|| ityadvaitasiddhau jīvabhedānukūlatarkabhaṅgaḥ|| 20 || 21. bhedapañcake anumānāni evaṃ jaḍeśabhede jaḍedīvabhede ca tāttvike pramāṇaṃ nāsti| (1) brahma, jīvo vā, anātmapratiyogikadharmijñānābādhyabhedavān, padārthatvād, ghaṭavat, (2) brahma jīvo vā, ghaṭapratiyogikadharmijñānābādhyabhedavān, ghaṭāsambandhikālasambadhitvāt, tadasambandhideśasambandhitvāt, tajjanakājanyatvād vā paṭavat, (3) brahma jīvo vā, jaḍapratiyogikadharmijñānābādhyabhedavān, jaḍānātmakatvād, yadevaṃ tadevam, yathā dūrasthavanaspatyoreka ityādiṣu pūrvoktadoṣānativṛtteḥ, paricchinnatvasya jaḍatvasya janyatvasya copādhitvād, aprayojakatvācca| jīvo brahma vā, ātmapratiyogikatādṛgbhedādhikaraṇam, padārthatvādityādyābhāsasāmyācca| na ca- ghaṭābhede ghaṭasiddhyaiva tatsiddhyā vedāntavaiyarthyam, brahmaṇo jaḍatvānityatvādyāpattiḥ, muktisamānādhikaraṇabandhādhārasya jīvasya jaḍavannivṛttyāpattiḥ, goro'hamityādipratītiśca pramā syādityādivipakṣabādhakānnābhāsasāmyādikamiti- vācyam, svaprakāśatvena sarvapratyayavedyatvena ca brahmasiddhāvapi savilāsājñānanivartakajñānāya vedāntasāphalyasya bahudhābhidhānāt| ghaṭādau kalpitavyaktyantareṇākalpitabhedasyābhāve'pi na yathā kalpitavyaktyātmakatvaṃ tadvat prātibhāsikatvatadvadviśeṣadarśanena nivṛttirvā kalpitavyaktyantareṇaikyajñānapramātvaṃ vā, tathā prakṛte'pi kalpitajaḍena tadabhāve'pi na tadātmakatvādīti na vipakṣabādhakasyāpyaprasaraḥ| evaṃ jaḍānāmanyonyabhede'pi nānumānam| (1) ghaṭaḥ, tattvataḥ śuktyabhinno na śuktisambaddhakālāsambandhitvāt, tajjanakājanyatvāttatrāropitarūpyavad, vyāvahārikabhedasya tvayāpyaṅgīkāreṇa na pakṣadṛṣṭāntādyanupapattiḥ, anyathā bhedasiddhyasiddhyordoṣatadabhāvayoścābhedena svakriyāvirodhaḥ syāditi| atra tāttvikaśuktyabhinnatvarūpapratiyogyaprasiddhyā sādhyāprasiddheḥ, tattvata ityasya netyatra viśeṣaṇatve sutarāmaprasiddheḥ, ghaṭādisamasattākabhedamātreṇa hetorupapattyā aprayojakatvācca, bhedasya tāttvikatve bādhasyoktatvena bādhācca| (2) anātmā, svavṛttidharmānādhārajñānabādhyāntargaṇikabhedavān, padārthatvādātmavad| vipakṣe ca dūrasthavanaspatyoḥ śuktirūpyayoścābhedagrāhi pratyakṣaṃ tattvāvedakaṃ syāt muktisaṃsārādisāṅkaryaṃ ca syādityādi bādhakamiti yat, tanna, ekatra ghaṭe kalpitā ye aneke ghaṭāḥ, teṣu svavṛttidharmānadhikaraṇaghaṭajñānābādhyabhedavatsu vyabhicārāt| yatkiñcitsvavṛttidharmānādhāroktau ghaṭatvānadhikaraṇapaṭajñānābādhyabhedenātmajñānabādhyenārthāntaram| svavṛttyaśeṣadharmānādhāroktau tava mate brahmaṇo'pi vācyatvādikevalānvayidharmādhāratvena sādhyāprasiddheḥ, kalpitena saha tāttvikabhedābhāvavat tāttvikābhedasyāpyabhāvena udāhṛtasthale tattvāvedakatvasāṅkaryādīnāmaprasaṅgāt| yattu ātmanāmātmānātmanoścha parasparaṃ tāttvikabhede- anātmā, svāvṛttidharmādhikaraṇapratiyogikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedādhikaraṇaṃ yatsvāvṛttidharmādhikaraṇaṃ tatpratiyogikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedādhikaraṇam, padārthatvādātmavat, pakṣe svāvṛttidharmādhikaraṇamātmā, tato bhinnādātmāntarādbhinnatvena sādhyasiddhiḥ| dṛṣṭānte ca svāvṛttidharmādhikaraṇaṃ jaḍam, tato bhinnāt jaḍāntarāt bhinnatvena sādhyasattvamiti, tanna, pakṣadṛṣṭāntayoḥ svapadārthapratiyogipadārthayorananugamena vyāpyatvāsiddheḥ, ajaḍatvasyopādhitvācca, jaḍatvena vyatirekiṇā satpratipakṣācca| yadapi jīvasya brahmato jīvācca jaḍasya satyabhede- pṛthivī, brahmapratiyogikadharmijñānabādhyabhedādhikaraṇaṃ yadaptvādyanadhikaraṇam, tatpratiyogikapratiyogijñānābādhyabhedavatī, vastutvāttoyavat, aptvādītyādiśabdena tattadvādinaḥ prati tattadvādisiddhāḥ pṛthivītvabhinnāḥ jaḍaniṣṭhā dharmā vivakṣitāḥ| pakṣe brahmabhinnājjvīvāt bhinnatvena sādhyasiddhiḥ| dṛṣṭānte tu brahmabhinnapārthivabhinnatveneti| tanna| aptvādyanadhikaraṇatvavajjīvatvānadhikaraṇetyapi viśeṣaṇaṃ datvā jīvabrahmabhinnātmano'pi sādhanaprasaṅgād, gandhādhāratvādivyatirekiṇā satpratipakṣasambhavācca, dharmipadavikalpanibandhanadoṣatādavasthyācca| etena- jīvasya brahmajīvāntarābhyāṃ jīvācca jaḍasya bhede- pūrvaprayoga eva jīvasya jīvāntarādbhedasidhyarthamantargaṇikabhedavadityaptvānadhikaraṇetyatra viśeṣaṇaṃ datvānumānam| atra ca pakṣe brahmaṇaḥ parasparaṃ ca bhinnājjīvād bhinnatvena sādhyasiddhiḥ, dṛṣṭānte tu brahmaṇaḥ parasparañca bhinnāt pārthivād bhinnatveneti - nirastam| jīvasya brahmajīvāntarābhyāṃ jaḍasya ca jīvāt brahmaṇo jaḍācca bhede- pṛthivī, brahmapratiyogikadharmijñānābāṃdhyabedādhikaraṇam aptvādyanadhikaraṇamāntargaṇikabhedavacca yattatpratiyogikapratiyogijñānābāṃdhyabhedavattve sati aptvādyanadhikaraṇāsaṃsāridharmikadharmijñānābādhyabhedapratiyoginī, vastutvādambuvadityatra brahmaṇo jaḍādapi bhedārthaṃ pūrvasmādadhikamaptvānadhikaraṇāsaṃsārītyādi viśeṣaṇam| atra pakṣe aptvādyanadhikaraṇamasaṃsāri brahma, taddharmikabhedapratiyogitvena sādhyasiddhiḥ, dṛṣṭānte tvaptvādyanadhikaraṇāsaṃsāri pārthivam, taddharmikabhedapratiyogitvena jñeyam| atra jīvatvānadhikaraṇatvasya aptvānadhikaraṇetyatra viśeṣaṇatvena pūrvavadābhāsasāmyāt, pākajarūpādhikaraṇatvādinā satpratipakṣācca, dharmādipadavikalpagrāsācca| evaṃ bhedamātre'pi nānumānam| (1) brahma, bhedahīnaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate svajñānābādhyabhedavadvā, padārthatvād, ghaṭavad iti; tanna muktyasahavṛttitvasya jaḍatvasya copādhitvāt, svapadavikalpagrāsācca| etena (2) anātmā svānyajñānābādhya bhedādhikaraṇam| padārthatvād, ātmavaditi- nirastam| (3) brahmabhedo na sarvaniṣṭhātyantabhāvapratiyogī, brahmanirūpyatvād, brahmābhedavadityatra brahmābhinnāvṛttitvamupādhiḥ, brahmābhedasyābrahmanirūpyatvena tadanirūpyatayā sādhanavaikalyaṃ ca| (4) brahmajñānaṃ, svābādhyabhedavadviṣayakam, jñānatvācchuktijñānavadityatrājñānātmaviṣayatvamupādhiḥ| svapadena brahmajñānoktau tadabādhyabhedāprasiddhyā sādhyāprasiddhiḥ, śuktijñānoktau siddhasādhanam| (5) ghaṭo ghaṭasaṃsargānavacchinnapratiyogitākapaṭādidharmikatraikālikābhāvapratiyogī, dravyatvāt, paṭavadityatra kālpanikābhāvasyāpi kālatrayavṛttitvasaṃbhavena siddhasādhanam, ghaṭasaṃsargānavacchinnetivattādātmyānavacchinnetyapi viśeṣaṇaṃ datvā pañcamābhāvasādhanasyāpi prasaṅgaśca, vipakṣabādhakābhāvasya ubhayatra sattvāt| (6) samānādhikaraṇakarmaprāgabhāvasamānakālīnajñānabādhāyogyo bhedaḥ, paramārthasan, prātibhāsikatvānadhikaraṇatve satyasattvānadhikaraṇatvāt, svāsattvāgocarapramāṃ prati sākṣādviṣayatvād, āropitamithyātvakatvāt, kalpakarahitatvāt, svaviṣayakasākṣātkārāt pūrvabhāvitvād, ātmavat| (7) brahmajīvapratiyogiko bhedaḥ, paramārthasan, anāditvādātmavat| (8) sākṣivedyasukhaduḥkhādibhedaḥ, paramārthasan, aniṣedhyatvena doṣājanyajñānaṃ prati sākṣādviṣayatvāt (9) dharmādharmayāgadānādibhedaḥ, paramārthasan, śrutitātparyaviṣayatvādityādiṣvātmasādhāraṇadharmāṇāṃ cetanatvādīnāmupādhitvaṃ jaḍatvādinā satpratipakṣaśca, mithyātvasādhakānāṃ prābalyasyoktatvena tairbādhaśca| ādye ca prātibhāsikatvasya doṣaprayuktabhānatvātmakatve asiddhiḥ, brahmajñānetarabādhyatvoktau caramavṛttyavyavahitaprātibhāsike vyabhicāraśca| dvitīyahetau tādṛkpramāviṣayatvasya bhedapāramārthikatvasiddhyadhīnatvena sādhyāviśeṣaparyavasānam| tṛtīye caramavṛttyanyabādhyamithyātvakatvasyopādhitvam| caturthe avidyārūpakalpakasattvenāsiddhiḥ| pañcame dṛṣṭisṛṣṭipakṣe asiddhiḥ, itaratrāprayojakatā| anāditvaṃ ca ajñānādau vyabhicāri| doṣājanyajñānaṃ pratītyatra śrutitātparyaviṣayatvādityatra cāsiddhiḥ, sākṣyavacchedakavṛtterdoṣajanyatvāt, mukhyatastātparyasya tatrābhāvāt| tasmād bhedapañcakaṃ nānumānaviṣayaḥ|| ityadvaitasiddhau bhejapañcake anumānabhaṅgaḥ|| 21 || 22. bhedaśruteḥ anuvādakatvabhaṅgaḥ nanu- bhedatāttvikatve `dvā suparṇā,' `ya ātmani tiṣṭhan,' `nityo nityānāṃ cetanaścetanānām,' `ajo hyeko juṣamāṇo'nuśete jahātyenāṃ bhuktabhogāmajo'nya' iti śrutayo mānamiti- cenna, dvā suparṇetyatra pūrvārdhe na bhedaḥ prameyaḥ, apadārthatvādavākyārthatvācca| dvitvasya svāśrayapratiyogikabhedasamānādhikaraṇatvaniyamāt| śrutadvitvārthāpattisamadhigamyasyāpi bhedasya śrautatvamiti cet na| dvau candramasāvityatreva kalpitabhedenāpyupapatteḥ tātvika bhedānākṣepakatvāt| ata eva nottarārdhasyāpi tāttvikabhedaparatvam, vastutastvasyāḥ śruteḥ paiṅgirahasyabrāhmaṇe buddhijīvaparatayā vyākṛtatvena jīveśabhedaparatvasya vaktumaśakyatvāt| `ya ātmani tiṣṭhan' ityādāvādhārādheyabhāvasya `cetanaścetanānā'miti nirdhāraṇasya `ajo'nya' ityatra bhedavyapadeśasya kālpanikabhedamādāyāpyupapatteḥ bhedatāttvikatvāparyavasāyitvāt, śrutyantaravirodhācca| na caitat śrutivirodhāt saiva śrutiranyaparā, bhedaśruteḥ pratyakṣasiddhabhedānuvādatvena hīnabalatvāt| na ca jīvatvāvacchinnajīvabhedasyāprāptyā `na hiṃsyā'dityādivadananuvādatvam, jīveśvarabhedasya pratyakṣasiddhatayā tadanyathānupapattisiddheśadharmikajīvatvāvacchinnabhedasyāpi pratyakṣasiddhatulyakakṣyatayā tadbodhakaśruteranuvādatvopapatteḥ| na hiṃsyādityatra nānuvādatvaśaṅkāpi, brāhmaṇo na hantavya ityādeḥ purovādakatvanirṇāyakābhāvāt| na ca - puṃviśeṣaṃ pratyasyārthavattvaṃ śākhāntarasthavidhivākyavaditi- vācyam, ekasyānekaśākhādhyayanāsaṃbhavāt, pratyakṣasya sarvapuruṣasādhāraṇyena prāthamikaprasaratvena ca puruṣaviśeṣaṃ pratyapi sārthakatvasya vaktuśakyatvāt| na ca- dvayoḥ praṇayantī'tyādivad vartamānamātragrāhipratyakṣāprāptakālatrayābādhyabhedaprāpakatvamiti-vācyam, ajo hyanya ityādau trikālābādhyatvabodhakapadābhāvāt| na ca- abhede ṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgavaddārḍhyārthatvaṃ bhedaśruteriti- vācyam, tatra prayojanavattve'pyanuvādatvāparihārād agnirhimasya bheṣajamitivat| na ca `ṣaḍviṃśatirityeva brūyādi'tivat pratiprasavārthatvam, tadapekṣayā hīnabalatvena pratiprasavāyogāt, bhedaniṣedhakaśruteḥ bhedatāttvikatvaniṣedhaparatvena bhedasvarūpapratipādakavākyasya tatpratiprasavāyogāt| na ca pratyakṣasyāprāmāṇye śrutestatsiddhānuvādakatvāyogaḥ, tasyā jñātajñāpakatvamātreṇānuvādakatvopapatteḥ| na ca- evamapi nirapekṣānuvādatvena dhārāvāhikadvitīyādijñānavat pramātvopapattiriti- vācyam, nirapekṣasāpekṣasādhāraṇānuvādatvamātrasyāprāmāṇyaprayojakatvād, dṛṣṭāntasyātiriktakālakalāviṣayatvenānadhigatārtha viṣayatayā viṣamatvāt| na ca vidvadvākyavat saprayojanānuvādatvena svārthaparatā, tasya svārthabodhakatve'pi dvitvasampādakatayā svārthaparatvābhāvāt| na ca yattannetyādiniṣedhārthānuvādaliṅgābhāvena vidheyāntaraśravaṇena ca niṣedhārthānuvādatvāyogaḥ, yattadityāderanuvādaliṅgatve'pi anuvādavyāpakatvābhāvād, anyenāpi hyunnayanasaṃbhavād, `brahmaṇo na hantavya' ityādau yattatpadābhāve'pi niṣedhānuvādadarśanād, vidheyāntarasattve tu niṣedhārthānuvādakatvābhāve'pi tadarthānuvādatvāparihārāt| na caivaṃ vidhānārthānuvāde tāttvikatvaniyamaḥ, yadrajataṃ tadānayetyādau anyavidhānārthaṃ bhrāntisiddhānuvāde tāttvikatvādarśanāt| na ca- anuvādatve'pi yathārthatvarūpaprāmāṇyāhāniriti- vācyam, tasya bādhakābhāvanibandhanatvena prakṛte asaṃbhavāt| nanu- aupaniṣadasya brahmaṇaḥ śāstrātiriktenāprāpteḥ taddharmikasya tatpratiyogikasya vā bhedasya kathaṃ śāstranirapekṣapratyakṣādinā prāptiriti- cenna, pratiyogigrahārthaṃ tadapekṣatve'pi svasamānaviṣayapramāṇapūrvakatvāniyamena pratyakṣasya bhedaprāpakatvopapatteḥ| yadyapīśadharmikasya bhedasya pratyakṣeṇāprāptiḥ, tathāpi pratyakṣasiddhajīvadharmikeśabhedānyathānupapattisiddhasyāpi tasya śrutārthāpattisiddhasya śrautatvavat pratyakṣasiddhatvopapatteḥ| ityadvaitasiddhau bhedaśruteranuvādakatvam|| 22 || 23. bhedaśruteḥ vyāvahārikabhedaparatvabhaṅgaḥ athavānuvādakatvābhāve'pi vyāvahārikabhedaparatvenaiva śrutyupapattiḥ| na cāprāmāṇyāpātaḥ, arthavādavākyavadupapatteḥ, pratīyamānārthe cābhedaśrutivirodhenāprāmāṇyasyeṣṭatvācca| na cābhedaśruterakhaṇḍacinmātraparatvena bhedāvirodhitvam, taddvārībhūtārthamādāya tadvirodhāt| nāpi vaiparītyam, prāptāprāptārthatvābhyāṃ viśeṣāt| na ca- aikyaśruterapi pratyakṣaviruddhatvādaprāmāṇyam, mānāntaraprāptivat tadvirodhasyāpi daurbalyahetutvāditi vācyam, virodhe virodhino mānatvavad anuvādakatvopapādakasya mānatāyā anapekṣitatvāt| kiñca ṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgavattvād aikyaśruteḥ prābalyam| na ca- tātparyamātrajñāpakatvena teṣāmarthatathātvājñāpakatvamiti vācyam, śrutestatparatvajñāpanena paramparayopayogāt, etadviruddhaśruteḥ śrūyamāṇe'rthe tātparyābhāvasampādanenādhikabalasampādakatvācca| na ca atrāpi svādvatti anaśnan pūrṇaḥ paraḥ jīvasaṃgho hyapūrṇa ityādyupapattirūpaṃ `satyaṃ bhidā satyaṃ bhidā satyaṃ bhidetyabhyāsādirūpaṃ tātparyaliṅgamastīti bhedaśrutirapi tatpareti vācyam, attīti apūrṇa iti ca jīvānuvādena tasya pūrṇabrahmarūpatāvidhānārthatvena bhedopapattitvābhāvāt| satyaṃ bhideti na bhedābhyāsaḥ, etadvākyasyāprāmāṇikatvāt, prāmāṇikatve vā bādhāyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyenābhede paryavasānāt| nanu- bhedaśrutireva prabalā, `asañjātavirodhitvāt pratyakṣādisaṃvādānniravakāśatvācceti cenna, abhedaśrutirūpavirodhino jātatvāt, pratyakṣāderapramāṇatvena tatsaṃvādasya prābalyāprayojakatvāt, śatamapyandhānāmiti nyāyād, vyāvahārikabhedaviṣayatvena sāvakāśatvācca| nanu- nāyaṃ bhedo vyāvahārikaḥ, muktāvapi bhedasya śrutismṛtibhyāṃ siddheriti cenna, tasyā mukteravāntaratvāt| nanu vyāvahārikaḥ, muktāvapi bhedasya śrutismṛtibhyāṃ siddheriti cenna, tasyā mukteravāntaratvāt| nanu idaṃ jñānamupāśritya mama sādharmyamāgatāḥ| sarge'pi nopajāyante pralaye na vyathanti ca|| ityādismṛtau sargādyabhāvokteḥ| na yatra māyā kimutāpare hare- ranuvratā yatra surāsurārcitāḥ| śyāmāvadātāḥ śatapatralocanāḥ| piśaṅgavastrāḥ surucaḥ supeśasaḥ|| iti smṛtau māyāniṣedhācca| `yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścite'tyatra śuddhabrahmajñānaphalatatvokteśca| tvayāpi śuddhabrahmaviṣayatvena svīkṛtāyāḥ bhūmavidyāyāḥ phaloktyavasare `tasya sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmacāro bhavati pañcadhā saptadhe'tyādibhedokteḥ `paraṃ jyotirupasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate' `sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇa' ityādau svarūpābhivyaktyukteśca tathā `vidvān puṇyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanaḥ paramaṃ sāmyamupaitītyatra karmakṣayokteśca| `juṣṭaṃ yadā paśyatyanyamīśamasya mahimānamiti vītaśokaḥ pṛthagātmānaṃ preritāraṃ ca matvā juṣṭastatastenāmṛtatvametī't.yādau bhedajñānānmokṣokteśca| tvanmate'pi bhedabhogādiphaleṣu phalādhyāyāntyapādastheṣu `jagadvyāpāravarjam' `saṅkalpādeva tu tat śruteḥ' `bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgācce'ti sūtreṣu prakrāntaśuddhabrahmavidyāphalasyaiva vaktavyatvācca paramamuktitvameveti cenna, saguṇopāsanayā brahmalokaṃ gatasyāpi `na sa punarāvartata' ityādiśrutyā dainandinasargādyasambahandhasya pratipādanenāvāntaramuktāvapyupapatteḥ| `na tatra māye'tyādismṛtau ca māyāśabdasya mātsaryādiparatvena mūlamāyāvirahāpratīteḥ, anyathā śyāmāvadātatvāditi virodhāpatteḥ, `yo veda nihita' mityatra śuddhabrahmajñānaphalabhūtā yā sarvakāmāvāptiḥ, sā na vaiṣayikabhogarūpā, kintu sarvavaiṣayikasukhānām etasyaivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrāmupajīvantī'tiśrutyā brahmānande antarbhāvoktestadabhiprāyeti na tadvalānnānākāmāvāpteḥ śuddhajñānaphalatvam, bhūmavidyāphaloktyavasare sarvalokakāmacārānekadhābhāvādeḥ phalasya bhūmavidyāvākyopakrame prāṇavidyāphalatvenoktasya jyotiṣṭomaprakaraṇe śrūyamāṇāhīnadvādaśopasattāvat nirguṇavidyāstāvakatvenāpyupapatteḥ, svayaṃjyotirityādau jakṣaṇaprabhṛtīnāṃ bhedagarbhatvena jakṣanniva kroḍannivetyādibādhitatvavivakṣayā paramamuktestatroktyā tvadabhimatabhedagarbhakrīḍādīnāṃ paramamuktitvābhāvāt, puṇyapāpe vidhūyetyatra paramasāmyasyaikyarūpatayā karmakṣayasya aikyarūpamuktiphalatayā bhedagarbhamuktiphalatvābhāvāt, juṣṭamityatrānyapadasya dehendriyādivilakṣaṇātmaparatvena jīveśaparatvābhāvāt| tathā ca bhedajñānasya mokṣahetutvam ato'vagamyate manmate bhedabhogādipareṣu `saṅkalpādeva tacchuterityārabhyādhyāyaparisamāptiparyantādhikaraṇeṣu saguṇavidyāphalasya uktatayā śuddhabrahmavidyāphalāpratipādakatvāt| tasmāt paramamuktau bhedasyāprasakteḥ vyāvahārikatvopapattyā bhedaśrutervyāvahārikaparatvaṃ sthitam| ityadvaitasiddhau bhedaśrutervyāvahārikabhedaparatvopapattiḥ|| 23 || 24. jīveśabhede śabdāntarādibhaṅgaḥ| nanu- pūrvatantre dvitīyādhyāye yaireva śabdāntarādibhiḥ karmabheda uktaḥ, taireva jīveśabhedo'pi sidhyati| tathā hi- eṣa eva jīvaṃ prabodhayati `etasmājjīva uttiṣṭhatī'ti viruddhārthadhātuniṣpannākhyātarūpaśabdāntarasya `nityaḥ paro nityaḥ jīva' iti pratyabhijñāyamānapunaḥ śrutirūpābhyāsasya `dvā suparṇe'tyādisaṅkhyāyā aśabdamanaśnannityāderbhedakasya guṇāntarasya `yato vāco nivarttanta' ityādiprakaraṇāntarasya jīveśāviti nāmadheyadvayasyāpi sattvācceti cenna, pratyakṣādisamakakṣyatayā śabdāntarādīnāṃ bhedakatve'pi tāttvikābhedāvirodhitvāt| kiñcādṛṣṭacarastvaṃ mīmāṃsakaḥ yaḥ karmabheda śāstrabhede vā pramāṇatvena klṛptānāṃ śabdāntarādīnāṃ cetanabhede pramāṇatvaṃ kalpayasi| na hyanyabhedaprayojakasyānyabhedaprayojakatā| viśiṣṭabhede prayojakasyāpi viśeṣaṇabhedasya viśeṣyabhedakatvāpatteḥ| `devadatta uttiṣṭhati śiṣyaṃ bodhayati yajati dadāti juhotī'tyādāvapi bhedāpatteḥ| na śabdāntarasya kartṛbhedakatā|| ityadvaitasiddhau śabdāntarāderātmabhedakatvābhāvaḥ|| 24 || 25. bhedaśruteḥ ṣaḍvidhatātparya liṅgāni nanu- ṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgopetaśrutigamyabhedasya kathamatāttvikatvam ? tathā hi- ātharvaṇe dvā suparṇetyupakramaḥ, paramaṃ sāmyamupaitītyupasaṃhāraḥ, `tayoranyaḥ anaśnannanyaḥ anyamīśa'mityabhyāsaḥ, śāstraikagamyeśvarapratiyogikasya kālatrayābādhyabhedasya śāstraṃ vinā aprāpterapūrvatā, `puṇyapāpe vidhūye'ti phalam, `asya mahimāna'miti stutirūpo'rthavādaḥ, atti anaśnannityupapattiḥ| atra ca `māyāmātramidaṃ dvaita'mityādāviva dviśabda eva bhedavācakaḥ, tadākṣepako vā dvitvasaṅkhyaivaikyavirodhinīti vā bhavatyupakramo bhedaviṣayaḥ| tadbhinnatvaviśeṣitameva ca tadgatabahudharmayogitvaṃ tatsādṛśyam, na tu viśeṣyamātram, nāyaṃ saḥ kintu tatsadṛśaḥ nāyaṃ tatsadṛśaḥ, kintu sa eveti sādṛśyaikyayorekataravidhānāyānyataraniṣedhād| `gaganaṃ gaganākāra'mityādi tu tatsadṛśavastvantaraniṣedhaparam, gaganādyekadeśasya tadekadeśasādṛśyaparaṃ vā ityupasaṃhāro'pi bhedaviṣaya eva| abhyāsatve'pi arthata evaikaprakāratvaṃ tantram, na tu śabdataḥ, atiprasaṅgāt| anyamīśamityatra īśagatānyatvaṃ prati paśyatīti prakṛto jīva eva padinyāyena pratiyogitayā sambadhyata ityabhyāso'pi saṃbhavatīti cet| maivam, ātharvaṇe prathamamuṇḍake `kasminnubhagavo vijñāte sarvamidaṃ vijñātaṃ bhavatī'ti śaunakapraśnānantaraṃ `dve vidye veditavye' iti vidyādvayamavatārya ṛgvedādilakṣaṇāmaparāmuktvā `atha parā yayā tadakṣaramadhigamyate yattadadreśyamagrāhyamagotravarṇa'mityādinā paravidyāviṣayamakṣaraṃ praśnānusāreṇa pratipādayatā abhedasyaivopakrāntatvād, anyathā taduttaratvānupapatteḥ| dvitīyamuṇḍake `puruṣa evedaṃ viśvaṃ brahmaivedaṃ variṣṭha'miti madhye parāmarśāt| tṛtīyamuṇḍakānte ca `pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti, sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavatī'tyaikyalakṣaṇaphalenopasaṃhārācca muṇḍakatrayātmikāyā upaniṣada aikyaparatve sthite `asaṃyuktaṃ prakaraṇā'diti nyāyenābhikramaṇādivanmadhyasthitavākyasyāpi dvāsuparṇetyādestadanukūlatve sambhavati mahāprakaraṇavirodhena viparītatātparyakalpanayā bhedopakramatvābhāvāt| `paramaṃ sāmyamupaitī'tyasya pūrvoktanyāyena aikyaparatayā bhedopasaṃhāratvābhāvāt| ataḥ anaśnannityādinā na tāttvikabhedābhyāsaḥ, nāpīśasya śāstragamyatayā tatpratiyogikastaddharmiko vā bhedo'pūrvaḥ, īśajñānamātre tadapekṣāyāmapi pratyakṣeṇa tatsamakakṣyamānena ca tayoḥ prāptatvāt| tvaduktaphalārthavādayoraikyapakṣe'pi sambhavena na bhedāsādhāraṇaliṅgatā, anaśnannityādeḥ kālpanikabhedenopapattyā tāttvikabhedopapattitvābhāvāt| nanu- antaryāmibrāhmaṇaṃ ṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgopetaṃ vākyaṃ bhede pramāṇam| tathā hi- `vettha nu tvaṃ kāpya tamantaryāmiṇa'mityupakramaḥ `eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmī'tyupasaṃhāraḥ, `eṣa ta ātmetyādyekaviṃśatikṛtvo'bhyāsaḥ antaryāmitvasyāprāptatayā'pūrvatā, `sa va brahmavi'dityādi phalam, `taccettvaṃ yājñavalkya sūtramavidvāṃstaṃ cāntaryāmiṇaṃ brahmagavīrudajase mūrdhā te vipatiṣyatī'ti nindārūpo'rthavādaḥ, `yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yaṃ pṛthivī na veda' ityādyupapattiriti cet, maivam| `ātmetyevopāsīte'ti sūtritabrahmavidyāvivaraṇarūpāyāṃ caturadhyāyyām anena hyetatsarvaṃ vedeti ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñāpūrvakaṃ `brahma vā idamagra āsīttadātmānamevāvedahaṃ brahmasmīti tasmāttatsarvamabhava'dityabhedenopakramya ṣaṣṭhādhyāyante maitreyībrāhmaṇe nigamanarūpe `yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttat kena kaṃ paśye'dityādinā'bhedenaivopasaṃhārād adhyāyacatuṣṭayasyāpyabhedaparatve sthite tadantargatasya brahmalokāntarasūtrātmapratipādanaparasya uttarabrāhmaṇapratipādyanirūpādhikasarvāntarabrahmapratipattyanukūlasya mahāprakaraṇānurodhena tadvirodhibhedaparatvābhāvāt, tvadupanyastaliṅgānāṃ bhedaparatānirṇāyakatve'pi kalpitabhedaparatayā tāttvikābhedāvirodhitvāt| ata eva na `śārīraścobhaye'pi hi bhedenainamadhīyata' iti sūtravirodhaḥ, navā tadbhāṣyavyāhatiḥ|| ityadvaitasiddhau bhedaśruteḥ ṣa़ḍvidhatātparyaliṅgabhaṅgaḥ|| 25 || 26. aikyasvarūpabhaṅgaḥ nanu- aikyaṃ (1) ātmasvarūpam ? (2) utānyat ? nādyaḥ, ekatarapariśeṣādyāpatteḥ, sāpekṣasyaikyasya nirapekṣātmatvāyogācca| nāntyaḥ, satyatve advaitahāneḥ, mithyātve tattvamasītyāderatattvāvedakatāpatteriti cenna, ādyamevānavadyam| jñānānandayorātmaikye'pi yathā naikatarapariśeṣāpattyādikaṃ kalpitānandatvādidharmāt tathā prakṛte'pi sambhavād, aikye abhijñeyatvasya prāgukteḥ tasyāpi nirapekṣatayā nirapekṣātmasvarūpatvāvirodhād, ajñānādyadhiṣṭhānatayā bhāsamānātmasvarūpatve'pi aikyasya tadgocaravṛttiviśeṣasyājñānanivartakasya idānīmasattvātsaṃsāropapatteḥ| antye pakṣe doṣāstvanuktopālambhā eva| ata eva atiriktamaikyaṃ| naikatvasaṅkyā, na vā tanniṣṭhāśeṣadharmavattvam, na vā tanniṣṭhāsādhāraṇadharmavattvam, nirdharmake brahmaṇi teṣāmabhāvāt| nāpi bhedavirahaḥ, bhedasyaikyaviraharūpatvenānyonyāśrayāt| nāpi tadavṛttidharmānadhikaraṇatvam, śūnyasyāpi brahmaikyāpātāditi nirastam, tadavṛttidharmānādhāratvopalakṣitasvarūpasyābhedatvāt| śūnyasya niḥśvarūpatvāt na śūnyasyaikyarūpatā| na ca- tadavṛttidharmaniṣedhena tadvṛttidharmavidhānaprasaṅgaḥ, viśeṣaniṣedhasya śeṣābhyanujñāphalakatvāditi vācyam, śeṣavidhāyakatvasya sarvatrāsampratipatteḥ| anyathā vāyau na nīlarūpamityasyāpi gauraṃ prati vidhāyakatvāpātāt| nanu- abhede abhedatvapāramārthikatvāsadvailakṣaṇyādīni tattvataḥ santi vā ? na vā ? ādye sadvitīyatvāpattiḥ `dvitīye abhedatvādihāniriti cenna, tattvataḥ svarūpabhūtaireva tairabhedarūpatāyā advaitasya cāhānyupapatteḥ| na ca- evamabhedasyābādhitātmasvarūpaparyavasāne tasya cātmasvarūpasya parairapi saṃmatatvena tvacchāstrāviṣayatvamiti vācyam, jīvāvṛttidharmānadhikaraṇatvopalakṣitātmasvarūpasya parairanaṅgīkārāt| tadevamukte jīvabrahmābhede `tattvamasi' sa vā ayamātmā brahma' ityādiśrutirmānam| ityadvaitasiddhau aikyarūpopapattiḥ|| 26 || 27. aikyaśruterupajīvyabādhaḥ nanu- sārvajñyāsārvajñyādiviśiṣṭayoraikyamayogyatvaparāhataṃ kathamudāhṛtaśrutyā bodhyamiti cenna, so'yamityādāviva viruddhākāratyāgena śuddhākāraikyabodhanāt| nanu viruddhākāratyāgaḥ kimavivakṣāmātreṇa ? utānityatvena ? utamithyātvena ? nādyaḥ, viruddhākārasyāvivakṣāyāmapyanapāyāt| na hi `asadvā idamagra āsītsarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahmetyādiśrutyā sattvaśūnyatvayościttvajaḍatvayorvehāvivakṣāmātreṇa brahmaṇaḥ śūnyena jaḍena ca aikyaṃ suvacam| na dvitīyaḥ, tattvaṃ bhaviṣyasīti nirdeśāpattyā asīti vartamānanirdeśāyogād, daśābhedena bhedābhedayoḥ sattvāpattyā tvayāpyanaṅgīkārācca, jīveśayoḥ svātantryāpāratantryādernityatvācca| na tṛtīyaḥ, nirdoṣaśrutisākṣisiddhayorviruddhadharmayormithyātvāyogāditi cenna, viruddhākārasyāvivakṣayaiva tyāgāt| tyāgaśca brahmānubhavāviṣayatvam, na tvapāyaḥ, tasya caramasākṣātkārasādhyatvāt| tathā ca tattedante ivānapete api sārvajñyāsārvajñye nāśrayābhedavirodhāya| avivakṣā ca pradhānaprameyanirvāhāya| na ca- so'yamityatra tattedantayorna tyāgaḥ| krameṇaikatra tayoravirodhāditi vācyam, abhedapare asminviśeṣaṇayoraikyāpattyā krameṇaikatra sattve'pi tattyāgasyāvaśyakatvāt, `asadve'tyādau `sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahme'tyādau ca na śūnyajaḍaikyāpattiḥ śūnyasatoḥ cijjaḍayorvā viruddhākāraparityāgena jīvabrahmaṇorivānusyūtasyākārasyābhāvād| asato niḥsvarūpatvājjaḍasya bādhyasvarūpatvāt| ityadvaitasiddhau jīvabrahmābhede pramāṇam| nanu- aikyaśrutyā pratyakṣasiddhaṃ jīvamanūdya brahmatvaṃ vā bodhanīyaṃ, śrutisiddhaṃ brahmānūdya tasya jīvatvaṃ vā, ubhayānuvādenābhedo vā vidheyaḥ, sarvathāpyupajīvyavirodhāt naikye prāmāṇyam, pratyakṣeṇa jīvasya brahmabhinnatvena śrutyā ca sarvajñatvādimadbrahmagrāhiṇyā taddhīnatvenānubhūyamānājjīvād bhinnatvena brahmaṇojñāyamānatvāt| na cānumānena brahmopasthitiḥ, tenāpi sarvajñatvādinā brahmaṇo viṣayīkaraṇena upajīvyavirodhatādavasthyāditi cenna| śaktigrahādau tayorupajīvyatve'pi svaprameye'nupajīvyatvāt| taduktaṃ vācaspatye- `yat upajīvyaṃ, tanna bādhyate, yadvādhyate tannopajīvyamiti| yathākathañcidapekṣāmātreṇopajīvyatve nedaṃ rajatamityatrāpi idaṃ rajatamityasyopajīvyatāpatteḥ| nanu- yaddhi yadapekṣaṃ yasya bādhe svasya bādhāpattiśca tattasyopajīvyam, prakṛte ca dharmyādigrāhakasyaiva svaprāmāṇyagrāhakatayā tadbādhe svabādhāpattiḥ, niṣedhyārpaṇasthale tu na tathā| na hi brahmasvarūpadharmijñānāpramāṇye aikyajñānāprāmāṇyavat pratiṣedhyajñānāprāmāṇye pratiṣedhajñānāprāmāṇyam, pratiṣedhaśāstravilopaprasaṅgāditi cet, satyam, sārvajñyādiviśiṣṭaṃ na tāvaddharmi, kintu brahmasvarūpamātram| viśiṣṭadharmijñānaprāmāṇyaṃ aikyajñānaprāmāṇye nāpekṣyate, kintu svarūpajñānaprāmāṇyamātram| anyathā `iṃda rajata'mityasyāpi dharmijñānatvena upajīvyatayā niṣedhajñānaprāmāṇye rajatatvaviśiṣṭedaṃ jñānaprāmāṇyaṃ syāt| rajatatvavaiśiṣṭyasya dharmitvāprayojakatvavat sārvajñyādivaiśiṣṭyasyāpi tadaprayojakatvasya prakṛte'pi samānatvāt| nanu- evamasādhāraṇasārvajñyādidharmāvacchedena brahmaṇo'nuddeśyatve sādhāraṇadharmeṇa svarūpeṇa vā uddeśyatā vācyā| tatrādye iṣṭāpattiḥ, cittvādisādhāraṇadharmaikyasyāsmābhirapyaṅgīkārād| dvitīye brahmaikyāsiddhiḥ, sādhāraṇasvarūpamātroddeśāditi cenna| brahmaikyāsiddhirityatra brahmaśabdena sārvajñyādiviśiṣṭaṃ cedabhimatam, tadeṣṭāpattiḥ, tadā tvamā ca lakṣitayoreva padārthayoraikyabodhasya prāk pratipāditatvāt| ata eva śabdena asādhāraṇabrahmasvarūpoddeśasyāsādhāraṇadharmeṇa vinā'siddherupajīvyavirodhatādavasthyamiti nirastam, asādhāraṇadharmasya uddeśyasamarpaṇe upalakṣakatvāt| na ca- upalakṣyatāvacchedakābhāve upalakṣyatvāsiddhiḥ, cittvasya tattve siddhasādhanāditi vācyam| svarūpopalakṣaṇa upalakṣyatāvacchedakasyānapekṣaṇāt| yattu cittvenaikye siddhasādhanam, tanna| cittvaikyasyeṣṭatve'pi tadāśrayaikyasya tavāniṣṭatvād, iṣṭau cāvivādāt| ata eva- `puroḍāśakapālena tuṣānupavatītyatrādhiṣṭhānalakṣaṇāyām anyato'prāptatuṣopavāpavidhānarūpeṣṭasiddhivadatra na lakṣaṇayābhīṣṭasiddhiḥ, yena lakṣaṇā syāditi nirastam| cittvaikyasya prāptatve'pi āśrayaikyasyāprāptasya lakṣaṇāprāpaṇīyasya sattvāt, so'yamityatrāpi uktaprakārasyāvaśyavācyatvāt| na ca tattāviśiṣṭasya tatroddeśyatā yadvattayā jñāta eva yadanvayadhīḥ, tattvasya viśeṣaṇatvasya tattādau sambhavāditi vācyam, dattottarattvāt| nanu- evaṃ paramāṇuḥ sāvayavaḥ, īśvaro na sarvajñaḥ, ādityo yūpa ityādāvapupajīvyavirodho na syād, utpannaśiṣṭaguṇavidhau saguṇotpattivākyavirodhaśca na syāt, tatrāpi paramāṇutvādiviśiṣṭaṃ na dharmī, kintu svarūpamātramiti suvacatvāditi- cenna, paramāṇavādeḥ svarupeṇāpi sāvayatvādikaṃ prati dharmitve paramāṇutvādikaṃ dharmisamānasattākaṃ paramāṇvādau na syāt, tadīyasamasattākatvasya tatsāvayavatvabodhakaprābalyādhīnatvāt, tatprābalye'numānābhāvāt, pratyuta bhrāntavākyatvena durbalatvāt| ādityo yūpa ityatrābhedo na prameyaḥ| stutidvārānyaśeṣatvāt, stuteśca pratyakṣāviruddhairguṇairapi sambhave pratyakṣaviruddhārthakalpanāyogād, utpannaśiṣṭaguṇavidhau tūtpattivākyasthitāmikṣādipadasya dravyasāmānyaparatve tatpadavaiyarthyāpattiḥ, `taddhitārthāntargatāsyeti sarvanāmnā yajaticodanādravyadevatākriyamiti nyāyena yāgacodanamātreṇa ca dravyasāmānyalābhāt| prakṛte ananyaśeṣatayā prabalatvāt pramāṇavākyatvācca tadvirodhyaikyapratipādakatayā svarūpalakṣaṇāyā yuktatamatvācca| nanu- rūpyarūpaniṣedhyārpakasyāpekṣitasyāpi parīkṣitatvābhāvād, yadyapi durbalatvam, upajīvyatvamātrasya prābalyāprayojakatvāt, tathāpīha niṣedhyārpakabhedaśrutiḥ, sākṣipratyakṣaṃ ca nirdoṣatvāt parīkṣitamapi prabalaṃ tadvirodhāt kathamaikyaparatvamiti- cenna, nirdoṣāyā api śruteḥ bhedaparatvasyaivābhāvena tadvirodhasyaikyaśrutāvasambhavāvitatvāt| na hi śruterupakramādiṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgaśūnyārthaparatvam, tanniyāmakābhāvāt, anyathā'tiprasaṅgāt, sākṣiṇo'pi nirdoṣatvamātreṇa parīkṣitatvābhāvād, duḥkhābhāvādāvāropitasukhāderapi prāmāṇikatvāpatteḥ manmate prātibhāsikamātrasya sākṣisiddhasya mithyātvāt, sākṣiṇo'pi nirdoṣajavṛttyuparaktatvenābādhyatvāsiddheruktatvācca| pramāṇatadabhāvavyavasthāpi prātibhāsikavyāvahārikayoḥ karaṇasaṃsargidoṣaprayuktatvāprayuktatvābhyām, vyāvahārikasya caitanyamātrasthājñānadoṣaprayuktatvāt| tasmādupajīvyavirodhābhāvāt, pratyutābhedaśrutereva sarvaśeṣitayā bhedaśrutiṃ pratyupajīvyatvād, bhedaśrutereva tadvirodhena tadanukūlatayā neyatvāt sarvavirodhaśūnyaṃ tattvamasyādivākyam| tathā caikyaparamiti siddham|| ityaikyaśruterupajīvyavirodhābhāvaḥ|| 27 || 28. tattvamasyādivākyārthaḥ nanu- evaṃ padadvaye'pi lakṣaṇā syāt, tathā ca manmatamāśritya ekapadalakṣaṇaivāśrayaṇīyā| tathā hi- `dvā suparṇā sayuje'tyādau jīvasya brahmasāhacaryoktestatsāhacaryāttaditi vyapadeśaḥ, `vasantādibhyaṣṭhagi'tyatra vasantasahacarite adhyayane vasantapadaprayogasya mahābhāṣye uktatvāt, `sanmūlāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanā'ityādivākyaśeṣāt| prasiddhatadāśritatvādvā taditi vyapadeśaḥ, `samarthaḥ padavidhi'riti sūtre samarthapadāśritatvena padavidhiḥ samarthapadaprayogasya mahābhāṣyokteḥ, `sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ prajāḥ sarvā'iti vākyaśeṣāt| prasiddhatajjatvādvā tatpadaprayogaḥ, `brahmaṇo'sya mukhamāsī'dityādivat, `igyaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇa'mityatra saṃprasāraṇājjāto varṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇamiti bhāṣyokteḥ| `prāṇabandhanaṃ hi somya mana'iti vākyaśeṣeṇa jīvasyeśādhīnatvoktyā tadadhīnatvādvā tacchabdaprayogaḥ, `dhānyamasi dhinuhi' ityatra mantre taṇḍule dhānyapadaprayogavat| tatsādṛśyādvā tatpadaprayogaḥ, sārūpyāditi jaiminisūtre `ādityo yūpa' ityādikaṃ sādṛśyādityuktatvāt `tadaguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ prājñava'dityatra brahmasūtre brahmaguṇayogajjīve tadvyapadeśa ityukteḥ, mahābhāṣye ca bahugaṇetyādisūtre vatiṃ vinaiva saṅkyāvaditi vatyartho gamyate| abrahmadattaṃ brahmadattetyāha tena vayaṃ manyāmahe brahmadattavadayaṃ bhavatītyukteśceti- cenna| abhede tātparye'vadhṛte tannirvāhakalakṣaṇābāhulyasyādoṣatvāt| na hi lakṣaṇaikyānurodhena tātparyaparityāgaḥ| taduktaṃ nyāyacintāmaṇau- `tātparyāttu vṛttiḥ, na tu vṛttestātparya'miti| jahadajahallakṣaṇayā mukhyaparatve saṃbhavati tatsahacaritādyarthaparatvakalpanasyānucitatvācca| yathā abhedaparatve na bodhakatvānupapattiḥ, tathoktaṃ prāk| `dvā suparṇā sayujā' ityādinā na jīvasya brahmaṇā sahacaritatvoktiḥ, kiṃtvantaḥkaraṇeneti na tena sahacaritatvaprasiddhirapi| na vā sanmūlāḥ prajā ityādinā jīvasya tadāśritatvaprasiddhiḥ, prajāśabdasya prajāyamānavācakatvena jīvasya nityasyāpratipādanāt| ata eva na tajjanyatvenāpi tacchabdaprayogaḥ| brāhmaṇo mukhamityeva mukhājjātatvahetutaḥ| yathāvaducyate tadvajjīvo brahmeti vāgbhavet|| iti smṛtirapyasmṛtireva, śrutivirodhāt| yattu tadguṇasāratvādityādinā jīve brahmaguṇayoga ukta ityuktam, tanna, buddhiguṇasūkṣmatvayogāt jīve brahmaṇīva sūkṣmatvamityevaṃ paratvātsūtrasya| etena- śākhāsadeśe candre śākhetivat jīvāntaryāmitayā jīvasadeśe brahmaṇi tvamiti prayogaḥ, ātmani tiṣṭhanniti śruteḥ, brāhmaṇo vai sarvā devatā ityādivat| jīvāśrayatvādvā brahmaṇaḥ sarvakartṛtvena yajamānaḥ prastara ityādivat tatsiddhyā vā brahmaṇi tvamiti vyapadeśa iti nirastam| nanu- jahadajahallakṣaṇāyāṃ vācyāntargatatvena prāgdhīsthasya bādhakāt tyaktasya punaḥ svīkāraḥ, jahallakṣaṇāyām adhīsthasyātyaktasyaiva svīkāraḥ tyaktasvīkārādvaramadhīsthasya svīkāra iti- cenna, anupapattyā viśeṣaṇatyāge'pi viśeṣyāṃśātyāgāt| etena- tacchabdāt paratṛtīyādivibhakteḥ supāṃ sulugityādinā prathamaikavacanādeśo vā lugvā, tathā ca tena tvaṃ tiṣṭhasīti vā, tataḥ sañjāta iti vā, tasya tvamiti vā, tasmin tvamiti vārthaḥ, `anena jīvenātmanānuprabhūtaḥ pepīyamāno modamānastiṣṭhati sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajā aitadātmyamidaṃ sarvamityādivākyaśeṣāt| tathā ca mīmāṃsakā `uta yatsunvanti sāmidhenīstadanvāhu'rityatra yattacchabdayoḥ saptamyarthe prathamāṃ svīkṛtya yatra sunvanti tatra havirdhāne sthitvā sāmidhenīranubrūyāditi vyākhyāñcakruḥ| nyāyyaṃ ca niravakāśapradhānabhūtānekaprātipadikasvārasyāya saṅkhyarthatvena sāvakāśapradhānaikavibhaktyasvārasyamiti nirastam, prodgātṝṇāmityatra vibhaktisvārasyāya prātipadikasyānyathānayanavadatrāpi prātipadikasyaivānyathānayanācca| na ca- ṣaṣṭhībahuvacanasya prathamaikavacanavadanyatrāvidhānena tasyānyathānayanamasaṃbhavīti bahuvacanānusāreṇa prātipadikasya prastotrādichandogeṣu lakṣaṇā''śriteti vācyam, `saktūn juhotī'tyatrevānyatra nayanasya saṃbhāvitatvāt| kiṃ ca na tāvat pratipādakasya niravakāśatvam, vibhakteḥ saṅkhyāmiva viśeṣyāṃśe sāvakāśatvāt| nāpi prādhānyaṃ, pradhānārthavācakapratyayasyaiva prādhānyāt| taduktaṃ prakṛtipratyayau sahārthaṃ būtaḥ tayoḥ pratyayaḥ prādhānyene'ti| nāpi prātipadikānekatvaṃ svārasye tantram, `gabhīrāyāṃ nadyā'mityādau anekatve'pyasvārasyadarśanāt| tātparyabalāttatra tatheti cet, samaṃ prakṛte'pi| yattu `prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṃṣyabhighāraya'tītyatra prayājaśeṣaṃ haviḥṣu prakṣipatīti tṛtīyāvibhaktyasvārasyaṃ, saktūn juhotītyādāvapi dvitīyāvibhaktyasvārasyaṃ, tadagatyā, `prayājaśeṣeṇa'tyādau upayuktasaṃskāravyatirekeṇa prakārāntarasyāsaṃbhavāt, saktūnityādau bhūtabhāvyupayogābhāvena saṃskāryatvābhāvāt| etena- tasya tvaṃ tattvamiti samastaṃ padamiti nirastam, asamāsenaiva ṣaṣṭhyarthalakṣaṇādirahitena upapattau ṣaṣṭhīsamāsasyānyāyyatvād, anyathā sthapatyadhikaraṇavirodhāpatteḥ| nanu- aitadātmyamidaṃ sarvaṃ tatsatyaṃ sa ātmā tattvamasītyatra tatpadena nātmā parāmṛśyate, kintu aitadātmyam, napuṃsakatvād, aitadātmyamityasya eṣa cāsāvātmā ca etadātmā tasyedamaitadātmyam| evaṃ ca etadīyaṃ vastu tvamasītyarthaḥ, na tvabhedaḥ, etadātmā yasya tadaitadātmyamityarthe bhāvapratyayavaiyarthyāpatteḥ| tato varamarthāntarāśrayaṇam; vicitrā hi taddhitagatiriti vacanāt| sa sraṣṭā caiva saṃhartā niyantā rakṣitā hariḥ| tena vyāptamidaṃ sarvamaitadātmyamato viduḥ|| iti smṛteśceti- cenna, tasyedamityarthe ṣyaño'vidhānāt prayogādarśanācca| svārthe ca saukhyamityādiprayogadarśanāt| tathā ca etat sad ātmā yasya sarvasya tadetadātmā tasya bhāva aitadātmyaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca svārthikatvādvā, bhāvabhavitrorabhedopacārādvā, `yo vai bhūmā tatsukha'mitivat| yattu smṛtāvetadvyāpakatvena aitadātmyoktiḥ, sā na yuktā, ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñāvirodhāt| nanu- śarīravācināṃ devamanuṣyaśabdānāṃ śarīriparyantatvadarśanād brahmaśarīrabhūtajīvavācitvaṃ padasya brahmaparyantatvena tattvamiti vyapadeśaḥ śarīraśarīribhāvanibandhanaḥ, `yasyātmā śarīra' mityādiśruteriti mukhyamevāsmanmate padadvayamiti- cenna, śarīriparyantatvamiti tallakṣakatvaṃ vā ? tatrāpi śaktatvaṃ yā ? śarīraviṣayavṛttyaiva tatpratipādakatvaṃ vā ? nādyaḥ, mukhyatvānupapādanāt| na dvitīyaḥ, śarīravācināmityasādhāraṇyena nirdeśānupapatteḥ pravṛttinimittamanuṣyatvādijāteḥ śarīriṇyavṛtteruktatvācca| na tṛtīyaḥ, anyaviṣayavṛtteranyānupayogena śarīraśarīriṇoranādibhramasiddhābhedanibandhano'yaṃ prayogo vācyaḥ| tathā cātrāpyabhedanibandhana evāyaṃ prayogaḥ, abhedastu bādhakābhāvādatra tāttvika ityeva viśeṣaḥ| yattu `ādityo brahmeti'vat jīve brahmatvopāsanārthastattvamasīti nirdeśa iti, tanna, anupāsanāprakaraṇasthatvena dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyād, uktarītyā vastuniṣṭhatve saṃbhavati tattyāgāyogācca| nanu- sa ātmā tattvamasītyatrātattvamasīti padacchedaḥ, `śabdo'nitya'ityatrānitya iti padacchedo yathā ghaṭadṛṣṭāntānusāreṇa, tathā'trāpi śakunisūtrādidṛṣṭāntānusārāt| na hi prathamakhaṇḍe śakunisūtrayoḥ sa yathā śakuniḥ sūtreṇa prabaddha ityuktayoḥ śakunisūtrayoḥ, ṣaṣṭhe lavaṇametadudakamityādinoktayorlavaṇodakayoḥ, saptame `puruṣaṃ somya gandhārebhya' ityādinoktayoḥ puruṣagandhāradeśayoḥ, navame ca `apahārṣīt steyamakārṣī'dityādinoktayoḥ stenāpahāryayoḥ aikyam| stenāpahāryadṛṣṭānte hi spaṣṭamaikyajñānino'narthaḥ, parakīyabrahmatvābhimānī hi stenaḥ, na tu vidyamānabrahmatvājñānīti cenna| śakunisūtrādau dṛṣṭānte vidyamāno'pi bhedo nātaditipadacchedaprayojakaḥ, taṃ vinaiva tadupapatteḥ, ghaṭadṛṣṭāntastu na nityatva upapadyata iti vaiṣamyāt| tathā hi- jvarādirogagrastasya tannirmoke svāsthye viśrāntivajjāgratsvapnayoḥ karaṇavyāpārajanitaśramāpanuttaye jīvasya devatātmasvarūpāvasthānamityasminnarthe śakunisūtradṛṣṭānta ityanyathaivopapatteḥ, `svamapītobhavatī'ti śruteḥ| nanu- brahmaṇi svaśabdo na jīvābhedābhiprāyaḥ, kintu ātmīyatvādyarthaḥ svātantryābhiprāyo vā, `svātantryātsva' iti prokta ityāgamād, `apīto bhavatī'tyasyāpi tirohitaḥ san prāpto bhavatītyevārthaḥ, na tvabhinna iti apeḥ pidhāne, iṇodhātośca gatau, niṣṭhāyāḥ kartari śakteḥ klṛptatvād, aikye yogarūḍhyorabhāvācceti cet, na| svaśabdasya svarūpe mukhyasyārthāntaraparatve gauṇīlakṣaṇayoranyatarāpatteḥ, abhede yogarūḍhyorabhāve'pi upasargaprakṛtipratyayaparyālocanayā labdhasvarūpaprāptirūpārthasyābhede paryavasānāt| ata eva- aikyārthatve apīta ityasya bhavateścākarmakatayā śrutadvitīyāyogaḥ aśrutatṛtīyākalpanamiti- nirastam| ata eva- `yathā asminnākāśe śyeno vā suparṇo vā viparipatya śrāntaḥ saṃhatya pakṣau saṃlayāyaiva dhriyate evamevāyaṃ puruṣa' iti suṣuptisamaye śrutyantare bhinnaśyenanīḍadṛṣṭāntoktiriti ca- nirastam, sarvasāmyasya dṛṣṭāntatāyāmatantratvāt| na ca- prājñenātmanāṃ sampariṣvaktaḥ sa iti suṣuptiviṣaye bhedaśrutyā tvanmate'pi bhedapareṇa suṣuptyutkrāntyorbhedeneti sūtreṇa tvatpakṣe'pi jāgaraṇa iva suṣuptāvapi āvidyakajīvabrahmabhedasvīkāreṇa ca virodha iti vācyam, yato jāgratsvapnayoriva sphuṭataravikṣepo nāstītyabhiprāyeṇa svasvarūpaprāptyuktiḥ, na tvātyantikābhedābhiprāyeṇa, anyathā suṣuptimuktyoraviśeṣāpatteḥ| yadi sajjagato mūlam, tadā kathaṃ nopalabhyata ityāśaṅkāyāṃ vidyamānamapi vastu nopalabhyate, anyathā tūpalabhyata ityamumarthaṃ spaṣṭīkartuṃ lavaṇodakadṛṣṭānta iti, tatrāpyanyathopatatteḥ| yadyevaṃ lavaṇamivendriyairanupalabhyamānamapi jaganmūlaṃ sad upāyāntareṇa upalabdhuṃ śakyate iti tasyaivopalambhe ka upāya ityāśaṅkāyām `ācāryavān puruṣo vede'tyupāyaṃ vaktuṃ gāndhārapuruṣadṛṣṭānta iti tatrāpyanyathaivopapatteḥ| tathā cācāryavān vidvān yena krameṇa satā sambadhyate sa ka ityāśaṅkāyāṃ satyābhisandhasyārthaprāptiranṛtābhisandhasyānarthaprāptiriti vaktuṃ stenāstenadṛṣṭānta iti tatrāpyanyathaivopapatteḥ| na ca satyānṛtadṛṣṭāntena pūrterapahārṣīt `steyamakārṣī'diti udāharaṇāyogaḥ, tadupapādakatvena pṛthak dṛṣṭāntatvābhāvāt| nanu- navamakhaṇḍe `nānātyayānāṃ vṛkṣāṇāṃ rasāni'tyādinoktānāṃ nānāvṛkṣarasānāṃ daśame `imāḥ somya nadya' ityādinoktayornadī- samudrayoścaikyaṃ vaktuṃ na hi śakyam, na hi nānāvṛkṣarasā anyonyabhedatyāgena prāk siddhena madhunā aikyamāpadyante, na vā prāk bhedabhrāntiviṣayāḥ paścāttadaviṣayāḥ, kintu tantava iva paṭamanyonyabhinnā eva prāgasiddhaṃ madhūtpādayanti, na cedaṃ dārṣṭāntikānuguṇam| nadīsamudradṛṣṭānte'pi kiṃ nadīsamudrāvayavinoraikyam ? kiṃ vā tadavayavajalāṇūnām ? uta dravyāntarārambhaḥ ? nādyadvitīyau, māṣarāśau prakṣiptamāṣatadavayavānāmiva kṣīre prakṣiptanīratadavayavānāmiva cānyonyamiśrībhāve'pi prāgbhinnānāṃ paścādapyaikyāyogāt| tṛtīye tu bheda eva, evaṃ dārṣṭāntikānānuguṇyaṃ ceti-cenna, spuṭāvacchedakaviraheṇa spaṣṭabhedābhāvābhiprāyeṇa dṛṣṭāntanāmupāttatvena dṛṣṭānte vāstavabhedābhedayoraudāsīnyena tvaduktadūṣaṇagaṇānāmagaṇanīyatvāt| ata eva sato bhedasyājñānamātre dṛṣṭānta iti nirastam; bhedasattāyāmaudāsīnyāt| na caivamasphuṭabhedaviṣayatvasyātyantikābhede'nupayogaḥ, sūkṣmopādhyavacchinnasya mahopādhyavacchinnaikyavattadavacchinnasyāpi tadvilaye anavacchinnaikyamiti sambhāvanābuddhijananadvāropayogitvasambhavāt| ata eva `tāḥ samudrāt samudramevāpiyanti sa samudra eva bhavatī'tyatra prakṛtanadīruddiśya samudrabhavanavidhāne suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍalaṃ bhavatītivat, tāḥ samudra eva bhavantīti vyapadeśaḥ syāt| ato nadyo'niyatajalarāśirūpāt samudrād gacchanti taṃ praviśanti ca, samudrastu sa eva, naitāsāṃ samudratvamiti vā, samudra eva na tu nadītvaṃ prāpnototi vārthaḥ| sato'pyanyaunyaṃ bhedasyājñāna evemau dṛṣṭāntau| ata eva nānārasavākye dārṣṭāntike `evameva khalu somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sati sampadya na viduḥ sati sampatsyāmaha iti ta iha vyāghro ve'ti nadīsamudravākye ca dārṣṭāntike `sata āgamya na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha'iti `ta iha vyāghro ve'ti sato bhedasyājñānenaivānartha ukta iti nirastam, spaṣṭabhedaviṣayatābhāvābhiprāyeṇa dṛṣṭāntatvāt| yacca bhedājñānanibandhanavyāghrādirūpānarthaparā śrutiriti, tanna, sati sampadyetyesyāsannatvāt `na vidu'rityanena satsampattyajñānamucyate na tu bhedājñānam| tathā ca satsampatterjñānapūrvakatvābhāvāt tattadvāsanayā tattadvyāghrādibhāva eva bhavatītyetatparatvāt| tasmād dṛṣṭāntavaryāṇāṃ bhede tātparyahānitaḥ| eteṣāmanusāreṇa chedo nātaditi sphuṭam|| nanu- aṣṭamakhaṇḍe svapnāntaṃ me somya vijānīhiti svātantryaśaṅkānāspadasuṣuptinidarśanena ekādaśe cāsya yadekāṃ śākhāṃ jīvo jahātītyādinā anvayavyatirekoktyā pañcadaśe ca puruṣaṃ somyotopatāpinamityādinā svātantryaśaṅkānāspadamaraṇanidarśanena īśvarādhīnatvasyoktatvādatadityeva chedo yukta iti- cenna, svapnāntamityādeḥ suṣuptyavasthāyāmeva jīvatvavinirmuktaṃ svaṃ devatārūpaṃ darśayiṣyāmītyanenābhiprāyeṇa uddālakenāvatāritatveneśvarādhīnatvaparatvābhāvāt| jalādutthitānāṃ vīcītaraṅgaphenabudbudānāṃ punastadbhāvaṃ gatānāṃ vināśo dṛṣṭaḥ| jīvānāṃ pratyahaṃ svarūpatāṃ gacchatāṃ maraṇapralayayośca nāśābhāvaḥ kathamityāśaṅkāyāṃ tatparihāratvenoktasya vṛkṣaśākhānidarśanasya jīvādhiṣṭhitaṃ śarīraṃ jīvati, tadapetaṃ ca mriyate, na tu jīvo mriyata ityetatparatvāt `jīvāpetaṃ vāva kiledaṃ mriyate na jīvo mriyata' iti vākyaśeṣāt| yathā somyotopatāpinamityasyāpi `ācāryavān vidvān kena krameṇa sat sampadyata ityāśaṅkāyāṃ tatkramapradarśanaparatvena īśvarādhīnatve tātparyābhāvāt| yattu ekādaśe `jīvenātmanānuprabhūtaḥ pepīyamāno modamānastiṣṭhatī'tyatra jīvaśabda īśvaraparaḥ modamāna iti saṃsāriṇaḥ pṛthagukteriti, tanna, modamāna ityasya dṛṣṭāntatvena prakrāntavṛkṣaviśeṣaṇatvena saṃsāriparatvābhāvena jīvaityatra śrutārthatyāgāyogāt| yacca dvādaśe etasyaiva somyaiṣo'ṇimna ema mahān nyagrodhastiṣṭhatīti, atra aṇimaśabdaḥ sūkṣmeśvaraparaḥ, sa eṣo'ṇimā aitadātmyamidaṃ sarvamiti ihaiva śrutāvīśvare tasya prayogāt, na tu dhānāparaḥ, tāsāṃ kimatra paśyasīti aṇvya ivemā dhānā iti bhāvapratyayarahitena strīliṅgena bahuvacanāntena ivaśabdaśiraskenāṇuśabdena nirdiṣṭatayā tadviparītāṇimaśabdānarhatvācceti cenna| eṣo'ṇurātmetyatra bhāvapratyayarahitaprayogaviṣaye'pīśvare eṣo'ṇimeti prayogadarśanena dhānāsu tathā vaktuṃ śakyatvāt| na ca tarhi na nibhālayasa ityuktādṛśyatvāyogaḥ, anubhūtāyāṃ dhānāyāmeva mahān nyagrodhasthiṣṭhati sa tvayā'nabhivyaktatvāt na jñāyata ityevaṃ paratvāt| nanu- yadi pañcadaśe viduṣo brahmaprāptimātraṃ vivakṣitam, tadā tasya vāṅmanasi sampadyata ityādi tejaḥ parasyāṃ devatāyāmityantameva vākyaṃ syāt, yāvanna vāṅmanasi sampadyata ityādi vyarthaṃ syāditi- cenna| laukikamaraṇe yaḥ satsampattikramaḥ, sa eva viduṣo'pi, viśeṣastu jñānājñānakṛta iti amumarthaṃ pratipādayituṃ dṛṣṭānte'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ satsampattikrama iti vaiyarthyābhāvāt| na ca `tat satyaṃ sa ātmā' ityatrātmaśabdenāṇimaśabdokteśvara eva gṛhyate, na tu jīvaḥ| "yadāpnoti yadādatte yaccātti viṣayāniha| yaccāsya santato bhāvastasmādātmeti gīyate||" iti vacanāditi- vācyam, katama ātmetyādau ātmaśabdasya jīve prasiddhatvād, vacanoktaviṣayāttṛtvasya jīva eva ca saṃbhavāt tatparigrahasyaivocitatvāt| yacca `tamevaikaṃ jānatha ātmāna'miti vākyokto na jīvaḥ tadvāciśabdābhāvāditi siddhāntitam, tadātmaśabdasya na jīve amukhyatvābhiprāyeṇa kintu pradhānādau| jīvasya tu ātmatve'pi paricchinnatayā jagatkartṛtvāsambhavād vyudāsa ityevaṃ param| jīvenātmaneti sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapatteśca| na ca jīvaśabdena īśvara evoktaḥ, rūḍhiparityāge kāraṇābhāvād, rūḍheśca klṛptatvād, ahaṃ hi jīvasaṃjña ityādeśca abhedapakṣe'pi saṃbhavāt| na ca prāṇadhārakatvamīśamātravṛtti, jīvasādhāraṇatvāt| na ca trivṛtkaraṇapūrvakanāmarūpavyākaraṇasya jīve'saṃbhavaḥ asmadādāvasaṃbhave'pyatrivṛtkṛtabhūtārabdhaliṅga śarīrābhimānino hiraṇyagarbhasya nāmarūpātmakaprapañcavyākaraṇasaṃbhavāt| na ca- tarhi punarjīvapraveśoktyayogaḥ, `tatteja aikṣata tā āpa aikṣanta imāstisro devatā' iti pūrvameva cetanatvasiddheriti vācyam, avyākṛtabhūtasṛṣṭau sākṣātkāraṇatvavat brahmāṇḍādisṛṣṭau na sākṣātkāraṇatā kintu svābhinnajīvadvāreṇetyevaṃ paratvāt| kiñca `ekamevādvitīyamityupakramāt na śyenādidṛṣṭāntānusārādataditi padacchedo yuktaḥ, ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñānavirodhād, brahmajīvaikyasyāprasaktatvena niṣedhānupapatteśca| na ca- `iṣṭāpūrtaṃ manyamānā variṣṭha'mityādāviṃva śrutitātparyāparijñānena `taddhaika āhurasadevedamagra āsī'dityādāvivānādikusamayena vā dehendriyādīn prati svātantryarūpasya aiśvaryasya sarvairapi svātmanyabhimanyamānatvena pratyakṣeṇa vā prasaktiraikyasyeti- vācyam, aikyatātparyasya pramitatvena susamayatvasya vyavasthāpitatvena ca tātparyāparijñānakusamaya prāptatvasya vaktumaśakyatvād, aikyaliṅgasyāpi ābhimānikatvābhāvena tena cet prasaktiḥ, tadā niṣeddhumaśakyataiva, dehendriyādīnāṃ jīvasyaikyenādhyastatvāt tān prati svātantryābhimānasya sārvalaukikasya vaktumaśakyatvād, yatkiñcitprati svātantryasya īśvaralakṣaṇatvābhāvācca| etena- ekamevādvitīyamiti samābhyadhikarāhityasyopakramād, aitadātmyamiti tasyaivopasaṃhārād, atattvamasīti navakṛtvo'bhyāsād, śāstraṃ vinā śāstraikagamyasya īśvarabhedasyāprasaktatayā'pūrvatvād, atha sampatsyata iti phalaśravaṇād, yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavatītyarthavādāt, śakunisūtrādidṛṣṭāntairupapādanāt, ṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgāni bhedaparāṇyeveti- nirastam, ekamevetyatra samābhyadhikarāhityamātreṇa bhodopakramatvābhāvād, abhede'pi tatsaṃbhavād, ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñānavirodhād, dvitīyābhāvamātrasyaivopakramāt| ata evābhyāsopasaṃhārāvapi bhedaviṣayau na bhavataḥ abhede tu yathā'pūrvatā tathoktam| phalārthavādopapattīnāmabheda eva saṃbhavācca| tathā śākhāntarasthitābhedavākyānāmupāsanāprakaraṇasthitānāṃ tūpāsanāparatayā nābhedaparavākyavirodhaḥ| iti tattvamasivākyārthanirūpaṇam|| 28 || 29. ahaṃ brahmāsmītyādiśrutyarthaḥ bṛhadāraṇyakasthitasya tu `brahma vā idamagra āsīt tadātmānamevāvedahaṃ brahmāsmī'ti vākyasyānupāsanāprakaraṇasthatayā abhedapramāpakatvameva| na ca tadyo yo devānāṃ pratyabuddhyata, sa eva tadabhavattatharṣīṇāṃ tathā manuṣyāṇāmiti bhedaparavākyaśeṣavirodhaḥ, tatrāpi devādiṣu prabuddhaṃ puruṣaṃ nirdhārya `sa eva tadabhava'diti brahmābhedaparatvena bhedaparatvābhāvāt| na ca- atra vākye brahmaṇa eva prakṛtatvānnānena jīvabrahmaikyasiddhiriti śaṅkyam, yo devānāmiti jīvaparāmarśivākyaśeṣānusāreṇa brahmapadasya kāryabrahmaparatvāt, śuddhabrahmaparatve ca bodhanimittasya tasmāttatsarvamabhavaditi sārvātmyalakṣaṇaphalakīrtanasyāyuktatvāpatteḥ| na ca- `nāma brahmetyupāsītādityo brahmetyādeśa' ityādāvitiśabdaśiraskatayā nāmādyabhedābhāvādatrāpītiśabdaśiraskatayā brahmabhedābhāva iti śaṅkyam, anupāsanāprakaraṇasthatvenābhedāvivakṣāyā nāma brahmetyādāviva vaktumaśakyatvāt| na cetiśabdavaiyarthyam, ātmetyevopāsīta ityādāviva śabdajñānayoḥ svābhāvikasakarmakatvaprāptau tannirākaraṇaparatvenopayogāt| yacca- ahaṃ śabdo jīvāntaryāmiṇi mukhyaḥ, ahaṃ manurabhavaṃ sūryaśceti antaryāmiṇyahaṃ śabdaprayogāt, sarvāntaryāmiko viṣṇuḥ sarvanāmnābhidhīyate| eṣo'haṃ tvamasau ceti na tu sarvasvarūpataḥ|| iti vacanācceti, tanna| śāstradṛṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmadevavaditi nyāyena vāmadevajīvacaitanyasya vastuto brahmābhedena sūryādibhāvasyoktatayā antaryāmiparatvābhāvād, `tadyo yo devānāṃ pratyubuddhyata sa eva tadabhava'diti pūrvavākye tattvabodhanimittakabrahmabhāvasya prakṛtatayā paśyan pratipede ityāderapi bodhanimittabrahmabhāvaparatayā antaryāmiparatvābhāvāt| smṛterapi asādhāraṇatattadātmani śakterāvaśyakatayā tatsahacāreṇāntaryāmiṇi eṣo'hamityādiprayogaḥ, na tu sarvasvarūpata iti| niṣedhasya tūpahitayoraikyābhāvanibandhanatvānna virodhaḥ, ata eva- viśiṣṭacaitanyarūpe vāmadeve viśiṣṭacaitanyarūpamanusūryādibhāvo na sambhavatīti nirastam, śāstradṛṣṭyā tūktatvāt| na ca tarhi śuddhacityabhavamityuttamapuruṣāyogaḥ, bhūtapūrvagatyā sambhavāt| na ca- ahaṃ bhūmimadāmāryāyetyādyayogaḥ, na hi cinmātraṃ bhūmidātriti- vācyam, upahitacitamādāya teṣāmupapatteḥ| ahaṃ nāmābhavattasyopaniṣadahamityādeśca tādṛśopāsanāparatvena śaktinirṇāyakatvābhāvāt| tasmānnāntaryāmyabhedapareyaṃ śrutiḥ, antaryāmiṇi bhedāprasakteśca| na ca niyamyānantyādinā prasaktiḥ, ekasnnipi jīve anekāvayavaniyāmakatvasyaikasminnapi rājanye anekadeśaniyāmakatvasya ca darśanāt| `sa yaścāyaṃ puruṣe yaścāsāvāditye sa ekaḥ' ityasyāpi nāntaryāmyaikyaparatā, brahmavidāpnoti paramityādinā śuddhasya brahmaṇaḥ prakṛtatayā tasminnupādhikṛtabhedasya tāttvikatvaprasaktau tannirākaraṇārthatvena aikyopadeśopapatteḥ| na caivaṃ chāndogye ya eṣa āditye puruṣo dṛśyate so'hamasmītyatra sa evainān brahma gamayatītyatra bhedaparottaravākyavirodhaḥ, tasya upāsanāprakaraṇasthatvenāhaṃ grahopāsanāparatayā virodhābhāvāt| na copāsanāprakaraṇasthitavākyabalādaikyāsiddhāvapi anupāsanāprakaraṇasthitādapi tadasiddhiḥ śaṅkyā| anyaśeṣatvasya tasya tatprayojakasyābhāvād| `atha yo'nyāṃ devatāmupāsta' ityuttaravākyasya bhedajñānanindāparatayā tadanusāreṇa pūrvavākyasyopāsanāparatvāyogāt| yattu brahmaśabdo'tra bṛṃhaṇārtha iti na parabrahmaikyasiddhiḥ, anyathā pūrvavākye ātmānamevāvedahamityanenaiva brahmeti jñānasya siddhatvād brahmāsmīti vyarthamiti, tanna| ātmaśabdena jīvacaitanyamanūdya bṛṃhitatvādyupalakṣitabrahmacaitanyābhedavidhiparatvena sārthakatvāt| tathā ca smṛtiḥ `ahaṃ hariḥ sarvamidaṃ janārdana' ityādikāpi saṅgacchate| yattu `atha yo'nyāṃ devatāmupāste'nyo'sāvanyo'hamasmīti na sa veda yathā paśu'rityatrāntaryāmibhedajñānanindanamiti, tanna, antaryāmiṇo'prakṛtatvāt padadvayalakṣaṇādestātparyānurodhena labdhatvāt| yattu atra yo'nyo jīva anyāṃ vilakṣaṇāṃ devatāmupāste anyo'sau paramātmā ahamasmīti na sa veda yathā paśurityartha iti, tattuccham, vyavahitānvayadoṣāt| ahaṃ śabdasannihitānya ityasya ya ityatra nayanāt| na ca `yasya yenārthasambandha' iti nyāyena sannidhānādyogyatāyāḥ prabalatvamiti śaṅkyam, yathāsthitārthasambandhe'pyuktakrameṇa yogyatāsattvāt| na ceyaṃ śrutiḥ svātantryeṇānyasadbhāvaniṣedhikā, anyatvapratiyogini svātantryopasthāpakapadābhāvāt| yattu kaiścidupāsta iti śravaṇāt prayatnasādhyajñānavijātīyavṛttyantararūpapopāsanāyā eva niṣedhaḥ, na tu jñānasyetyuktam, tanna| `tadyo yo devānāṃ pratyabudhyate'ti pūrvavākye na sa vedeti nindāvākye ca vedanasyaiva nirdeśāt madhyasthitopāsterapi jñānaparatvāt| evaṃ muṇḍake `sa yo ha vaitatparamaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati' ityetadapi vākyamabhedaparameva| na ca- dvitīyabrahmaśabdo jīvapara eva, tasya jātijīvakamalāsanādyanekārthatvāt, dve brahmaṇī ityādau jīve brahmaśabdaprayogasambhavācca, yaḥ paramaṃ brahma veda sa jīva eva bhavati, na tu paramaṃ brahmetyarthaḥ| ata eva ādyo brahmaśabdaḥ paramatvena viśeṣita iti- vācyam, jīve brahmapadaprayogasambhave'pi prakṛte parabrahmopadānamevocitam, jīvabhāvasyābrahmabhāvasya ca prāgeva siddhatayā brahmajñānasādhyatvābhāvāt| evaṃ ca arthād dvitīyabrahmabhavanamapi paramatvaviśeṣitameva| yacca brahma bhavatītyasya bṛṃhitatvarūpabrahmatvākrānto bhavatī'tyarthaḥ, sampūjya brāhmaṇaṃ bhaktyā śūdro'pi brāhmaṇo bhaved itivat| na hi śūdro'pi pūjitabrāhmaṇavyaktirbhavati, kintu brāhmaṇatvajātyākrānta iti, tanna, pūrvoktayuktyā prakṛte vyaktyabhedasyaiva sambhavena dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyāt| na ca- `asya mahimāna'miti vākyaśeṣāttadīyamahattvaprāptireva, na tu tadbhāva iti yuktam, dehendriyādiprapañcavilakṣaṇaṃ yo veda, prapañca tadvibhūtiṃ ca yo veda, sa vītaśoko bhavatītyevaṃ paratvāt| na ca `yathā nadyaḥ syandamānā' iti bhinnanadīsamudradṛṣṭāntoktirayukteti vācyam, spaṣṭabhedavilayanamātraparatvena dṛṣṭāntopapatteruktatvāt| parāt paraṃ puruṣamupaiti divyamiti na deśāntarasthabrahmaprāptyuktiparā, tasyāḥ saguṇopāsanāphalatvena brahmavidyāphalatvāsambhavena svarūpabhūtabrahmaprāptiparatvāt| na ca- advaitamate nityaṃ brahmabhūtasyāpūrvabrahmabhāvoktirayukteti vācyam, kaṇṭhagatacāmīkarādau bhrāntinivṛttimātreṇa prāptaprāptirūpatayā phalatvadarśanāt| na cāropanivṛtteraśābdatvam, śrutārthāpattigamyatayā śābdatvopapatteḥ| `brahmaiva san brahmāpyetī'ti śrutirapyaikyaparā| na cātra prathamabrahmapadasya jīvaparatvābhāve kartṛkarmabhāvavirodhaḥ, sākṣātkāraprākkālīnaupādhikabhedamādāya tādṛṅnirdeśopapatteḥ| pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavantītyetadapyabhede mānam| na ca gāvaḥ sāyaṃ goṣṭha ekībhavanti| ekībhūtā nṛpāḥ sarve vavarṣuḥ pāṇḍavaṃ śaraiḥ| kīṭo bhramareṇaikībhūta iti sthānaikyamatyaikyasādṛśyanibandhanaikībhāvasya gonṛpakīṭabhramarādau darśanād, atrāpi taireva nimittaiḥ gauṇa ekībhāva iti- vācyam, mukhyatve sambhavati gauṇatvasyāyogāt| brahmaikyamātraparatvena sakṛduccaritasya nānekārthaparatvaśaṅkāpi| na caikyasya prāgeva siddhatayā abhūtatadbhāvārthacvipratyayāyogaḥ, svagṛhanikṣiptājñātanidhivat sate'pyāvṛtatvenābhūtasamatayā cvipratyayopapatteḥ| na ca pare'vyaya iti śrutasaptamīhāniraśrutatṛtīyākalpanāpattiśceti- vācyam, śrutyantarānusāreṇa saptamyā ananusaraṇīyatvāt| na ca `paramaṃ sāmyamupaiti', parātparaṃ puruṣamupaitīti pūrvottaravākyavirodhaḥ, tasya prāgeva nirāsāt| tathāntaryāmiprakaraṇasthaṃ`nānyo'to'sti draṣṭe' iti vākyam akṣaraprakaraṇasthaṃ `nānyadato'sti draṣṭriti' vākyaṃ ca aikye pramāṇam| na cāta ityenena prastutaṃ sarvaniyantāraṃ parāmṛśyānyo draṣṭā nāstītyukteḥ svaniyāmakadraṣṭrantaraniṣedha āyāti, na tu draṣṭṛsāmānyaniṣedhaḥ, asmin grāme ayameva sarvaniyāmako nānyaḥ puruṣo'stītyadāvanyaśabdasya prastutasadṛśānyaparatayā vyutpannatvāt samānamitaracchyenenetyatra itaraśabdasya pūrvanirdiṣṭasadṛśaparatvokteśceti- vācyam, anena hyetatsarvaṃ vedeti pratijñātasya ekavijñānena sarvavijñānasyopapādanārtham anyatvena pratītena jīvenābhedabodhanāt| acetanavargasya ato'nyadārtaṃ, neti netīti niṣedhācca jīvabrahmābheda eva vākyaprameyaḥ| dṛṣṭānte tu abhedasyāvivakṣitatvāt tvaduktaprakārāśrayaṇe bādhakābhāvāt| na cātrāpyantaryāmivākye `ya ātmano'ntaraḥ yamātmā na veda yasyātmā śarīraṃ ya ātmānamantaro yamayatī'ti pūrvakyena `eṣa ta ātmā'ntaryāmyamṛtaḥ ato'nyadārtami'tyuttaravākyena ca virodhaḥ| tatra paramātmano'nyaṃ cetanamaṅgīkṛtya tasyārtiyuktatvenāsvātantryasyaivoktiriti vācyam, pūrvavākyasyaupādhikabhedamātreṇopapatteḥ| uttaravākyena na cetanāntarasyārtiyogo vidhīyate, kintu `eṣo'ntaryāmī te ātme'ti jīvasvarūpabhūtādantaryāmiṇo vyatiriktaṃ sarvam ārtaṃ vinaśvaramiti vā mithyeti vā bodhanānna virodhaśaṅkā| ata eva akṣaravākye'pi `etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane gārgi sūryācandramasau vidhṛtau tiṣṭhataḥ' ityādipūrvavākyena virodha ityapāstam| kiñca dvitīyādvai bhayaṃ bhavatīti bhedasya bhayahetutvena ninditatvādapyabheda evopaniṣadgamyaḥ| na ca- asya virodhinaḥ samānād bhayaṃ bhavatītyevārthaḥ, loke tādṛśādeva bhayaṃ bhavatīti lokasiddhanuvāditvāt pūrvatra `tasmādekākī bibheti' uttaratra `tasmādekākī na ramata' iti śravaṇācceti vācyam, yanmadanyannāsti kasmānna bibhemīti tata evāsya bhayaṃ vīyāyeti śruteḥ| sāmānyato dvitīyamātradarśanasyaiva bhayahetutvād viśeṣakalpanāyogāt| ekākī bibhetīti pūrvavākye paramārthadarśanarahitasya tannimittabhayasambhavād ekākī bibhetītyuktam| uttaravākye tasmādekākī na ramata ityatra iṣṭasaṃyogajanyaraterekākinyabhāvād ekākino ratirnāstītyuktam| tataścātattvajñaviṣayoktavākyānusāreṇa tattvajñaviṣayamadhyavākyasya svārthasamarpaṇenāpyupayuktatvāt tadvirodhyarthaparatvāyogāt| `etasminnudaramantaraṃ kurute atha tasya bhayaṃ bhavatī'ti bhedanindayāpyabhedasiddhiḥ| na ca etasminniti śravaṇāt svagatabhedaniṣedho'yam, na bhedamātraniṣedha iti śaṅkyam, alpārthakāraśabdasvārasyādapyarthakotpadasvārasyād, etasya pratiyogitvenānullekhācca bhedamātraniṣedhaparatayā tadviśeṣaniṣedhaparatvakalpanāyogāt| evaṃ `eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍha' ityādiśrutirapyatraikyapramāṇam| na ca- arntāmyaikyapareyaṃ śrutiḥ, `yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante' ityādāviva bhūtaśabdasya cetanaparatvāditi vācyam| dṛṣṭāntāsampratipatteḥ, cetanasya jāyamānatvādyayogād, bhūtahiṃsāniṣedhavākya iva cetanādhiṣṭhitaprāṇaśarīrādereva bhūtaśabdavācyatvāt| ata eva `eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ| ityādismṛtirapi| evaṃ yāvanmohaṃ tu bhedaḥ syāt jīvasya paramasya ca| tataḥ paraṃ na bhedo'sti bhedahetorabhāvātaḥ|| vibhedajanake'jñāne nāśamātyantikaṃ gate| ātmano brahmaṇo bhedamasantaṃ kaḥ kariṣyati|| ityādismṛtyā bhedasyāvidyakatvapratīterabheda eva tāttvika iti gamyate| na cātra bhedaśabdo mitrabheda ityādāviva vaimatyārthaḥ, tathā sati lakṣaṇāpatteḥ, anyo'nyābhāvādereva mukhyatvāt, śrutārthatyāgasyānyāyyatvāt| kṣetrajñaṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata ityādismṛtirapyatra mānam| na ca kṣetrajñaṃ sarvajñaṃ māṃ sarvakṣetreṣu viddhītyarthaḥ| `mahābhūtānyahaṅkāra' ityādyuktvā `etatkṣetraṃ samāsena savikāramudāhṛtam' ityanena `yasya pṛthivī śarīra'mityādiśrutyeśvaraśarīratayoktaṃ cetanācetanātmakaṃ sarvaṃ kṣetramityuktatvāditi vācyam, sarvaniyāmakatayā sakalakṣetrasambandhasya prāgeva siddheḥ paunaruktyāpatteḥ, tattatkṣetrādhiṣṭhātṛtvena kṣetrajñapadavācyajīvābhedaparatvasyaivocitatvāt| ata eva kṣetrāṇi ca śarīrāṇi bījāni ca śubhāśubhe| śrutāni vetti yogātmā tataḥ kṣetrajña ucyate|| prakṛteśca vikārāṇāṃ draṣṭāramaguṇātmakam| kṣetrajñamāhurjīvaṃ tu kartāraṃ guṇasaṃvṛtam|| ityādismṛtau kṣetrajñaśabdasya sarvāntaryāmisarvajñaparatve'pi prakṛte tadasambhavaḥ jīve suprasiddhatvācca| na ca śāstrasthā veti nyāyaḥ, tasya ekatarāśāstrīyaviṣayatvāt| evamanyānyapi vākyāni yathāsambhavamaikye yojyāni| tasmādāgama aikye mānam| ityadvaitasiddhau ahaṃ brahmāsmītyādyanekaśrutismṛtyarthakathanam|| 29 || 30. ekyānumānabhaṅgaḥ evamanumānamapi tatra mānam- jīvāḥ, paramātmanastattvato na bhidyante, ātmatvāt, paramātmavat| nanu- ātmatvaṃ jātiratra hetuḥ tathā cābhede hetūcchittireva pratikūlatarka iti cenna, tattvato'bhede'pi vyāvahārikabhedenaiva vyāvahārikajāteranucchedopapatteḥ| jñātṛtvādityapyatra hetuḥ| jīve upadheye antaḥkaraṇopahitavṛttestasyāsiddherabhāvāt| vyavahāre svabhinnajñānānapekṣatvaṃ hetuḥ| tavāpi jīvasya svābhinnanityajñānasyābādhyavyavahāraviṣayatvāt| abādhyatvamapyatra hetuḥ| na ca jaḍe vyabhicāraḥ, tatra bādhyatvena hetorabhāvāt, `tāttvikabhedasya sarvatrāsattvena vyabhicārānavakāśāt| na ca- evaṃ vyāvahārikabhedavyatireko'pyevameva sādhyatāṃ jīvaparamātmanoriti vācyam, tatra pratyakṣavirodhasyaiva bādhakatvāt, śrutyanugrahāccābhāsasāmyāpādanāprayojakatvānavakāśāt| ata eva- vimatā jīvāścaitrāt tattvato na bhidyante, jīvatvāccaitravaditi jīvaikye, vimatā jīvā vastuto brahmaṇo na bhidyante, vastutvād, brahmavaditi brahmajīvakye ca yadanumānam, tatra vyavahārato'pi na bhidyanta ityapyevaṃ sādhyatāmityābhāsasāmyam- apāstam| evaṃ vimatāni śarīrāṇi, caitrādhiṣṭhitāni, śarīratvāt, saṃmatavat| na ca- etāvatā na jīvaikyasiddhiḥ, caitrādhiṣṭhitatve'pi anyādhiṣṭhitatvasambhavāt, caitramātrādhiṣṭhitatve tu antaryāmyadhiṣṭhitatvena dṛṣṭānte sādhyavaikalyāpattiriti vācyam, caitramātrasaṃsāryadhiṣṭhitatvasya sādhyatvāt| caitramātrabhogāyatanānīti vā sādhyam| na ca- bhoktṛtvamantaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭasya, tacca pratiśarīraṃ bhinnam, yaccaikaṃ śuddhacaitanyaṃ tanna bhoktriti bādha iti vācyam, bhoktṛtvasya viśiṣṭavṛttitve'pi viśeṣyavṛttitvānapāyāt| na caivaṃ vimatāni śarīrāṇi caitramanasaiva yuktānītyābhāsasāmyam, manaso'pyaikye vyavasthāyāḥ sarvathānupapatteḥ, śrutyanugrahānanugrahābhyāṃ viśeṣācca, dṛṣṭisṛṣṭipakṣe tadabhyupagamācca| ātmā, dravyatvāparajātyā nānā na, vibhutvād, ākāśavat| na ca- pratikalpamākāśasya bhedena sādhyavaikalyaṃ paricchinnatvena sādhanavaikalyaṃ cātmatvasya paramāṇutvādivadajātitve'pi ātmabhedasiddhyā cārthāntaramiti- vācyam| ātmatvādhikaraṇaṃ, dravyatvāparajātyaikakāle nānā na, samānakālīnamūrtamātrasaṃyuktatvād, gaganavadityatra tātparyāt| pakṣaviśeṣaṇamahimnā ca nārthāntaram| vimato bhedaḥ, mithyā, ekasyāṃ dṛśi kalpito vā, bhedatvād, dṛśyatvādvā, candrabhedavad, ekasyāṃ dṛśi kalpito vā, bhedatvād, dṛśyatvādvā, candrabhedavad, ekasyāṃ dṛśi kṣaṇikavādikalpitabhedavadvā| mithyātvaṃ prāguktameva| na ca kalpitasādhāraṇabhedatvāsiddhiḥ, bhede akalpitatvasyaivāsiddheḥ| ata eva- candrasya kalpitadvitīyacandrād bhedasya satyatvena dṛṣṭānte sādhyavaikalyam, mukteḥ saṃsārād brahmaṇo anṛtād bhede ca vyabhicāra iti nirastam, na caivamabhedo mithyā abhedatvād dehātmābhedavadityādi susādham, śūnyavādāpatteruktatvāt| evaṃ vimatā bhedadhīḥ, mithyā, bhedadhītvāccandrabhedadhīvat| na ca brahmānṛtabhedapratītyādau vyabhicāraḥ, tāsāmapi pakṣasamatvāt| ābhāsasāmyasya tāttvikatve pratyetavyatvānupapattyaiva nirāsaḥ| ata eva| vimataṃ tāttvikasvāntarbhedaśūnyaṃ mahattvataḥ| yadevaṃ tattathā yadvat khaṃ tathedaṃ tatastathā|| ityatra gaganasya sāvayatvena na sādhyavaikalyam, svāntaḥpadena svāvayavātiriktasyokteḥ| evaṃ saṃvit, svāntargaṇikasvābhāvikabhedahīnā, upādhimantareṇāvibhāvyamānabhedatvād, gaganavat| na ca sādhyavaikalyam, naiyāyikadiśā dṛṣṭāntatvokteḥ| na ca- icchāderapi ghaṭapaṭādyupādhibhedana vibhāvyamānabhedatayā vyabhicārasteṣviti vācyam, icchādīnāmekāntaḥkaraṇapariṇāmatvena tatrāpi sādhyasattvāt| vimato avyāpyavṛttidharmānavacchinnapratiyogitāko bhedaḥ, svasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogī, bhedatvāt, saṃyuktabhedavat| vimato bhedaḥ, kevalānvayyatyantābhāvapratiyogī, padārthatvāt, nityadravyavat| svarūpeṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitve yathā na tucchatvaṃ pāramārthikatvākāreṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitve brahmavat tadrūpatopapattyā na yathārthāntaram, tat prāguktam| anyo'nyābhāvatvam, svasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogivṛtti, traikālikābhāvavṛttitve sati abhāvatvasākṣādvyāpyatvād, atyantābhāvatvavadityanumānaṃ pūrvoktasaṃyuktapratiyogikabhedarūpadṛṣṭāntasiddhyartham| na ca śuktau śuktibhedasyāropitasya sattvena siddhasādhanam, asadanyathākhyātivādinastavānaṅgīkṛtvena tasya sādhyatvāt| na ca traikālikatve mithyātvāyogaḥ, māyācitsambandhasya kālatvena sarvakālasthiteratadvirodhitvāt| na cāvyāpyavṛttitayā saṃyogādivat samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitvenārthāntaram, pakṣaviśeṣaṇamahimnā avyāpyavṛttitvasyāsambhavena tadayogāt| anusandhānādyavyavasthādikaṃ prāgeva nirākṛtam| aprayojakatvābhāsasāmyasatpratipakṣopādhyādi pūrvoktaprapañcamithyātvānumānavannirākaraṇīyam| evamātmatvamekatvavyāpyam, ātmamātravṛttitvāt, caitratvavadityādyapi draṣṭavyam| ityadvaitasiddhau jīvabrahmābhedānumānam|| 30 || 31. aṃśatve naikyasiddhibhaṅgaḥ `pādo'sya viśvā bhūtānī'ti śrutau `mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ' iti smṛtau cāṃśatvavyapadeśādapi jīvabrahmābhedasiddhiḥ| yadyapi brahma prati jīvasyāṃśatvaṃ na tāvadārambhakatvam, brahmaṇo'nāditvāt| nāpi khaṇḍatvam, acchedyatvāt| nāpi samudāyitvam, samudāyasya samudāyyananyatvena vyavahāradaśāyāmapi saṃsāryanyaśuddhabrahmābhāvāpātāt| nāpi bhinnābhinnadravyatvam, anaṅgīkārāt| nāpi paṭaṃ prati khaṇḍapaṭasyeva pradeśatvam, niṣpradeśabrahma prati kalpanāṃ vinā tadayogāt| tathāpi ghaṭākāśasya mahākāśaṃ pratīva kalpitapradeśatvarūpamaṃśatvaṃ jīvasyāvacchedapakṣe gambhavati| svato niraṃśe'pi aupādhikāṃśo yathā yujyate, tathoktaṃ purastāt| na tu sadṛśatve sati tato nyūnatvam, sthūlapaṭaṃ prati sūkṣmapaṭasyāpyaṃśatvāpatteḥ| vastvekadeśe mukhyasyāṃśaśabdasya svato niraṃśe'pi kalpitaikadeśe prayogasyārthāntare prayogakalpanāpekṣayā'bhyarhitatvāt| `aṃśo nānāvyapadeśādanyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvamadhīyata eka' iti sūtre `so'nveṣṭavavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavya, etamevaṃ viditvā munirbhavati ya ātmani tiṣṭha'nnityādibhedavyapadeśasya `brahma dāśā brahma dāsā brahmeme kitavā utetyātharvaṇamantre abhedavyapadeśasya codāhṛtatvāccoktārthaparigrahasyocitatvāt| ātyantikabhedagarbhārthāntarasvīkāre caitatsūtravirodhāpatteḥṣa kutracidanyatra prayogamātreṇa sarvatraitatkalpane bahuviplavāpatteśca| ata eva nanu jīvasya śuddhacaitanyāṃśatvaṃ vā ? īśvarāṃśatvaṃ vā ? pādo'syetyanayā śrutyā bodhyam ? nādyaḥ, pādo'sya viśvā bhūtānīti śrutāvidaṃśabdena sahasraśīrṣatvādiviśiṣṭaprakṛteśvarasya mamaivāṃśa iti smṛtau ceśvare prayuktāsmacdabdeneśvarasyaivokteḥ| nāntyaḥ, tvanmate īśvarasyāpyupahitatvena ghaṭākāśaṃ prati karakākāśasyeveśvaraṃ prati jīvasyāṃśatvāyogāt| na ca gṛhākāśa eva punarghaṭeneveśvaropādhinā'vacchinnameva caitanyaṃ punarjīvopādhināvacchidyata iti vācyam, tathātve hi muktasya śuddhabrahmatvaṃ na syāt, tasmāttvanmate'pi na mukhyamaṃśatvam, nāpyaupādhikaṃ vaktuṃ śakyam, ato maduktaprakāra evādaraṇīya iti nirastam| arthāntaraparigrahe virodhasyoktatvāt, śrutismṛtigatasarvanāmnā sahasraśīrṣatvādyupalakṣitacaitanyaparāmarśāduktadūṣaṇānavakāśācca| tasmāt "tvaṃ strī tvaṃ pumānasi tvaṃ kumāra uta vā kumārī tvaṃ jīrṇo daṇḍena vañcasi tvaṃ jāto bhavasi viśvatomukhaḥ sarvāṇi rūpāṇi vicitya dhīraḥ nāmāni kṛtvābhivadanyadāste' ityādiśrutyā jīvabrahmābhede pramite'pi mantṛmantavyatvādibhedavyapadeśanirvāhārthaṃ kālpanikāṃśatvasya śrutismṛtivyāhatatvena tadbalādapyabhedo'vagamyata iti siddham|| ityadvaitasiddhau aṃśatvenāpyaikyasiddhiḥ|| 31 || 32. bimbapratibimbaikyabhaṅgaḥ tathā jīvabrahmaṇormukhapratimukhavad bimbapratibimbarūpatvādapyabhedo'vagantavyaḥ| nanu dṛṣṭānte nābhedaḥ saṃpratipannaḥ, caitratacchāye bhinne itivat caitratatpratibimbe bhinne ityeva pārśvasthitena grahaṇāt, svenāpi svakaratatpratibimbe bhinne iti grahaṇācceticenna| āpātato bhedapratītāvapi sayuktikapratyakṣeṇa bimbapratibimbayoraikyasiddhyā dṛṣṭāntatvopapatteḥ| yathā lakṣaṇāparijñāne bhedabhramavato'pi bahisthitaścaitro yatsvalakṣaṇakatvena pratipannaḥ, tato gṛhasthe tathā bhāti tasmin caitra evāyamiti dhīḥ, tathā grīvāsthaṃ mukhaṃ yatsvalakṣaṇakaṃ pratipannaṃ darpaṇasthamapi tathetyavadhārya tathaivedaṃ mukhamiti sa evāyaṃ kara iti ca svaparasādhāraṇapratītirapyanubhavasiddhā| na ca kiñcitsvacchatāmrādau mukhachāyāmātre pratīte'pi saṃsthānaviśeṣāpratītyā pratyabhijñāyā asiddhiriti vācyam, sarvatrāpratītāvapi nirmaladarpaṇādāveva tatsiddhyā dṛṣṭāntasiddheḥ| nanu svanetragolakādau svasyābhijñāvirahāt pratyabhijñāpi kathamiti cenna, darpaṇāhatacakṣūraśmīnāmagrāvacchedena sambandhāt svanetragolakādīnāmabhijñāyāḥ sannihitapūrvasamaya eva saṃbhavāt| yattu sūryapārśvasthite pratisūrye pratyabhijñāvirahādatrāpi pratyabhijñāvirahaḥ iti, tanna, tatropādheratrevānākalanenaupādhikatvānirṇayāt| tathā ca upādhinibandhanatvajñānaṃ tallakṣakatvajñānaṃ cābhedasākṣātkāre sāmagrī| tasyāṃ satyāṃ darpaṇe mama mukhaṃ lagnamiti anubhavābhāva evānubhavaviruddhaḥ| yattu caitrapratibimbo dṛṣṭo na caitraḥ, kintu tenānumita iti viparītānubhavavirodhaḥ iti, tanna, vastuto'bhede jñāte'pi upādhyavacchinno dṛṣṭo'navacchinno'numita iti pratītyavirodhāt śaradgaṅgayā varṣartugaṅgānumānavat| na ca evaṃ pratimukhe pratyaṅmukhatvādinā dṛśyamāne svamukhe tadabuddhiḥ syāt, bālānāṃ ca svapratibimbe bālāntarabhramo na syāditi vācyam, tayoḥ svalakṣaṇakatvājñānanibandhanatvāt| ata eva kadācit pratimukhe'pi mama mukhamiti buddhivyapadeśau| na cāyaṃ vyavahāro bhedajñānapūrvakatvena mārge svapadavyāṃ svapadavyavahāravadgauṇaḥ, svalakṣaṇakatvajñānadaśāyāṃ bhedajñānasyāsatkalpatvāt| nanu avivādaḥ syād bhedasākṣātkāre, anyathā tvayāpi kasya bhramatvamucyeta ? na ca bhedaṃ bhedakaṃ ca sākṣātkurvan abhedaṃ sākṣātkurvāṇo dṛṣṭa iti cet, śvaityavyāpyaśaṅkatvasākṣātkāre pītasākṣātkāravad upādhimāhātmyādabhedaṃ sākṣātkurvāṇo bhedaṃ sākṣātkarotītyaṅgīkriyate, anubhavasya durapahnavatvāt| na caivamupādānasya aikyājñānasya aikyajñānena nivṛtteḥ bhramānupapattiḥ, tannivartane upādhivirahasyāpi sahakāritvāt| na ca evaṃ tajjñāne sati tanna jānāmītyananubhavena tasya svaprāgabhāvaṃ pratīvājñānaṃ pratyapyanyānapekṣasyaiva nivartakatvamiti vācyam, na jānāmīti vyavahāraprayojakājñānāṃśanivartane'pi bhramasyānubhūyamānatvena tadupādānāṃśasya nivṛttau jīvanmuktau prārabdhakarmaṇa ivopādhereva pratibandhakatayā tadvirahāpekṣāyā āvaśyakatvāt| etena bhedabhramasyāsya mūlāvidyopādānakatve vyāvahārikatvāpattiḥ, ajñānānupādānakatve apasiddhāntaḥ, bimbapratibimbabhedasya satyatvāpattiśceti nirastam, uktanyāyenopapattervyāvahāri katve'pyanupapattyabhāvācca| tayoraikye anumānamapi pramāṇam| atra yadyapyatyantāsādṛśyaṃ savyetarakarādau vyabhicāri, tathāpi pratibambo bimbābhinnaḥ tadgatāsādhāraṇadharmavattvāt, tadviruddhadharamānadhikaraṇatvād, bimbājanakājanyatvācca| na ca dvitīyahetorasiddhiḥ, pratyaṅmukhatvādiviruddhadharmasya upādhikṛtatvena svābhāvikaviruddhadharmānadhikaraṇatvasya sattvāt| na ca bimbānantarajāte pratibimbe tṛtīyahetorasiddhiḥ, aikya vādinaṃ prati bimbānantaratvasyaivāsiddheḥ| nanu pṛthakkāryānurodhena pariveṣendracāpacchāyāpratisūryādāvivātrāpi pṛthakkāraṇaṃ kalpanīyam, pratibimbamapi hi chāyāviśeṣaḥ, na hi bherīghātādiklṛptahetvabhāvād dhvanāvuparate'pi śrūyamāṇaḥ pratidhvanirna śabdāntaramiti cenna| pratibimbasya chāyāvirodhinyāloke'pi sambhavena chāyāviśeṣatvāsiddheḥ, pratidhvanestu bhinnakālatvena tadbhedasya prakṛte'nupayogāt, kāryapārthakyasiddhyuttarakālakalpyakāraṇabhedasya prathamaṃ vaktumaśakyatvāt, klṛptahetubhāvena kāryasyaiva bhāvācca| pratyakṣasya bhedābhedayoḥ samatvāt, yuktyā abheda eva prābalyācca| ata evoktam| vivaraṇe- `darpaṇādau na mukhavyaktyantaramasti, tajjanakaśūnyatvāt, śaśaśirasi viṣāṇavaditi| evamabhedadhiya upapāditatvād asyāḥ prābalyam| vyaktyantarahetvabhāvāt saiva nāstītyapāstaṃ prāk| na ca chāyādāviva kāraṇabhedasya kalpyatvena bhedabuddhiḥ sopapattikā tathā klṛptadravyānantarbhāve tamovad dravyāntarataiveti vācyam, anyonyāśrayāpatteḥ| bhedasopapattikatvedravyāntaratvakāraṇāntaratvayoḥ kalpanam, tasmiṃśca sopapattikatvamiti| ata eva `noparaktaṃ na vāristha'miti smārtavyavahāro mukhyaḥ, na tu yathā citritaḥ siṃhaḥ, yathā dārumayī yoṣā, yathā carmamayo mṛga ityādivad gauṇaḥ| na ca tvatpakṣe'pi vāristhaśabdo na mukhyaḥ, vāriṇi sūryāntarābhāvād gaganasthasya vāristhatvāyogāditi vācyam, vāristhatvenopasthitāśeṣavāristhasūryaniṣedhāt| nanu vāristhatvena sūrya evopasthitaḥ tayorabhedo na pratyakṣasiddhaḥ, nāpi yuktaḥ nyūnādhikaparimāṇavattvacalatvopādhisaṃyuktatvāsaṃyuktatvatvagādigrāhyatvāgrāhyatvapratyaṅmukhatvāpratyaṅmukhatvādinā kastūrībimbapratibimbayoḥ saurabhāsaurabhādinā ca bhedasiddheriti cenna, nyūnaparimāṇādinā saurabhādinā ca upādhigatasya bhedaḥ sādhanīyaḥ| tathā ca upādhigatatvasya bimbe kalpitatvena pakṣahetvorasiddheḥ, kalpitahetvādinā tatsamānasattākasādhyasiddhāvavivādācca| nāpi- "yathaiṣā puruṣe chāyā etasminnetadātatam| chāyā yathā puṃsadṛśī pumadhīnā ca dṛśyate| evamevātmakāḥ sarve brahmādyāḥ paramātmanaḥ||" iti śrutyā bheda iti vācyam, kalpitabhedamātreṇa sādṛśyopapatteḥ tāttvikatve śrutitātparyābhāvād, aikyapratipādakānekaśrutivirodhācca| nanu tatsvalakṣaṇakasyaiva darpaṇasthatvenāropitatayā tadrūpādiyuktasyeva tadgandhādiyuktasyāpi darpaṇasthatvena pratītiḥ syāditi cenna, tatsvalakṣaṇakatvenāropitatve'pi yāvatsvalakṣaṇakatvenāropitatvānaṅgīkāreṇa gandhādipratītyāpādanasyāśakyatvāt| nanu evaṃ darpaṇe mukhasyābhāve upādheḥ pratibimbapakṣapātitvena mukhapratimukhayoravadātatvaśyāmatvavat jīvabrahmaṇoḥ saṃsāritvāsaṃsāritvādivyavasthā kathamiti cet, na| āropitenādarśasthatvena viśiṣṭe pratibimbe taddharmasya mālinyādeḥ sambhavāt| na ca upādhisthatvasyāpi āropyatvena kathaṃ mālinyāśrayatāvacchedakatvam ? ekaviśiṣṭe itarāropābhāvāditi vācyam, āropapūrvapratītadharmaviśiṣṭasyaivāropyāśrayatvāt, na tu tasya satyatvamapīti paraprakriyānibandhanadoṣānavakāśāt| na ca pratimukhameva darpaṇasthaṃ na tu mukhamiti pratibimbadarpaṇasthatvānubhavena kathaṃ pratibimbatvasya tatsthatvagarmateti vācyam, avidyopahitasyāvidyāśrayatvavat darpaṇopahitasya darpaṇāśritvasaṃbhavāt| etena mālinyasthānīyasya saṃsārasya viśiṣṭavṛttitvāt śuddhāśritamokṣasāmānādhikaraṇyāyoga iti nirastam| saṃsārastāvadupahitavṛttiḥ, tathā copadheyāṃśamādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyasaṃbhavāt| tathā ca vṛkṣasthakapisaṃyogādhāratā agreṇeva mukhemālinyaṃ darpaṇasambandhenāvacchidyate| etāvāneva viśeṣaḥ vṛkṣe kapisaṃyogastu sāhajikaḥ, mukhe aupādhikaṃ mālinyam| tenopahite upādhyavacchinna eva mukhe mālinyadhīḥ, etena darpaṇamālinyasya mukhaniṣṭhatve saṃsārasyāpi śuddhaniṣṭhatāpattiḥ, vṛkṣaḥ saṃyukta iti vat mukhaṃ malinamiti pratītyāpattiḥ, makhaṃ na malinam kintu pratimukhamityanubhavavirodhāpattiśceti nirastam| nanu kastūryādipratibimbasya svalakṣaṇānanugamena kathaṃ bimbaikyam ? na ca tadākāratāmātreṇa tattvaṃ, tarhi chāyāpratimudrāpratimādīnāmapi tattvaṃ syāt, pratyaṅmukhatvāderbhedakasyātrāpi sattvācca| na ca pratyaṅmukhatvadhīrbhrāntā, pratibimbaṃ bimbābhimukhaṃ neti kadāpyananubhavāditi cenna, darpaṇādipratibimbe svalakṣaṇānugamena bimbaikye vyavasthite pratibimbatvāvacchedenaiva tatkalpanād, chāyādau svalakṣaṇakatvasya kutrāpyadarśanena sāmyābhāvāt| nāpi pratyaṅmukhatvādi bhedakam, malinatvavadupādhikṛtatvāt| ata eva japākusume raktatāpratītivat taddhīrbhrāntā| darpaṇāhataṃ cakṣuḥ pratyaṅmukhaṃ bhavati, tasya ca svābhimukhatayā grahaṇasāmarthyāccānyābhimukhasyāpi mukhādestathāgrahaṇopapatteśca| taduktaṃ- "darpaṇābhihatā dṛṣṭiḥ parāvṛttya svamānanam| vyāpnuvantyābhimukhyena vyatyastaṃ daśayenmukham||" na ca parāvṛttya svamukhasyaiva grahaṇe pārśvasthasya mukhadvayapratītyayogaḥ, svamukhasyaiveti niyamāsiddheḥ, upādhisannihitamātrasyaiva tathā grahaṇāt| na ca evaṃ darpaṇāderabhighātakatāmātreṇa upakṣīṇatayā darpaṇa iva darpaṇabhede'pyanekamukhapratītirna syāditi vācyam, abhighātakānekatvena cakṣuṣo'nekāgrasampattyā pratyagraṃ svābhighātakāvacchedakamukhagrāhakatayā dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyāt| na ca maṇidarpaṇakṛpāṇādiṣu viruddharūpānekamukhapratītiḥ kathamevaṃ yujyata iti vācyam, anvayavyatirekasiddhopādhi- prābalyanibandhanatvāditi gṛhāṇa| na ca cakṣuḥ parivṛttiprakriyā brahmapratibimbe jīve na saṃbhavatīti vācyam, cākṣuṣapratibimbamātraviṣayatayaivāsyā upapāditatvāt| na ca viralāvayasya jalasya netrābhighātakatve jalāntargataśilādyagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, sarvāvacchedenābhighātābhāvenāntare'pi cakṣuṣaḥ praveśasaṃbhavāt| na ca evaṃ bahudūravyavahitordhvabhāgasūryādigrahaṇe pṛṣṭhabhāgasthasya vyavahitasyāpi grahaṇāpattiriti vācyam cakṣuṣo gamanāgamanābhyāṃ viśeṣāt| na hi dūrasthasūryagrahaṇaṃ vadatā pṛṣṭhakuḍyādikaṃ bhittvā cakṣurgacchatītyuktaṃ bhavati| na ca evaṃ śilābhihatamapi cakṣuḥ parāvṛttya mukhaṃ gṛhṇātviti vācyam| tavāpi pratibimbaṃ tatrotpadyatāmityāpatteḥ, asvacchatayā parihārasyāsmākamapi samatvam| tava svaccha eva utpadyate, mama tata eva cakṣuḥ parāvartate ityaṅgīkārāt| na caivaṃ pratibimbadarśanenāpi bimbadarśanajanyasukhapuṇyādiprasaṅgaḥ, yatra taddarśanamātrajanyatā nānyataḥ, tatreṣṭāpatteḥ yatra copādhivinirmuktajñānatvena viśiṣya janyatā, tatrāpādakābhāvāt| nacaivaṃ sūryakasyāpi sūryavad durdarśatvāpattiḥ, golake sūryatejaḥsāmmukhyasya durdarśatāprayojakasya sūryakagrahaṇakāle'bhāvāt| na ca svacchadarpaṇa kiñcitsvacchatāmrādau mukhasaṃsthānaviśeṣapratītyāpātaḥ, upādhigatātyantasvacchatāvyatirekaprayojakamālinyādereva tatra pratibandhakatvād, anyathā tavāpi tādṛksaṃsthānaviśeṣavat pratibimbaṃ tatra kathaṃ notpadyata ityasya duṣpariharatvāpatteḥ| nanu avacchedapakṣe dviguṇīkṛtya vṛttyasambhave'pi pratibimbapakṣe tatsaṃbhavenāntaryāmitvamiti svavacanavirodhaḥ, upādheḥ pratibimbapakṣapātitvamityuktyayogaśceti cenna, sarvopādhyavacchinnatvaikadeśopādhyavacchinnatvābhyāmupādhikalpitabhedena ca svoktyavirodhopapatteḥ| ata eva darpaṇe na mukhamityeva upādhisaṃsṛṣṭatayā niṣidhyate, na tu `nedaṃ rūpya'mitivat naitanmukhamiti svarūpeṇa| nanu nātra mukhacchāyāstītyananubhavena pratyutaitāvantaṃ kālam atra pratisūrya āsīditivat pratimukhamāsīdityevānubhavena pratibimbamivādarśa ityādismṛtyā vā pratimukhe darpaṇasthatvasyāpyabādha eva, na hi bhūmau megho netyetāvatā meghacchāyāpi tatra bādhiteti - cenna, mukhapratimukhayorekasvalakṣaṇakatvenaikyavyavasthityā mukhasyaiva tatsthatvaniṣedhena pratimukhasya tatsattvaniṣedhasaṃbhavāt| meghacchāyāpratisūryādīnāṃ na tatheti na meghādiniṣedhena chāyādiniṣedhaḥ| smṛtistu prātītikārthamādāya dṛṣṭāntaparā| na ca evaṃ pratibambād bimbānumānocchedaḥ sādhyāviśeṣāditi vācyam, upādhikalpitabhedena viśeṣopapatteḥ| etena `nekṣetodyantamāditya'mityanena udyatpratibimbadarśanasyāpi niṣedhaḥ syāt, vāristha sūryadarśananiṣedhenākāśasthasūryadarśanasyāpi niṣedhaśca syāt, pratibimbadarśanenaiva dṛṣṭvā snāyāditi śāstrārtho'pyanuṣṭhitaḥ syāditi nirastam, kalpitabhedādeva śāstrīyavyavasthopapatteḥ na ca audumbaratayā jñātenānaudumbareṇa audumbaro yūpo bhavatīti śāstrārthasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ, ātmatayā jñātadehaśravaṇādinātmā śrotavya iti śāstrārthasiddhiprasaṅgaśceti vācyam, pramayā upapattau saṃbhavantyāṃ bhrameṇa tadupapādanasyāyuktatvāt| nanu anāderjīvasya nopādhyadhīnaṃ pratibimbatvam, kintu tadadhīnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam, tacca bhedavyāptamiti viruddho hetuḥ| uktaṃ hi sūtrakṛtā- `ata eva copamā sūryakādiva'diti cet, na, upādhyadhīnatvaṃ hi upādhau satyeva sattvam| tacca nānāditvavirodhi, anādijīvasyāpi tatsaṃbhavāt| ata eva pratibimbapadasya bhedasādṛśyārthakatvamādāya viruddhatvoktirhetāvayuktā| tadevam- pratibimbasya bimbenaikye vyavasthite| brahmaikyaṃ jīvajātasya siddhaṃ tatpratibimbanāt|| ityadvaitasiddhau bimbapratibimbanyāyenaikyasiddhiḥ|| 32 || 33. jīvāṇutvavivaraṇam nanu aṇutvājjīvasya kathaṃ vyāpakādīśvarādabheda iti cenna, `nityaḥ, sarvagataḥ', `sa vā eṣa mahānaja ātmā' ityādiśrutyā jīvo nāṇuḥ, pratyakṣaguṇāśrayatvāt pratyakṣatvācca, ghaṭavad, ātmatvādabhūtatvācceśvaravadityādyanumānaiśca jīvānaṇutvasiddheḥ| vipakṣe ca dehavyāpisukhajñānādyanupalambhāpattirbādhikā| na ca- "amurhyeṣa ātmā yaṃ vā ete sinītaḥ puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca," bālāgraśatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya ca| bhāgo jīvaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ sa cānantyāya kalpate|| iti śrutyā jīvo'ṇuriti vācyam, vyāpakatvapratipādakabahuśrutivirodhena durvijñeyatvaparatvād dehavyāpiguṇopalambhasyānyathayitumaśakyatvāt| etena jīvo na vyāpakaḥ, utkrāntimattvād, gatimattvāt, kriyāvattvācca, khagaśarīravad, vipakṣe hetūcchittyāpattirbādhiketi nirastam, hetvasiddheḥ| na ca `so'smāccharīrādutkramyāmuṃ lokamadhigacchati, amuṣmādimaṃ lokamāgacchatī'tyādibhiḥ śrutibhiḥ `tatra candramasaṃ jyotiryogī prāpya nivartata' ityādismṛtibhiśca hetusiddhiriti vācyam, utkramaṇādīnāṃ buddhigatānāṃ tadupahite śrutyā pratipādanāt| na ca `nākasya pṛṣṭhe sukṛte'nubhūtvemaṃ lokaṃ hīnataraṃ vā viśanti, te aśubhamanubhūyāvartanta' ityādau śrutau sukhaduḥkhādyanubhavasāmānādhikaraṇyasya gatāvukteḥ kathaṃ tasyā buddhigatatvamiti vācyam, ātmani sukhaduḥkhādyanubhavasyāpi buddhyupādhikatvena tatsāmānādhikaraṇyasya gatau svābhāvikatvāsādhakatvāt| nanu- `sa enān brahma gamayatī'tyādiśrutau `tatra prayātā gacchanti brahma brahmavido janā' ityādismṛtau ca gatermuktisāmānādhikaraṇyokteḥ kathamasiddhiriticenna, avyāpakasyaivāvyāpakaṃ pratyeva gamanam| brahma ca vyāpakaṃ tatprati gamanāsambhavena gamanapadasya upādhikṛtabhedarāhitya- paratayā gatimuktisāmānādhikaraṇyāpratipādakatvāt| nanu- `pradyotenaiva eṣa ātmā niṣkrāmatī'tyātmaniṣṭhatvaśruternāsiddhiḥ, anyathāmokṣādikamapi buddhereva syāt, nāpi śruterbuddhyupādhikagatyādiviṣayatvaṃ saṃbhavati, `tadyathā anaḥ susamāhitamutsarjadyāyādevamevāyaṃ śarīra ātmā prājñenātmanā'nvārūḍha utsarjat yātī'ti svābhāvikagatyāśrayaśakaṭadṛṣṭāntokteriti cenna, eṣa iti buddhyupahitasyaiva parāmarśena śuddhātmaniṣṭhatvasya gatāvanukteḥ, mokṣe tu buddhyuparameṇa tanniṣṭhatvasyāsaṃbhāvitatayā vaiṣamyāt, sarvasāmyasya dṛṣṭāntatāyāmaprayojakatvāt, tadvalena svābhāvikatvaparyantatvasyāsiddheḥ| na ca- `tamutkrāmantaṃ prāṇo'nūtkrāmatī"tyādiśrutau prāṇākhyabuddhigatitaḥ prāgeva jīve gatyukteḥ kathaṃ buddhigatyā'nyathāsiddhiriti vācyam, prāṇākhyāṃśena kriyāśaktiśālinā paścādgatāvapyaṃśāntareṇa prathamamutkramaṇasaṃbhavāt| etena- `mana udakrāmanmīlita ivāśnan pibannāste vetyādiśrutau manautkramaṇe'pi ātmanastadabhāvaśravaṇācca kathaṃ tadgatyaiva gatimattvamiti nirastam, upahitasyopādhinibandhanagatimattve buddhyanupahitasya tadabhāvāvirodhāt| na ca tathā `vidvānnāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parātparaṃ puruṣamupaiti divyamityādiśrutau nāmarūpavimokṣānantaramapi gatiśravaṇāt kathaṃ sā aupādhikīti vācyam, paramapuruṣasya sarvatra sannihitatvena taṃ prati gamanāsambhavena upaitītyasyāpi pūrvavadarthāntaraparatvāt| ata eva "paraṃ jyotirupasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate sa uttamaḥ sa tatra paryetītyādiśrutirapi na gatyarthā| nanu- buddhigatena gatyādinā kiṃ tadavacchinnātmani gatyādi jāyate ? uta buddhigatamevāropyate ? utopacaryate ? nādyaḥ, ghaṭagatyā tadavacchinne nabhasi gatyantarādarśanāt| anyathā yato ghaṭasya buddhervā gatiḥ tatrākāśasyātmano vā sacchidratvaṃ syāt| anyatra dviguṇīkṛtya vṛttiśca syāt| na ca pratibimbapakṣe noktadoṣa iti vācyam, tasya vastvantaratvamate uktadoṣābhāve'pi darpaṇāhatā dṛṣṭiḥ parāvṛtya svamukhaṃ gṛhṇātīti tvanmate upādhigatyā bimbe na gatiriti pratibimbe'pyasyāyogāt| nāntyau, karturavacchinnasyaitadātmapradeśasya na bhogāyatanalokaprāptiḥ, kintu gayatā buddhyā'vacchinnasya pradeśāntarasyaiveti svīkāre kṛtahānyādiprasaṅgāt karturbhoktuścāvacchinnasya bhinnatvāt abhinne vā'navacchinne kartṛtvādyabhāvāditi cenna, upādhigatyā upahite gatiprayoga aupacārika eva| na caivaṃ kṛtahānyādyāpattiḥ, yadabuddhyavacchinnena yenaivātmanā yat kṛtaṃ tadavacchinnena tenaiva bhogajananāt| na hyātmano niravayavasya pradeśo'sti| yattu avacchinnasya karturbhokturbheda ityuktam, tanna, avacchedyātmano'vacchedakabuddheścaikye'vacchinne bhedasya vaktumaśakyatvāt| na cātmatvamaṇuniṣṭhaṃ dravyatvasākṣādvyāpyajātitvāt pṛthivītvavadityanumānam, vyāpakāvṛttitvasyopādhitvāt, sparśādisāmānādhikaraṇyasyāpyevaṃ sādhanaprasaṅgācca| jīvo na vyāpakaḥ, bhūtetaratve sati paratvāsamavāyikāraṇānādhāratve satyasarvajñatvāt śabdetarānityaviśeṣaguṇāśrayatvāt saṃskārāśrayatvācca kaṭavadityatrānātmatvamupādhiḥ, anityaviśeṣaguṇasaṃskārādīnāmupādhivṛttitvenāsiddhiśca| evaṃ mahattvasyāpi susādhatvaṃ ca| jīvaḥ, aṇuḥ, jñānāsamavāyikāraṇa saṃyogāśrayatvāt, manovad ityatra madhyamaparimāṇavattvena manaso dṛṣṭāntāsampratipatteḥ| jaḍatvasyopādhitvācca| sarvatra cātra vyāpisukhajñānādyupalambhaḥ pratikūlastarkaḥ, ekasyāṇorekadā vyavahitadeśadvayāvacchedāsaṃbhavena `pāde me sukhaṃ śirasi vedanā' ityādiyugapadanubhavavirodhaśca| na ca guṇaniḥ aṇutve'pi guṇavyāptyā vyāpisukhajñānānumānavirodhaḥ guṇivyatirekeṇāsyāsaṃbhāvitatvāt| anyathā ghaṭavyatirekeṇāpi ghaṭarūpaṃ syāt| pradīpādanyatra dṛśyamānāpi prabhā na dīpaguṇaḥ, kintu anudbhūtasparśaṃ dravyāntaram| na ca jātisamavāyāderdharmito'nyatra vartamānatvavadatrāpi guṇasya buddheranyatropalambhaḥ syād iti vācyam, jātisamavāyādivadatrāpi tarhi vyāpakatvaprasaṅgāt, dharmiṇo vihāyāpi sthitau tasyā niyāmakābhāvāt| na ca kāraṇaniyamānniyamaḥ, tarhyavyavahitasamavāyikāraṇaniyamādeva niyame amumātradeśatā durvāraiva| na ca vahnerauṣṇyaṃ bahirnopalabhyeta, samīpavṛttyanudbhūtarūpatejasastadityucyamāne vahnerauṣṇyaṃ na sidhyediti vācyam| bādhake sati savidhe tejo'ntarakalpane'pi dṛśyamānavahnāvanubhūyamānauṣṇasparśe bādhakābhāvena tasmiṃstejo'ntaratvakalpanasyāśakyatvāt| etena ketakyādau parito gandhānubhavād guṇānāṃ guṇinairapekṣyam| na ca tatra ketakyavayavānāṃ paritaḥ prasahatāṃ te gandhāḥ, tarhi dravyakṣayaprasaṅgāt| na cāvayavāntarapraveśāttadakṣayaḥ, sphaṭikakaraṇḍikāsthakastūryādau avayavāntarapraveśakalpate mānābhāvād iti nirastam, samavāyinairapekṣyekāryasya nirāśrayatvāpattau tatpratyāsattinibandhanakāraṇāntarasyāpyucchede kāryatvahānereva tatra kalpanāyāṃ mānatvāt| yattu nityaḥ sarvagatasthāṇurityatra `nitye sarvagate viṣṇāvaṇurjīvo vyavasthitaḥ' iti smṛtyantarānusārāt sarvagatasthaḥ aṇuśceti vigrahaḥ iti tanna| `ākāśavatsarvagataśca nityaḥ' `sa vā eṣa mahānaja ātme'ti śrutyanusāryarthasyaivocitatvād aṇuriti padacchede tadvirodhāpatteḥ| yattu krameṇa nānādehasambandhādaṇoreva sarvagatatvoktiḥ iti, tanna, aśeṣavācisarvaśabdasaṅkoce mānābhāvāt| yadapi pratyakṣatvādinaivāvyāpakatvaṃ sādhanīyamityuktam, tanna, pratikūlatarkasyoktatvād vyāpakatvasādhane tasyaivānukūlatvenāprayojakatvābhāvācca| nanu ātmano vyāpakatve `sarvāṇi śarīrāṇi sarvasyaiva bhogāyatanāni syuḥ, sarvaśarīrendriyādīnāṃ sarvadā sarvātmasaṃyuktatvāt, karmaṇāmapi sādhāraṇadehādikṛtatvenāsādhāraṇyāyogād, ahantvāropāderapi niyāmakamūlasambandhāderabhāvena naiyatyāyogāditi cenna, tavāpīśvarasya vyāpakatvena sarvaśarīrāṇāṃ tadbhogajanakatvāpatteḥ samānatvāt| na ca tadadṛṣṭājanyatvāttatsaṃyuktatve'pi na tatra bhogajananam tarhīhāpi samam| na ca karmaṇāmeva kathamasādhāraṇyam ? pūrvatatkarmajanyatvād, evamanāditaiva| anyathā īśātmani tavāpyagateḥ caitrabhogajanakāṅkurādeḥ tadadṛṣṭajanyatvāda ātmasamavetasyādṛṣṭasya sākṣādaṅkurāsaṃbandhād ātmadvārakasambandhasya vācyatāyāmātmano vibhutvam| na ca caitrabhogāhetorapyāṅkurāderātmadvārā'dṛṣṭāsaṃbandhe'pi tadajanyatvena tasyātantratvamiti vācyam, janakādṛṣṭanirūpitātmadvārakasannikarṣasyātiprasaṅgābhāvena tantratvāt| janakatā tu adṛṣṭasya phalaikonneyā| evamevopapattau pratiyogyabhāvavācyavācakajñānajñeyādāvivādṛṣṭakāryayorapi saṃbandhāntarasvīkāre mānābhāvaḥ| yattu kārīryadṛṣṭasya vṛṣṭyā saha taduddaśena vihitakriyājanyatvādirūpaḥ saṃbandho'stītyuktam, tanna tatrāpi yajamānātmadvārakasaṃyuktasamavāyasyaiva jalakṣaraṇādiprayojakatvāt| etacca sarvaṃ pararītyoktam| svamate ca vyavasthā prāguktaiva| tathā ca `buddherguṇenātmaguṇena caiva hyārāgramātro hyavaro'pi dṛṣṭa' iti śrutau buddhiguṇenārāgramātratvokteḥ svābhāvikameva vibhutvam| na cātrātmaguṇenārāgramātratvaṃ buddherguṇena cāvaratvamiti vyutkramayojanā, "tadyathāṇunaścakṣuṣaḥ prakāśo vyāptaḥ, evamevāsya puruṣasya prakāśo vyāptaḥ aṇurhyevaiṣapuruṣa" iti śrutyanusārāditi vācyam| vyāpakatvabodhakānekaśrutivirodhena buddherguṇenetyetadanusāreṇa cāsyā eva aupādhikāṇutvaparatvāt, puruṣasyeti ṣaṣṭhyā rāhoḥ śira ityādivadupacaritārthatvācca| tathā ca na vyutkrameṇānvayaḥ, tasmādaṇutvaṃ nātmabhedakam|| iti advaitasiddhau ātmano'ṇutvabhaṅgaḥ|| 33 || stitāni grantheṣu prakaṭamupadiṣṭāni gurubhirguṇo, vā doṣo vā na mama paravākyāni vadataḥ| paraṃ tvasminnasti śramaphalamidaṃ yannijadhiyā, śrutīnāṃ yuktīnāmakali guruvācāṃ ca viṣayaḥ || 1 ||
1. Refutation of the definition of undivided meaning. Here, justification of the definition of undivided meaning. ‘Having defined what is to be abandoned, called bondage, we now state what is to be accepted: the undivided meaning, knowledge of which grounds bondage's cessation.’ Undivided meaning is twofold: concerning the meaning of a word and concerning the meaning of a sentence. Each is again twofold, Vedic and ordinary. Vedic word-meaning is itself twofold, concerning the meaning of ‘that’ and the meaning of ‘you’. ‘Truth, knowledge, infinity’ and the like concern the meaning of ‘that’. ‘This person consisting in knowing among the vital powers, the inner light within the heart’ and the like concern the meaning of ‘you’. ‘Excellent light’ and the like are ordinary word-meaning cases. Sentence-meaning cases too are Vedic, as ‘You are that’, or ordinary, as ‘This is that Devadatta’. Here they object: what is having undivided meaning? It cannot be having a meaning without difference. If absence of difference is conveyed by words, whether as qualifier or identifying indication, the meaning would be divided, as in ‘The ground is potless’. If it is not conveyed, even qualified sentences revealing Brahman, which in fact lacks difference, would have undivided meaning. If it means intending only what in fact lacks difference, that fails to extend to sentences such as ‘Excellent light’: they concern an object possessing difference at its own level of reality, rather than something in fact without difference. For the same reason, having a meaning without distinctions fails too. Nor is it non-synonymous words ending only in the meaning of a nominal stem: there would be overextension to ‘Water and fire possess cold and hot touch’, concerning meanings of multiple nominal stems. Nor can one say that these do not jointly concern one meaning, but each concerns one meaning as a definition-sentence, so there is no overextension. It would still be absent in Brahman: through denotation or implication, Vedānta sentences cannot end in relationless Brahman. Hence intending one substantive too fails: there is overextension to ‘A blue lotus’ and similar sentences revealing one qualified substantive, and the consequence is accepted. The proposed definitions—non-synonymous words producing valid cognition not concerning a relation, or those words ending only in one nominal-stem meaning—are also unsound. The author of the Pañcapādikā says: ‘Words whose meanings are not delimited by each other and which expect nothing else connect only with an undifferentiated, homogeneous nominal-stem meaning.’ The author of the Tattvapradīpikā says: ‘Words' causing right understanding not associated with relation is called having undivided meaning; alternatively, their having that nominal-stem meaning.’ On the first, there is underextension to a sentence defining conjunction, ‘Conjunction is the coming together of two things not together’. If not producing knowledge of a relation between word-meanings recalled by the words is intended, there is overextension to ‘Eat poison’ intending ‘One must not eat an enemy's food’. Nor can one say that the latter has scripture ‘One must not eat an enemy's food’ as its basis and reveals the relation of word-meanings recalled by scriptural words, so there is no overextension. Its basis is reasoning, so a scriptural basis is unestablished. If the intention is not producing knowledge of a relation between word-meanings which one wishes to convey, that is impossible too. The natures of the meanings of ‘moon’, ‘Brahman’ and the like are already known, so one does not wish to convey those, but only their being counterpositives of a particular relation. For the same reason, the second definition fails too. Since no definition is possible, evidence is also impossible: evidence cannot be adduced for what is undefined. Reply: by ‘relation’ here we intend what is additional to what the operation of a word recalls. The first definition therefore amounts to non-synonymous words producing valid cognition not concerning anything additional to what their operation recalls. There is no underextension to the definition of conjunction, since conjunction is recalled by the word's operation. Nor is there overextension to a sentence forbidding an enemy's food: it conveys the relation of being a means to harm, not recalled by a word's operation. We accept ‘Water and fire possess cold and hot touch’ as having undivided meaning. Nor should one ask how undivided meaning, which cannot tolerate a property-bearer relation, could tolerate different bearers. Intolerance in one case does not cause intolerance everywhere; moreover, the sentence-meanings differ as ‘Water possesses cold touch’ and ‘Fire possesses hot touch’. Impossibility will be refuted when removing non-establishment of the reason ‘being an answer to a question concerning that alone’. ‘Non-synonymous words’ prevents overextension to ‘A pot is a pitcher’ and the like, which reveal no relation and intend one meaning. Even there, the plural yields joint conveyance of one meaning, preventing overextension to ‘Dhava, khadira, palāśa’ and the like. If we said ‘what a word makes known’, being a means to harm made known through postulation would yield overextension to ‘Eat poison’. ‘Operation’ prevents that. Even so, on the view that words denote connected meanings, the sentence's relation is made known through denotative power; on the view that denoted meanings subsequently connect, through implication. Overextension would therefore occur in every valid sentence. To prevent that, we said ‘recalls’. The former view accepts a contracted denotative power; the latter accepts even an unknown implication situated in the word-meaning as an operation. The relation is therefore not recalled by a word but experienced, avoiding overextension. The second definition too is sound. There, oneness of the nominal-stem meaning means being an object of the word's operation under one property, rather than being only one individual. Thus there is no underextension to ‘Aupagava is dark, tall, red-eyed’ in reply to a question about a derived meaning such as Aupagava, or ‘A forest is trees standing in one place’ in reply to a question about a forest, army and the like consisting in many things. ‘Water and fire possess cold and hot touch’ should be included because each intends one respective meaning. The author of the Kalpataru says: ‘Those immersed in Vedānta understand as undivided what is revealed by many non-qualifying, non-synonymous words.’ Objection: non-synonymy consists in different grounds of application. That is impossible in words such as ‘infinite’, since they rest only in pure Brahman. The definition therefore fails to include Vedānta. Reply: no. Accepting different grounds of application, we shall explain how ‘infinite’ and the like concern pure Brahman through implication. Nor should one say that implication too is impossible in the pure because relation is absent. An unreal relation can explain implication, just as ‘silver’ implies a shell through the relation of silverhood apprehended in error. The pure itself is the locus of every imagining, so an imagined relation in it is not inexplicable. We shall explain how, even when ‘infinite’ and the like operate through implication, finitude and the like do not follow in Brahman. Here ends the justification of the definition of undivided meaning in the Advaita Siddhi. 1. 2. Refutation of the inference that sentences such as ‘Truth, knowledge ...’ have an undivided meaning. Just as such a definition is possible, so is a means of establishing it. Thus: the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ concerns an undivided meaning, or concerns the meaning of the nominal stem ‘Brahman’, because it is a defining sentence, or because it answers a question about that alone, like the sentence ‘The moon is the exceedingly bright light’. This is the inference of undivided meaning concerning the meaning of a word. The sentence ‘You are that’ and the like concerns an undivided meaning, or the nature of the self alone, because, while concerning a substance alone that is neither effect nor cause, it has words in apposition, or because it answers a question about that alone, like the sentence ‘This is that man’. This is the inference of undivided meaning concerning the meaning of a sentence. Nor is answering a question about that alone unestablished in the sentence beginning ‘Truth’. Since ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ presents knowledge of Brahman alone as the means to the desired end, the desire to know concerns that alone, and that alone is the subject of the question. Nor does the example ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’ lack the property to be established. Taking that sentence as the subject, its concern with the moon alone is established from its answering a question about that alone, by relying on the general pervasion. Likewise, answering a question about that alone is not unestablished in ‘You are that’ and the like. Since ‘Who am I?’ asks about the self’s nature alone, an answer concerning anything additional would be inappropriate. Nor is the example unestablished here: ‘This is that man’ is used when the question concerns Devadatta’s nature alone. Nor does the reason fail to entail the conclusion. There is reasoning that excludes the contrary: the question and answer would otherwise concern different subjects. Nor should one say that the property to be established, producing valid cognition that does not concern a relation, is unknown, since perception and the like also produce only valid cognition concerning a specific relation, ‘This is thus’. For those who accept indeterminate cognition, it is known in that very cognition. For others, it is established generally by the inference: being a valid cognition occurs in something that does not concern a relation, because it occurs in every valid cognition, like being expressible. Although failure to entail the conclusion may be suspected here too, awareness of the property to be established in the form of doubt is still readily available. In fact, its occurrence in the sentence ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’ has already been shown. Nor should one say that being a defining sentence is unestablished in the sentences beginning ‘Truth’: truth and the like are higher or lower universals, and, since they occur elsewhere too, are not distinctive; they cannot be real in Brahman, because that conflicts with the scripture teaching non-duality, while if unreal they occur elsewhere equally. For being absolute truth and the like defines Brahman’s very nature. On our view, although any one of the words beginning ‘truth’ defines its nature, since anything other than Brahman is only an appearance of that, nevertheless others admit truth elsewhere, knowledge together with truth elsewhere, and bliss together with truth elsewhere; even the nihilists admit elsewhere a nature consisting of knowledge and bliss without existence. Thus Brahman is not established beyond doubt without their combination, and their combination forms the definition. Nor does defining it through a qualified expression make its meaning divided. Even though what is directly expressed is divided, what is implied is undivided. Although all the words beginning ‘truth’ imply the same unqualified Brahman, the other words are not pointless, because there are further aspects to be removed. Thus the qualification of the directly expressed meaning serves as a means to establishing the undivided and does not oppose it. Objection: this is contradictory, since a sentence intending a definition in the form of a distinctive property necessarily has a divided meaning. Reply: no. That rule is unestablished, since all defining sentences culminate in the nature alone; and even if definition through a property opposes indivisibility, definition through the nature does not. Nor does identity make the relation of defined thing and definition impossible. Both are possible through a difference of aspects due to mental modifications, just as being covered and uncovered are possible. Otherwise there would be no division between essential and incidental definitions. Nor can that division be determined by whether something lasts as long as the substance. That would distinguish permanence and impermanence, rather than what constitutes the nature and so forth. On your view it would also exclude essential definitions such as the colour of earthly things, and Brahman has no property lasting as long as its substance. In fact, intending a definition as an avenue to something does not conflict with the undivided meaning of what is approached through it. Nor should one say that, since knowledge of the nature has already arisen generally, knowledge of it does not require this avenue. Even if it is not an avenue to mere knowledge, it is required as an avenue to this knowledge that removes doubt and the like. Nor is a defining sentence about a divided forest and the like an exception: the presence of the property to be established there too has been explained. Nor is ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’, answering a question about a distinctive property, ‘What is the moon’s definition?’, an exception. There the intention is not the moon’s nature but the nature of the light that possesses the excellence. Thus, since it conveys only the very nature of the individual light indicated by excellence, its meaning can be undivided there too. This also disposes of the objection that it is inappropriate to state the moon’s nature when the question concerns a property: it is the property itself that has been stated in its nature. Otherwise the question and answer would concern different subjects. Objection: the inference is contradicted. The injunction to inquire into Vedānta cannot be explained except as providing a means to qualified knowledge that causes liberation and removes qualified doubt and the like dependent on knowledge of a property-bearer. Thus the absence in Vedānta sentences of the property to be established is certain. Reply: no. This is explained otherwise, since knowledge of a distinguishing aspect that excludes unreality and the like can itself remove doubt about unreality and the like. Mere possession of a qualifying aspect is not decisive here. If knowledge of a continuing aspect, present during error and itself qualified, removed doubt and the like, error could never occur. Knowledge removes ignorance because it has the same object as ignorance, without also needing the same qualifying aspect, which would add needless complexity. Ignorance has pure Brahman as its object: everything else is imagined through ignorance and cannot be its object. Thus a mental modification whose form is pure Brahman, having no qualifying aspect, removes ignorance. Every qualifying aspect is imagined through ignorance, so a modification concerning such an aspect would not have the same object as ignorance. How knowledge concerning ignorance and its effects fails to remove ignorance has been explained earlier. Experience rejects the claim that cognitions in the form of substance and the like have the form of a pot and the like. Thus knowledge in the form of substance does not remove ignorance in the form of a pot; the objects differ also because substancehood and pothood differ. We have explained in the Vedāntakalpalatikā how accepting sameness of qualifying aspect also affords no escape. This indicates the direction of the argument. Objection: let there be a counter-inference of equal force. The intended meaning of the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ has the form either of related things or of a relation, because it is the intended meaning of a valid sentence, like an accepted instance. The sentence beginning ‘Truth’ intends a relation that is not sublated by knowledge of its intended meaning, or intends a relation that is not sublated by knowledge of its intended meaning and is determined by word-meanings that are objects of the valid cognition produced by that sentence, because it is a valid sentence, like sentences concerning the Agnihotra and the like. ‘Eat poison’ and the like are not exceptions: even though they do not intend a relation between the directly expressed meanings, they intend a relation between word-meanings that are objects of the valid cognition they produce. Nor are ‘Kha means a hole’ and ‘Kokila means a cuckoo’ and the like exceptions. Since apposition is impossible when the meanings are not sufficiently different, they intend the relation of being expressed by the words ‘kha’, ‘pika’ and the like to holes, cuckoos and so forth. Reply: no. In the first inference, if the property to be established is ‘having the form of related things’, a relation is an exception; if it is ‘having the form of a relation’, a word-meaning consisting in related things is an exception. Both can be the intended meaning of a valid sentence. In the second inference, being a valid sentence is explained by intending something unsublated alone, or by intending an object of valid cognition alone. Since the specified property to be established plays no decisive role in this, the reason fails to entail it. Moreover, not being a defining sentence is an unstated condition. Nor should one propose this counter-proof: valid cognition produced by a Vedānta sentence is qualified, because it is produced by inquiry, or because it removes doubt, like cognition produced by the ritual portion of scripture; or, valid cognition produced by Vedānta concerns a qualifying aspect of Brahman, because it opposes doubt having Brahman as its subject, or because it is produced by inquiry into Brahman; whatever is such is so, like certainty produced by the ritual portion. On your view every cognition is qualified, so being produced by inquiry and opposing doubt are redundant. They also fail to entail the conclusion, since even cognition without a qualifying aspect can remove doubt and the like; and not being produced by a defining sentence is an unstated condition. This also disposes of the second inference. Moreover, there is no example to establish that its object is a qualifying aspect residing in Brahman. In all these counter-proofs, the consequence that the question and answer concern different subjects should be understood as opposing reasoning. Objection: the example lacks the property to be established. The sentence ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’ does not concern an undivided meaning through direct expression: the word ‘exceedingly’ and the like do not directly express the undivided, nor do you accept that they do. Nor does it do so through implication. The exceedingly bright light, whether a substance or a quality, can be connected with the moon, so the basis of implication, impossibility of connection, is absent. Reply: no. In ordinary usage, in ‘Let the staffs enter’, and in the Veda, in ‘The sacrificial cakes are made of reeds’, although a connection of the words as heard is possible, the words ‘staff’ and ‘sacrificial cake’ are understood through implication as staff-bearing people and all the Savanīya oblations, because the intended connection would otherwise be impossible. Likewise here, implication occasioned by impossibility of the intended connection can make the sentence concern an undivided meaning. When ‘Which is the moon?’ asks about the moon’s nature, only an answer concerning that alone is appropriate. Objection: if the moon’s nature is known, a question about it is inappropriate. If it is unknown, desire to know and doubt, which depend on knowledge of the property-bearer, are inappropriate; so too is asking ‘Which?’ after mentioning ‘the moon’. Since the meaningfulness of ‘moon’ would be unknown, it would not be a nominal stem, and the case-ending following it would be inappropriate. Nor is it right to say that, though the moon’s nature is known, its unmixed nature is unknown, since it has no two natures. If you say that it is not known as unmixed, the sentence culminates in a cognition qualified by being unmixed. That consists either in possessing a distinguishing property or in possessing distinction, and either way its meaning ceases to be undivided. Reply: no; this misunderstands the point. Since we accept that the moon’s nature is known, there is no room for defects dependent on its being unknown. Even when it is known, a question is appropriate to bring about knowledge opposing error, while such knowledge has not yet arisen. Otherwise all questions everywhere would disappear. If knowledge in an unpractised state does not oppose error, the same holds here. Although the object is the same, it is universally accepted in all systems that only a particular kind of knowledge removes error. The very same nature of whiteness, or of the absence of yellow, that appears in indirect knowledge such as ‘The conch is white, not yellow’ opposes error when it becomes the object of immediate knowledge. Thus it is called unmixed when accompanied by the result of opposing error. The presence and absence of that result correspond, conversely, to the absence and presence of a particular defect; that is a separate matter. Hence one and the same nature is mixed or unmixed according to differences of state, and knowledge and ignorance can coexist in the mixed state. This also disposes of the claim that being unmixed consists in possessing distinction or a distinguishing property. Although both occur in ‘The conch is white, not yellow’, one sees there the mixed state consisting in failure to oppose error. Experience says: ‘Although I know that whatever is the moon possesses moonhood and distinction from darkness, stars and the like, I still do not know the moon’s own nature.’ Thus possessing a distinguishing property or distinction is not what one wishes to know. What is inappropriate in saying that ‘The moon is the exceedingly bright light’ conveys the moon’s very nature, which one wishes to know, by producing a particular knowledge that opposes error? Even though distinction is the result of verbal cognition, it is not its object, and so does not conflict with undivided meaning; nor is there a word expressing it. Objection: distinction appears in verbal cognition through implication. Reply: no. Since that would serve no purpose, there is no intention to convey it, and implication is inappropriate. Is distinction conveyed as belonging to the moon, or to a particular individual? Not the first. Just as knowledge that whatever is a shell differs from silver and the like can coexist with ignorance of the shell’s nature and the resulting error, so knowledge that whatever is the moon differs from darkness and the like can coexist with ignorance of the moon’s nature and the resulting error and so forth. In the second case, since the particular individual must be conveyed, let that alone be conveyed. What need is there for distinction, which the words have not brought to mind? It is established by the very cognition of the particular individual. ‘There is smoke’ does not imply fire through implication. This also rejects the claim that distinction appears in verbal cognition without implication, like being unbroken in ‘Fetch water with a pot’. Even if being unbroken is intended by the words because it cannot be obtained otherwise, distinction is different: like rejection and acceptance and so forth, it is obtainable otherwise as a result. Even being unbroken is not an object of verbal cognition without implication, since otherwise implication itself would be abolished. Rather, it is in fact present in the means of fetching water that is the object of verbal cognition. This is explained at length elsewhere. Hence the authoritative work says: ‘Distinction from other things follows from the sense, not from the word.’ Nor is ‘Which is the moon?’ a question about a property. When one is free to say ‘What is the moon’s property?’, needless implication is unjustified; moreover, we have explained how an undivided meaning remains possible even when that is conveyed. Objection: since all defining sentences actually produce knowledge concerning only their respective, mutually different nominal-stem meanings, and do not produce qualified knowledge, the respondent should simply use the word ‘moon’ or the like occurring in the question, which conveys the subject alone. What purpose do the words ‘exceedingly bright’ serve? Reply: no. Although the nature alone is to be known, all the words serve a purpose: only when knowledge of that nature depends on that many word-meanings does it result in distinction from things other than those word-meanings. Otherwise, as experience establishes, doubt and the like persist. Objection: if the answer does not intend knowledge qualified by excellence and the like, it conveys in intention merely ‘Whatever is the moon’. Thus in fact anything whatever could be the moon. In the intended meaning ‘This is the moon’, there would be no division into subject and predicate consisting of defined thing and definition, so the desire to know the moon would remain, and this would not answer ‘Which is the moon?’. Reply: no. Although there is no intention to convey something qualified by relation to the Ganges, the word ‘Ganges’ implies a bank that is actually related to the Ganges. Or, in ‘He sprinkles the rice grains’ and the like, prescribing sprinkling and the like of the mere nature of rice grains would be pointless. Hence, although the words imply possession of a relation to the unseen result established by sentences such as ‘He should sacrifice with rice grains’, the words ‘rice grains’ and the like imply individuals that actually possess ricehood and the like. Likewise here, the words ‘exceedingly bright’ imply precisely the individual that actually possesses their meanings, rather than just anything. Thus the previously stated defect does not follow even without an intention to convey something qualified. Although ‘This is the moon’ lacks a relation of defined thing and definition, the single nature brought to mind by the two words conveying them can itself stand as subject and predicate. Thus the desire to know can cease and the sentence can be an answer. We have already explained that even knowledge without a qualifying aspect removes doubt and the like. The conclusion is this: the question and answer concern only the meaning of the nominal stem ‘moon’. That nominal-stem meaning is the distinctive individual that, possessing the exceedingly bright light, stands as the subject; it is not something qualified by the exceedingly bright light, since otherwise their joint use in ‘The moon is the exceedingly bright light’ would be inappropriate. The individual constituting the subject is undivided. Hence the meaning is indeed undivided. Objection: in ‘Bring a cow’, bringing is enjoined with reference to a cow. Cowhood determines the subject, and thus constitutes a qualifying aspect even though it is not connected with bringing. Likewise here, even if exceedingly bright light is not connected as the nominal-stem meaning of ‘moon’, its being the delimitor of the subject makes its role as a qualifying aspect unavoidable. In ‘Bring a cow’, there is no connection without cowhood. Reply: no. Being the delimitor of a nominal-stem meaning invariably involves being a nominal-stem meaning. Something that is not a nominal-stem meaning cannot be said to delimit it. Hence, if exceedingly bright light delimits the nominal-stem meaning, its being a nominal-stem meaning is unavoidable. Objection: in ‘Earth possesses earthhood’ and the like, earthhood does not fail to connect with the predicate as a nominal-stem meaning of ‘earth’, because earthhood is a nominal-stem meaning of ‘earth’. Their joint use is possible because the word ‘earth’ intends the requirement to apply that designation. This is therefore an exception. Reply: no. For someone who does not know that what possesses the universal earthhood is the meaning of ‘earth’, the word ‘earthhood’ would not bring that universal to mind, and connection would indeed fail. Thus you must say that the hearer has already apprehended that what possesses the universal earthhood is the meaning of ‘earth’. But then the statement is pointless. Consequently, lacking any other course, the answer culminates in a meaning such as: earth possesses a universal that shares a locus with smell and is distinct from water and the like. Possessing a universal sharing a locus with smell and so forth is not directly expressed by ‘earth’, so how could connection fail? Nor is it right to explain the joint use through implication of the requirement to apply a designation. Implication of that requirement abandons the word’s own meaning, whereas implication of the nature both abandons and retains the meaning, and the word’s own meaning remains connected there. Thus implication that both abandons and retains the meaning is appropriate precisely with regard to the nature. The author of the commentary says this in the topic ‘And because of pervasion, it is appropriate’: ‘Even in implication there are proximity and remoteness.’ In ‘One should meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgītha’, does the meaning intend a Udgītha resembling Om, or Om as a part of the Udgītha? That discussion determines that, since figurative usage abandons the word’s own meaning, implication of a part is preferable, because it is closer. This also rejects the following argument: the moon as property-bearer is generally known, and the distinguishing property and distinction from stars and the like are already known in pots and the like; thus the question and answer concern something qualified. If the questioner directly wishes to know its possession of distinction, even then, since each distinction cannot be stated in a thousand compounds, the answer conveys only possession of a distinguishing property, like conveying smoke when someone wishes to know fire. ‘There is smoke’, intended to convey fire, surely intends smoke; and ‘What belongs to Agni ...’ and the like, which imply a sacrifice, intend the relation between material and deity. But if, understanding that each distinction cannot be stated, the questioner asks only about possession of a distinguishing property, the question and answer all the more concern something qualified. This is rejected because in the first case the question and answer would concern different subjects, and in the second the meaning actually heard would have to be abandoned. Even in the first case the abandonment of the meaning actually heard remains. Nor can this abandonment be accepted as the only course, since another course has been stated. Objection: if implication of the nature is admitted because otherwise the question and answer would concern different subjects, then let ‘There is smoke’, answering a question about fire, imply fire. Reply: no. When ‘There is smoke’ directly conveys an inferential sign through its expressive power, knowledge of fire can arise from that very sign. There is therefore no place for implication postulated because the intention cannot otherwise be fulfilled. Moreover, by the reasoning of the topic concerning direct scriptural statement and indicative sign, an indicative sign is stronger than a sentence. The present case differs, since no means of knowledge apart from the sentence establishes the moon’s unmixed nature. Objection: just as a definition is stated in answer to ‘What is the moon’s distinctive mark?’, which concerns a distinctive property, ‘Which of many is the moon?’, which concerns a class, and ‘Which of these two is the moon?’, which concerns determination by distinguishing through class, quality or action, so it is stated in the answer here. We should therefore supply a word expressing a property in the question too: ‘Is it exceedingly bright or not exceedingly bright?’ The use of ‘which’ indicates this. Reply: no. The observed answer ‘There is smoke’ to a question about fire shows that being stated in the answer is not decisive in determining what the questioner wishes to know. If you say that smoke is mentioned there because it serves knowledge of what is desired, who told you that it serves no purpose here? In questions such as ‘What is its distinctive mark?’, possession of a word expressing that property is an unstated condition. Mere observation of this somewhere does not entail the conclusion. The word ‘which’ indicates a desire to know, and that desire is not restricted to a desire to know a property. Thus, because the question lacks a word expressing a property, the property-expressing word in the corresponding answer concerns the nature alone. Since the desire to know the nature has been justified, there is no basis for implication, and the word ‘moon’ in the question does not imply its distinctive property. Some say: a defining sentence intends possession of the requirement to apply the designation ‘moon’, and hence has no undivided meaning. Applying that designation means a usage qualified by the word ‘moon’, rather than by the thing that is the moon. Thus knowledge or ignorance of that thing does not produce the defects of pointlessness or inability to convey it. Nor should one say that ordinary usage by competent speakers itself reveals the word’s power, making a defining sentence unnecessary, since one means does not invalidate another means. This is incorrect. We have stated that the question and answer would concern different subjects, and there is no basis for implication in the word ‘moon’ in the question. Without knowing the moon’s distinctive nature, one cannot know that it possesses usage qualified by the word ‘moon’. Knowledge of that nature is therefore necessary, and that alone can explain the sentence’s validity. There is no means of establishing that the sentence intends the requirement to apply a designation. Hence it has been said: ‘Possession of exceedingly bright light, established by another means of knowledge, is merely a means to establishing the undivided meaning.’ As it is known through perception when one asks ‘Which is the moon in this circle of lights?’, so it is known on other occasions in another way; otherwise it could not be mentioned as already known. Although the moon’s nature is known, the absence of unmixed knowledge justifies the desire to know, as explained. Thus the first inference is untroubled. The second inference too has no defects such as an unknown qualifying term, contradiction, a counter-inference of equal force, or absence of the property to be established in the example. The property to be established is concern with the subject constituting the nominal-stem meaning of ‘Brahman’. Otherwise, since ‘Brahman’ is an etymologically derived word, a divided meaning would follow. The sentence ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’ concerns only the subject constituting its nominal-stem meaning. Thus, on the general pervasion, the example does not lack the property to be established. Concern with only the subject constituting the nominal-stem meaning of ‘Brahman’ is precisely undivided meaning. The reason, answering a question about that, is explained by the same reasoning already given for ‘The exceedingly bright light ...’; thus there is neither unestablishedness nor contradiction. Since the inference is supported by reasoning excluding the contrary, namely the consequence that question and answer concern different subjects, there is no room for a counter-inference of equal force, failure to entail the conclusion, or unstated conditions. Nor should one say: when the answer is ‘Truth’ and the like, no question is heard as it is in ‘Which is the moon?’; a question must therefore be supplied in accordance with the answer, and since nothing opposes it, a question about properties should be supplied; thus the reason is unestablished. By the force of sentences such as ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ and ‘It is to be discerned as one alone’, it is knowledge concerning Brahman alone, without possession of truth and other qualifications as its object, that produces liberation. There is no desire to know anything additional, so a question about it cannot be supplied. Thus, just as in ‘Which is the moon?’, only the question ‘What is Brahman?’ is supplied, and the reason is not unestablished. Objection: in questions concerning the meaning of ‘you’, ‘Which of many is the self?’ and ‘Which of two is that self?’, the words ‘which of many’ and the like have meanings such as class, as determined by the grammatical rules ‘Optionally, when asking about a class among many, the suffix ḍatamac’ and ‘When determining one of two, the suffix ḍatarac’. Thus the reason you intend is unestablished in the subject, the answering sentence ‘That which consists of cognition ...’ and the like. Nor should you say: ‘We do not claim that whatever answers a question about something has that as an undivided meaning, but that whatever answers a question about something has that as its meaning.’ Even if the general pervasion has no exception, using it to establish an undivided meaning in this subject ultimately makes the reason ‘because it answers a question about an undivided meaning’, and its unestablishedness remains unresolved. Reply: this is no defect, since by ‘meaning’ we intend precisely the object of the sentence’s intention. Just as, despite containing a word expressing a property, the answer does not chiefly intend the property, so too the question, despite containing a suffix such as ‘which of many’ that expresses it, does not chiefly intend that. It serves as a means to the self’s distinctive nature, which is chiefly what one wishes to know, since knowledge of the self’s nature alone is the human goal. Nor should one say that the reason is contradictory because every answer intends one undetermined property residing in a property-bearer determined by the question and questioner. Being an answer is explained simply by determining what is undetermined. Intending such a property is not decisive for being an answer, so the rule is unestablished. Objection: how can what concerns the nature alone determine anything? Reply: understand that it can because it is a defining sentence. Nor should one ask how the cognition produced by the answer, being without a qualifying aspect, can remove qualified doubt. Its removal of doubt even without a qualifying aspect has been explained. Objection: if an answer did not concern anything beyond the question, it would not be an answer; the question itself would be the answer. Reply: no. Although its object does not exceed the question’s object, it can be an answer through containing a word expressing a distinctive property, or through conveying the property-bearer beyond doubt. For this very reason it is a question-answer; because the form that occasions that is absent (the local wording is fragmentary). Nor should one cite an exception in ‘He studies’ or ‘Bring a cow’, answering ‘What does he do?’ or ‘What is to be brought?’, on the ground that these do not, through implication abandoning studyhood, cowhood and the like, intend merely an object of action and so forth. Here the question is not about doing or bringing, but about the object of doing or bringing. Otherwise one would ask precisely ‘What is doing?’ or ‘What is bringing?’. Thus, since the question and answer do not concern an object of action qualified by studyhood and the like, there is no exception to the general pervasion that whatever answers a question about something has that as its meaning. Consequently the inference in the Nyāyadīpāvalī is sound too: the meaning of the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ is only the nominal-stem meaning of ‘Brahman’, because it is the meaning of a sentence answering a question about that alone, and so forth. Objection: even if answering a question about one nominal-stem meaning alone establishes concern with one nominal-stem meaning alone, how does this establish undivided meaning? Grammarians hold that a nominal stem has five meanings, or three. It is said: ‘Its own meaning, an individual substance, gender, number, and case-relations such as objecthood: they call these the five meanings of a noun; others hold only the first three.’ On the Prābhākara view, and that of some within our own school, only a connected meaning is the meaning of a nominal stem. Even on the view that separately expressed meanings are subsequently connected, if a nominal stem means an individual qualified by a universal, the nominal-stem meaning itself is qualified. On the view that expressive power concerns the universal alone, while the individual is obtained by implication from it, concern with the nominal-stem meaning alone would fail to concern the individual moon and the like that constitutes the subject. Moreover, since ‘Brahman’ is etymologically derived, its nominal-stem meaning is all the more qualified. Reply: no. What is to be established is concern with only the subject-aspect of the nominal-stem meaning of ‘Brahman’. Thus an undivided meaning is established even though the nominal-stem meaning is qualified. Moreover, in ‘Merely the nominal-stem meaning, gender, measure and number’, competent authorities raise the objection that mentioning gender and the like is pointless because they too are nominal-stem meanings, and answer that ‘nominal-stem meaning’ expresses only the nature unqualified by gender and the like. As for the claim that the nominal-stem meaning is fivefold and so forth, it is rejected by our refusal to accept it and conflicts with reasoning. Qualities and actions are not obtained from nominal stems such as ‘substance’. Otherwise, when ‘substance’ is said, one would not doubt, ‘Is it blue or yellow? Does it move or not?’ Nor should one say that, because the desire to know cannot otherwise be explained, these are expressed generally, but doubt arises because they are not expressed specifically. The desire to know is explained by general knowledge implied by substancehood and the like alone. Number, objecthood and so forth are obtained precisely from number-endings, case-endings and the like. The view of some within the school, that connected meanings are expressed, likewise cannot withstand reasoning. Connection is established from words whose expressive power concerns only word-meanings, through the assistance of expectancy and the like. Nor should one ask how what concerns only the nominal-stem meaning can concern only one part of it: this has already been explained by the absence of expectancy for the qualifier. Nor does the reason fail to entail the conclusion: its being prompted by a desire to know the nature alone has been stated as excluding the contrary. Objection: since the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ contains qualifiers, expectancy should be generated for their meanings too, by the reasoning of the red cloth, just as for excellence in an injunctive sentence accompanied by praise. It is said: ‘Expectancy is absent when there is nothing to be expected.’ Reply: no. Although the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ contains a qualifier, expectancy concerning it need not be postulated. Even though ‘The moon is the exceedingly bright light’ contains a qualifier, ‘Which is the moon?’ shows expectancy concerning the nature alone. Nor should that expectancy be postulated there too. Without postulating it, the words serve their purpose simply through conveying distinction. Knowledge of a particular distinction can arise from knowledge of the nature alone through that qualifier, even without intending the qualifier itself. Objection: since qualified knowledge alone causes liberation, the meaning of ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’, the scripture ‘One who knows thus becomes immortal here’, and the following sentence ‘One who knows it as lodged in the cave’ make a desire to know appropriate for the seeker of liberation only when qualified knowledge of a property-bearer is to be achieved. Reply: no. We have explained how knowledge without a qualifying aspect alone causes liberation by removing error and the like, since it is knowledge of the substratum indicated by an indication of its nature. In accordance with that, there is no evidence that ‘The knower of Brahman’ and the like intend qualified knowledge of Brahman. ‘One who knows thus’ does not mean possessing some further qualifying aspect, but being indicated by an aspect of this kind, in accordance with ‘As one alone’ and the like. Nor should one say that consequently sentences concerning Brahman with attributes, when prompted by a desire to know Brahman, the ritual portion, when prompted by a desire to know action, and medical and other treatises, when prompted by a desire to know medicines and the like, would concern undivided Brahman, undivided action, undivided medicine and so forth. We do not infer undivided meaning merely from a sentence’s being prompted by a desire to know, but from its being prompted by a desire to know the nature alone. Nor is the desire there too for the nature alone, since nothing opposes its concerning something qualified. If that does occur there in a defining sentence and the like, we accept the consequence. Nor does it follow that sentences concerning Brahman with attributes cannot be valid because they concern a real, pure thing qualified by other, false things. They can have empirical validity, like the ritual portion. Objection: there are sentences about Brahman that do not define it, just as there are about action. Those too would have an undivided meaning. Reply: no. If their subsidiary intention is considered, they do not concern Brahman at all. If their ultimate intention is considered, we accept the consequence. Moreover, obstacles are supplied by sentences excluding many aspects, such as ‘It is to be discerned as one alone’; sentences excluding difference, such as ‘He makes an interval ...’; ‘Alone and without attributes’, which excludes attributes; and ‘One only, without a second’, which excludes every second thing. The words ‘infinite’ and ‘Brahman’, concerning what is unlimited in every respect, also oppose the qualified interpretation. Nor should one say that, if these intend something qualified by unity, absence of difference and the like, no Vedānta sentence is established as having an undivided meaning, while if they intend a real, pure thing qualified by other, false things, validity is impossible. Since unity, absence of difference and the like are the very nature, there is no intention of something qualified. If absence of difference and the like are imagined because their counterpositives are imagined, their validity is still explained: like the words beginning ‘truth’, they concern the nature by way of expressing a qualified meaning. Nor should one say: because these have an undivided meaning through implication, opposition to them cannot justify abandoning the direct meaning of a sentence concerning something qualified, since a sentence concerning the subject does not oppose a sentence concerning something qualified. Unity, absence of difference and the like, even when presented as an avenue, oppose a qualified meaning, and so the direct meaning can be abandoned. Nor should one say that unity and the like, presented as an avenue, cannot oppose an interpretation concerning truth and other properties if they are false, while if they are real the established doctrine is contradicted. Only reality together with difference contradicts the established doctrine. Nor does identity make their role as an avenue impossible. They can serve as an avenue through having imagined propertyhood. Nor should one say that, since truth and the like are taken here as an avenue, these exclusions oppose those very things. Even though truth and the like, in the form of imagined universals, are taken in their own nature as an avenue, they do not conflict with what excludes their absolute reality. This also explains how the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘infinite’ oppose the qualified interpretation. Objection: scripture says, ‘Why is it called Brahman? Because the attributes in it are great’, and traditional teaching says, ‘They call it infinite because of its great attributes’. These explain the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘infinite’ as expressing something with attributes. How do these not oppose your view? Reply: no. Those scriptural and traditional passages concern the meanings of ‘Brahman’ and ‘infinite’ occurring in a context about what possesses attributes. They cannot intend an explanation of the meanings of ‘Brahman’ and ‘infinite’ occurring in a defining sentence. Objection: these reasons are defeated by opposing reasoning. If a sentence concerning identity, whether the subject of the inference or its example, did not have related meanings, it would not be a sentence at all, since it would lack expectancy, compatibility and proximity. Expectancy is incompleteness of expression: that without which something cannot convey the connection of its own meaning is precisely what makes it incomplete. Proximity is the uninterrupted presentation of what stands as the counterpart in a connection. Compatibility is absence, in the relation to one word-meaning, of a property delimiting counterpositiveness to an absolute absence located in the other word-meaning. None of these three is possible where no relation is concerned. Reply: this is no defect, since all three are possible even for an undivided meaning. Even mutually unexpectant expressions convey some connection or other; thus expectancy must be defined precisely as failure to convey the intended meaning. The reference to connection is therefore superfluous. Merely saying ‘That without which something fails to convey its intended meaning’ is adequate. The intended meaning is sometimes related and sometimes undivided; this makes no difference. Hence expectancy is indeed present even in a Vedānta sentence before it produces experience of its intended undivided meaning. Proximity too is merely the uninterrupted presentation of word-meanings conducive to verbal cognition, rather than presentation qualified by their being counterparts in a connection, which adds needless complexity. It exists even in what does not convey a relation. Compatibility too is simply the non-sublation of the intended meaning, not something of the form ‘In the relation to one word-meaning ...’. Where two relations, one sublated and one unsublated, are possible, that definition would wrongly include a case whose intended meaning is sublated. Non-sublation of the intended meaning is readily available for an undivided meaning too. Alternatively, since connection need not invariably involve difference, expectancy and the like can be explained through a relation of identity. Nor is it inappropriate for one undivided word-meaning to be the intended meaning. Where a word-meaning is known in its distinctive nature, it is conveyed as qualified by another word-meaning. Where it is not known in that way, it cannot be qualified by other word-meanings, and so it alone must be conveyed, since the sentence reaches its completion in that alone. Excellence, truth and the like serve the different distinctions through cognition of their respective roles as avenues. Thus these reasons are not defeated by the opposing reasoning that sentencehood would be impossible. Objection: if they did not have related meanings, Vedānta passages would have no object. Their undivided sentence-meaning, self-luminous consciousness alone, is eternally established as the substratum of the superimposition of ignorance and the like and as their witness. Reply: no. There is no defect, because it is conditioned by beginningless ignorance. Even though established of itself, without a modification produced by a means of knowledge it does not remove ignorance. The modification produced by a means of knowledge is accompanied by the result of removing ignorance; thus nothing is inappropriate. Nor should one offer the opposing reasoning that abandoning the direct meaning is impossible without an obstacle, while the scriptural passages conveying uniformity and the like supply no obstacle because they too intend an undivided meaning. We have stated that even what is presented as an avenue can oppose an interpretation. Objection: if the cognition produced by a Vedānta sentence lacked a qualifying aspect, it would not be cognition at all. Just as cognition necessarily has an object, like desire and the like, so it necessarily has a qualifying aspect; an object cannot enter the intellect without some qualifying aspect. Reply: no. The pervasion is unestablished, since even the logicians and others accept indeterminate cognition. The disputants disagree over whether direct expression by a word is possible without some qualifying aspect. We do not accept such direct expression of Brahman. Yet even that can be possible by taking some condition of usage, as with the word ‘space’ and the like. Nor can determinate character be established from being verbal cognition. Not being produced by knowledge of an indication of the nature, and being cognition not produced by a sentence concerning the nature, are unstated conditions. Moreover, just as with being cognition, there is no evidence establishing that being verbal cognition is pervaded by being determinate. Nor should one say that Vedānta would concern something no one wishes to know, because the property-bearer is already known and there is no desire to know it. Even though the nature is known, we have explained the desire to know its distinctive nature. Nor is the injunction to inquire inappropriate. Inquiry has the result of determining Vedānta’s intention and the like, and can therefore aim at unobstructed knowledge of Brahman without a qualifying aspect. A preliminary view, being obstructed, does not remove ignorance. Nor is it inappropriate to begin the topics concerning even pure Brahman, since the five factors beginning with the subject are possible. The subject is what is unknown in its distinguishing aspect, and Brahman indeed is such. The purpose depends on determination of the subject’s nature; that determination does not require possession of a qualifying aspect. In an object without a qualifying aspect there is no conflict with determining its nature. Determination is knowledge of the undivided meaning indicated by non-duality and the like; its dependent purpose is liberation alone. The initial objection and established conclusion rely on imagined qualifying aspects. Doubt too arises from cognition of an imagined common property, so nothing is inappropriate. This also rejects the following: the topics of the third section of the first chapter should not be begun at all, since they lack the five factors beginning with the subject. A subject is what is unknown specifically; doubt is produced by cognition of a common property; the initial objection and established conclusion rely respectively on a false and a true qualifying aspect; and the purpose depends on determination through one qualifying aspect. How can these five occur in what has no distinctions? They are possible in the manner stated. Nor does general knowledge through ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ make the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ pointless. It serves its purpose by providing knowledge of the distinctive nature. Nor should one say that, without intending something qualified by truth and the like, it merely conveys in intention ‘Whatever is Brahman’, so that anything whatever would be Brahman, and ‘This is Brahman’ would lack a division into subject and predicate consisting of defined thing and definition. We have already said that, by the nature of a definition, the thing’s actual nature is obtained. Even in one thing an imagined relation of subject and predicate is possible. Since the sentence concerns only a previously unapprehended predicate, there is no conflict with its undivided meaning. Objection: a predicate known in its own nature must be conveyed precisely as related to the subject. Thus the meaning is divided. It is said: ‘The settled position of the wise is that a sentence predicates something after mentioning something already known. Tell us what the sentence beginning “Truth, knowledge” predicates.’ Reply: this is no defect. The distinctive nature, being what is to be known, is the predicate. Knowledge of the nature through truth and the like culminates in conveying its distinctiveness. Through the avenue and its result, what has not been obtained can be obtained. Thus being the subject and being the predicate both culminate in the nature alone. Objection: in that case the words beginning ‘truth’ would not operate through implication. Implication, being the presentation of a counterpart in a connection that is neither directly expressible nor similar to the directly expressed meaning, would be impossible; and its basis, impossibility of connection, is absent here. Reply: no. A word-meaning is presented through a semantic operation; that presentation is not itself the operation. Thus implication is not of the stated form, but is a relation to the directly expressed meaning, and that exists here too. Even if implication has the form of presentation, it is presentation conducive to the intended meaning, not presentation of the stated kind, since the latter occurs even where the intended meaning is absent. Nor is its basis impossible: impossibility of fulfilling the intention is itself the basis. Nor do the words beginning ‘truth’ become synonyms, since their directly expressed meanings differ. On our view, truth is non-sublation in all three times; on the opponent’s view, a higher universal shared by pots and the like is the ground for applying ‘truth’. For ‘knowledge’ and ‘bliss’, on our view the grounds of application are knowledgehood and blisshood recurring in particular manifestations of consciousness and bliss whose differences are obtained through conditioning by mental modifications. On the opponent’s view, they are lower universals residing in knowledge and bliss whose differences are obtained by their own nature. Thus even though the implied meaning is identical, there is no fear of synonymy. Objection: existence recurring in pots and the like cannot define Brahman, since there is no universal recurring in the false and the real. Thus distinction from unreality and the like is not established. Moreover, your view that non-sublation in all three times is taught of Brahman by scripture would be lost. Reply: no. Since Brahman is the substratum of everything, existence consisting in it pervades everything and is spoken of as a universal. Moreover, taking its imagined propertyhood, it has Brahman as its individual instance. That existence is precisely non-sublation in all three times, so its scriptural status is not lost. Although it is the substratum of the unreal, it does not reside in the unreal and can therefore distinguish Brahman from it. Stating the definition together with imagined universals such as blisshood follows the opponent’s approach. Nor should one say that, without difference of the same order of reality as the property-bearer, merely conditioned difference cannot make knowledgehood and the like universals, any more than spacehood and the like. Knowledgehood and the like occur in conditioned things possessing difference of the same order of reality as the property-bearer. Objection: then how can knowledgehood and the like define the pure? Smell does not define water. Reply: no. Even though they occur in what is conditioned, they do not cease to occur in what receives the conditioning. It is said: ‘The words beginning “truth”, directly expressing variegated Brahman qualified by truth and the like, imply pure Brahman.’ Nor should one say that truth cannot belong to the variegated, whose nature is unreal, or that, if it can, it does not distinguish from the unreal. Truth in the variegated consists precisely in this: when it is apprehended as related to absolute reality, the connection of the word ‘truth’ with it is apprehended. The Saṃkṣepaśārīraka says: ‘There is one sort of truth in space and the like, another sort in the inward self alone, and another there through contact with that. The word “truth” is learned in that latter application.’ The words beginning ‘bliss’ should be understood similarly. How then do they fail to distinguish from unreality and the like? This also rejects the claim that, because truth and the like are impossible anywhere except in the pure, and because truth and the like do not appear in the pure when the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ has an undivided meaning through implication, synonymy is unavoidable. We have also said that, although only the nature is intended, the other words are not pointless, since they fulfil their purpose by conveying different distinctions. Nor should one say that distinction is not established unless truth and the like, which effect the distinction, are intentionally conveyed. In ‘A herdsmen’s settlement lies on the deep river’, although the bank is intended, distinction from what is not deep is obtained in the river through direct expression, because it serves as a means to cognising the intended bank distinguished from the bank of a river that is not deep. Likewise here, although something qualified by truth and the like is not intended, mere preliminary apprehension through direct expression establishes distinction. Its role as a means to cognising the intended nature distinguished from unreality and the like is the same. Nor does Brahman, implied by words such as ‘truth’, have to be untrue and so forth, as a bank implied by a word such as ‘river’ is not a river. We do not accept implication that abandons the meaning entirely. If truth and the like were not apprehended in Brahman through direct expression, just as riverhood and the like are not apprehended in a bank, that consequence would follow. But this is not so: truth and the like are apprehended in Brahman itself, as riverhood and the like are apprehended in a river. Nor does this disturb its freedom from properties. Even though an empirical property is present, freedom from properties is explained by the absence of properties of the same order of reality as itself. That even directly expressive words operate through implication in order that the nature appear uncoloured by anything else is a further point. The author of the Kalpataru says: ‘Because universals such as existence are identical with the individual, Brahman, the individual implied, does not for us abandon existence and the like.’ Moreover, although implication is accepted to connect only one aspect in both ‘The cow is eternal’ and ‘The cow is transient’, the logicians accept both universal and individual as meanings of ‘cow’. Objection: the properties of the person taught by the Upanishads are obtained not from perception but from the Veda, which reveals reality. How then are they empirical? Reply: no. Even though they are preliminarily apprehended from the Veda, they can be non-absolute because they are not objects of the Veda’s intention. The Veda is authoritative regarding its intended meaning, and what falls within that authority alone is absolute: such is the rule. Nor should one say: how does merely not being intended by the Veda establish empirical status? If it is through being sublated, being the sacrificer would be empirical even in the sacrificial grass-bundle. If it is non-empirical because being the sacrificer is not superimposed there, shell-silver and the like would become empirical. Once non-absolute status has been established through not being an object of the Veda’s intention, the distinction between empirical and apparent is explained by being sublated respectively by what reveals absolute reality and by what reveals empirical reality. Nor does the revealer of reality fail to sublate because it concerns the subject alone. Even what concerns that alone can sublate by way of cognition of the qualifier; alternatively, a subsidiary intention regarding the qualifier is accepted. In ‘The sacrificer is the grass-bundle’ and the like, however, there is no subsidiary intention regarding the qualifier, since it is not a means to establishing the intended meaning. All schools accept that subsidiary intention concerns a means to establishing what is ultimately intended. Objection: are the distinctions real or false? Not the first: what effects them would also have to be real, since empirical things do not establish absolute distinctions. Not the second: just as, if a shell’s distinction from shell were false, shellhood would have the same order of reality as the shell, so, if distinction from unreality were false in Brahman, unreality would have the same order of reality as Brahman. Reply: no. Neither alternative has a defect. (1) Even if distinction is absolute because it is not different from Brahman, why must what effects the distinction be absolute? There is no rule that what reveals the absolute is absolute. The claim that what is revealed and what reveals it have the same order of reality has already been rejected through exceptions such as a word and its meaning. Appearance not occasioned by a defect is what accounts for reality. Nor is there a rule that what conveys distinction has the same order of reality as the distinction. Even a woman in a dream and the like produce cognition distinguishing another pleasure from the pleasure produced by themselves, since a cause distinguishes its effect. On your view that distinction is absolute, whereas on mine it is empirical. In either case it has a higher order of reality than the apparent thing effecting the distinction. Nor, if distinction is not different from Brahman, are the other words pointless because ‘Brahman’ alone supplies it. Even though it is established generally, those words serve their purpose by establishing it in the aspect of distinction from unreality and the like. This also rejects the claim that, since distinctions from ignorance and the like are mutually identical, ‘truth’ alone fulfils the purpose. Establishing each in its respective aspect is impossible without the respective word. Nor should one say that properties such as truth and knowledgehood too should be absolute, like distinction, through being not different from Brahman. We accept that consequence. Thus there is no defect whatever if distinction is real. (2) Even on the alternative that distinction is false, unreality does not acquire the same order of reality as Brahman, since being sublated by one and the same sublator is common to both. Only a counterpositive sublated by what sublates its distinction has a higher order of reality than that distinction; this does not apply also to what is sublated by the same sublator. Even though an imagined silver’s distinction from imagined silver is false, the silver has no higher order of reality than that distinction. Further details should be seen in the justification of the falsity of falsity. Objection: it is inappropriate to teach something false to a seeker of liberation who wishes to know reality. Nor can it be for removing the error of unreality and the like. Since that can be removed by direct realisation of the reality of Brahman, the substratum, it is inappropriate to produce another error. Someone mistaking an anthill for a post is not told, ‘This is a man.’ Reply: no. It serves as a means to precisely that direct realisation of the substratum’s reality which removes error. Moreover, in the account of the five sheaths, imagined teaching is seen removing each preceding error through the reasoning of the conspicuous star shown as Arundhatī. Just as imagined brahminhood in the self removes a suspected error about brahminhood, so empirical distinction removes apparent error about unreality and the like. Nor, if distinction from non-being is empirical, does the sentence ‘In the beginning this was non-being’, whose authority is not displaced, make non-being absolute. ‘There is no plurality here’ denies it, and we have already shown that ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ and the like intend something else. Thus, just as on the Mīmāṃsaka view even an unreal meaning of a commendatory passage serves as an avenue to real excellence, it is appropriate to convey even false distinctions as avenues to real Brahman. It is said: ‘The words beginning “truth” culminate in real Brahman through distinction.’ Nor is there a reversal of order because knowledge of distinction depends on knowledge of the property-bearer. We accept as an avenue to knowledge of the pure property-bearer a distinction that depends on knowledge of the property-bearer qualified by properties. Nor should one say that what is obtained from the sense cannot be an avenue to what is verbally conveyed, since otherwise ‘blue lotus’ and the like would concern the nature alone through distinction from what is not blue. In ‘blue lotus’ and the like, there is no intention to convey the nature alone, so the verbally conveyed meaning does not require a meaning obtained from the sense; something qualified is intended. Here, however, the nature alone is intended, and this is impossible without a meaning obtained from the sense serving as an avenue. Nor should one ask what, previously unknown, is to be made known through distinction, since on your view no particular distinction exists. Knowledge of the nature, not concerning anything else and opposing error, is to be achieved. Nor does this make it an avenue to ignorance of other things. It can be an avenue to pure knowledge precisely by obstructing cognition of other things. Nor should knowledge of the nature instead be the avenue to knowledge of distinction, since the latter is possible from the qualified cognition obtained through direct expression alone. Nor should one object that in the prior immediate knowledge of Brahman that removes ignorance of Brahman, nothing else that is an effect of that ignorance can appear, and that this contradicts your own procedure, according to which this sentence is prompted solely by a desire to know the nominal-stem meaning of ‘Brahman’. Is immediate knowledge of Brahman its very nature, or does it have the form of a mental modification? On the first alternative, the appearance of something else is not inappropriate, since that knowledge does not remove ignorance. Even a modification in the form of a preliminary view does not remove ignorance, either because it is not direct realisation, or because, even if it is direct realisation, it is obstructed. Knowledge produced by inquiry and yielding its result removes ignorance; knowledge prior to that does not. What is inappropriate here? Objection: what ‘truth’ conveys through distinction from non-being is precisely what the words beginning ‘knowledge’ must convey through distinction from ignorance and the like. The additional words are therefore pointless. Nor can the avenues be alternatives. The words beginning ‘truth’ are heard as obligatory, and, as with rice and barley in one performance, many such words cannot be taken in one sentence as alternatives. Moreover, their observable effects, removing errors about unreality and the like, differ; unlike rice and barley, they lack the single effect that occasions alternation. Reply: no. They serve their purpose by acting jointly as avenues. For the positive aspects beginning with bliss, useful for apprehending the principal thing, Brahman, the aphorism ‘Bliss and the like belong to the principal’ teaches their collection from all scriptural branches precisely for apprehension of attributeless Brahman. For the negative aspects beginning with not being gross, the aphorism ‘But the cognitions of the imperishable are to be included, because of commonality and identity, as with the Upasad; that has been stated’ teaches the same. Thus it is precisely the combination of avenues that is intended. Objection: let attributes from other branches be collected for meditation on Brahman with attributes. But what purpose does collecting attributes from other branches serve in apprehending attributeless Brahman? Each word beginning ‘truth’ implies Brahman and is individually capable of conveying the implied Brahman; truth and the like each constitute a definition. Truth and the like are not overinclusive as excellence and the like are. Reply: no. Like ‘exceedingly bright’, the words beginning ‘truth’ require combination to remove the overinclusiveness introduced by erroneous views. Without conveying distinction from unreality, ‘Brahman is cognition and bliss’ does not establish Brahman as distinct from nihilism. Similarly, overinclusiveness should be understood everywhere when any one word is absent. Thus truth and the like, through distinction from unreality and the like, are means to establishing Brahman as distinct from nihilism and the like. Nor should one say: is distinction conveyed as a qualifier of Brahman or independently? The first gives a divided meaning; in the second, teaching it to someone who wishes to know Brahman is irrelevant. Although distinction appears precisely as a qualifier in cognition obtained from the sense, the verbal cognition does not thereby have a divided meaning, by the principle that a meaning obtained from the sense is not the meaning of the injunction. The author of the Vārttika says: ‘Exclusion comes from another means of knowledge; hence it is held not to be verbal.’ Nor does even a qualifier obtained from the sense make Brahman divided. Scripture teaches its freedom from properties and the like, and a qualifier not of the same order of reality as the property-bearer does not occasion division. Nor should one say that ‘infinite’ directly conveys distinction from finite things, so that this is not obtained from the sense and ‘infinite’ would consequently have a divided meaning. The Taittirīyavārttika says: ‘There “infinite” is a qualifier precisely through exclusion of finite things; the remaining two are qualifiers through the channel of presenting their own meanings.’ In accordance with this, affirmative words convey exclusion of others indirectly through presenting their own meanings, whereas negative words do so directly. Nevertheless, we have repeatedly said that, even though the cognition serving as an avenue has a divided meaning, there is no conflict with undivided meaning in the cognition concerning the ultimate intention. Ānandabodhācārya says precisely this: ‘Even without difference in the implied meaning, because what is excluded differs, the words “cognition” and “bliss” are neither synonymous nor pointless.’ (1) Thus the objection is resolved on the view that implication occurs in the word. Some, however, say that implication here occurs in the sentence, not the word. Just as in ‘The herdsmen’s settlement is on the deep river’, after cognition of the mutual connection of depth and river, the bank related to that qualified meaning is implied, so here, after cognition of mutually qualified meanings, the undivided related to them is implied. Thus the words are not pointless. Nor is implication there individual to each word: then one would obtain the bank of the deep and the bank of the river and so forth, and there would be no cognition of the qualified bank. Nor should one say that, on your view, the words beginning ‘truth’ here do not convey cognition of mutual connection as ‘deep’ and ‘river’ do there. In the single Brahman, the words beginning ‘truth’ jointly produce cognition of the mutual connection of their meanings, which serves as an avenue. Cognition of the undivided through implication is accepted only afterwards. Nor should one ask how this resembles ‘on the deep ...’, when in ‘Truth, knowledge’ and ‘Cognition, bliss’ and the like the words beginning ‘truth’ are seen to imply Brahman without depending on one another. Where, actually intending a deep river, one says ‘The settlement is on the river’, implication without mutual dependence is seen; when ‘on the deep’ is said, joint implication is seen. Moreover, combination of avenues has been established by the reasoning for collecting attributes. Nor should one say that, through the words’ mutual association, a bank related to a deep river is implied there, while otherwise it is related to each separately, but here no additional gain is obtained even through another word. Even there, implication as the bank of a deep river is not accepted, since it would bring the conflict of two simultaneous semantic operations. Even from each word, what is actually related to the qualified thing is obtained. If the difference is whether cognition of the qualified thing serves as an avenue or not, that same difference is present here. Objection: even in ‘on the deep ...’, implication does not occur jointly, but only in ‘river’. After cognition of something qualified through mutual association, that word can imply what is related to the qualified thing it makes known. Implication is simply relation to what a word makes known, for economy; it is not the special case of relation to the directly expressed meaning, which adds complexity. Thus implication in two words, or two implications, is inappropriate. This also accords with the rule that a semantic operation is an operation of a word. Reply: this has no substance. You say that implication is relation to what is made known. Here what is made known is something qualified, and making that known belongs equally to both words. How then does implication occur only in ‘river’, not in ‘deep’, when there is no deciding ground? Nor should one say that the bank’s relation to depth is indirect, whereas its direct relation to the river supplies the deciding ground. Since the lexicon says ‘Nimna, gabhīra, gambhīra’, the word ‘deep’ expresses the river-substance in the form of something low, and so direct relation too is common to both. Nor should one say that, since a qualifier’s case-ending serves grammatical correctness, the meaning of the ending would fail to connect if ‘deep’ operated through implication. Although ‘deep’ is a qualifying word at the time of cognising the qualified thing, it is a subject-word at the time of implying what is related to that qualified thing. Moreover, the claim that a qualifier’s case-ending serves grammatical correctness is unfounded. The Naiyāyikas accept that it means identity, and the Mīmāṃsakas accept an individual connection for each, as established in the topic concerning the reddish cow. (2–3) Other examples of implication in a sentence should similarly be considered: ‘Go, if you are going, beloved ...’, ‘Eat poison’, and the like. Objection: here death is inferred from birth, and from that the impropriety of the departure that causes it is inferred. There is only a succession of inferences, not implication, since only what cannot be obtained otherwise is the meaning of the words. ‘There is smoke’ does not imply fire. In ‘Eat poison’ too, stating that eating poison is a means to something desirable indirectly conveys that eating food in an enemy’s house is a means to something undesirable. Alternatively, from a trustworthy person’s giving advice contrary to valid knowledge, anger is inferred; then, supposing the contemplated eating of food in an enemy’s house to be its cause, one infers that this should not be done. There is no implication. Reply: this is unsound. Even though death follows from birth, it does not follow that departure causes that death, since death can occur from old age and the like a hundred years later. Thus one cannot understand that departure causes the beloved woman’s death without implication. Nor can the impropriety of departure be inferred from its causing her death. There are exceptions: even what causes the beloved woman’s death is seen to be something one should do, when its nature is unknown, or under a teacher’s command, or to save oneself, or to avert disgrace to the family. Thus both the departure’s causing the beloved woman’s death and the impropriety of such a departure depend on implication. Mention of birth is irrelevant to the matter at hand, and thereby makes known the whole expression’s intention to convey not departing, which is relevant. Thus implication belongs to the whole expression, not to each word, since there is no indication of intention for each separately. Accordingly there is neither a succession of inferences here nor implication in each individual word. Likewise in ‘Eat poison’, from eating poison’s being a means to something desirable one cannot indirectly convey that eating food in an enemy’s house is a means to something undesirable: they have different loci, and both could be means to desirable ends even without that supposition. Not just anything is implied by anything whatever; rather, what would be inexplicable implies what explains it. Nor is there an inference of anger from being trustworthy while giving advice contrary to valid knowledge, followed by an inference of the impropriety of eating food in an enemy’s house, the cause of that anger. Even a trustworthy father and the like is seen to give advice contrary to valid knowledge through error and the like without anger, so there is an exception. Moreover, even what causes a trustworthy person’s anger can, through error and the like, be something one should do, just as with what causes the beloved woman’s death; thus there is an exception there too. Accordingly, knowing from the statement of something not contemplated that the intention is to prevent what is contemplated, one postulates implication in the whole expression without dividing it into words, rather than in each individual word, since no distinct indication of intention is present for each. Thus, when the intended meaning or connection of a word-meaning is impossible, implication occurs in the word; when either of these is impossible for a sentence-meaning, implication occurs in the sentence. It should be understood that not being occasioned by impossibility of a sentence-meaning is an unstated condition in the argument establishing that implication is an operation of a word. (4) Likewise, in ordinary usage ‘Half inside, half outside’, and in the Veda ‘Half inside the altar, half outside the altar’, implication occurs in the sentence alone. Nor should one say that an interval is inferred from one half’s being inside while the other is outside, so there is no implication. A divided house provides an exception: both are seen even without an interval. Or, if the mere possibility of an inference of some sort sufficed, verbal testimony would everywhere be abolished as a means of knowledge. (5–6) Thus the author of the Vivaraṇa’s statement that inquiry is implied by the expression ‘desire to know Brahman’, and the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka’s statement that the sacrificer is implied by ‘one possessing sacrificial implements’, are explained through implication in a sentence. Although ‘desire to know Brahman’ and ‘one possessing sacrificial implements’ are words in the sense of having a nominal ending, they are not words in the sense of possessing a single expressive power. Thus implication consisting in relation to the directly expressed meaning is impossible there; but implication consisting in relation to what is made known is not inappropriate even in an aggregate of etymologically derived words that stands in the place of a sentence. (7) Likewise, in the commendatory passage ‘Vāyu is indeed the swiftest deity’ and the like, implication must be accepted in the sentence itself in order to apprehend excellence, since this is impossible from each word individually. Nor should one say that it only conveys, in the action, a relation to that word-meaning in the form of causing the swift deity’s favour, rather than implying some further excellence. If it conveyed only connection among the word-meanings, the cognition would be merely ‘Vāyu is swiftest’, and would not concern the action’s excellence. Nor should one say that there, impossibility of connection with the act expressed by an optative and the like provides the basis of implication, whereas here all the words imply and there is no impossibility of connection among directly expressed meanings. Who told you that implication is due to impossibility of the directly expressed meaning? It is due to impossibility of fulfilling the intention. Whether that intention concerns connection among directly expressed meanings, connection generally, or the nature alone makes no difference. Otherwise there would be no implication in ‘Let the staffs enter’. Nor should one say that precisely an impossibility of connection exists between staffs and entry for the purpose of eating. Even so, apprehension of the intention to convey a particular kind of entry must be relied upon. Let impossibility of fulfilling that intention alone therefore be the basis of implication. It should be understood that even if, lacking a deciding ground, both bases are accepted as alternatives applying in their respective cases, this does us no harm. Objection: if all the words operate through implication, there would be no immediate cognition of the sentence-meaning, since what operates through implication does not produce immediate cognition. Reply: no. Producing immediate cognition is possible even when something operates through implication. It produces immediate cognition because it possesses expressive power, not because it possesses expressive power for that particular meaning, which would add needless complexity. Even what operates through implication possesses expressive power somewhere. Moreover, Bhaṭṭācārya accepts the sentence-meaning as implied by all the words. On the theory that separately expressed meanings are subsequently connected, words express word-meanings through their own power; they do not merely recall them, since that would require postulating an underlying relation in addition to the relation between what is recalled and what recalls it. Knowledge of one related thing recalls the other related thing; being a reminder is not itself the relation, as is seen with an elephant and its keeper and the like. Hence it is said: ‘Since a word has nothing additional, it does not differ from a reminder.’ The meaning is this: it does not produce immediate cognition, because it does not make known something unknown; nor does it recall, because there is no further relation. Rather, through its power it makes known what is known, and thus resembles a reminder. A cognition distinct from both recollection and immediate cognition must indeed be accepted when established by the force of evidence. Moreover, cognition of a word-meaning does not present the aspect ‘that’, characteristic of recollection; and postulating its loss here, in breach of the rule that recollection presents that aspect, adds excessive complexity. Thus word-meanings that become objects of a word-produced cognition distinct from recollection and immediate cognition are called expressed. In accordance with expectancy and the like, such word-meanings produce immediate cognition of their own connection; hence the sentence-meaning is called implied. For the rule is that what is conveyed by a word is directly expressible, and what is conveyed by a word-meaning is implied. Hence it is said: ‘Our position is that the sentence-meaning is everywhere implied.’ Although being implied in the case of a bank and the like means being recalled through a word-meaning expressed by a word, whereas in the case of a sentence-meaning it means being immediately cognised through that word-meaning, the designation ‘implied’ applies on the basis of being conveyed through a word-meaning. For this reason, implication of one word-meaning through another requires prior knowledge of their relation, since the former is recalled. Implication of a sentence-meaning, however, does not require this, since the sentence-meaning is immediately cognised and does not depend on prior knowledge of a relation. In implication of a word-meaning the regulator is prior knowledge of the relation alone; in implication of a sentence-meaning it is expectancy and the like alone. These two regulators are independent of one another. This disposes of the question how implication can occur for a previously unknown sentence-meaning that cannot be known as related to the directly expressed meaning: only implication of a word-meaning has that requirement. Thus, since a word’s expressive power is exhausted in presenting its word-meaning, and the presented word-meanings produce immediate cognition of their connection, there is no impossibility in Vedānta sentences producing immediate cognition of connection even when all their words operate through implication. One might object: there may be no difficulty on the theory that separately expressed meanings are subsequently connected, but there is one on the theory that connected meanings are expressed. On that theory, precisely the words’ capacity to produce immediate cognition of connection is called expressive power. Presentation of each individual word-meaning is recollection, not something accomplished by expressive power, since recollection of one related thing from knowledge of another is common to the elephant and its keeper and the like, and the underlying relation consisting in capacity to produce immediate cognition of connection is already present. Thus, since presentation of a word-meaning is not accomplished by expressive power, is common to other recollections, and affords no evidence for postulating a different kind of recollection, one supplies a meaning, rather than a word, unless there is an obstacle. In ‘For the flowers’, the word ‘desires’ is supplied for grammatical correctness; in ‘One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit’, ‘desiring heaven’ is supplied to obtain the person enjoined; and, in the offering of boiled grain to Sūrya, when the mantra ‘I offer what is pleasing to Agni’ is obtained by transference, the word ‘Sūrya’ is supplied to obtain a directly expressive word, displacing ‘Agni’, whose assistance in the original rite is established through possession of a directly expressive word. Even though words are supplied in these cases, they are not required for recollection of the word-meaning or for immediate cognition of the sentence-meaning. Being verbal cognition consists precisely in being immediate cognition of connection produced by words, not in being immediate cognition of connection produced by presentations produced by words, which adds needless complexity. For this reason, even being unbroken and the like, which delimit compatibility and have not been presented by a word, are verbal because they are objects of the immediate cognition of connection produced by words. Others too accept the same for conduciveness, counterpositiveness and the like. Accordingly, in ordinary usage ‘This is Caitra’, and in the Veda ‘One who desires cattle should sacrifice with Udbhid’ and the like, the very words ‘Caitra’, ‘Udbhid’ and so forth, presented by perception, connect as names. Otherwise, supplying expressions such as ‘This is what the word “Caitra” expresses’ and ‘With the sacrifice expressed by the word “Udbhid”’ would require implication, which is impossible in a word whose relation to its meaning has not been apprehended. Just as negation connects in ‘A pot is not a cloth’, the connection of names in ‘This is Caitra’ and the like is explained by postulating a different rule of usage, without requiring a case-ending’s meaning as an avenue. If connection of negation required a case-ending’s meaning, the non-dualists would have won: the meanings of ‘pot’, ‘cloth’ and negation could be connected through identity, just as in ‘A blue, fragrant, large lotus’. If names required a case-ending’s meaning, their status as names in the Veda would not be established, and the initial objector would have won. For, just as in ‘One should sacrifice with Soma’, implication of possession would explain ‘One should sacrifice with Udbhid’ and the like as an injunction of something qualified. Although implication is common to both interpretations, an injunction is more appropriate because it makes a difference to action. The author of the Vārttika, however, accepts the supplying of words everywhere for the presentation of word-meanings, since that is accomplished by a word’s expressive power; even so, he relies on a different rule of usage for the connection of names. He has himself explained this in the topic concerning names. Enough of this succession of incidental matters. Let us return to the matter at hand. On this account, if even what operates through implication produces immediate cognition of connection, then, since expressive power is precisely the capacity to produce immediate cognition of connection, what operates through implication would possess that too, and there would be no division into primary and secondary meanings. This would conflict with the topic concerning indicative force. There the question is whether mantras such as ‘I cut you, sacrificial grass, seat of the gods’ are assigned by indicative force to both their primary and secondary meanings, or to the primary meaning alone. The initial position is that they are assigned to both, since both are verbally conveyed; the established conclusion is that they are assigned only to the primary. The aphorism says: ‘In mantras, subordinate status would follow from connection through expression of the meaning; hence the original relation, because of constant connection with the meaning.’ Its meaning is this: for mantras such as ‘I cut you, sacrificial grass, seat of the gods’, which no direct scriptural statement assigns, subordinate status, namely assignment, follows from indicative force consisting in capacity to express a meaning. That capacity concerns the primary meaning, not the secondary. A meaning presented by the word’s power is unobstructed, like the face, and is therefore called primary; one presented through relation to the primary meaning is intervened upon, like the rear, and is therefore called secondary. Thus even someone asserting assignment to a secondary meaning must admit presentation of the primary meaning in order to present the secondary. Consequently, the original relation, the natural relation consisting precisely in expression of a meaning, should determine the assignment, since it is restricted to that meaning and thereby fulfils the injunction to study the Veda. Relation to the primary meaning, however, is not an indicative force: many things are related to the primary meaning, so the meaning is not determined, and that relation comes later. For this very reason, all systems hold that implication should not be adopted where the primary meaning is possible. Expressive power operates in a word, whereas implication operates in a word-meaning. That it has many varieties is a further matter. When a word operating through implication has presented the counterpart in a connection, whatever remains directly expressive is what produces immediate cognition of connection. Even though all the words in a commendatory passage operate through implication, the injunctive word forming a single sentence with it produces immediate cognition, by the principle ‘But because they form a single sentence with an injunction, they serve injunctions through praise.’ Thus, if all the words beginning ‘truth’ operate through implication, how can immediate cognition of connection occur? Reply: this is no defect. We accept immediate cognition of connection precisely of what is directly expressible. Implication merely abandons one part; it does not present an inexpressible meaning, as in ‘The cow is eternal’ and the like. Hence we said earlier that this is implication by directly expressive words in their own meaning. Objection: if implication abandoning the meaning entirely is accepted, how does immediate cognition of connection occur, since even a part of the directly expressible meaning is absent there? The Saṃkṣepaśārīraka says: ‘If the word “Brahman” expresses ignorance together with its appearance, and the word “I” expresses the ego, then on that alternative the implication abandons the meaning entirely.’ On this alternative, the theory that connected meanings are expressed is not accepted, so there is no defect. Reliance on both theories applies only on the alternative of implication that both abandons and retains the meaning. This is shown in the same work: ‘When separately expressed meanings are connected, the two words then produce a pair of cognitions resembling recollection; but on the other view, expression of connected meanings, only a pair of recollections first arises from the pair of words.’ The author of the Tattvapradīpikā and others, however, adopt only the theory that separately expressed meanings are subsequently connected, since it accords with the established conclusion in every respect. Thus there is nothing objectionable. The exclusion of the logicians’ view from both alternatives and related matters has been explained in the Vedāntakalpatā; we therefore stop here. Here ends the justification of the undivided meaning of the subsidiary sentences beginning ‘Truth’ in the Advaita Siddhi. 2. 3. Refutation of the inference that sentences such as ‘You are that’ have an undivided meaning. Likewise, the inference taking great sentences such as ‘You are that’ as its subject is free from defect. Nor does the example ‘This is that Devadatta’ lack the property to be established, since identity of qualified things cannot be conveyed. Does the sentence convey qualification by this place and time in what is qualified by that place and time; qualification by that place and time in what is qualified by this place and time; unity of those qualifiers; or unity of what is qualified by them? Not the first: qualification by that place and time is not perceived and cannot constitute the subject, and that time and the like would have to exist now. Not the second: this time and the like would have to exist at another time. Not the third, because it is contradicted. For the same reason, not the fourth either. Since the qualifiers differ, the qualified thing, consisting of qualifier, subject and their relation, differs. Even if the qualified thing is something additional to these, its difference invariably follows from difference of qualifier and of subject. Thus, abandoning both qualifiers, the subject alone is conveyed as identical, and an undivided meaning is established. It is said: ‘When unity is impossible for two qualified things even though they arise from two non-conflicting qualifiers, it is all the more impossible for two having the opposite character.’ In ‘The staff-bearer is the earring-wearer’ and the like, even though staff and earrings do not conflict, since they occupy the same place and time, the things qualified by them are not identical: that would make the qualifiers identical too. What then of the identity of qualified things in ‘This is that man’, where thatness and thisness conflict with one another because they necessarily do not occur at the same time? Conveying identity through implication, however, is common to both cases. Even though implication is present, ‘The staff-bearer is the earring-wearer’ and the like are not spoken of as having an undivided meaning, because something qualified is intended. In ‘This is that man’, however, the meaning is undivided, because the identity alone that is the object of doubt or error, ‘Is this that man or not? This is certainly not that man’, is what one wishes to know, and that alone is intended. We have said that it is inappropriate to convey something else when one wishes to know one thing. Even perceptual recognition concerns nothing beyond the nature presented by the two cognitions; nevertheless, by conveying identity through both presentations, it removes error. This sentence has the same meaning as that recognition, and so does not concern something qualified. Although recognition has no different object from the two cognitions, its result differs precisely through a difference in the cognition occasioned by a particular avenue. The same applies to the recollective presentations of the meanings of ‘that’ and ‘this’ and the immediate cognition of the sentence-meaning. Thus the ancients’ statement, ‘Apposition is the intention to convey one meaning through words having different grounds of application’, is all the more appropriate for what has no qualifying aspect. Objection: recognition in the form ‘This is that man’ does not concern an undivided meaning. In that perception there is no implication, which is a semantic operation of words. Moreover, its presenting thatness and thisness makes freedom from qualifying aspects contrary to experience. If those were not presented, no difference of object from ordinary cognition could be explained. Verbal recognition too must therefore be the same, since one conveys to another what one has understood through one’s own recognition. Reply: no. Even though perception does not require a semantic operation, contradiction obstructs its concerning identity of qualified things, so it concerns only identity of the nature. Identity is not a qualifying aspect: as the very nature, it is principal. Nor do thatness and thisness constitute qualifying aspects, since they do not stand as counterparts in the qualification consisting in the identity that appears. Hence recognition does not present thatness and thisness. In its verbal expression, however, such presentation is spoken of on the basis of the two ordinary cognitions arising without interruption, and implication has an established place there. This is the procedure everywhere in verbally expressing the indeterminate. Nor is recognition indistinguishable from ordinary cognition: they differ precisely through having or lacking a qualifying aspect. The difference in result has already been stated. For this very reason, a teaching corresponding to the knowledge is also appropriate, since its intention concerns the very nature of Devadatta indicated by thisness, free of difference whose counterpositive is indicated by thatness. Absence of difference is not some property, but the nature itself, and that itself is called unity. Nor is there a rule that one must convey to another something precisely as one has understood it. Even on the basis of a cognition of an aggregate, one is seen to teach only the part the hearer wishes to know. Teaching depends on knowledge alone and follows the desire to know. Thus teaching the undivided is possible even from cognition concerning something qualified. The distinction between a qualifier, an indication and the like is clear elsewhere, and is not elaborated here. Just as the example does not lack the property to be established, the same should be understood in great sentences such as ‘You are that’. Objection: if identity of consciousness alone with consciousness alone is conveyed, we accept the consequence, and the negation excludes something that was not in question. If identity is the very nature, that nature is eternally established through self-luminosity, making the teaching pointless; if it does not appear, the desire to know it and the like do not cease. Moreover, the great sentence is fruitless, since the subsidiary sentence clarifying the meanings of ‘that’ and ‘you’ already suffices. The additional word is pointless, since one word alone suffices. And the great sentence would not remove the error of difference, since it gives no apprehension beyond what was known at the time of error. Reply: no. Although consciousness is eternally established, knowledge of its nature indicated by omniscience and the like, which removes ignorance and the like, is something to be achieved. Nor does this knowledge have a qualifying aspect. Like thatness and the like, omniscience and the like are not qualifying aspects in the cognition of connection. Since knowledge of this kind is impossible through another means, the defects beginning with pointlessness of teaching do not follow. Knowledge of the nature alone, indicated by both the delimitor of being the locus and the delimitor of being the counterpositive of the difference apprehended in error, removes the error of difference. Thus even without difference of object, there is difference of result. Although inference and perception alike concern the conch’s whiteness, the error of yellowness, which inference does not remove, is seen to be removed by perception. Hence the Vivaraṇa says: ‘Recognition has no difference from ordinary cognition in respect of what is known, since recognition too apprehends precisely the unity of Devadatta known through ordinary cognition. It is not that Devadatta’s unity with himself fails to appear in ordinary cognition. Nor does he have another unity that, previously unknown, is recognised. If one says that the relation of one thing to two times is the object of recognition, no: in unity, relation to two times is established through the two ordinary cognitions themselves. Therefore, although both equally concern the unity of a thing related to two times, recognition alone removes the error of difference between things by referring back to both times; ordinary cognition does not. Likewise, although “You are that” has no different object of knowledge from the sentences beginning “Truth” or the word “that”, it is authoritative because, by referring back to both properties, it removes the error of difference. Kātyāyana too says: “But it is established, because it removes.”’ One might object: even though ordinary cognition apprehends relation to two times and identity with Devadatta in what is actually one, recognition apprehends either ‘Relation to two times belongs to one thing’ or ‘What is related to two times is one’, and so differs in its very object of knowledge. Although the cognition ‘This’ actually apprehends identity with shell in a shell, it does not, like ‘This is a shell’, have the form ‘This is a locus of non-shellhood’ (the local wording is difficult). Otherwise there would be no difference even in result, since reference back to both times occurs even in the error of difference. The same applies in ‘You are that’. Reply: no one holds that unity is a qualifying aspect in recognition, since, being the nature itself, it is the subject. Although both views equally take the identical nature as the object, your view is that recognition has both thatness and thisness as qualifying aspects, whereas mine is that it has no qualifying aspect at all. Unity is not the numerical quality one, since that is absent in qualities and the like, and knowledge of it does not oppose the error of difference. Rather, as stated, it is the nature in the form of absence of difference. Otherwise the sentence expressing recognition would be ‘That is this one’, rather than ‘This is that man’. In the sentence ‘This is that man’, unity’s being a qualifying aspect is decisively excluded by the very absence of a word conveying it. Even though reference back to both times occurs in the error of difference, the previously explained difference of result, involving the delimitor of being the locus of the difference apprehended in error and so forth, is fully possible. Hence the Kalpataru’s statement is sound: ‘That by which a meaning divided through differences of conditioning adjuncts is conveyed as one also has an undivided meaning, as in “The great space is the pot-space”.’ So too is the Vārttika: ‘As cognition of unity arises from saying “Pot-space is the great space”.’ Thus the claim is: the sentence ‘You are that’ has an undivided meaning, because it conveys unity in a meaning divided through differences of conditioning adjuncts, like the sentence ‘Pot-space is the great space’. Citsukhācārya’s statement too is sound: ‘“Truth, knowledge” and the like are a means of knowledge regarding a meaning distinct from the relation of these, because they are a means of knowledge, like the eye and other means of knowledge.’ The intended property to be established includes the restriction that the sentence beginning ‘Truth’ is a means of knowledge only regarding a meaning distinct from the relation of its word-meanings. Thus, although authority is accepted even regarding related things distinct from a relation, there is no proving what is already established. The removal of difficulties proceeds as before. The formulations of others too should be justified in the appropriate ways. Therefore you weep in vain, dull-witted one: this suffering of yours comes only from your error. Its removal has been provided through means of knowledge; it is strange that this does not please you. The sentences of Vedānta are a means of knowledge because they convey the attributeless and undivided. Its freedom from attributes is declared by scripture supported by reasoning. 2. Here this poor man of wrong understanding, declaring what is unreal to be real, loudly babbles an untimely semblance of refutation. What knower of reality would answer him? A lion does not echo the barking of a village dog. 3. Here ends the justification of the undivided meaning of great sentences such as ‘You are that’ in the Advaita Siddhi. 4. Refutation of Brahman’s freedom from attributes. First, the Kaivalya scripture teaches that the self is without attributes. Objection: scripture says, ‘Its properties are great’; traditional teaching says, ‘Even the gods, Brahma, Shiva and the rest, all assembled and speaking continually, cannot determine even a fraction of its attributes’; and inference says, ‘Brahman possesses properties, because it is an entity’, and so forth. Thus Brahman has properties of the same order of reality as itself. Reply: not so. Scripture does not establish possession of attributes. A passage occurring in a context concerning Brahman with attributes presents qualifiers of the object of an injunction to meditate, and does not intend to establish their reality. Nor, because of novelty, is its intention directed towards qualifiers such as having true desires. Even something novel, when subordinate to something else, is seen not to be the intention. Thus in ‘One should offer with gruel of wild sesame, or offer with gruel of wild grain’ and the like, being a means of offering is stated of gruel of wild sesame and the like; and in ‘Wild sesame and wild grain are indeed no offering’ there is condemnation. Since these form a single sentence with the injunction ‘He offers with goat’s milk’, they do not intend those statements independently. The same is possible here. A passage occurring in a context concerning the attributeless is explained otherwise: it presents the object required for a negation conducive to apprehending non-dual Brahman. Nor should one say that, since a general word such as ‘anything whatever’ already presents everything other than Brahman that is to be negated, mentioning particulars is pointless. Its purpose is to dispel the error that, because something is beyond ordinary experience, it must be an object established by the sentence. This also rejects the objection that, if scripture negates what is obtained from scripture, a statement of non-injury would negate the killing for Agni and Soma, a statement of not taking the cup would negate taking the Ṣoḍaśin cup, ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ and the like would negate Brahman’s existence, and a statement of difference would negate unity. Here there is nothing established by scripture in the first place. Being established by scripture does not mean merely being suggested by it, since that would lead too far; and being validly known from it is absent in this case. The statement of non-injury concerns injury not enjoined by scripture and so does not have the same subject. If it had the same subject, alternation would follow, as with taking and not taking the cup. Although the sentences concerning taking and not taking do have the same subject, neither is stronger, so there can be no relation of sublated and sublator between them; otherwise alternation would never be accepted. The statements of non-being and difference do not negate Brahman’s existence and unity, since the statements conveying existence and unity alone intend these matters and are therefore stronger. Nor is inference capable of establishing real properties in Brahman. Consider these inferences: (1) Brahman possesses properties of the same order of reality as the existence of the property-bearer; or possesses positive properties of that stated order of reality; or possesses properties persisting throughout its nature; or possesses positive properties of that kind; or possesses properties not sublated by knowledge of itself; or possesses positive properties of that kind; or does not remain without properties, or without positive properties, because it is an entity, or because it is a positive existent, like a pot. (2) Brahman possesses qualifying aspects not sublated by knowledge of itself, or possesses qualifying aspects distinguishing it from what is superimposed upon it and not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is a substratum, like a shell. (3) Brahman possesses a property distinguishing it from suffering and not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is not of the nature of suffering, like a pot. (4) Brahman is a subject qualified by an aspect not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is doubted, inquired into, or to be determined, like a post. (5) Brahman possesses a qualifying aspect falling within Vedānta’s intention, because it is an object of inquiry in Vedānta; whatever is such is so, like dharma, which is an object of inquiry in the ritual portion. (6) The Lord always possesses all auspicious attributes, because he always wishes to obtain them and is capable of doing so. Whoever at any time wishes to obtain something and is capable of doing so possesses it then, like Caitra. (7) The Lord has always abandoned all defects, because he always wishes to abandon them and is capable of abandoning them. Whoever is such is so, like Caitra. In these and similar inferences, if ‘property-bearer’ and ‘self’ refer to any property-bearer and to what is related to anything whatever, the conclusion is already established through possession of imagined properties of the same order of reality as pots and the like. If they refer to Brahman, the property to be established is unknown, since properties of a pot and the like are not known to have the same order of reality as Brahman and so forth. Nor should one say that, when determining the property to be established in the example, that very example is the property-bearer, while in determining it in the subject, Brahman alone is the property-bearer, since ‘property-bearer’, ‘self’ and the like refer to what is mentioned together with them. Citing the nature of a word does not establish anything in an inference. Likewise, with the word ‘nature’, if Brahman is intended, the property to be established is unknown; if a pot and the like are intended, what is already established is proved. The defect that a word’s nature of referring to what is mentioned with it does not establish anything in an inference applies as before. ‘It does not remain without properties’ means that Brahman is pervaded by properties. That too is already established. In whatever time or place Brahman is, properties indeed exist there. Neither time nor place is without properties; time, which is the relation of māyā and consciousness, does not coexist with liberation. In ‘Not sublated by knowledge of itself’, the alternatives concerning the meaning of ‘self’ are as before. This also rejects ‘Possesses properties distinguishing it from what is superimposed on itself and not sublated by knowledge of itself’. In ‘Possesses a property distinguishing it from suffering and not sublated by knowledge of itself’, the alternatives concerning ‘self’ are again as before. Possessing a property distinguishing it from suffering is already established. In ‘Falling within Vedānta’s intention’, taking the subsidiary intention gives an already established conclusion; if the primary intention is stated, the property to be established is unknown, since a qualifying aspect that is an object of a Vedānta sentence’s primary intention is unknown. Nor can the property to be established be made known through generalising with ‘whatever’ and ‘that’. Such verbal generalisation is useless for inference. In ‘The Lord always possesses all auspicious attributes’, we too accept possession of attributes throughout time. When freedom from properties obtains, there is no relation to time. Moreover, if the pure is the subject, the reason is unestablished; if the conditioned is the subject, something other than the intended conclusion is established. Possession of all auspicious attributes that are not different from oneself cannot make one possessed of properties, and the conclusion is already established. Moreover, since auspicious attributes such as bliss are eternal, even you cannot speak of a desire to obtain them or a capacity to do so. This also rejects ‘Desire to obtain and the like follow because it is a mass of consciousness’. If always having abandoned all defects is to be established, the reason is unestablished, since until the final mental modification there is no capacity to abandon them. When that capacity exists, having abandoned defects is precisely what we accept. Where possession of qualifying aspects and the like is to be established, the reason also fails to entail the conclusion. Nor is impossibility of being a substratum, being doubted and the like itself favourable reasoning. We have stated that what is decisive for being a substratum is possession of what distinguishes it from what is superimposed upon it, whether imagined or unimagined. Being a substratum is not impossible without a property qualified by not being sublated by knowledge of itself. Being doubted too is explained merely by not being determined through a distinguishing form, imagined or unimagined; hence it too is not impossible without the undetermined property to be established. Likewise, being other than suffering must at some point be explained simply through having a nature distinct from suffering; otherwise an infinite regress follows. A distinguishing property is not itself universally present, so that it could occur in itself. Thus, since being other than suffering is possible even without a distinguishing property, it cannot establish such a property. If, fearing infinite regress, one stops at some property, being an entity too admits an exception. Nor can an exception be avoided by saying that it occurs in itself, since that is self-dependence. Nor does being an object of cognition likewise fail to be established in part because it does not occur in itself. Even though it does not occur in itself, what would make it unestablished here, being the counterpositive of an absolute absence in itself, is absent. Therefore inference is not a means of knowledge for a property having the same order of reality as Brahman. Moreover, the scriptural passage concerns the lower Brahman. Its subject must differ because of its conflict with scripture teaching freedom from properties. Nor should one say that a higher Brahman apart from Brahman with attributes is still unestablished, and that, since on your view there is no other individual possessing real attributes, the scriptural passage concerning attributes has no possible object. That passage does not make the absolute reality of attributes its object, and pure Brahman is established by scripture teaching freedom from properties. In the topic concerning the inner one, the author of the Kalpataru says: ‘Those of limited understanding who cannot directly realise the unqualified, highest Brahman are compassionately helped through accounts of it as qualified. When their minds have been brought under control by cultivation of Brahman with attributes, that very Brahman would appear directly, free of imagined conditioning adjuncts.’ Hence there is no conflict with traditional teaching and the aphorisms. Nor should one say that traditional teaching such as ‘Higher than the highest’ declares Brahman with attributes higher even than the higher, so that sentences about attributes cannot concern the lower Brahman. The one with limited knowledge is higher than the insentient; relative to that one, the omniscient is higher, even though lower relative to the pure. Nor should one say that ‘In the beginning, dear one, this was existence alone’ and ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ should also concern the higher and lower Brahman respectively. Since the world is introduced here by ‘this’, one cannot say that Brahman is intended. The two passages concern the world alone as previously existent in the form of its cause and non-existent in the form of its effect. Nor do the passages concerning taking and not taking the cup concern higher and lower sacrifices. Although the injunction to take the Ṣoḍaśin cup concerns a sacrifice, like ‘He takes the cup for Indra and Vāyu’, the statement of not taking conveys its absence and does not concern a sacrifice. Objection: then the scripture ‘He becomes non-being indeed if he knows Brahman as non-being’ too need not establish non-being, but could intend highest liberation in the form of becoming nothing. Reply: no. Nothingness is not a human goal, and this conflicts with what teaches liberation as attainment of bliss. Alternatively, the statements do not conflict if Brahman possesses attributes now and is without attributes in another state. Nor should one say that this establishes only impermanence of attributes, rather than their falsity as you intend. Their absolute reality, as you intend, is likewise unestablished; resort to another means is common to both sides. The objection that Brahman would likewise be existent now but non-existent in another state is incorrect: non-existence in another state is not conveyed as freedom from attributes is, so this does not follow. Nor should one say that scripture such as ‘The highest self’s knowledge is eternal, its action eternal, its power eternal’ and ‘This is the eternal greatness of the knower of Brahman’ teaches the eternity of Brahman’s knowledge and the like, and hence possession of attributes. Knowledge and the like are its very nature, so their being attributes is unestablished. What is additional to its nature is figuratively called eternal because it lasts until the final direct realisation, just as ‘immortal’ in ‘We have drunk Soma; we have become immortal’ and the like means the immortality described in the Purāṇa: ‘Remaining until the dissolution of beings is spoken of as immortality.’ This also rejects the claim that the sentence ‘This is the eternal greatness’ and the like in the Taittirīya branch concerns eternal attributes. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage, however, conveys the greatness belonging to the person who has abandoned all desires, whose form conditioned by all adjuncts is denied by ‘This self is not this, not this’; it does not intend an attribute belonging to Brahman. Nor should one suspect that, since Brahman is the topic in ‘The controller of all’ and the like, attributes belonging to it are intended. It mentions the nature of the individual self stated in ‘That which consists of cognition among the vital functions’ and the like, in order to convey that its nature is Brahman, rather than intending an attribute belonging to Brahman. Moreover, ‘brāhmaṇa’, formed with the suffix aṇ prescribed by the rule ‘One studies that, one knows that’, conveys a knower of Brahman; interpreting it as Brahman would require implication. Further, sentences about attributes concern attributes due to conditioning adjuncts, and so do not conflict with scripture teaching natural freedom from properties. Nor should one say: if being due to conditioning means being superimposed together with an adjunct, scripture would be invalid and would conflict with the scripture teaching reality to be mentioned later; if it means being imagined by an adjunct, it conflicts with the stated scripture teaching eternity; and, since scripture teaches seeing and the like before creation of adjuncts such as the internal organ, no adjunct is possible. Like a sentence reporting an illusion displayed by a magician, these sentences do not of themselves generate error, so invalidity does not follow. The scripture teaching reality will be interpreted otherwise; another meaning of the scripture teaching eternity has already been stated; and even before creation, though the internal organ is absent, the adjunct ignorance exists. Nor does dependence on adjuncts conflict with ‘Its knowledge, power and action are natural’. They are called natural because, unlike ours, they do not depend on material adjuncts, and, unlike those of yogis, they are not acquired through yoga. Nor is there no ground for restricting the meaning: the passage teaching freedom from attributes itself supplies the restriction. Nor does this conflict with mention alongside natural knowledge. ‘Knowledge’ intends precisely the transformation of ignorance in the form of omniscience and the like. Even in joint mention, difference of character is accepted according to the presence or absence of an opposing consideration, as in ‘The Brahmin is fire’. Moreover, sentences about attributes do not convey the attributes’ reality, since reality is not a meaning of their words. Nor should one say that this is established by the force of declaring eternity, by the general presumption of validity characterised by non-sublation of its object, and directly by scripture such as ‘That greatness of his is real’. We have stated how the first is explained otherwise. The reasoning called a general presumption has been explained through empirical non-sublation alone. In ‘That greatness of his is real’ and the like, greatness is the very nature, so there is no conflict. If it is a property, application of ‘real’ is explained by its possessing the feature of not being removed by anything other than direct realisation of Brahman. Nor should one say that Brahman’s reality, unity and the like, stated in scripture such as ‘Truth, knowledge’ and ‘You are that’, would likewise fail to be absolute. The conflict with scripture teaching freedom from attributes that occurs there does not occur here. Objection: when two scriptural passages conflict, one does not thereby concern something non-absolute. The earlier system and grammar determine that both remain authoritative through restriction, alternation and the like when reconciling scriptural statements. In the tenth chapter’s account of overriding an already transferred detail, the established directive ‘One should perform as in the original rite’ and the like is merely restricted to ‘Except for pounding’ and so forth in the case of kṛṣṇala weights and the like. Likewise, in the third chapter’s account of blocking a detail before it is transferred, the indicative force of a mantra containing ‘Indra’ is merely given a secondary application to the Gārhapatya fire in accordance with the direct accusative statement ‘The Gārhapatya’. In grammar too, where a later rule is said to override an earlier one, a constant rule an inconstant one, and so forth, there is only restriction. In the tenth chapter, ‘He does not choose the ancestral ṛṣis’ and the like, occurring in the context of the modified rite, the great sacrifice to the ancestors, are said to have the meaning of exclusion: through forming a single sentence with ‘As in the original rite’ belonging to that sacrifice, they mean ‘One should perform as in the original rite, except for choosing the ancestral ṛṣis’. But in ‘He does not perform those two in the animal sacrifice’ and the like, adjacent to the sentence enjoining the two portions of clarified butter in the context of the original new- and full-moon sacrifices, unity with ‘As in the original rite’ belonging to the animal sacrifice is impossible. Exclusion being impossible, it is said to be outright negation in a separate sentence: ‘One should perform as in the original rite, but should not perform the two portions of clarified butter.’ There, since nothing else suggests those two portions in the animal sacrifice, and something suggested by scripture cannot be wholly overridden, alternation is stated. Thus it is said: ‘What Mīmāṃsaka would say, when two scriptural statements conflict with one another, that one is authoritative and the other is not?’ Reply: no. There, the two statements stand equally in authority, so neither can be wholly overridden; authority applying in one alternative is therefore accepted through restriction or alternation. Here the case differs: one is strong because it intends the matter, whereas the other is weak because it does not. As for the claim that alternation is stated in ‘He does not perform those two in the animal sacrifice’ and the like, no. When the passage occurs in the context of the animal sacrifice, it has the meaning of exclusion by forming a single sentence with ‘As in the original rite’ belonging to the animal sacrifice. When it occurs in the context of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, it serves praise: ‘Those two portions of clarified butter do not occur in the animal sacrifice; here they do occur.’ Even if the author of the Vārttika accepts alternation, there is no defect, since both passages intend their respective matters, which distinguishes that case. Some say: here too, in ‘If it be objected: not so, because of the word denoting modification; no, because of abundance’, ‘If it be objected: not so, because the instructions differ; no, because there is no conflict even in both’, ‘Because a secondary sense is impossible’ and the like, conflict between scriptural passages is resolved by assigning one another real meaning, rather than a superimposed meaning. Otherwise, in the topics beginning with seeing, seeing and the other features supporting the established conclusion could be superimposed upon primordial matter and the like as held by the Sāṃkhyas and others, so exclusion of primordial matter and the like would not be established. This is incorrect. In ‘Because of the word denoting modification’ and the like, the meaning is not that conflict requires another real meaning. Rather, since being a part is impossible in Brahman, which is independently principal, ‘tail’ is used figuratively. Hence the subcommentary says: ‘Tail means the supporting locus.’ Even in the aphorism stating the initial objection, ‘Because a secondary sense is impossible’, the meaning is that ‘From the self, space came into being’ is secondary because a cause of the production of space is impossible; it does not mean that the passage concerns some other real meaning. In ‘Because the instructions differ’ and the like, the locative ‘in heaven’ and ablative ‘from heaven’ convey being a support and being a limit respectively. The initial view is that, because the instructions differ, there is recognition of the Brahman previously indicated. The answer is that even of one hawk one sees the expressions ‘The hawk is at the treetop’ and ‘The hawk is from the treetop’; thus both forms do not conflict in the very same Brahman. The meaning is not an intention concerning another real object. Nor can seeing be superimposed upon primordial matter. Superimposition is observed only where there is suitability. The fact that kingship is superimposed on a king’s minister does not make it superimposed on a post and the like. Seeing is observed only in something conscious, so its superimposition is appropriate in conscious Brahman, not in the unconscious; the established conclusion is therefore not harmed. Moreover, when authority is possible through forming a single sentence by presenting what is to be negated, it is inappropriate to make a separate sentence establishing attributes. Hence there is no conflict with ‘What Mīmāṃsaka ...’ and the like. Objection: just as the rule beginning ‘Mṛḍ, mṛd ...’ negates the prohibition ‘Not ktvā with seṭ’, why should sentences teaching attributes not likewise override sentences teaching freedom from attributes? Reply: no. In the example, by the reasoning of the topic concerning exclusion, the rules form a single statement that negates the absence of iṭ and the absence of kit-status for a suffix, even when prescribed later by the rule beginning ‘Mṛḍ, mṛd ...’. One does not postulate a separate sentence negating the prohibition. Nor can exclusion be the meaning in the present case too. The distributive repetition in ‘Not this, not this’ negates everything that presents itself, and, since no particular remainder is possible, exclusion cannot be adopted. Some say: if omniscience and the like, implied by being the maker of the world, are mentioned in order to be negated, then the world’s falsity, Brahman’s existence, and the identity of the individual self and Brahman could likewise be mentioned by ‘There is no plurality here’, ‘Truth, knowledge’, and ‘You are that’ in order to be negated by ‘The world is real’, ‘In the beginning this was non-being’, and ‘Two birds’. For these three are implied respectively by the scripturally taught removability through knowledge, by being the substratum of the world’s superimposition, and by the individual self’s and Brahman’s being the self of all, taught in ‘It alone is all this; the self alone is all this’. This is incorrect. ‘The world is real’ and ‘Two birds’ have no word indicating negation and cannot negate. ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ does contain negation, but it is joined to a noun and cannot function as a negating statement. Moreover, the Paiṅgirahasya Brāhmaṇa explains ‘Two birds’ as concerning the intellect and the individual self, so it does not convey difference between the individual self and Brahman. If negation is explained as a result, the example and the case exemplified differ. Even though omniscience is false as the counterpositive of negation, there is no impossibility in its being implied: even superimposed omniscience can account for its implying ground, being the maker of the world. But if the implied falsity of the world, existence of Brahman and identity of the individual self and Brahman were negated, their three implying grounds, removability through knowledge and the rest, would be impossible. What is real is not removed by knowledge; what is unreal cannot be a substratum; and where there is difference, being the self of all is impossible. This also rejects the claim that freedom from attributes, obtained by understanding the intention of non-duality scripture or some other attributeless scripture, is merely repeated by an attributeless sentence in order to be negated by a sentence teaching attributes. What is obtained by understanding the intention cannot be repeated for negation. Objection: since ‘The witness, the conscious one, alone and without attributes’ and the like prescribe attributes such as being a seer, they cannot negate those attributes, and a sentence teaching attributes does not merely repeat them for that purpose. Otherwise omniscience and the like would not be even empirical: there is no subsidiary intention regarding prohibited acts such as killing a Brahmin. Nor is the omniscience and the like of Brahman, taught by the Upanishads, established by inference and the like. Reply: no. Repeating witnesshood and the like established through ignorance, the sentence concerns Brahman through an incidental definition rather than intending attributes, and can therefore negate attributes. Nor should one say that, just as prohibited acts such as killing a Brahmin have no subsidiary intention directed towards them, omniscience here too would not be empirical if no such intention were present. A deity’s bodily form and the like, adopted as avenues to injunction and praise, are neither obtained from another means of knowledge nor contradicted; their establishment follows merely from not discarding them. Likewise, omniscience and the like, adopted here as useful to negation and not obtained from another means of knowledge, are not denied by an empirical means of knowledge, and their empirical status is explained merely by not discarding them in the empirical state. Killing a Brahmin and the like, however, are obtained from another means of knowledge; this is the difference. Nor does conveying something invariably require intending it. Although an injunction of something qualified conveys the qualifier, it does not intend the qualifier, since the qualified thing is additional to it. If omniscience and the like, adopted as subordinate to something else, were also intended, division into separate sentences would follow. Nor should one say that this conflicts with the traditional verse: ‘In an injunction concerning meditation on the self and the like, the intention concerns both the obligation to meditate and Vishnu’s being the self.’ That traditional verse, saying that both are intended because both are established by the reasoning of the topic concerning deities, is not authoritative. Even when ‘He who knows all’ and the like do not occur in a meditation context, they intend to convey Brahman through an incidental definition and do not intend the qualifier. Otherwise the promise that everything is known through knowledge of one thing would be contradicted. Nor should one say that in ‘One should meditate on it only as the self’, non-duality too, being an object of meditation and subordinate to meditation, would remain unestablished. There the word ‘meditate’ means the same as ‘knows’ in the following sentence, ‘For through this one knows all this’, and does not express an action. Nor is there an injunction of knowledge; that will be refuted. Nor is the injunctive wording pointless, since it turns the mind away from external objects and makes it incline towards the inward self. As for ‘Now one who worships another deity’ and the like, consideration of the following sentence, ‘He does not know’, shows that it intends to condemn the vision of difference; there is no room even to suspect that worship is its intention. Nor should the conclusion be interpreted to follow the opening. The conclusion is stronger because the contrary would conflict with the promise that everything is known through knowledge of one thing, ‘For through this one knows all this’. Some say: in the section on collecting attributes, the aphorism ‘Bliss and the like belong to the principal’ presents bliss and the like, taught in ‘Brahman is bliss’ and similar passages, as objects of meditation; and ‘Interchange’ does the same for the Lord’s being in the individual self, or the individual self’s being in the Lord, taught by scripture such as ‘That which I am’. Although meditation on the attributeless is also taught in the Uttaratāpanīya and the like, bliss and the like, unity and the attributeless are established. Let the absolute reality of having true desires and the like likewise be established. This is incorrect. The aphorism ‘Bliss and the like’ collects directly expressed sentence-meanings in order to establish the implied, undivided sentence-meaning; it does not state their being objects of meditation. The aphorism ‘Interchange’ concerns meditation on the Lord’s identity in the individual self or the individual self’s identity in the Lord, as taught in the scripture ‘That which I am, he is; that which he is, I am’, read in a meditation context. Its intention is that the identity of the individual self and the Lord should be made firm even through meditation with attributes. Thus, although unity is an object of meditation, it is not non-absolute like having true desires and the like. Nor do having true desires and the like become absolute like unity. They differ in being or not being conveyed by sentences that intend them and occur outside meditation contexts. Meditation taught in the Uttaratāpanīya and the like intends knowledge, since meditation concerns something qualified and does not concern the unqualified. Some say: consideration of the commentary, ‘Just as, even when attributes such as having true desires are taught for meditation, the Lord possessing those attributes is established, so too is unity’, establishes having true desires and the like in the same way as unity. This is incorrect. The meaning there is that the Lord, who is spoken of with attributes, is established, not that the attribute too is established. In accordance with scripture teaching freedom from attributes, the intended possessive compound does not include ascertainment of the attributes themselves. Thus the Lord, rather than the attribute, is the example for establishing unity. The subcommentary too should be understood in precisely this way: ‘We do not disregard what is established from the sense, since the teaching of attributes such as having true desires establishes the Lord spoken of with those attributes and the like.’ Objection: the sentences about bliss and the like and those about having true desires and the like are equal in not conflicting with another means of knowledge, in not being obtained from it, in containing no audible injunction to meditate, and in conflicting with scripture teaching freedom from attributes. How then can bliss and the like be absolute, while having true desires and the like are non-absolute? Reply: no. The deciding factor is that bliss and the like, being Brahman itself, do not conflict with scripture teaching freedom from attributes. Nor should one say that strength, power and the like too are not different from Brahman, on the authority of ‘The Lord consists of knowledge; the Lord consists of strength’ and ‘He consists of all auspicious attributes’. We too oppose the existence of attributes apart from Brahman. When there is identity, accepting the relation of attribute and attribute-bearer is merely terminological. Some say: if meditation on Brahman with attributes is erroneous, meditation on attributeless Brahman would also be erroneous, and neither a proper result nor Brahman would be established. Nor should one answer that, although meditation on attributeless Brahman is erroneous, it produces a proper result like mistaking a gem’s radiance for a gem. It is said: ‘Just as even an error, when it leads to the desired object, produces a proper result, so meditation on Brahman’s reality produces liberation as its result.’ Nor should one answer that Brahman does not remain unestablished, since, although meditation is erroneous, knowledge arising from verbal testimony is valid. The same would follow in the present case too; moreover, unlike gemhood in a gem’s radiance, Brahman is not false, so meditation too concerns real Brahman. This is incorrect. Although meditation with attributes is erroneous because its object is something qualified, meditation on the attributeless and the like is not erroneous because its object is unqualified. The same applies to verbal knowledge concerning Brahman with and without attributes: although a sentence concerning attributes has something real as its subject-aspect, its qualifier-aspect is unreal. This also rejects the claim that, if meditation on Brahman, produced by verbal cognition concerning Brahman and producing immediate cognition of it, concerned something other than Brahman, hearing and the like would likewise concern something else. They do not concern something qualified, whereas meditation does. Nor should one cite a contradiction in the Bhāmatī on the aphorism beginning ‘The object of seeing’: ‘Seeing and meditation, standing as effect and cause, have one object; likewise, seeing is presumed to concern reality.’ There ‘He sees the person dwelling in the city, higher than the higher’, whose object of seeing is the highest Brahman itself, is also stated as what is to be meditated upon in ‘He should meditate upon the highest person’. There is no contradiction, because what is stated as the object of meditation is precisely what is qualified by the conditioning adjunct that is the support consisting in Om with its three measures, rather than the pure. Having the same object as seeing is explained by taking the subject-aspect. As for the claim that meditation on unity and the like, suspected of being a stream of invalid cognitions, is said to be the same as meditation with attributes, that is inappropriate. Knowledge of unity produced by a unity-sentence occurring in a context concerning attributes belongs within meditation with attributes and concerns something qualified. Knowledge of unity produced independently, however, concerns the unqualified and differs from meditation with attributes, whose object is qualified. Nor should one say that, just as unity and the like are both to be meditated upon and known because they are conveyed by both injunctive and non-injunctive sentences, so omniscience and the like, although objects of an injunction to meditate, are also to be known because they are conveyed by non-injunctive sentences about the reality of things, such as ‘He who knows all’. Such a sentence serves as a means to apprehending the highest Brahman through an incidental definition; unlike ‘You are that’ and the like, it does not intend the property. This also rejects the objection that, if agency and the like in Brahman are superimposed and then removed, sentences about the cause could not be harmonised as concerning Brahman, just as statements of Brahman concerning a name cannot, and the chapters beginning with harmonisation could not be begun. Even though the name, being a modification of Brahman, is not their common purport, Brahman is unmodified and is to be known by the seeker of liberation. By conveying agency and the like as an incidental definition, the causal sentences can intend Brahman alone. Harmonisation and the like are therefore necessary, and those chapters can be begun. Nor should one say that in the passage beginning ‘The self free from evil’ and continuing ‘Whose desires are true, whose resolves are true; it is to be sought, it is to be known’, having true desires and the like are to be known because they are heard as objects of the desire to know together with freedom from evil and the like. Although freedom from evil and the like, being the very nature, enter the class of what is to be known, having true desires and the like fall outside the nature and cannot be objects of the desire to know. They are not referred to by ‘it’. If the others too are not the very nature, they too are not referred to, and only the subject-aspect is referred to, as in ‘Bring the one who has spotted cows and much wealth’ and the like. This also rejects the claim that omniscience and the like are established as real and so forth because, after stating properties such as ‘This is the Lord of all; this is the ruler of beings’, scripture says that they are to be known by seekers of liberation in ‘Brahmins desire to know this through recitation of the Veda’; because, after saying ‘He who knows all, who knows everything, whose greatness is on earth’, it declares an object of immediate valid cognition in ‘Through knowledge of that, the steadfast see it fully’; and because scripture declares omniscience in the fourth in ‘The fourth, ever seeing all’. Some say: if freedom from evil and the like are objects of meditation, they can occur even in elemental space, contradicting the topic of the small space, which establishes that the small space is Brahman. This is incorrect. Although absence of evil and the like, consisting in absolute absence of properties belonging to something conscious, is possible in the unconscious, desire, resolve and the like cannot be supposed in the unconscious. Hence there is no conflict. Some say: in ‘That greatness of his is real’, ‘that’ merely repeats the greatness stated by scripture, and reality is prescribed of it, just as the Āhavanīya fire is prescribed after merely repeating an offering. Omniscience and the like are therefore real too. Although ‘That greatness of his is real’ and the like occur in a hymn to Indra, the direct scriptural mention of Brahman in ‘I approach you, of excellent might; consider that Brahman first’, together with the indicative sign of making the sun shine in ‘Indra made the sun shine; in Indra all worlds are held’ and the like, establishes by the reasoning of the topic concerning light that the hymn concerns the highest Lord. This is incorrect. Because of the conflict with scripture teaching freedom from attributes, reality is stated only of the greatness that is the very nature. The genitive is figurative; alternatively, even of properties only empirical reality is stated. Nor is Brahman’s existence likewise merely empirical: that would conflict with the declaration of unsurpassed existence in ‘The truth of truth’, and being a substratum would be impossible. Nor does that itself entail possession of distinctions, since it has been explained even with freedom from distinctions. Nor should one say that qualified knowledge alone liberates, because scripture such as ‘The distinct self’ and traditional verses such as these declare liberation from qualified knowledge alone: ‘To the one who knows me as free of every defect, enriched with the entirety of attributes, I, being pleased, would grant liberation, and not otherwise’; ‘Knowing me as the enjoyer of sacrifices and austerities, the great Lord of all worlds, and the friend of all beings, one attains peace.’ As commendatory passages belonging to injunctions of meditation with attributes, these do not convey direct causation of liberation. Meditation with attributes is a means to purification of the mind, useful for direct realisation of the attributeless, which causes highest liberation. Nor is scripture teaching liberation from knowledge of the attributeless the same: the cases differ through intending or not intending that matter, and another result is heard for knowledge with attributes. Although another result, ‘No one ignorant of Brahman is born in his family’ and the like, is heard even for attributeless knowledge, although explaining it as praise is common to both, and although stating both results by the reasoning of distinct connections is likewise common to both, knowledge without and with attributes still differ through comprehending or not comprehending the reality of the substratum. Moreover, liberation produced by knowledge with attributes is intermediate liberation. Nor should one say that ‘Having shaken off merit and demerit’ declares the cessation of all action and thus precisely highest liberation. It concerns actions other than those causing direct realisation of Brahman’s reality; and without destruction of ignorance, highest liberation is not established. Nor should one say that liberation produced by attributeless knowledge too is intermediate, whereas nothingness stated in ‘He becomes non-being indeed’ is highest liberation. Nothingness, not being bliss, is not a human goal; and ‘He becomes non-being indeed’ and the like do not convey nothingness. As for the claim that a statement negating the world generally, adjacent to an injunction of particular attributes, cannot negate the attributes enjoined, that is incorrect. Restriction occurs only when the opposing consideration has authority equal to that of the negation, and that is absent here. Some say: if merely occurring in a meditation context makes something an object of meditation, infinity and the like, heard in ‘This is infinite’ in the meditation on the Udgītha, could easily be mere meditation on elemental space. Then the topics concerning space and the like could not establish Brahman through indicative signs such as infinity. This is incorrect. Even though they occur in a meditation context, infinity and the like are accepted as absolute because they do not conflict with scripture teaching freedom from attributes. Since these are impossible in space and the like, those topics can be begun. The claim that having true desires and the like are heard outside meditation contexts is also incorrect. They can be transferred from their context, like the accompanying mantras to Pūṣan and others, or can serve as praise, like the sentence concerning twelve Upasads. Some say: in ‘Because piercing and the like have different purposes’, mantras such as ‘Pierce everything’ are said to be removed from their meditation context. By the same reasoning the sentence about the infinite and the like should be removed. If that sentence intends both meditation and the reality of things, a sentence concerning attributes should do so too. This is incorrect. In a sentence concerning the nature, such as ‘Truth, knowledge, infinite’, infinity and the like already occur independently, so removal serves no purpose; and that sentence concerns only the reality of the thing, not both. Even if a sentence about the infinite occurring in a meditation context concerns both, a sentence concerning attributes does not concern both because it conflicts with scripture teaching freedom from attributes. Nor does this make omniscience and the like merely apparent, like speech’s being a cow and the like. Although speech’s being a cow and the like are apparent because they are objects of deliberate superimposition, having true desires and the like are impossible anywhere other than the Lord, and so are not objects of deliberate superimposition. Objection: meditation on the unreal is impossible, since traditional teaching prohibits it: ‘Neither the Vedas nor those who follow the Veda tell one to meditate on what does not exist’; ‘Alas, the slayers of the self delight in meditation on the unreal’, and the like. The Saṅkarṣaṇa aphorism also prohibits it: ‘The unconscious, unreal and unfit are not to be meditated upon, because of fruitlessness and the contrary result.’ Reply: no. The traditional passage and aphorism intend to prohibit meditation on what is utterly nonexistent, so there is no conflict. Moreover, even something apparent is seen to be an object of meditation in ‘One should meditate on speech as a cow’ and the like. Nor should one say that ‘cow’ is figurative there because another scripture says ‘Night coming like a cow’; and that, in ‘One should meditate on a woman as fire’, since scripture says ‘They offer semen’, ‘fire’ is figurative because she supports an offering consisting in semen, or is etymologically interpreted as the commentary explains, rather than superimposed. When the primary meaning is possible through superimposition, a figurative meaning is unjustified. Nor does figurative usage thereby disappear: where meditation is not heard, superimposition would serve no purpose, and figurative usage is appropriate. Moreover, when the conventional meaning is possible in any way, an etymological meaning is unjustified. This also rejects the following argument: in ‘The name is Brahman’, the word ‘Brahman’ is figurative in name and the like, which have Brahman as their substratum, on the authority of the traditional teaching ‘Uṣas presides over name; one should remember Hari as her Brahman’. The nominative ‘name’ has a locative sense, like ‘Spring is the Maruts’, or the nominative ‘Brahman’ has an ablative sense, like ‘The Brahmin was his mouth’, by the rule ‘Of nominal endings, su and elision ...’. Otherwise, teaching meditation on name would be inappropriate to Narada, who had asked, ‘I have heard from venerable ones like you that the knower of the self crosses beyond sorrow’. Even in an image, the result comes only from cognising the deity as real, not from cognising it as unreal, since the cognition ‘The stone is the deity’ is prohibited by ‘One whose conception of the worshipful is earthly’ and the like. This is rejected because, when the primary meaning is possible through superimposition, a figurative meaning is unjustified; and without matching case-endings the word ‘as’ would fail to connect. Likewise in an image and the like, when the primary meaning is possible through superimposition of deityhood, a figurative meaning is unjustified. Nor does the prohibition ‘One whose conception of the worshipful is earthly’ prevent this: it intends to dispel the error that no conscious deity exists apart from the earthly thing, rather than prohibiting superimposition. Meditation on what is not the self is introduced solely to teach Brahman in its primary sense, by the reasoning of showing the moon through a branch. Moreover, ‘Know that alone as Brahman, not this which people worship’ denies Brahmanhood of the qualified object of worship. Nor should one say that ‘It is different from the known and beyond the unknown’ denies non-scriptural knowledge or incomplete knowledge, so ‘Know that alone as Brahman’ and the like likewise deny non-scriptural or incomplete meditation, rather than denying Brahmanhood of the object worshipped; otherwise ‘Through meditation on it’ would be contradicted. In ‘It is different ...’, the intention is to convey self-luminosity by distinguishing it from knowable things such as pots and from unknowable things such as a hare’s horn. Thus it provides no example of your proposed meaning. Even if Brahmanhood is denied of what is worshipped, there is no conflict with ‘Through meditation on it’, since ‘meditation’ expresses sustained contemplation. Even if it means meditation, it concerns gradual liberation, so there is no conflict. Therefore Brahman is without attributes, because there is no means establishing attributes, and because there is an opposing consideration against possession of attributes. Nor is this unestablished: scripture teaching falsity and scripture teaching freedom from attributes supply that opposition. Attempts to show that scripture teaching falsity does not oppose it have been rejected in the discussion of falsity and the discussion of undivided meaning. Objection: what determines that a sentence teaching freedom from attributes sublates a sentence teaching attributes, rather than the latter sublating the former? Nor can the attributeless sentence be stronger because it negates, since ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ and the like would then be stronger than ‘Existence alone’ and the like. Reply: no. Its strength through the reasoning of interruption has already been stated. It is also stronger because it negates. In ‘In the beginning this was non-being’, ‘non-being’ intends the unmanifest, so the sentence does not negate and gains no strength by this reasoning. The attributeless sentence is stronger because, culminating in the human goal, it intends that matter. A sentence about attributes read near it must be interpreted in conformity with it, by the principle concerning proximity to what has a result. Nor does knowledge with attributes liberate; that has already been rejected. This also rejects the following: since possession and absence of attributes conflict, they cannot be combined; and since alternatives are impossible in an existent thing, unlike in performance, one must state that one passage is sublated by abandoning its apparent meaning. That should apply to the attributeless sentence alone, rather than to the stronger sentence teaching attributes. Its supposed strength is unestablished. Nor should one say that a sentence teaching attributes is stronger by the reasoning of the topic concerning the opening, because opposition has not yet arisen; because it acts more quickly, like direct scripture compared with indicative force, whereas scripture teaching freedom from attributes is delayed through depending on knowledge of a counterpositive; and because it concerns particulars, like ‘He offers on the footprint’. The reasoning of the topic concerning the opening concerns a conclusion explicable otherwise, and that is absent here. If a sentence teaching attributes were stronger because, presenting the counterpositive, it acts more quickly, the sentence enjoining taking the cup would likewise be stronger, and alternation would disappear. Only a means concerning particulars that is on an equal level with the means concerning the general is stronger; that equality is absent here. This also rejects the claim that a sentence teaching attributes is stronger because it has no other scope, like ‘He should recite at the initiation offering’, whereas scripture teaching freedom from attributes has scope in qualities such as sattva, as in the scriptural and traditional passages ‘The power of the divine self, concealed by its own qualities’ and ‘This divine māyā of mine consists of qualities’. The reasoning concerning having or lacking another scope applies to things on the same level. For this very reason, greater number gives no strength either, by the principle ‘Even a hundred blind people do not see’. Nor are the expressions presenting attributes stronger as what must be relied upon when properties are negated of a property-bearer designated by words such as ‘Brahman’, which require grounds of application. Like the oneness of the cup, grounds of application, as qualifiers of the subject, are not intended. Nor should one say that in the reasoning concerning the oneness of the cup, only what is additional after the subject’s nature is obtained is not intended; otherwise cuphood too would not be intended. Hence the topic concerning damage to an oblation says: ‘We accept the qualification by “oblation”, but do not accept duality.’ That reasoning applies where a word presents a property-bearer by conveying its ground of application; it does not apply where a word presents it through implication. Nor should one say that even a word implying something must designate the thing’s nature as unmixed and distinct from others, since otherwise properties could be negated anywhere whatever. Just as ‘On the Ganges’ and the like yield a bank distinguished from the banks of other rivers, here too the thing that is distinct of itself can be the subject. What need is there to present a property? Nor should one say that a sentence teaching freedom from attributes is restricted, by the reasoning of goat and sacrificial animal, to particular statements such as ‘Devoid of the three qualities’ and ‘Without undesirable attributes and the like’. When the force of distributive repetition in ‘Not this, not this’ conveys negation of everything that presents itself, one cannot leave certain particulars over. Rather, like ‘Protect the curds from crows’, the negation of the three qualities and the like has general scope. Since scripture has no authority regarding omniscience and the like, there is no conflict; support from another means of knowledge is equally present here, as in the word ‘crow’. If, despite this, restriction to particulars were made, ‘One should not injure any beings’ would have to be restricted to ‘A Brahmin must not be killed’. Just as there is no injunction of pointless injury, there is equally no injunction of attributes such as omniscience, so the negations are alike. This also rejects the claim that scripture such as ‘Seeing properties as separate’, by the principle concerning what is qualified, negates only the separateness of attributes, and that, because the cases are alike, negation elsewhere should likewise be understood. The principle concerning what is qualified applies only when an opposing consideration concerns the subject. None exists here, since the supposed opposition from scripture teaching omniscience has been rejected. Moreover, when separateness is negated, Brahman alone remains, and non-dualism itself has merely been stated under another name. Some say: when knowledge and bliss are identical, neither alone remains; so here too neither property nor property-bearer alone remains. Otherwise either bliss or manifestation would be absent, and liberation would not be a human goal. This is incorrect. The expression ‘either one’, which contains difference within it, does not apply to the individual reality of knowledge and bliss. Likewise, on your view the individual attribute and attribute-bearer can be identical; thus this is merely a matter of terminology. Some say: because attributes are stated both before and after ‘The witness, the conscious one’, the attributeless sentence between them should also be interpreted in conformity with them, by the reasoning of the Upāṃśu sacrifice. This is incorrect. Taking attributes as incidental indicators, those sentences concern Brahman and do not intend the attributes. This also rejects the claim that ‘without attributes’ cannot negate attributes in general because that conflicts with prescribing seeing and the like through words such as ‘witness’, and must therefore be restricted. Seeing and the like are not intended here either. Thus the appropriate meaning is Brahman approached through seeing and the like, since revelation can be authoritative precisely regarding that. Accordingly, ‘Where an appropriate and an inappropriate meaning appear in revelation, only the appropriate meaning should be adopted’ and the like are better explained on our view. Therefore, since the principles beginning with the opening concern other cases, their force does not establish possession of attributes. Some say: attributes are accepted as establishing the conclusions of the respective topics in aphorisms such as ‘The one within, because its properties are taught’ and ‘The inner controller in the divine and other spheres, because its properties are declared’; thus possession of attributes is established. This is incorrect. The conclusions can be established by adopting superimposed attributes related to Brahman alone, without concern for the absolute reality of those attributes. Some say: even though the sentences teaching attributes and freedom from attributes can be reconciled as concerning different subjects, like the statements of non-injury and of the sacrifice to Agni and Soma, calling the attributive sentence non-authoritative arises from friendship with the Buddhists. This is incorrect. Since the attributeless sentence is stronger because it intends the matter, sublation is necessary. To assert authority despite that is merely hostility to those who teach Brahman. Therefore the sentence teaching attributes does not intend their reality, because it is sublated by the attributeless sentence. The inference through negative concomitance, ‘Experience is without distinctions, because it is experience’, also supplies an opposing consideration. Nor is its qualifying term unknown. It is generally known that what would, in its absence, lead to an unwanted consequence is capable of being established by a means of knowledge. It is also established specifically: being a distinction delimits counterpositiveness to an absence, because it occurs only in counterpositives of absence, like pothood. Nor is there self-contradiction. Freedom from distinctions is the very nature, and is not accepted as a distinction. Nor would inference be pointless because the nature is already established: knowledge of it in that form is intended. Nor is it contradicted by scripture; that has already been rejected. Rather, many scriptural passages support it. Hence it is not on a par with a fallacious inference. Nor does it fail to entail the conclusion. Whether a property is different, identical, or related, the impossibility of the relation of property and property-bearer through excessive consequences and infinite regress itself excludes the contrary. Nor does the relation avoid infinite regress by explaining itself, like falsity, since on the identity view something additional cannot be stated. Nor should one say that this is unsound reasoning because there is contradiction between the presence and absence of a property consisting in absence of properties. Absence of properties is accepted as existing precisely as the nature, so there is no contradiction. Even you accept usage in terms of property and property-bearer by imagining difference where there is identity. Nor should one say: if bliss is knowledge alone, knowledge of suffering too would be bliss; if different, indivisibility is lost. Likewise, if Brahman is identical with the world, it would be false; if different, difference would be real. Thus Brahman as you intend it too would not be established, being contradicted by such reasoning; the view that reasoning is fallacious because contradicted by scripture is therefore common to my position. Knowledge of suffering has the form of a mental modification, so there is no excessive consequence when bliss is nothing other than eternal consciousness alone. By the reasoning of the topic concerning origination, the world has no existence apart from Brahman, so there is no scope for alternatives of difference and identity. Since scripture teaching attributes does not intend their reality, the claim of equal contradiction by scripture is inappropriate. Scripture teaching freedom from attributes does intend that matter, and reasoning supported by it is not bare reasoning. Some say: the presence or absence of freedom from distinctions produces self-contradiction, like ‘I am mute’. If the distinction consisting in freedom from distinctions is itself negated by this statement, the act of speaking too is negated by ‘I am mute’; thus the cases are equal. This is incorrect. If freedom from distinctions has the form of a distinction, it can be negated precisely under the form of distinction, just as in the statement ‘Without a second’, a second thing consisting in the absence of a second is negated. Otherwise apprehension of negation delimited by distinctionhood would be impossible. If it is nothing beyond absence, we have said that, being nothing beyond the nature, it does not contradict its own statement like ‘I am mute’. In ‘I am mute’, speaking and its absence are not negated under one and the same form, so contradiction is appropriate. Objection: if Brahman has no distinction separating it from the void and the indefinable, utter nonexistence, falsity and the like follow; if it has such a distinction, it possesses distinctions. Reply: even without a distinction of the same order of reality as what is excluded, difference and freedom from distinctions can be explained through a property of the same order of reality as the cognition of distinction. This also rejects the claim that, if Brahman is without distinctions, it cannot be an object of inquiry, together with the verse: ‘Knowledge that this is thus is the purpose of the desire to know. Its being thus is indeed its property; if not, there is no counterpositiveness.’ Imagined properties are possible at the time of inquiry; after inquiry, usage in the form ‘thus’, and the nature, distinction and the like, are explained by taking imagined separateness. Objection: even to superimpose properties, some properties must be accepted as real, since silver and the like are seen to be superimposed only on what is known through thisness and the like. It is said: ‘Superimposition of properties too occurs only on seeing common properties and the like. Where is superimposition of properties seen in what lacks all properties?’ Reply: no. The reality even of thisness and the like is not accepted, and superimposition even in the pure has been explained. Possession of properties differing from what is superimposed is explained by the relation to beginningless ignorance alone. This also rejects the claim that, if negative properties are accepted, positive properties too should be accepted, since both are equally established by means of knowledge. Even an absence additional to the nature is not accepted, and the claim that any property is established by a means of knowledge has been rejected. Therefore the highest Brahman is without distinctions. Here ends the justification of Brahman’s freedom from distinctions and attributes in the Advaita Siddhi. 4. 5. Refutation of a means of knowledge for the attributeless. Objection: what is the means of knowledge for what is without distinctions? Reply: is the question about a means of knowledge for its manifestation, or for removal of ignorance? On the first alternative a means of knowledge is pointless, because it is self-luminous. Nor does this lead too far because self-establishment can be claimed even where something is disputed. The cases differ through the presence or absence of a means of knowledge conveying distinction from absence. On the second alternative, the Upanishads themselves are the means of knowledge. Hence alternatives such as whether it is perception or inference have no scope. Objection: how are the Upanishads a means of knowledge for it? Direct semantic operation is impossible, and is not accepted, because there is no ground such as a universal, quality or action. A cognition concerning an imagined ground cannot be authoritative regarding the undifferentiated. Figurative operation presents its meaning only as possessing a quality of the primary meaning, and implication only as possessing a form delimiting relation to the directly expressible meaning. Since a word presents its meaning through a form delimiting its role in connection, no semantic operation whatever is possible in what is without distinctions. Thus neither through words nor through sentences are the Upanishads a means of knowledge regarding the undifferentiated, also because it is not an object of relation. Reply: no. Even though direct and figurative operation are impossible, implication is possible. There is no rule that an implying word presents its meaning as possessing a form delimiting relation to the directly expressible meaning, or that every word presents it as possessing a form delimiting its role in connection. Only words occurring in sentences that convey relations do so. Nor does absence of a relation as object make a valid sentence impossible. Even though indeterminate, it can be valid by conveying cognition free from doubt and error, and can be a sentence by possessing expectancy and the like. Moreover, the author of the Vārttika explains the authority of Vedānta sentences concerning the undifferentiated even without a semantic operation, like a sentence awakening someone from sleep. He says: ‘Without apprehending the relation between expression and what is expressed, those in deep sleep, awakened by others, abandon sleep and wake. In deep sleep no one knows the relation as one does while awake.’ Through such passages he explains the authority of a sentence even without a relation. Even on the implication view, excessive consequences must be prevented by failure to apprehend the particular intention, since relation to the directly expressible meaning can occur in many things. Apprehension of the particular intention occurs in a particular person, not everyone. The distinguishing factor in the person is absence of obstruction in the form of purity of the internal organ. The obstructive character of purity of the internal organ and of sin is established by scripture such as ‘Knowledge arises in people through the destruction of sinful action’ (the local reading of the first item is difficult). Thus, when obstruction is destroyed, direct realisation of the self from verbal testimony even without a relation is unobjectionable. We have explained this at length in our work on the Gita. Nor should one say that, since inquiry dependent on knowledge of the property-bearer produces only certainty qualified by one previously undetermined alternative, knowledge from a Vedānta sentence supported by inquiry cannot lack a qualifying aspect. The result of inquiry is simply knowledge capable of removing doubt. Such removal is possible even from knowledge of the property-bearer indicated by what rejects the opposing alternative, so there is no rule requiring accompaniment by a means of knowledge for that purpose. Nor is there excessive complexity: complexity supported by evidence is justified. Nor should one say that, if knowledge concerning the undifferentiated lacks a qualifying aspect, freedom from distinctions is not established, so that establishing it necessarily requires an object consisting in a distinction in the form of absence of distinctions. Absence of distinctions is the very nature and requires no means of knowledge for its manifestation. Merely being an object of presentations of word-meanings that arise separately and assist the establishment of undivided meaning explains usage as something qualified. Therefore, because there is no means establishing possession of attributes and there is an opposing consideration against it, whereas no such opposition exists to freedom from attributes, Brahman is indeed without attributes. This is established. Here ends the justification of a means of knowledge for Brahman’s freedom from attributes in the Advaita Siddhi. 5. 6. Refutation of Brahman’s formlessness. In the same way, Brahman is also formless. Objection: bodily form is established by scriptural passages such as ‘Sun-coloured, beyond darkness’, ‘When the seer sees the gold-coloured one’, ‘The true, the real, the highest Brahman, the person dark and tawny’, ‘With eyes everywhere’, and ‘The thousand-headed’; by traditional passages such as ‘See my forms, Arjuna’ and ‘It has hands and feet everywhere’; and by inferences such as ‘Brahman has a body, because it creates’, or because it preserves, or because it teaches. Reply: no. ‘Sun-coloured’ can intend to convey the self-luminous nature distinct from ignorance, or can concern an object of meditation. Nor does speaking of being beyond darkness make the meditation interpretation impossible. Being beyond darkness is stated of what is indicated by the form meditated upon, not of what is qualified by a form. Nor should one say that, in ‘This golden person is seen within the sun’, the present tense states an object of immediate cognition, so that it cannot be superimposed: one does not say that a woman’s being fire is seen. Although direct realisation of the object of meditation is not invariable in symbolic meditation, it is invariable in meditation with attributes, as established by the scripture ‘It would indeed be so for him’; that alone is expressed by ‘seeing’. Scriptural and traditional passages such as ‘With eyes everywhere’ can be explained as repeating the eyes, hands, heads and so forth belonging to the bodies of the individual selves under its control, because it is the self of all and the inner controller of all. Since having hands and feet everywhere and the like is otherwise impossible, you too must explain it in precisely this way. Otherwise your account of highest liberation as delimited by a particular place, and your explanations of being an object of approach, entering and the like, would be inappropriate. In the inference too, the conclusion is already established in this same way. There is no conflict, since in the aphorism ‘If it be objected: not so, because it lacks organs; that has been stated’, a transformation of ignorance occupying the place of an organ is accepted. Some say: Brahman’s entering and being an object of approach, established by scripture such as ‘It entered that very thing’ and ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’, are inappropriate without bodily form, since Brahman is all-pervasive. This is incorrect. The meaning of ‘entering’ is precisely manifestation in the effects it has itself created, since literal entry is impossible for what is all-pervasive. Even though attained of itself, it is figuratively spoken of as attainable with reference to removal of concealment by ignorance; this does not imply bodily form. Some say: in ‘Knowing him thus, one becomes immortal here’, ‘When the seer sees’ and similar scriptural passages, the pronoun refers only to one with bodily form, and knowledge of that alone liberates; thus Brahman has bodily form. This is incorrect. Knowledge with attributes is explained otherwise, as directed towards gradual liberation. On the alternative that it directly produces liberation, only knowledge of the self indicated by that form liberates. This also explains traditional statements such as ‘Even the gods constantly desire to see this form’. Moreover, is the body material or non-material? If non-material, is it produced by māyā or not? If not produced by māyā, is it different from Brahman or identical? Even a material or māyā-produced body: is it acquired through its own action or through another’s action? On the first alternative, involvement in transmigration follows; on the second, we accept the consequence. If different from Brahman, it contradicts your established doctrine, conflicts with ‘Not this, not this’, and conflicts with scripture such as ‘Without hands and feet’. Accepting a body that is non-material, not produced by māyā, and identical with Brahman conflicts with the stated scripture, enters the Cārvāka position, and lacks evidence, and lacks evidence. Nor should one say that its non-materiality is unestablished because ‘From its navel arose the intermediate space’ declares it the cause of the elements. Consideration of scripture such as ‘Fire is its head’ shows that it conveys the Virāṭ body by imagining intermediate space and the like as its navel and so forth, rather than teaching that a body causes the elements. ‘Beyond darkness’ and the like concern Brahman indicated by the Virāṭ body, and do not convey that the bodily form is beyond darkness. Nor does ‘Narayana alone existed, neither Brahma nor Shiva’ establish an eternal bodily form by declaring Narayana’s continuance at the great dissolution. In accordance with ‘In the beginning, dear one, this was existence alone’, ‘Narayana’ concerns Brahman conditioned by māyā, not a bodily form. Nor does this make it common to other conscious beings: being conditioned by undivided māyā alone distinguishes it. Nor does absence of an eternal body conflict with the statement of distinction in ‘The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious’. That can be explained through the nature, consciousness, even without accepting a body. Nor is an eternal body established by a direct statement that the body remains at the great dissolution in ‘Formerly, at the dissolution of the age, having taken into your belly the modification you had made’ and the like. ‘Taking into the belly’ means the persistence in the form of latent impressions of ignorance, the root cause of every modification. Nor is the primary meaning thereby abandoned. You too must state precisely this meaning; otherwise merely entering him would not establish dissolution of the entire universe. Some say that this conflicts with the direct declaration of eternity: ‘All the bodies of that great self are eternal and everlasting, masses of highest bliss, and always knowledge alone’, and the like. This is incorrect. It concerns a body lasting until dissolution, not serving as a locus for experiencing suffering, and having knowledge alone as its principal feature; it does not intend your proposed meaning. Hence it is insentient and different from him. Nor should one say that, from scripture such as ‘What shines as bliss and immortality’, ‘Entirely bliss to the tips of the nails’, ‘Joy is the right wing’, ‘The Lord is of that nature of which the individual is’, and ‘Of what nature is the Lord? Of the nature of knowledge, of the nature of lordship’, even without difference, bodily form is possible through the force of a distinction, by the reasoning of the snake and its coil. These intend to convey that the self consists of knowledge and bliss, not to convey bodily form. ‘The ancient person has manifold power’ and the like, and the aphorism ‘And in the self too, for manifold powers are so observed’, convey the manifold character of māyā’s power rather than a power intrinsic to the self. ‘To the tips of the nails’ and the like can be explained by delimitation through a form assumed for play, as not experiencing suffering and the like. ‘Joy is the right wing’ and the like convey the sheath consisting of bliss and do not concern Brahman. Merely being stated by scripture does not make Brahman bodily in nature; scripture such as ‘All this is Brahman alone’ and ‘All this is the person alone’ would then make Brahman the world in nature too. Imagining bodily form in the bliss that is the very nature, like eternity and independence from anything else, is merely terminological. On my view too, what is additional to Brahman and held to have the same order of reality as Brahman’s existence is accepted as negated in Brahman. Nor should one say that, since ‘This understanding is not to be reached by reasoning’ declares inaccessibility to reasoning, the self itself has bodily form. It declares that the undifferentiated self is inaccessible to reasoning, not that the self’s having bodily form is inaccessible to reasoning. Since it is formless, visibility does not arise, and explaining non-apprehension by a power of invisibility, as in a spirit and the like, explains what was never in question. Moreover, the conflict of the bodily-form alternative with scripture such as ‘Without hands and feet’ has been stated. Nor should one say that, just as ‘Without suffering, without pleasure’ and the like negate material pleasure, so here only material limbs are negated; otherwise the continuation ‘It hears, it sees’ would be contradicted. There the meaning is restricted because of conflict with scripture conveying its nature as bliss and the like; here no cause of restriction exists. Hearing and seeing can be explained simply through witnessing sound and colour, so there is no conflict. Otherwise, even on your view, which does not accept knowledge produced by eyes and the like in Brahman, that conflict would be hard to avoid. This also rejects the claim that, because the traditional statement ‘Formless and non-material’ itself explains scripture teaching formlessness, the statement negating form does not negate form in general. That traditional passage concerns what is meditated upon and gives no cause for restricting scripture that conveys Brahman as what is to be known. Scripture and traditional teaching do not have equal strength. Rather, ‘That which is invisible’ and the like conflict with attributing bodily form to the object of the higher knowledge. Moreover, the Lord’s body is not eternal, because it has colour while having magnitude, or because it is a body. We have also explained otherwise the scripture thought to convey eternity. Nor is materiality an unstated condition: it pervades the reason. Nor is it eternal, also because it has parts. Nor can something with parts be eternal in a particular case through the force of scripture: scripture has been explained otherwise. Objection: if ‘part’ means a material cause, it does not exist in Brahman’s body. If it means merely a region, space and the self are exceptions, since they too have regions. Nor is there no region other than a material cause: in cloth and the like one experiences a region measuring a cubit, a span and the like, distinct from the threads that are its material cause. Reply: no. It is precisely the causal threads, possessing measures such as a cubit and a span, that are experienced. As for establishing regions in space and the like through being conjoined and so forth, we accept that, since we accept both possession of parts and impermanence there. As for establishing regions in the self because pleasure and suffering are apprehended in different places, that is incorrect. Pleasure and suffering belong to the internal organ, not to the self. Nor should one cite an exception in nature: scripture such as ‘The cow is without beginning and has an end’ teaches nature as beginningless and eternal, yet regions in the form of sattva, rajas and tamas are seen in it. Nature is not eternal, and there is no nature other than ignorance. Nor is ignorance itself an exception: it too is impermanent, so there is no exception. Nor should one say that the individual selves and the Lord are exceptions, because portions are stated even of individual selves in ‘Drona is a portion of Bṛhaspati; Drauṇi is born from a portion of Rudra; Durvāsas is a portion of Shiva’ and the like, and of the Lord in ‘I bow to that imperishable one whose nature is the highest Brahman, in even a hundred-millionth part of whom the power of the universe abides’, and ‘Supporting this entire world with one portion, I remain’. A portion of the self is due to a conditioning adjunct, not intrinsic. On your view, individual selves have atomic size, so an intrinsic portion is absent and an imagined portion alone must be stated. This also rejects the eternity of the Lord’s realm and the like. Nor is there conflict with revelation such as ‘Therefore those realms of Vishnu are eternal, consisting of consciousness’ and ‘Through my grace you will attain highest peace and the everlasting abode’. Those concern persistence through intermediate dissolutions. Therefore Brahman is without attributes and without form. This is established. Here ends the establishment of Brahman’s formlessness in the Advaita Siddhi. 6. 7. Refutation, on the opponent’s view, of Brahman’s being knowledge, bliss, without a second, eternal and the witness. I know no reality beyond Krishna, whose hand is adorned with a flute, whose radiance is that of a fresh rain-cloud, whose garment is yellow, whose lips are red like the bimba fruit, whose face is beautiful as the full moon, and whose eyes are lotuses. (1) Objection: if Brahman is without distinctions, it is inappropriate to say that Brahman alone is one, consists of knowledge and bliss, is without a second, eternal, and the witness. First, is knowledgehood a particular universal; directly producing practical dealings; opposition to the insentient; being other than the insentient; opposition to ignorance; having the nature of illuminating an object; or what the opponent accepts? Not the first. Although it is possible in appearances of knowledge reflected in mental modifications, it is impossible in Brahman-knowledge, whose nature is undivided. Not the second: accompaniment by a result is absent in deep sleep and the like, and even intrinsic fitness in the form of power and the like is absent in liberation. Not the third: since knowledge as the very nature is eternal, the insentient opposed to it would be eternally absent. Not the fourth: that would conflict with saying that distinction from unreality in ‘Truth, knowledge’ and the like is obtained from the sense. Not the fifth: ignorance would be eternally absent. Not the sixth: no other object is presented in liberation; if its own nature is presented, it would become its own object. Not the seventh: the universal or causation of practical dealings and the like accepted by the opponent is impossible on your view. Reply: no. Knowledgehood is precisely illuminating an object. Even though an object is absent in liberation, being illumination related to it is not lost, since a relation to an object occurs at some time. This also rejects the verse: ‘How can Brahman’s knowledgehood consist in illumination of an object, since another object is absent in liberation and it does not know itself through itself?’ (2) Some ask: is blisshood a particular universal; being experienced as agreeable; agreeable experience; mere agreeableness; being knowledge alone; opposition to suffering; being the nature indicated by absence of suffering; or what the opponent accepts? Not the first: that is absent in bliss that is the undivided nature. Not the second: there is no experiencer in liberation, and the self is not an object of experience. Moreover, agreeableness is relative to something. It cannot be relative to another, so it must be relative to itself, entailing possession of distinctions. For the same reason, not the third. Moreover, if what is agreeable, additional to the nature of experience, is intrinsic, division follows; if due to an adjunct, bliss would sometimes cease. Not the fourth, since agreeableness is impossible in the manner stated. This also rejects the claim that blisshood is being desired without a condition. Not the fifth: knowledge of suffering and the like would also be bliss. If you say that knowledge presenting no object is such, no: knowledge invariably has an object, and in ‘Brahman is cognition and bliss’ and the like, if ‘cognition’ alone establishes distinction from suffering, ‘bliss’ becomes pointless. Not the sixth: if opposition means removing and the like, suffering would be eternally absent; if it means inability to be identical, pots and the like too would be bliss. Moreover, one could not say that distinction from suffering in ‘Brahman is cognition and bliss’ and the like is obtained from the sense. Not the seventh: the absence of bliss despite absence of suffering, which you say makes Vaiśeṣika liberation no human goal, would apply to your liberation too. Not the eighth: being experienced as unconditionally agreeable and the like, accepted by the opponent, is impossible on your view. And if, although blisshood and the like are hard to define, their locus Brahman is unsublated and consists of bliss and the like, then, although truth and the like are hard to define, their locus, the world, should likewise be unsublated and consist of existence. Reply: no. Blisshood consists in being desired without a condition. Nor is this overinclusive of absence of suffering: absence of suffering too is subordinate to happiness, and absence is accepted as another positive thing opposed to what is absent. Nor would bliss disappear when desire ceases in liberation. The nature indicated by being desired does not disappear, and the presence of the delimitor of that indication is not decisive for what is indicated. Nor should one ask whether being desired without a condition is intrinsic or due to an adjunct, rejecting the latter because Brahman’s being bliss would follow, and, in the former case, asking whether it is additional to knowledge or not, with division following in the first case and pointlessness of ‘bliss’ in the second. Even though knowledge and bliss are identical, the use of the two words is grounded in differences of imagined universals, and fulfils its purpose through different distinctions. This also makes it appropriate to say that bliss is precisely knowledge presenting no object, since the rule that knowledge presents an object has already been rejected. Thus blisshood can readily be defined, and that reasoning does not establish that the world too consists of existence. Moreover, being an object of cognition and the like oppose the world’s consisting of existence and the like, but not bliss, which is nothing beyond the seer. This also rejects the verse: ‘Pleasure is held to be what is experienced as unconditionally agreeable. How can Brahman be of the nature of pleasure when it is without distinctions and is not experienced?’ It is experienced as the object of highest love; pleasure and its experience are not different, so one cannot establish absence of pleasure through absence of experience. (3) Objection: does being without a second mean being qualified by absence of a second, or being indicated by it? Either way, if absence of a second, as qualifier or indication, is established by a means of knowledge, that itself makes a second. If not established by a means of knowledge, the second thing makes a second. Nor should one say that, even if an absence is a second, non-duality among positive things is not lost: nothing would then prevent perceptible properties and the like too from being established by means of knowledge, just like absence. Reply: no. On the Prābhākara approach, absence of a second is nothing beyond its locus. Thus, even though established by a means of knowledge, it does not make a second. Nor should one say that stating non-apprehension as a separate means of knowledge is then inappropriate because its object is not additional. That is stated precisely on the view that accepts an additional absence. Even without accepting an additional absence, its authority can be explained for cognition having absencehood as its qualifying aspect. Nor should one object that, if even distinction from immortality is Brahman alone, difference would be real. We accept that consequence. Only its being determined by unreality is false, because unreality is false; difference, being not different from Brahman, is indeed real. Nor should one say that, on the Prābhākara view, a distinction such as isolation must be stated in the locus in order to distinguish it from a locus possessing the counterpositive, and that this is itself absence; otherwise their view too would be inexplicable. In what never has a relation to the counterpositive, isolation is precisely identity consisting in its own nature. In what sometimes has such a relation too, the locus at that time is the locus delimited by a time different from the time of the locus possessing the counterpositive. Thus isolation is not additional to the locus, nor is anything inexplicable. Nor should one say that, as with whiteness and the like on the view that an attribute and its bearer are identical, positive properties such as power too should be identical with Brahman. There is no means of knowledge apprehending identity with power and the like. Alternatively, let being without a second mean being the nature indicated by absence of a second. Even though that absence is established by a means of knowledge, its counterpositive, the second thing, need not thereby be established, as in swallowing what was enjoyed in a dream and the like. This also rejects the following: if absence of a second is prior absence or the like, only impermanence of the second follows, not falsity; if it is absolute absence, it cannot serve as an indication because it exists at all times; if it serves as an indication by not entering into an effect such as being an object of scripture’s intention, absolute absence is not established. Likewise the verse: ‘If absence of duality is absolute, it would itself make a second; if non-absolute, duality would make a second.’ Valid cognition of it as additional to the nature is not intended. Cognition of it is possible in one way or another through a subsidiary intention. If absolute, it is nothing beyond Brahman; if non-absolute, the reasoning concerning swallowing in a dream has been stated. This has already been explained at length. All is well. (4) Objection: the eternity held to belong to Brahman alone—is it relation to all times, freedom from delimitation by time, not being the counterpositive of destruction, or freedom from both a beginning and an end? Not the first two, since they wrongly include ignorance and time. Ignorance, being the material cause of all time, necessarily relates to it, and is free from delimitation in the form ‘Now alone, not at another time’. Not the third, since it wrongly includes destruction. Nor should one say that destruction too is the counterpositive of destruction, while failure of the original counterpositive to reappear is appropriate, just as prior absence does not reappear even when the pot, consisting in cessation of that prior absence, ceases. In that case, even in liberation some destruction other than the self would have to be stated, and for economy the eternity of the first destruction alone is more appropriate. Nor should one say that, although destruction is eternal, Brahman alone is eternal among positive things. Positive things, lacking counterpositives, such as destructionhood and the like would also necessarily be eternal. Not the fourth: even if eternity is defined this way, the result that Brahman alone is eternal, namely absence of anything else in liberation, is not established. Reply: no. The fourth alternative withstands scrutiny. Nor should one say that absence in liberation of something other than Brahman that has no final limit is unestablished. The further qualifier itself is established. This also rejects the verse: ‘When time, not delimited by time, and destruction, not connected with destruction, are eternal, how do you hold that Brahman alone is eternal?’ Time too, being due to ignorance, has a final limit; and destruction, though not a counterpositive of destruction, has an initial limit. Nor does this make a second, since an absolute second is absent even so. Nor, if destruction is non-absolute, does its cessation cause a difficulty: it is accepted. Nor does the counterpositive reappear. The nature alone indicated by such a destruction opposes it, just as prior absence does when its counterpositive is destroyed and the like. (5) Objection: how can Brahman, whose nature is seeing, possess witnesshood consisting in directly being a seer, as prescribed by the grammatical rule ‘When directly a seer is denoted as a name’? Reply: witnesshood belongs precisely to consciousness reflected in either ignorance or its effect. Thus, even though its nature is seeing, it is a seer through a conditioning adjunct. Nor, because the adjunct too is an apparent effect of ignorance whose establishment depends on the witness, do circularity and the like follow. There is no obstruction to production or cognition, since both ignorance and the seerhood conditioned by it are beginningless. Objection: does the witness belong to the class of individual selves, to Brahman, or to consciousness alone common to both? Not the first. On the view that the individual self is atomic and conditioned by the intellect, shell-silver, which is known by consciousness delimited by the ‘this’ aspect, could not be known by the witness; circularity and the like would follow. Even on the view that it is all-pervasive and conditioned by ignorance, there is mutual dependence, since ignorance too depends for its establishment on the witness. Not the second: the cognition of suffering and the like known by the witness would then belong to Brahman alone, not to the individual self, reversing the proper position. Otherwise cognition of unlimited bliss too would belong to the individual self. Moreover, no modification is present here of the kind accepted on the view that Brahman-consciousness illuminates pots and the like: a modification of the internal organ that, through overcoming ignorance, manifests its identity with the individual self’s consciousness. Not the third. Although consciousness alone, like the Lord, does not apprehend the transmigrating being’s suffering as belonging to itself, the consciousness alone whose portion is liberated would be free from the disturbance consisting in presentation of suffering and the like. Moreover, just as Maitra’s ignorance and the like appear as Maitra’s to sleeping Maitra, waking Caitra’s suffering and the like would also appear as Caitra’s to sleeping Maitra, making Maitra’s recollection ‘For so long I did not experience suffering’ impossible. Reply: no. The witness is accepted as other than pure Brahman and other than the individual self conditioned by the intellect, so the defects stated for those alternatives are absent. Thus consciousness reflected in a modification of ignorance is the witness. Acceptance of modifications of ignorance even in deep sleep has already been stated. Nor is there mutual dependence; that has already been rejected. Since the pure is not the witness, disturbance does not follow for the liberated. The stated objection that apprehension of Caitra’s suffering in sleeping Maitra would obstruct the recollection ‘For so long I did not experience suffering’ is incorrect. Although the witness is common to all individual selves, only as manifested in identity with each individual self’s consciousness does it illuminate that individual’s suffering and the like, so no excessive consequence follows. Some say that, if pleasure and the like are known by consciousness reflected in a modification of ignorance immediately following them, they cannot exist only as known. This is incorrect. The same applies even on the view that they are mental. On that view too, there is no existence only as known beyond persistence only as known. Moreover, a modification arising simultaneously with suffering and the like can explain existence only as known. Therefore Brahman has the single nature of knowledge and bliss, is without a second, eternal and the witness. This is established. Here ends the justification of Brahman’s being knowledge, bliss, without a second, eternal and the witness in the Advaita Siddhi. 7. 8. Refutation of Brahman’s being the material cause. Objection: if Brahman is without distinctions, how can it itself be both efficient and material cause, so that the world has an identical efficient and material cause? Only a cause possessing modification is a material cause, whereas Brahman is unmodified. Otherwise scripture such as ‘Unchanging, imperishable, pure’ would be contradicted. Reply: no. Even if it is not a material cause through transformation, it can be a material cause as the substratum of apparent transformation. Being the substratum of apparent transformation is precisely being the object of the ignorance that causes the apparent transformation. The author of the Vārttika says: ‘Relying on ignorance, which is the material cause of this magical display of duality, Brahman is called the cause.’ Nor is the definition of material cause absent. Causing the birth of an effect in oneself is itself the definition of a material cause, and it is common to both what transforms and what does not transform. Objection: is Brahman alone the material cause, or ignorance too? In the first case, a real material cause entails a real effect, contradicting the supposition that ignorance is the material cause. In the second case, do Brahman and ignorance act as material causes with equal primacy, like two threads in relation to a rope, while scripture teaching changelessness concerns Brahman alone? Or is Brahman possessing the power of māyā the material cause, while scripture teaching changelessness concerns Brahman uncoloured by that? Or does Brahman cause through māyā, like a fibre causing cloth through a thread, while scripture teaching changelessness negates only change without an intermediary? Not the first: both would equally undergo change, so one could not specifically speak of Brahman’s changelessness. Both absolute reality and indefinability would follow in the world, like whiteness and blackness in cloth made of white and black threads. If absolute reality, Brahman’s nature, exists only in cognition of the effect, indefinability, ignorance’s nature, would also exist only in cognition. If having only that as material cause accounts for each respective reality, indefinability too would be absent, since it does not have that alone as material cause. In the second case, if Brahman changes through depending on contact with the cause called māyā, it would undergo transformation like clay and the like. If the qualified thing is Brahman, scripture teaching changelessness is contradicted. If it is not Brahman, Brahman’s being an effect is unestablished. Moreover, the qualified thing’s transformation, like that of clay and the like, into another form having the same order of reality as the property-bearer would overthrow the doctrine of apparent transformation. Nor should one say that it is transformation relative to the qualified and apparent transformation relative to the pure. Even in the pure, a superimposed modification is necessary for apparent transformation, so scripture teaching changelessness would not intend that. If it intends absence of real modification in the subject, one cannot state modification in the qualified thing, since superimposed modification does not conflict with what is really unmodified. Not the third: unlike a fibre in relation to a thread, Brahman is not a material cause of māyā. Reply: no. Both are accepted as causes without transformation. Nor is there scope for the defects stated against that alternative: causation through transformation is not accepted for both, but only for ignorance. Hence changelessness belongs distinctively to Brahman. Even together with ignorance, Brahman does not transform, but appears transformed. Nor does even transformation of ignorance entail absolute reality. Reality consisting in having the same order of reality as the transforming material cause accounts for transformation. Since it does not have the same order of reality as Brahman, it is not a transformation relative to Brahman; changelessness is explained by not causing a modification of the same order of reality as oneself. Nor does having a real material cause entail reality. Only properties of a transforming material cause, such as being clay or gold, are seen to recur in the effect. Thus even with a real material cause, unreality is possible. Nor should one say that, like smokehood recurring in real and unreal smoke, there is no single material-causehood recurring in the real and unreal. Causing the birth of an effect located in oneself has been stated. Difference in being real or unreal does not oppose a shared characteristic. Otherwise, if any difference opposed a shared characteristic, all talk of shared characteristics would disappear. Even in the example, being an object of knowledge produced by an impression concerning something non-apparent and the like occurs both in appearances and in what is not an appearance. Objection: supposing ignorance to be a material cause is inappropriate. Brahman alone can be the material cause of silver, space and the like, and ignorance’s positive and negative concomitance can be explained otherwise through mere efficient causality. Reply: no. Since pots, earrings and the like are seen to require something that transforms, ignorance must likewise be the transforming material cause even in space and the like. Nor should one say that unreal silver and the like do not require something transforming through an actual assumption of form, and hence not every effect necessarily requires it. By ‘actual assumption of form’ we intend precisely something’s becoming that without depending on ignorance concerning itself. In Brahman-ignorance’s becoming silver and the like, no ignorance concerning itself intervenes. Moreover, ignorance is supposed to be the material cause also through undergoing modification. Nor should one say that Brahman itself can undergo non-absolute modification, so this supposition is unnecessary. Without a modification’s being a transformation of ignorance concerning Brahman, its non-absolute status cannot be accounted for. Moreover, ignorance is the material cause also because an effect requires a material cause of the same order of reality as itself. In the case of silver, sameness of order of reality is explained either through the twofold character of existence, or by taking apparent status in the form of being sublatable by something other than knowledge of Brahman. This rejects the following: even if silver and its identity are modifications of ignorance, how can there be a modification of ‘this’ in the form of becoming silver? ‘This has assumed the form of silver’ is not apprehended, and what is superimposed is impossible without superimposition. We do not accept that ‘this’ becomes silver. It merely delimits consciousness, the substratum of ignorance transformed into the form of silver. Some ask: what is this material-causehood? Is it being the object of apprehension of assuming another form; being the object of cognition of identity with another form; or being the object of cognition of identity with the effect? Not the first, since it is unestablished: one does not apprehend ‘The shell has become silver’ or ‘Brahman has become space’. Not the second: the meanings of ‘that’ and ‘you’, milk and water, and being hornless and cowhood would become material cause and effect. Not the third: it is overinclusive, since even a similar, nearby efficient cause can be the object of erroneous identity with an effect. This is rejected as criticism of something not stated. Some also say that Brahman is not a material cause through being the substratum of error: even the past and the nonexistent, which are not material causes, are seen to be substrata of error; and even a shell and the like, though a substratum of error, are not spoken of as material causes. This is incorrect. Consciousness alone is the substratum, so the past and the like are not substrata. Moreover, mere absence of usage does not establish absence of the thing. Even though trees and the like are not called earth, earthhood exists in them. Some say: on the alternative that māyā is the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause, and pure Brahman the substratum, there is no identical efficient and material cause. Thus the topic concerning material nature and the like, which intend that, are inappropriate on your view. This is incorrect. One and the same thing can be the material cause as conditioned by ignorance, and also the efficient cause as the locus of desire, effort and the like that are transformations of ignorance. Here ends the justification of Brahman’s being the material cause of the world in the Advaita Siddhi. 8. 9. Refutation of Brahman’s being the efficient cause. Objection: on this account agency would have been stated as possessing effort and the like directed towards a material cause, as with a potter and the like. That is inappropriate when the effect is imagined: potters and the like are seen to act only towards what is not imagined, and neither the person in error nor anyone else is seen to act towards imagined silver and the like. Reply: no. We do not accept that even a pot and the like, the potter’s effects, are unimagined; nor is absence of a maker of silver and the like established. There too the witness alone is the maker. Mere non-observation does not deny a maker; otherwise, on your view too, an omniscient maker would not be established. This rejects the following: being a substratum is not agency, since, without an additional material cause, one could not state agency and material-causehood as sharing one locus. Nor is agency seeing a superimposition like a person in error, since the person in error does not deliberately make what is superimposed. Nor is agency seeing a superimposition like a person in error, since the person in error does not deliberately make what is superimposed. Nor is agency merely causing delusion like a magician. If the individual self to be deluded is not seen, there is no causing delusion; if it is seen, error follows. Moreover, since causing delusion too is superimposed, mutual dependence follows, and the scripture ‘Let me differentiate name and form’ is inappropriate. A magician does not create after resolving ‘Let me make a world and the like’, but displays after resolving ‘Let me display it’. On all three alternatives, the opponent’s view that the aphorism ‘Because it is the source of scripture’ makes manifest omniscience and the like, obtained from the meaning of the aphorism concerning origination and the like, would be overthrown, since being the substratum of error and the like does not yield omniscience. Nor is agency possessing effort and the like directed towards a material cause, since that is inappropriate towards what is imagined. Hence the verse: ‘There is no agency in a substratum, a person in error, or one who causes error; ordinary possession of effort is not seen towards what is imagined.’ This is rejected because the fourth alternative, which we intend, has been supported. As for the stated defect in the third alternative, that seeing the deluded individual self entails error, that is actually an advantage: one who knows an error is not in error. As for the claim that ‘Let me differentiate’ is inappropriate because a magician is not seen to act preceded by a resolve, that is incorrect: the supposed non-observation of such a resolve in a magician is not accepted. As for the claim that the opponent’s view would be overthrown, namely that ‘Because it is the source of scripture’ makes manifest omniscience established by the meaning of the aphorism concerning origination and the like, that too is incorrect. Even in being a magician, omniscience is obtained through being the support of the transformation of māyā’s sattva aspect into the form of the māyā-produced universe to be created. Therefore Brahman is both efficient and material cause. Here ends the justification of Brahman’s being the maker of the universe in the Advaita Siddhi. 9. 10. Refutation of a means of knowledge for Brahman’s being the material cause. Material-causehood is established by the directly heard ablative in ‘From which these beings are born’, prescribed in the sense of material nature by the grammatical rule ‘The source of the agent of birth’, and by the indicative sign of being the support of persistence and dissolution in ‘Into which they go and enter’. Agency is established by being the support of seeing and the like in ‘It saw’ and ‘Let me differentiate’. Objection: in the Vṛtti, ‘source’ is said to intend a cause in general, because an ablative is seen even with something that is not a material cause, as in ‘Delight arises from a son’. Relying on this, the Nyāsa too says: ‘If “source” were not mentioned, only the material cause would receive the designation apādāna, because of proximity, and not another cause. By mentioning “source”, any cause receives it. Thus “source” serves to establish the designation apādāna even for what is not a material cause.’ In the Mahābhāṣya too, the rule is rejected as unnecessary: ‘This rule too can be left unstated. Dūrvā grasses arise from cow-hair, goat-hair and sheep-hair; they depart from these’, and so forth. Hair and the like are points of departure for dūrvā grass and the like, so the designation apādāna is established by ‘What is fixed in separation is apādāna’ alone. Kaiyaṭa too considers the objection that, if hair and the like are merely points of departure, the effect cannot be apprehended in them, and explains only their being points of departure: the effect, dūrvā grass and the like, is apprehended there just as a long-bodied snake emerging from a hole is apprehended there in a delimited way. Thus neither view establishes the rule that ‘The source of the agent of birth’ prescribes the ablative only for a material cause. Reply: not so. Although ‘animal’ in ‘One should sacrifice with an animal’ and the like expresses animals in general, it concerns a particular animal in accordance with the continuation ‘Of the goat’s omentum’. Likewise here, although a cause in general is meant, reference to a material cause is possible. On the view that the ablative denotes a point of departure, words such as ‘horn’ in ‘An arrow from a horn’ can concern an efficient cause because there is no determining consideration. Here such a consideration exists, so an efficient cause is not intended. For this reason, ‘From the self, space came into being’ and the like too have an ablative denoting material nature. The determining consideration is the apprehended sharing of a locus, conveyed by the continuation ‘It became the formed and the formless’ and by the sentence ‘It desired’ occurring in another branch. Nor should one say: ‘It practised austerity; having practised austerity, it created all this; having created it, it entered that very thing; having entered it, it became the formed and the formless’ and similar scripture places becoming the formed and the like after creating and entering the world. Since this cannot itself be creation of the world, it intends manifestation of the highest Lord’s attributes such as sattva, and has no authority for Brahman’s being the material cause. Otherwise how could ‘became’ be used? One does not say, ‘The shell became silver.’ Becoming the formed and the like is itself creation of the world and does not follow it. ‘Having entered it’ can be explained like ‘Having opened the mouth’. Nor does this repeat ‘It created all this’: its intention is to dispel the error that Brahman is only the efficient cause. The stated non-observation of the experience ‘The shell became silver’ is due to the shell’s not being the material cause; thus that non-observation provides no example. Nor should one suspect that the words ‘defined’ and the like are pointless because the formed and formless world has already been stated by the words sat and tyat. They can be explained as summary and elaboration. Objection: ‘It desired, “May I be many”’ does not speak of association with what is to be created, whereby the Lord would be apprehended as sharing its locus. Rather, it speaks of the highest Lord’s resolve to be many through infinite forms directing the respective infinite objects, established by scripture such as ‘Though unborn, he is born in many ways’ and ‘That which is one and unmanifest’. Nor is creation of the world, ‘It created all this’, inappropriate after resolving to be many through his own infinite forms: multiplicity of controlling forms depends on what is controlled, and it is appropriate to say that, having created everything controlled, he enters through controlling forms. Otherwise ‘May I be’ could not speak of existence; moreover, before creation the internal organ is absent, so the meaning of ‘I’ qualified by it is absent, making the first person inappropriate. Reply: no. ‘May I be’ states future existence, like ‘May I be happy’, so that difficulty is impossible. Otherwise its being an object of resolve would be inappropriate, since there is no desire for what is already accomplished. This itself determines that ‘many’ concerns what is to be created. Even on your view, the controlling forms, being not different from the Lord, are already established. Thus even on your view desire culminates in what is controlled. This rejects the claim that, because desire concerns fire and the like, creating fire and the like after resolving ‘May I be many’ resembles obtaining pupils after resolving ‘May I be a teacher’. The stated inappropriateness of the first person is incorrect. ‘I’ can be used for what is qualified by a transformation of ignorance of that kind, so the first person is appropriate. The authority here of ‘It saw, “May I be many”’ and the like should be understood in precisely this way. Objection: you must say that becoming many is in the form of what is created, such as fire and the like. But these are conscious, since scripture states that fire and the like see, create and have the nature of deities. There is no such thing as a material cause of what is conscious. Reply: true. Since seeing and the like are impossible for created things, the words ‘fire’ and the like conveying agents of seeing and the like signify the self delimited by fire and the like. That very self, delimited by each preceding effect, is the efficient cause of each succeeding effect. Thus no defect based on consciousness has scope in the delimitors, fire and the like. ‘In the beginning this was non-being; from that, being was born; that made itself by itself’ and the like too are evidence for the stated meaning. Nor, when the self is made, is the statement of its existence in ‘It made’ inappropriate. Although made in the form of space and the like, it can exist in its own nature. For this very purpose, though not heard, the meaning ‘It made itself in the form of space and the like’ is supplied. Likewise, in traditional passages such as ‘Then I create myself’, one should explain ‘In the form of a body and the like that establishes dharma’. Nor should one say that, since ‘From that, being was born’ establishes the Brahman denoted by ‘that’ before the world’s origination, ‘That made itself’ is pointless. Although efficient causality is obtained from the preceding sentence, this one too serves its purpose by conveying material causality. Objection: the claim that Brahman is the material cause because creation and dissolution are heard as occurring in Brahman alone is incorrect. A thread is seen to disappear into a spider, which is only its efficient cause. Just as, although a constituent of the father’s body is the material cause of a son, the father is not that material cause but only an efficient cause, so, although a constituent of the spider is the thread’s material cause, the spider itself is only its efficient cause. Moreover, ‘As a spider’ and the like teach that Brahman too withdraws things just like a spider. Reply: no. Although the spider is not the thread’s material cause, since the thread is apprehended even after it is destroyed, and only the food eaten is the material cause, nevertheless the thread is not dissolved there: what is outside merely enters within. Hence it is said, ‘As a spider emits and takes in’. Nor should one say that, since Brahman’s withdrawing is stated by the same reasoning, let it too be just like that. Dissolution in Brahman is heard in ‘Born from that, dissolved in that, living in that’ and the like. The spider illustrates mere disappearance, and similarity in every respect is not decisive for being an example. Material-causehood also follows from the directly heard word ‘source’ in ‘That source of beings’. Nor should one say that ‘source’ is used even for an efficient cause in ‘Your source, Indra, in the abode’ and the like, so it does not establish material-causehood. By the principle ‘But the primary meaning follows from the word’s natural force’, even though elsewhere on some occasion it is somehow used for an efficient cause, abandoning the generally applicable primary meaning is inappropriate here. Scripture teaching knowledge of everything through knowledge of one thing is also a means of knowledge for material-causehood. We have already stated how similarity and primacy cannot explain it otherwise. Scripture of apposition, ‘All this indeed is Brahman’, is also a means of knowledge here. Nor should one say that traditional teaching, ‘You pervade everything; therefore you are everything’, explains it otherwise and prevents its authority here. Pervading everything as its substratum is the ground for applying ‘everything’; otherwise ‘everything’ would apply to space too. Material-causehood follows also because its absence would conflict with the topic concerning material nature. The inference stated in the Vivaraṇa, supported by scripture, should also be understood here: ‘The great elements have a real thing as their material nature, because, while coloured by the nature of existence, they are diverse modifications, like pots and the like pervaded by clay.’ Nor is material-causehood impossible on the view of apparent transformation, nor does the inference establish something else, namely having real primordial matter as material nature: its material-causehood was established at the very beginning. Or it would establish something else because the absence of existence of material nature has been proved; its material-causehood was established at the very beginning. And, since the absence of existence of material nature has been proved, there is no scope for establishing something else. Nor are horn-broken and hornless cows, coloured by cowhood in ‘A horn-broken cow’, ‘A hornless cow’, exceptions. The intention is ‘Because, while coloured by that, they are modifications of existence’; moreover, cowhood and the like additional to existence are not accepted. This also rejects the claim that, just as one apprehends ‘An existent pot’, so from apprehensions such as ‘A pot nonexistent here now’ and ‘A nonexistent human horn’, pots, human horns and the like would have non-being as their material cause. Nor is there a counter-inference of equal force from ‘Brahman is not the material cause of a substance, because it is conscious, like Caitra’; ‘The world does not have bliss as its material nature, because it is coloured by its nature’; ‘Whatever is not coloured by the nature of something does not have that as its material nature, as cloth and the like, not coloured by the nature of a pot, do not have a pot as their material cause’, and the like. Even though they appear equal in an initial apprehension of pervasion and presence of the reason in the subject, our proof is stronger through the support of scripture. In the second inference, a pot, not coloured by the nature of its potsherds, is an exception, since ‘The pot is a potsherd’ is not apprehended. Nor should one say that it is coloured by them through clayhood: being coloured by existence is equally present here. Thus Brahman as the identical efficient and material cause is established by ‘The world has an identical efficient and material cause, because it is an effect produced after consideration, like pleasure, suffering and the like’. Nor is there a redundant qualifier: two reasons are intended, ‘Because it is preceded by consideration’ and ‘Because it is an effect’. Nor should one say that, on your view, suffering and the like have the internal organ as material cause, so the example lacks the property to be established. Although on our view the internal organ is the transforming material cause, apparent material-causehood is not lost, through being the support of ignorance transformed into the form of the internal organ. Moreover, for the reason ‘Because it is an effect’, the conjunction of time and pot, accepted by both disputants and having time as the efficient cause of every effect, supplies an example. Nor is there a counter-inference of equal force from ‘The material cause of the world is not an agent, because it is the material cause of a substance, like clay’; or ‘The maker of the world is not the material cause of a substance, because it is an agent, like a potter’, and the like. These are weaker because they conflict with scripture. Insentience is an unstated condition in the first inference, and not being the inner controller of all is one in the second. Since these are brought to light by an opposing consideration, they remain defects even though they exclude the subject. Therefore Brahman is both the material cause and the maker of the world. This is established. Here ends the justification of a means of knowledge for Brahman’s being the identical efficient and material cause of the world in the Advaita Siddhi. 10. 11. Refutation of the definition of self-luminosity. Objection: material-causehood must be explained through being the substratum of transforming ignorance. What is not known cannot be a substratum; but if a means of knowledge is required to know it, mutual dependence follows. Nor should one say that being a substratum depends only on self-luminosity, since self-luminosity cannot be stated. What is this self-luminosity? Is it not being pervaded by a mental modification; not being pervaded by the result; being an object of immediate designation while not being an object of knowledge; fitness for that; or not being a locus of the absolute absence of that fitness? Not the first: even Brahman is pervaded by the final modification in order to break its covering. Not the second: it wrongly includes the past and the like, and what is eternally beyond the senses. Not the third: it fails to include deep sleep and the like, where designation is absent. Not the fourth: in liberation the property consisting in fitness is absent, so it fails to include Brahman then. Nor the fifth: not being a locus is itself a property, absent in liberation, so the definition fails to include it. For the same reason, it cannot be what is indicated by such non-locushood either, since that too, being a property, is absent in liberation. Reply: no. The fifth alternative itself withstands scrutiny. It does not fail to include liberation, since non-locushood is the very nature and exists even then. Nor does being the nature make its being a definition inappropriate. Just as on your view bliss and the like, though identical with Brahman, are spoken of as attributes, so non-locushood, though the very nature, is spoken of as a definition. Nor should one say: on your view fitness too is false in Brahman, so its absolute absence must also be stated; how then is Brahman not a locus of that absolute absence? The intended absolute absence is one opposed to fitness. An absolute absence in its own locus, which accounts for falsity, is not opposed to it precisely through being in its own locus. Alternatively, an empirical absolute absence is intended. In Brahman, absolute absence of fitness is absolute, being Brahman’s very nature. Nor is being unknown indefinable. It is precisely not being pervaded by the result, since consciousness alone is the result when the covering is broken. Nor should one say that the qualified definition is then overinclusive: a pot and the like are known through a modification and are not objects of the result, while silver, pleasure and the like too are fit for immediate designation. We have supported the pervasion of a pot and the like by the result. Although silver, pleasure and the like are designated as immediate because illuminated by the witness, they are not objects of an immediate modification produced by a means of knowledge. Thus the definition culminates in possession of that fitness in the same locus as not being pervaded by the result, and all defects are removed. Nor is it impossible because Brahman too is illuminated by the result consisting in consciousness reflected in a modification. Brahman is the result itself and is not its object. Nor does Citsukhācārya’s statement that even manifestation that is its very nature has it as its object make the definition impossible. That teacher’s statement is based on figuratively attributing objecthood because it is the object of designation occasioned by that manifestation. The conclusion here is this: being pervaded by the result means possessing an enhancement produced by consciousness reflected in a modification, or being an object of substratum-consciousness manifested by a modification or by consciousness reflected in it. The intended enhancement produced by consciousness is neither breaking the covering nor practical designation, but relation to consciousness whose covering has been broken. That exists in pots and the like, not in the self, since relation contains difference. Likewise, being an object of the stated consciousness involves difference and exists in pots and the like, not in the self. This is established in the account of the determination of each object. Nor is immediate designation hard to state: precisely the use of the word ‘immediate’ is intended. Nor does this wrongly include merit, demerit and the like as objects of extraordinary perception, because they too are fit for such designation. No extraordinary contact other than the capacity produced by yoga is accepted; even that only supplies capacity regarding an object fit for the knower but separated from him, not regarding merit and the like. It is said: ‘Even where an enhancement is observed ...’ and so forth. This rejects the following: what is this immediate designation? Is it produced by immediate knowledge; concerned with an immediate thing; or of the form ‘immediate’? Not the first: it wrongly includes merit and the like, since designation concerning them can be produced by subsequent awareness of a yogi’s immediate knowledge and by knowledge of pervasion. Not the second: if a thing’s immediacy is being an object of immediate knowledge, the self too would be known like a pot and the like. If it is being an object of immediate designation, the immediacy of the thing and of the designation depend on one another, producing mutual dependence. Not the third: designation produced by Vedānta concerning undivided meaning, whose object is formless, pure Brahman, cannot have the form ‘immediate’. This is rejected because ‘designation’ intends verbal expression. Even if the final modification does not have that form, there is no harm. Nor is the definition overinclusive of absence, which, being apprehended through non-apprehension, is not an object of knowledge, yet is ordinarily designated as immediate. Authoritative designation is intended. Objection: fitness for immediate designation is not relative to everyone: Maitra lacks it regarding Caitra’s knowledge. Nor is it relative to knowledge, which does not make designations. Nor is it relative to the locus of knowledge, since knowledge as consciousness does not reside in a locus. Reply: no. Fitness for immediate designation relative to some knower or other is intended. All agree that the knower is precisely the meaning of ‘I’. The stated absence of designation by Maitra regarding Caitra’s knowledge—does this mean that Maitra does not designate something through Caitra’s knowledge, or that Maitra does not designate Caitra’s knowledge? In the first case, even though Maitra does not designate through Caitra’s knowledge, he can designate a pot and Brahman as immediate through his own knowledge. Thus there is neither a redundant qualifier nor impossibility. In the second case, even if there is no such designation of Caitra’s knowledge, there is no harm. For us too, consciousness alone is self-luminous, not also consciousness conditioned by the modification designated as Caitra’s knowledge, since the modification is not self-luminous. Thus fitness for being an object of such designation relative to every knower is also appropriate. Objection: being an object of immediate designation while not being known, and fitness for that, are contradictory, since manifestation having it as its object causes its immediate designation. Reply: no. Although elsewhere manifestation having something as its object produces designation of it, manifestation, without having itself as its object, produces designation of itself, because its nature differs. Nor should the same apply to pots and the like. Since their nature is not manifestation, there is no other regulator without their being its objects. Moreover, even the subsequent awareness imagined by the logicians can be supposed to cause designation of pot-knowledge simply through being pot-knowledge, which is simpler than being knowledge of pot-knowledge. Objection: since fear of infinite regress prevents accepting another manifestation, let it have itself as its object. It is inappropriate to abandon the regulator, being its object, already established elsewhere. Otherwise knowability too could of itself produce the designation ‘knowable’ without occurring in itself, and its universal presence would be lost. Reply: no. Just as infinite regress allows another manifestation to be abandoned, identity makes the relation of subject and object, invariably involving difference, inappropriate and allows it too to be abandoned. We accept the loss of universal presence in knowability and the like. Nor should one say that motion too should then produce its effect in itself, as it does in a village. It would equally follow that clay too should produce cloth, like a thread, because difference is equally present. The answer through difference of nature is the same everywhere. Alternatively, self-luminosity is precisely having a nature that is not an object of consciousness. Everything other than consciousness is an object of consciousness. There is no fear of wrongly including the utterly nonexistent, because having a nature is required. Nor is the definition impossible. Since operation in oneself is opposed, one cannot be known by oneself, just as cutting cannot be cut. Nor should one say that the inference of falsity too would then not have itself as its object. The cases differ, since there one regulator of objecthood common to self and other exists. For this reason, just as conjunction with an axe in cutting and the like is not common to self and other, and operation in oneself is opposed, so too here. Nor should one say that designation produced by consciousness would then not occur regarding consciousness, just as the effect of cutting does not occur in cutting. The observation of the result itself determines a difference of nature from cutting. Alternatively, self-luminosity is not depending, for designation of oneself, on consciousness other than oneself, or not depending on consciousness delimited by oneself. Nor does this fail to establish self-luminosity as intended because it can be explained even through being known by oneself. Being known by oneself is contradicted, so an explanation relying on it is impossible. Objection: if the property self-luminosity is absolute, non-duality is contradicted; if non-absolute, lack of self-luminosity itself becomes absolute, contradicting the inferences and the like that establish self-luminosity. Reply: no. We have said that it is the very nature. Nor is this accepted by others, since they do not accept a nature opposed to being known. Here ends the justification of the definition of Brahman’s self-luminosity in the Advaita Siddhi. 11. 12. Refutation of the self-luminosity of the self as accepted by the opponent. Nor is a means of knowledge absent. The inference through negative concomitance, with being experience as its reason, is itself a means of knowledge. Objection: the property to be established is unknown here. Nor should one say that it is known generally through the inference ‘Being known is the counterpositive of an absolute absence located in something, because it is a property’. Even if not being known is known, the qualified property to be established remains unknown. Nor is only that much to be established through being experience. If being known consists in being pervaded by a modification, its absence is contradicted in experience, which is pervaded by the final modification. If it consists in being pervaded by the result, its absence is known outside the subject: on my view in pots and the like, and on yours in merit and the like and in shell-silver and the like. Thus the reason becomes inconclusive through being confined to its own subject. If it consists in not being self-luminous, it remains unknown because its counterpositive is unknown. Moreover, if being the counterpositive of an absolute absence is excluded from something, there is an exception precisely there; if not, there is an exception here. Reply: no. When self-luminosity in the form of having a nature that is not an object of consciousness is established through being experience, being known is precisely being an object of consciousness, occurring only in what is other than consciousness; that is the subject. The property to be established is having a nature that is the counterpositive of an absolute absence. We have explained how being an object of consciousness reflected in a modification occurs in pots and the like, not in Brahman; thus there is neither confinement to the subject nor contradiction. Nor does being the counterpositive of an absolute absence provide an exception when it itself is the counterpositive of an absolute absence. Since being such a counterpositive is false, it is the counterpositive of an absolute absence in precisely what is the counterpositive of an absolute absence. Thus being the counterpositive of an absolute absence located in something is not universally present. Nor should one say that, since absolute absence of being an object of consciousness is possible even when Brahman is an object of consciousness, something other than the intended conclusion is established, and, since the property to be established similarly exists even in pots and the like, the reason is confined to its own subject. What is to be established is being the counterpositive of an absolute absence opposed to being an object of consciousness, so neither defect follows. In pots and the like the two coexist and do not oppose one another; in Brahman they do oppose one another. Nor does the aspect of opposition then make the property unknown again. It can be known through ‘Being known is the counterpositive of an opposed absolute absence, because it is the counterpositive of an absolute absence, like a pot’. But when the property to be established in the preceding inference is self-luminosity in the form of fitness for immediate designation while not being known, the subject is being known in the form of being pervaded by the result; the property to be established is being the counterpositive of an absolute absence located in something fit for immediate designation. Thus not being known, sharing a locus with fitness for immediate designation, is known generally, and there is neither an unknown qualifying term nor confinement to the subject. The defect based on alternatives such as whether being the counterpositive of an absolute absence is itself the counterpositive of an absolute absence in something has already been removed. By this, the property to be established is also known through a Mahāvidyā argument such as ‘This pot differs from what, while other than this pot, is not a locus of being known, because it is an entity’. Nor is being known indefinable. When self-luminosity consists merely in not being an object of consciousness, being known is precisely being an object of consciousness; on the first alternative, being known is precisely being pervaded by the result. Nor does this establish something else, or something already established, by establishing difference from what is beyond the senses. Only what shares a locus with being an object of immediate designation is intended. Nor is there a counter-proof of equal strength in ‘This pot, while being this pot, is not a locus of difference from a non-locus of being known, because it is an entity’. Our proof is stronger because favourable reasoning in the form of scripture and the like is present. Moreover, even if a counter-proof causes doubt about the property to be established, awareness of that property in the form of doubt is not prevented. Nor is the reason unestablished. The universal experiencehood exists even in the pure by taking imagined differences among individuals. Nor is there a rule that a universal depends on individuals possessing difference of the same order of reality as the property-bearer. Excessive consequences are already excluded by requiring individuals with difference of an order of reality not less than the universal’s. Requiring individuals with difference of the same order of reality as the property-bearer adds complexity, since sameness means neither less nor greater. Nor is experiencehood impossible in the absence of something experienced: its occurrence at some time alone explains it. Otherwise cognition produced by a sentence such as ‘It existed’ would not be experience. Nor should one say that experiencehood is not excluded from contrary instances, since it exists in the non-self expressed by ‘experience’. The non-self is not directly expressed by ‘experience’; like ‘knowledge’, ‘experience’ is figurative in a mental modification. This also rejects the claim that there is contradiction if indirect experience is the subject, and an exception if immediate experience is the subject. Experiencehood in the form of consciousnesshood is intended. Nor does the reason fail to entail the conclusion, since scripture supports it. Nor should one say that it is contradicted by perception apprehending that the self is known, ‘I know even immediate experience immediately’, and by the scripture ‘It knew itself alone’. In the first case, the witness’s experience concerns experience of a quality in the form of a modification. Nor should one say that ‘I know’ is experienced precisely as being an object of cognition. The meaning of ‘I’ cannot be a locus of cognition, so ‘knowledge’ is figurative in a modification; and even in ‘I know suffering’ and the like, precisely a modification of ignorance having the form of suffering and the like is intended. The second concerns the meaning of ‘I’, which has been said to be non-self. Scripture comprehends being an object of knowing in the form of a modification produced by the Upanishads; it does not make being an object of consciousness, or being pervaded by the result, its object. Nor is there a counter-inference of equal force in ‘Experience is an object of manifestation, because it is an object of immediate designation, like a pot’; ‘Caitra’s experience is an object of immediate cognition fit for Caitra’s immediate designation, because it is an object of Caitra’s immediate designation, like a pot’; or ‘Caitra’s experience does not remain a non-object of immediate cognition fit for Caitra’s immediate designation, because it lacks non-manifestness to Caitra, like Caitra’s desire’. Objecthood in the form of possessing designation occasioned by manifestation is accepted by me too, so that conclusion is already established. Something other than that is contradicted by opposition to operation in oneself; insentience is an unstated condition; and, since being known by another leads to infinite regress, being known by oneself is contradictory. Objection: how is being known by oneself contradictory? Not because one is not in contact with the sense that produces one, or because one does not produce oneself: pots and the like are objects of eternal consciousness without either of those. Nor because the relation of object and subject resides in two things: knowledge of the past, the superimposed and the utterly nonexistent is observed, so the relation does not reside in both. Nor because actionhood and objecthood conflict: particular things such as effort are seen to be effects and the like. Nor because, if the subject were an object, the agent would become the object of its action. The inference of falsity and the like, though a subject, are seen to be objects. The experience ‘I know myself’ and the scripture ‘It knew itself alone’ also show no conflict between an agent and being the object of its action. Thus being the object of an action is not possessing the result of an action inhering in another, but being an object of an action and the like; that can be explained even in identity. Reply: not so. Since the subject-object relation is a relation, it invariably involves difference; thus being known by oneself is contradictory. Difference is not absent in the stated cases of the past and the like. For this reason, an effort is an object only of another effort; a desire of another desire; a usage of another usage; and an expression of another expression, not of itself. Thus there is no example whatever of having oneself as object. Objection: even though motion and the like do not have another motion as their object, things have diverse natures. Just as an effort and the like have another effort and the like as their object, let experience have itself as object. Otherwise it could not produce designation of itself either. If knowledge of pervasion, inference and the like did not have themselves as objects, universally inclusive pervasion and falsity of inference would not obtain. Reply: no. Rather than postulate a nature of having oneself as object to explain designation, let us postulate simply a nature of producing designation of oneself even without having oneself as object. This is simpler and suffices to explain it. We have said that knowledge of pervasion, inference and the like have that character because a single delimitor is obtained. Thus, also because action and being the object of that action conflict, one is not known by oneself. The inference of falsity does not have itself as the object of its action, since what is indirect is not such an object. The claim that the agent itself becomes the object of its action is inappropriate. The cited inference of falsity and the like are not objects of action. In ‘I know myself’ and the like, the witness is the agent and the meaning of ‘I’ is the object. In ‘It knew itself’ and the like, the meaning of ‘I’ is the agent and consciousness is the object; the two are not observed where there is identity. Hence the definition of an object of action involving difference is not abandoned. Merely being an object of an action is not being its grammatical object; otherwise actions such as sitting, which concern a support and the like, would also become transitive. Objection: it is defeated by opposing reasoning such as this: if it is not known, contradiction follows whether it is known or unknown through the means of knowledge establishing that it is not known; Vedānta cannot be authoritative regarding Brahman; the injunction to inquire into Brahman is pointless; and ignorance of Brahman cannot cease. Reply: no. Not being known means not being an object of consciousness, or not being pervaded by the result. There is no contradiction in its being known through a modification produced by the means of knowledge establishing this. Mere objecthood for a modification makes Vedānta’s authority, the injunction to inquire and removal of ignorance possible. This also rejects the consequence that, if Vedānta’s authority consists only in removing ignorance, the self remains unestablished. The self is established of itself. Objection: if ‘of itself’ means ‘by itself’, it would have itself as object. If it means ‘without a means of knowledge’, it remains unestablished because no other means is supplied; otherwise a human horn and the like too would be established. Reply: no. Establishment not depending on a means of knowledge is precisely what ‘established of itself’ means. Nor does this consequence apply to a human horn and the like, since there is no means of knowledge whose result is distinction from its nonexistence. Here such a means exists through mere objecthood for a modification. Regarding the self, whose form is establishment, the designation ‘established’ is figurative, because it is an object of designation occasioned by establishment. Nor does absence of what is known in liberation make knowing impossible: the reasoning concerning experience is readily available here too. Nor, if it does not have itself as object, can it fail to remove doubt concerning itself. Through its own greatness alone it can oppose doubt and the like in itself as property-bearer, just as it produces designation. Nor is there no common rule: as with objecthood on your view, something that does not recur can itself be the regulator. Even without being the object of its own action, its maintaining itself explains designation and the like regarding itself. Nor does ‘maintaining itself’ contradict itself by stating both agency and objecthood in an act of maintenance. Self-maintenance is figuratively attributed merely through not depending on a maintainer other than itself, just as ascetics are called their own servants merely because they have no servants other than themselves. Nor should one say that, in the injunction to study, a lamp’s light and the like, which maintain themselves, producing an effect in oneself is pervaded by having oneself as object, and the same should therefore apply here. In the injunction to study, there is no scope for self-dependence through the presence of only one delimitor; and having oneself as object is unestablished in a lamp’s light and the like. The Khaṇḍana says: ‘In “From gāṅ, kuṭ and the rest”, the possessive compound produces its own effect even in kuṭ, which is not its object. So too here.’ Nor should one object as follows: according to Kaiyaṭa’s statement ‘An aggregate in which the differences of the constituent parts are manifest is the compound’s meaning’, the aggregate containing kuṭ is itself the object of the possessive compound. Whether it is conveyed through expressive power, as held by grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas, or through implication, as held by others, is a separate matter. Just as in ‘Let those in Caitra’s hall be brought’, even Caitra, though an indication, is an object of that expression when in his own hall, so kuṭ too, included in the aggregate constituting the other meaning together with kuṭ and the rest, can be an object of the possessive compound. Thus the example is unestablished. ‘Not its own object’ means different from the other meaning that is its generally applicable object. The example therefore culminates in this: just as the compound’s effect occurs in its own word-meaning, as in something other through relation to its own word-meaning, so consciousness’s result occurs in itself, as in another through relation to itself. Alternatively, even though it is an object under the form occasioning an aggregate, apart from being its own object, it is not an object under the form occasioning membership in that aggregate; hence it is said not to be its own object. Objection: the conclusion is that, when producing designation concerning something other than itself, being its object is required, while in its own case identity with itself alone suffices. This is inappropriate, since one can easily say everywhere that the rule applies only outside the subject. Even though identity with oneself exists, one does not observe aversion opposing desire in itself without having itself as object, as it does in its own object; ignorance covering itself; indirect knowledge in the form of recollection and the like producing designation of itself; or Caitra’s consciousness producing designation regarding Maitra’s consciousness in deep sleep, despite the absence of both absolute and imagined difference. Moreover, in ‘I know the self’, having oneself as object is experienced in knowledge identical with the self. Reply: no. Then, since having oneself as object is not observed in aversion and the like despite identity with oneself, let the same apply here. If you say that, because the result in the form of designation is observed here, identity with oneself is postulated here alone as a regulator of having oneself as object, even though this is not observed elsewhere, then our answer is equal: because the result in the form of designation of oneself is observed, identity with oneself regulates production of one’s own effect here alone, not in aversion and the like, where such a result is not observed. Nor should one say that, if being its object, apprehended here, is silently abandoned, the same consequence follows everywhere. The opposing consideration that supplies the basis for abandoning such objecthood has already been stated; it is absent elsewhere. The claim concerning Maitra’s consciousness and the like is incorrect: at the time of that absence, Maitra’s consciousness itself is absent. Producing designation through witness-consciousness is a consequence we accept. If the internal organ remaining in the form of latent impressions distinguishes even then, difference itself is present. The claim concerning ‘The self’ and the like is also incorrect. What is experienced there is precisely being an object of knowledge in the form of a modification residing in the meaning of ‘I’. Nor is this on a par with the fallacy ‘A pot is self-luminous, because it is a pot’. That has been dealt with in removing the objection of failure to entail the conclusion. Moreover, the cases are not alike: without either identity with manifestation or objecthood for it, designation of a pot would be impossible. Objection: if ‘experience’ makes the modification the subject, there is contradiction; if it makes something else the subject, its locus is unestablished. Reply: no. Since the modification is insentient and non-luminous, precisely that in which luminosity comes to rest is the subject. Experience additional to a modification has already been established in the determination of each object. Thus these too are sound: ‘Knowledge of your fitness for immediate designation, while fit for your immediate designation, is not a locus of being known, because it is knowledge, like my knowledge’; and ‘The cognitions under dispute, while other than pot-knowledge, are not loci of being known, because they are cognitions, like pot-knowledge’. Nor should one propose counter-proofs of equal force, as appropriate: ‘Your knowledge, while fit for your immediate designation, is not a locus of not being known, because it is knowledge, like my knowledge’; and ‘Pot-knowledge, while other than cloth-knowledge, is not a locus of not being an object of consciousness, because it is knowledge, like cloth-knowledge’. Our proof is stronger, since an opposing consideration against the contrary has been stated. Here ends the justification of experience’s self-luminosity in the Advaita Siddhi. Thus self-luminosity should also be established for the self, which is not different from consciousness, because it has the nature of consciousness. We have explained how having the nature of consciousness is not unestablished in the self, and shall establish it also through scripture. Nor is there conflict with scripture such as ‘The knower, the understanding one’. Because of conflict with the many scriptural passages to be stated, it intends being the locus of knowledge in the form of a modification. Vidyāsāgara’s proof of self-luminosity, ‘The cognition under dispute has a locus and object that differ, because it is cognition, like another cognition’; and ‘What is under dispute does not have its own locus as object, because it is a quality, like the heat of fire’, follows the opponent’s approach. On our view, knowledgehood is absent in the self that is self-luminous, and qualityhood is absent in knowledge of that kind. Moreover, ‘I know myself’ has been explained as perception concerning a modification, so there is no conflict. Nor should one say that the reason fails to entail the conclusion because having its own locus as object can be explained, as in ignorance. If the self were known as an object, then, when knowledge of the self is absent in the state of ignorance, doubt, error or determination of exclusion regarding the self would follow. But no one doubts ‘Am I I or not-I?’, errs ‘I am someone else’, or determines exclusion in ‘I am not’. Thus an opposing consideration exists against lack of self-luminosity. Nor should one say that, on your view, the meaning of ‘I’, which is not an object of doubt and the like, is non-self, while another self, knowable only through words, does admit doubt and the like, so failure to entail the conclusion remains. The meaning of ‘I’ is a knot of consciousness and the unconscious. Just as doubt and the like are absent in its unconscious aspect under the delimitation of I-hood, they are also absent in its conscious aspect. Nor should one say that knowledgehood admits an exception in a word-produced modification concerning the internal organ. It means manifestation. Nor does the second reason admit an exception in colour or light, which removes darkness in its own locus too, as in a pot, and thus concerns that locus. Unlike knowledge and the like, colour does not have an object. Scripture such as ‘Here this person is his own light’ is also a means of knowledge here. In the passage beginning ‘When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya’ and ending ‘What light does this person have?’, the question is how the individual self manifests when light and other means of knowledge are absent. ‘The self alone is his light’, ‘His own light’ and the like declare self-luminosity as not depending on anything other than oneself. Nor does ‘self’ concern the highest self. The preceding passage teaches the self’s relation to the channels; the following passage, ‘Which is the self? That which consists of cognition among the vital functions, the light within the heart’, also shows, by the reasoning of the tongs, that the individual self is intended. Nor, by the reasoning of the topic concerning heaven, earth and the like, is ‘self’ primary only in the highest self. In ‘Because of its own word’, the word ‘self’ is given as a reason to exclude non-self such as primordial matter, not with the intention of establishing primacy, since the individual self is not at issue and primary application is common to both. This also rejects the interpretation that, by carrying over ‘his’, the conclusion ‘Here this person himself’ means ‘This Lord himself is the individual self’s light, the cause of knowledge’. By the stated reasoning, this conflicts with the opening. Nor should one say that, since in ‘He sits with speech alone as light’, ‘light’ is used of speech as a means of knowledge, ‘light’ here too means a means of knowledge, not knowledge. Just as ‘light’, conventional in ordinary light, applies to speech through being a means of knowledge, here too it can apply to what opposes ignorance through the aspect of opposing darkness. Nor is ‘here’ pointless in scripture if self-luminosity is intended, since the self is always self-luminous. In waking, lights such as the sun are possible, making the distinction difficult; in this state it is easy to distinguish, so the qualifier ‘here’ serves its purpose. Nor does the genitive ‘his’ express objecthood. As in ‘Their own servants’, it intends not being known by another. Nor does departure from the primary meaning cause a difficulty: it is accepted because the primary object is impossible. Nor is a lamp and the like called self-luminous because it has itself as object. There too the ground of designation is being light not illuminated by light of the same kind. Hence the consequence does not extend to non-luminous pots and the like. The Vivaraṇa’s inferences are these: the self is self-luminous because, in its existence, it is devoid of absence of illumination; because it is a locus of illumination; and because it produces illumination, like a lamp. Objection: if not being known is to be established, the example lacks it. If not being illuminated by illumination of the same kind is to be established, something else is established, since that is possible even without self-luminosity, as in a pot and the like. Moreover, illuminationhood common to knowledge and radiance is unestablished. The first reason admits an exception in suffering and the like, which exist only as known; the second and third are unestablished on your view, since the self is itself illumination. Reply: no. Something other than the intended conclusion is not established, because being illuminated by oneself is contradicted, or because the subject is qualified by not being so illuminated. Precisely being illumination not illuminated by illumination of the same kind is to be established. Thus this is not explained through lack of self-luminosity, as with a pot and the like. Through not being illuminated by oneself or by illumination of the same kind, not being known is obtained, since what is of a different kind is not illumination. Illuminationhood common to knowledge and radiance is overcoming a covering. Knowledge does this through consciousnesshood, while elsewhere it occurs through being a particular form of light and the like; that is a separate matter. Coveringhood common to ignorance and darkness is obstructing dealings concerning an object. Ignorance does this directly, darkness through obstructing knowledge; that is a separate matter. Nor is suffering an exception: in its first moment there is absence of illumination, and illuminationhood also qualifies the reason. Nor are the second and third reasons unestablished: they are stated according to the opponent’s approach. Moreover, because a reflection depends on the original and rests on it, being a cause of knowledge of the original is appropriate. Hence this too is sound: ‘The self is not a locus of illumination produced after itself, because it is a locus of illumination, like the sun.’ Nor is the conclusion already established, since you too accept that knowledge concerning pots and the like is produced. Ānandabodha also says: ‘The consciousness under dispute does not lack designation due to the absence of cognition concerning itself, having the same locus and the same time as itself, because it is consciousness, like consciousness designated immediately afterwards.’ Nor is this proving what is already established because it is explained through being known by oneself. It addresses one who accepts being known by another; through the force of qualifying the subject as not having itself as object, it culminates in what you do not accept. Brahman’s not being known is established by scripture itself. Nor does it intend not being known in its entirety; there is no cause for restriction. This also rejects the following argument: if knowledge is inferred through the sign of knownness, that conflicts with the indirect experience ‘I know’, like ‘I am happy’. On the Guru’s view, if the very produced cognition ‘This is a pot’ has itself as object, it would have to be the locus of contact with the sense producing itself; and this conflicts with experience of separation between first-order and subsequent cognition. On the Nyāya view, if subsequent cognition too is known by another cognition, knowledge, being a special quality of the self accessible to perception, must be known like desire and the like, so an experience of a stream of cognitions follows. If the stream is interrupted, the final cognition would lack evidential support, since there is no contact through universals. Thus an eternal cognition is established, having first-order cognition, pleasure and the like as objects, and itself as object. Having itself as object does not require contact producing itself and the like, just as the Lord’s eternal knowledge, whose object is everything, does not require contact and the like. The formulation is therefore: ‘Caitra’s pleasure, suffering and the like are objects of Caitra’s eternal immediate knowledge, because for him they exist only as known. Whatever exists only as known to someone is an object of manifestation of that kind for him, like the Lord’s effort.’ When eternal knowledge is established: ‘It has itself as object, because it is eternal knowledge, because it does not depend on another for designation of itself, and because it opposes doubt and the like concerning itself, like the Lord’s knowledge.’ Therefore knowledge, an eternal quality of the self, possesses self-luminosity in the form of having itself as object. The self too is its object because it is identical with that knowledge, which lasts as long as the substance, and because of the experience ‘I know myself’. ‘Consciousness that is the self’s nature has itself as object, because it is an object of designation produced by itself.’ ‘The stated consciousness has itself as subject, because it opposes doubt having itself as the qualified subject and selfhood as the qualifying aspect in the same locus as itself, or because it opposes error possessing the stated qualifications.’ This argument is rejected. In the first inference, the conclusion is already established through being an object of eternal immediate knowledge in the form of the witness. Moreover, existence only as known is possible even through knowledge arising simultaneously, so it cannot establish eternity in that knowledge. Nor is the recollection of Caitra on waking inappropriate without knowledge of that kind: a latent impression explains it, and eternal knowledge would oppose recollection. In the inference of having oneself as object, the example is unestablished: eternal knowledge having itself as object is unestablished even in the Lord. The reason also fails to entail the conclusion, since designation and the like have been explained even without having oneself as object. Moreover, no single regulator exists for Caitra’s eternal knowledge having itself as object. On the Nyāya view, the Lord’s knowledge can have everything as object through thinghood; identity too cannot regulate it, since it is absent in suffering and the like. Nor can sharing a locus regulate it, since it is absent in the self and present in merit and the like. Thus a non-recurring regulator must be stated. What then has the Guru done wrong in holding that first-order cognition is self-luminous? Even though contact regulates elsewhere, identity is possible in its own case. The dispute of experience over experiencing or not experiencing separation applies equally on your view. Therefore let a non-recurring factor itself cause designation. Why insist on a recurring factor to account for it, when in the end the result is non-recurrence anyway? Thus self-luminosity is not having oneself as object, but fitness for immediate designation while not being known. This is established. Here ends the justification of the self’s self-luminosity in the Advaita Siddhi. 12. 13. Refutation of not being directly expressible. Since Brahman is without properties and is not an object of knowledge, words such as ‘bliss’ imply it rather than directly express it, because a ground of application is absent. Objection: if it is expressed by ‘inexpressible’, direct expressibility is established. If it is implied, how can implication occur when there is no primary meaning in the form of the inexpressible? If such a meaning exists, Brahman would not be inexpressible, but, like a bank, merely related to a primary meaning consisting in the inexpressible. If even what lacks a primary meaning can imply Brahman, ‘pot’ too could imply a pot. Reply: no. Even without a primary meaning consisting in the inexpressible, the word ‘expressible’, combined with negation, conveys absolute absence of direct expressibility and thereby culminates in the nature through implication alone. The same applies to ‘without distinctions’. The rule that a primary meaning must exist applies only when an unanalysable word implies. Objection: then, if it is implied even by ‘implied’, Brahman would be not implied, just as a bank is not the Ganges. Reply: no; we accept that consequence, since it is entirely without properties. Designating it ‘implied’ is based on absence of direct expressibility, as explained earlier. Nor does absence of being implied then lead to designation as directly expressed. We accept even that as figurative. The words beginning ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ express imagined properties and imply the individual consisting in Brahman, so their undivided meaning is not lost. Nor should one say that, if Brahman is not implied as a locus of properties such as existence, but merely through relation to existence and the like, nonexistence and the like would follow, just as a person implied merely through relation to a platform is not a platform. Just as an imagined universal such as moonhood is identical with the absolutely real individual moon and the like, so that absence of moonhood does not follow, here too absence of existence and the like does not follow. It is said: ‘Even the implied individual, Brahman ...’. This also rejects the claim: if self-luminosity and the like are not Brahman, whatever is intended as Brahman is not Brahman; the doctrine of Brahman has certainly been well supported! Some say: one cannot claim that words such as ‘without distinctions’, being compounds, and words such as ‘implied’, being etymologically derived, do not express directly because they resemble sentences. On the theory that connected meanings are expressed, they too directly express; even on the theory that separately expressed meanings are subsequently connected, connection of expressed meanings is accepted only in a sentence, so base and suffix express connected meanings. Thus even what resembles a sentence directly expresses. If Brahman is a relation among word-meanings, division follows; if it is a word-meaning, direct expressibility cannot be avoided. This is incorrect. Even being implied by a word is compatible with not being a word-meaning, since sentence-meaning even when undivided has been explained. On the theory that connected meanings are expressed, implication concerning the nature is accepted even for what directly expresses something connected. Nor does not being directly expressible remain unestablished. Inexpressibility and the like, obtained as means to establishing undivided Brahman, are established incidentally in the absence of anything preventing them. Scripture such as ‘From which words turn back’ and ‘Without sound, without touch’ should also be considered here. Like ‘inexpressible’, ‘without sound’ contains no contradiction. Nor does this scripture intend merely wonderfulness, since nothing opposes its meaning as heard. Nor should one say that ‘From which words’ also says ‘Together with the mind’, so that, just as a mental modification pervades Brahman, a verbal operation cannot be wholly negated there either. Implication is accepted, and only expressive power is denied. Nor should one say that it is more appropriate to take the meaning of the single word ‘turn back’ non-literally than the meanings of many words such as ‘bliss’. Since Brahman is without properties, expressive power does not operate there, so number is not decisive. Moreover, because the undivided meaning is intended precisely through a meaning opposed to direct expressibility, that opposition remains. Hence in scripture such as ‘Why is it called the highest Brahman?’ and traditional teaching such as ‘It is also called the highest self’, direct expressibility is spoken of merely through being conveyed by the respective words, not with the intention of being directly expressible through their power. Thus these do not conflict. If one argues, ‘Brahman, the object of the intention, is directly expressible because it is a thing and because it is implied, like a bank’, direct expressibility is contradicted by its freedom from properties, and unstated conditions such as possession of properties are possible, being brought to light by that opposition. Nor is ‘The expression “absolutely real” and the like directly expresses something, because it is a word’ sound. What is wordhood here? Not ending in a nominal or verbal inflection, since there is an exception in compounds such as ‘king’s man’, which lack a single expressive power. Nor is it possessing expressive power, since that does not differ from the property to be established. If a compound directly expresses through its parts, we accept that. Nor is ‘The sentence beginning “Truth, knowledge” contains a word intending a directly expressed meaning, because it is a sentence’ sound: ‘Eat poison’ and the like are exceptions. Objection: if it is not directly expressible, it cannot be implied, since only what is known as related to a directly expressed meaning can be implied. That knowledge cannot come from something other than words, since Brahman is accessible only through the Upanishads; nor through self-luminosity, since words would be pointless for what is eternally established. Moreover, ‘inexpressible’ itself must be said to imply, and, if there too something must be known as related to a directly expressed meaning, infinite regress follows. Reply: no. Such knowledge assists presentation. Brahman, being self-luminous, is presented of itself, so what need is there for that knowledge? Nor are words thereby pointless: they assist the modification that overcomes the covering. Hence there is no infinite regress either. Therefore Brahman is not directly expressible because a ground of application cannot be defined. It is said: ‘Quality, action, universal and relation are observed as grounds for words. None of these exists in the self; therefore the self is not directly expressed.’ Nor is it directly expressible as the locus of an imagined quality. That is not the object of the intention, and inexpressibility is established regarding the object of the intention. Nor is there mutual dependence, with absence of a ground established when the words beginning ‘truth’ are established as implying, and implication established when that absence is established. The absence of a ground is established precisely by the sentence teaching absence of distinctions, ‘Not this, not this’. Nor should one say that, if the sentence teaching absence of distinctions concerns the nature alone, it does not oppose a ground of application; while if it concerns what is qualified by absence of distinctions, that very qualification exists, making it directly expressible by ‘without distinctions’. What is presented as an avenue opposes both itself and others, and what is without distinctions cannot be directly expressed. Therefore identity of the individual self and Brahman is established precisely through freedom from distinctions, since no differentiator is possible. Thus: ‘Let that shameless learned person who apprehends direct expressibility in inexpressible Brahman be awakened through the absence of grounds of application.’ Here ends the justification of Brahman’s not being directly expressed by words in the Advaita Siddhi. 13. 14. Defence of the general refutation of difference. One might object: this is inappropriate, since difference is established by means of knowledge. Nor should one argue that, if difference were the very nature, it would be independent, so it must be a property, producing infinite regress; and apprehending mutual difference between a post and a pot depends on apprehending their difference from one another, producing mutual dependence; thus difference is unestablished. Is there no cognition at all of difference, is it not produced by a cause, or does it have a sublated object? Not the first: dealings in the form of making choices and the like would collapse, since there is no choice involving something not known as different. Not the second: causeless production is contradictory, so the cognition would be eternal, and one would not pursue the means to liberation that removes it. Not the third: the stated bare reasoning does not sublate it. Otherwise cognition of unity too would have a sublated object, through arguments such as: if unity is the very nature, independence follows; if a property, non-duality is lost. Nor should one say, ‘As a mere critic, I need only refute the other side’. If you can be such while holding your own position, I too can be such without conflict. Nor should one say, ‘Merely refuting the other side establishes unity, my own view’. For me too, that alone could establish difference, my own view. Nor should one say, ‘Because I am assigned only to refute difference in reply to you, I alone am a mere critic’. I too can be assigned only to refute unity in reply to you, since the impartial judge is not under your control. When you say, ‘You must refute unity only through arguments that do not contradict themselves’, it can equally be said, ‘You must refute difference only through arguments that do not contradict themselves’. Reply: not so. We deny neither the existence nor the cause of cognition of difference, but say that its object is sublated. Difference is sublated by reasoning that is not bare, being supported by pervasion, and by scripture and traditional teaching that intend no other meaning. Conflict with perception has been resolved through difference of subject and the like, so scripture and the like do not have a figurative meaning here. As for the claim that identity is refuted in the same way, and that arguments refuting identity are not fallacious through contradicting themselves by preventing even something’s identity with itself, because arguments refuting difference equally contradict themselves through identity with supporting arguments, that is incorrect. Although the arguments refuting difference remove absolute difference, they do not deny empirical difference, so they can avoid contradicting themselves. Nor, when unreal difference is absolutely negated in Brahman, does identity with it follow there. In the case of an error imagining difference in a pot from another imagined pot, identity with that is not observed. Nor should identity too be absolutely negated: that would fail to culminate in the nature and would entail nihilism. Moreover, for us no unity additional to Brahman exists at all. Negating Brahman in that way conflicts with scripture. Nor should one say, ‘For me no difference additional to a pot exists; negating it conflicts with perception’. We have already said that perception does not concern absolute existence and so supplies no conflict. Objection: what sublates difference cannot concern difference itself, since it would then establish it. Nor can it concern identity: then the object, the meaning of negation, must be something other than difference, something opposed to it, or its absence. In every case difference is hard to avoid. If it is not different from difference, opposition to difference and absence of difference are impossible; even what apprehends absence of difference apprehends absence as distinct from its counterpositive. Moreover, what operates neutrally would fail to sublate, like the cognition ‘This’. Reply: no. Precisely what concerns absence of difference under the aspect of absolute reality sublates it. Nor is difference hard to avoid. Empirical difference alone can explain empirical opposition to it and empirical absence of it, by the principle ‘The offering suits the spirit’. Knowledge concerning the reality of the substratum of the error of difference can appropriately sublate that error, since apprehension of it as distinct from difference is possible in the manner stated. Some say: sublating knowledge must have the form ‘This is not difference’, ‘There is no difference here’, or ‘Something else appeared as difference’, like ‘This is not silver’. This comprehends difference in every way, so how can it sublate difference? This is incorrect. Apprehending it as a counterpositive does not conflict with sublating it. Nor should one say that ‘There is no difference here’ does not comprehend absence of difference in every respect. If difference existed elsewhere, difference from that would be necessary here. Thus ‘There is no difference here’ itself culminates in ‘There is none anywhere’. One should understand a sublating cognition such as ‘One alone appeared as many’. We have already stated how, through apprehending the alternatives as possessing empirical difference, sublation is possible. This also rejects the verse: ‘Does sublating cognition comprehend its own meaning as different from difference, or not? In the first case difference remains stable; in the latter it would not sublate difference.’ Even though stable in its own form, it can be unstable absolutely. Thus, because objecthood is not established, objections such as mutual dependence arise; once arisen, they are not fallacious. Moreover, this semblance of an objection addresses those who offer a definition, not us. We say that the difference that appears is indefinable through inclusion in or exclusion from alternatives such as being the nature, or through some other property. Nor, if indefinability is established by fallacious reasoning, does the same follow for unity. The non-fallacious character of what sublates difference has been stated, and unity and difference differ through being supported or unsupported by scripture. Objection: distinction from unreality and the like in Brahman must be stated as not sublated by knowledge of Brahman, since a pot and the like, not of the nature of the void and the like, are seen to differ from the void and the like in a way not sublated by knowledge of themselves. Reply: Brahman and a pot differ as substratum and superimposed thing. Since unreality is false, its distinction too can appropriately be false; being sublated by knowledge of the pot is common to both. Nor should one say that distinction from apparent silver and the like would then itself be apparent, so error and sublation could not be distinguished. We accept its apparent character, since sublation and error can be distinguished through being or not being produced by seeing the distinctive feature. Nor does the sentence beginning ‘Truth’, which conveys distinction from unreality, thereby become invalid: that distinction is obtained from the sense. Nor should one say that, just as distinction is false, an absolute absence whose counterpositive is false would also be false, so falsity in the form of being the counterpositive of an absolute absence not sublated by knowledge of the substratum would not obtain. Being sublated by knowledge of the substratum is not a qualifier there. Nor should one say that, if difference from the body in the self is sublated, identity of body and self would not be false. We have said that falsity of difference does not establish non-falsity of identity with the counterpositive. Nor should one say that knowledge discriminating the eternal and non-eternal, included among the four means, would be error, and could not therefore lead one to abandon the non-eternal and pursue the eternal. A cognition comprehending an aspect useful for rejection and acceptance has empirical validity, so empirical rejection and acceptance cannot be prevented. This also rejects the consequence that, if the world’s distinction from existence is false, identity with existence follows, and the means of knowledge for the world’s falsity would not reveal reality. An answer has also been stated in defining falsity. This also rejects the claim that, if identity does not differ from difference, refuting or establishing either would refute or establish both. Even without absolute difference, an imagined difference explains their distinction. Nor is it impossible for something imagined to obstruct an unimagined effect. Ignorance is seen to obstruct the effect of Brahman, whose nature is self-luminous, and an imagined beloved is seen to obstruct the effect of separation. Objection: even for difference to have empirical existence, you must remove mutual dependence and the like, since dealings too cannot occur through what is mutually dependent. Empirical clay does not depend on the pot produced by it. Moreover, here (1) mutual dependence and the like are not deduced merely from difference or from merely seeing it: then even their empirical status would be unestablished. (2) Nor do they follow from the reality of its cognition: just as the final modification is unreal while its object is real, this is possible here. Moreover, since mutual dependence is not observed in what is real, pervasion is unestablished. (3) Nor are they deduced from cognition of it as valid: you have stated mutual dependence in cognition generally, so no defect extends as far as its validity. (4) Nor are they deduced from its cognition’s dependence on the property-bearer and counterpositive: that would remove only its dependence on them. Reply: no. For us, the power of ignorance can sweep away every impossibility. Nothing is impossible in māyā. Thus it will display even what is mutually dependent, like a magical show. Nor should one say that, through the Lord’s power, something of that kind could also be real. Effects transgressing the arrangement of causes and the like are seen in a magical show, false as accepted by both sides, but not elsewhere. If seen elsewhere, they too culminate in falsity. The deduction is: if difference and its cognition were not produced by māyā, they would not transgress every arrangement; but they do transgress every arrangement. Therefore they are produced by māyā. The argument culminates in this contrary conclusion, and pervasion is established through observing transgression of arrangements in what is produced by māyā. Difference is sublated by the stated scripture and by reasoning that does not contradict itself, while identity is not sublated. Thus, although identity with oneself and difference from oneself are equally empirical, leaving identity with oneself aside and directing opposition entirely against difference is not without a reason. Here ends the general refutation of difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 14. 15. Defence of the specific refutation of difference. Objection: the claim that dependence is inappropriate if difference is an independent nature is itself inappropriate. On your view, cessation of ignorance and identity of the individual self and Brahman, on both views, depend for their existence; every universal depends on an individual; and being bluer and the like depend for their apprehension. Yet these are seen to consist in independent Brahman, individuals and the like. So too knowledge consisting in illumination of an object, Brahman’s identity with Brahman, and existence depending on time in ‘Brahman exists’ and the like. Reply: no. The dependence, in apprehension, of cessation of ignorance and identity of the individual self and Brahman is due to ignorance, and does not oppose absolute independence. Identity of every universal with an individual is unestablished. It is absent in pothood and the like, which have the same order of reality as the individual. In universals such as existence, which do not have the same order of reality as the individual, dependence is imagined. There is no reason establishing that being bluer and the like consist in the individual. The dependence of knowledge consisting in illumination of an object, and of Brahman’s identity, is imagined. The same applies in ‘Brahman exists’ and the like. Thus, since sharing a locus with absolute independence is unestablished, no pervasion establishing the reasoning as fallacious is established. This also rejects the following: if unity is not the nature, non-duality is lost; if false, difference would be real, by pervasions such as ‘Where something is superimposed, what opposes it is not sublated by knowledge of that locus, as non-silverhood in a shell’; or ‘Where identity with something is sublated, difference from it is not sublated by knowledge of that locus, as difference between trees seen from afar’; or ‘Where something is superimposed, what opposes it is absolute, as truth is absolute when unreality is superimposed in Brahman’. Unity is not accepted as different from Brahman. Everything opposing or conforming to something is imagined in Brahman and sublated by knowledge of it, so those pervasions are unestablished. Objection: if unity is independent, sentences such as ‘Truth, a mass of cognition’, concerning the meanings of ‘that’ and ‘you’, would not form one sentence with the great sentence concerning unity, and would be pointless. Reply: no. Although unity, being identical with self-luminous Brahman, is independent in existence, apprehension and the like, it depends on word-meanings in producing a modification that removes the error of difference between the implied meanings. Thus the sentences concerning the nature form a single sentence. Dependence is spoken of there through dependence on the counterpositive in the form of difference. Nor does reversal follow, as with difference, the meaning of negation in ‘A pot is not a cloth’, being negation of identity. If identity is the distinctive property residing in the thing, difference does not depend on identity. If identity has the form of non-difference, it depends on difference itself, so difference does not depend on it. Nor does this make unity dependent: imagined dependence is accepted. This also rejects the claim that difference can be dependent even though it is the nature, like cessation of ignorance, cognition in the form of Brahman, and identity. The examples differ because on your view both kinds of dependence are absolute. Nor should the same apply to difference: difference is heard as a counterpositive of negation and does not have the nature of Brahman. There is no scripture teaching identity in its case. This also rejects the claim that, just as identity, though independent as the nature, is dependent as identity, so a pot, though independent as the nature, can be dependent as difference; and that having or not having a counterpositive is similarly determined by different delimitors. If difference is independent and without a counterpositive in its own nature, it is indistinguishable in relation to oneself as in relation to others, producing self-contradiction. Nor should one object that identity too would then have that character in relation to others, as it does in relation to itself. We accept the consequence. Difference through pothood and the like is merely imagined; in its nature there is identity alone. In that case only otherness is contradicted, not also being the nature. Some distinguish having and not having a counterpositive as follows: what, when apprehended distinctively under the delimitation of the ground for applying its own expression, depends on apprehension of a counterpositive has a counterpositive; the rest does not. This is incorrect. If difference is the very nature, its being other than that nature is unestablished. This also rejects the following: just as one thing is independent when described through lightness, hardness and the like, yet dependent when described through not being heavy, not being fluid and the like, so what is independent when described as a pot can be dependent when described as difference. Dependence and independence are experienced even without words being mentioned. Moreover, as with dissolution and the like, the example is not accepted merely because a negative particle is not mentioned. Nor should one say that the same motion, expressed through ‘goes’ and ‘moves’, and the same effort, expressed through ‘does’ and ‘sets about’, are seen to depend or not depend on an object through the nature of the words, so here too dependence and independence could follow from mentioning ‘pot’ and ‘difference’. Transitivity and the like belonging to the meaning do not depend on a word’s nature. Rather, in the very same root tap the two are seen through difference of meaning, as in ‘The sage practises austerity’ and ‘The sun heats the earth’. Thus the meanings in the examples themselves differ. On the view that the result is a root’s meaning, there is difference of meaning in the form of conjunction. On the other view, ‘goes’ means movement delimited by a subsequent conjunction, ‘moves’ means movement resulting in prior separation, ‘does’ means conducive effort, and ‘strives’ means effort alone. Nor should one say that only differencehood is dependent, rather than difference. The subject itself is experienced as dependent; otherwise one would say ‘Differencehood having a pot as its counterpositive’. This also rejects the claim that, since it is said ‘Because it is of the nature of being and absence, mutual absence is not separate’, difference is not the mere nature but mutual absence; and since that is said to be identical with the thing with a distinction, the pot and the like itself is difference as both being and absence. In the case of a pot and its absence, being and absence are conceived as opposed. How then can their locus be one? Nor should one ask how cessation of ignorance and non-duality too can be identical with Brahman. On our view, absencehood there is imagined and due to māyā, so there is no opposition. On yours, both are absolute and the opposition is hard to avoid. This also rejects these definitions: difference from something is the nature consisting in inability to be identical with it; or not being an object of valid cognition of unity with it; or opposition to superimposition of identity with it wherever it is seen; or not being a locus of some property present in what does not bear some property occurring in oneself; or being a locus of a property not present in what bears some property not occurring in oneself. And not being a locus means absence of being a locus, not being other than a locus, so there is no mutual dependence. If it is the nature, dependence is inappropriate; if additional, infinite regress follows. Absolute absence and mutual absence would become identical, and, since valid cognition, seeing and the like enter the definitions, they would be inaccessible to the eye and the like. Moreover, if difference is the nature of a pot, the counterpositive determining it too would have to be that nature. For the pot is not merely of the nature of difference, but of difference having a cloth as counterpositive. Objection: this is no defect. The counterpositive of difference is an indication and does not enter into its being the nature. Otherwise, because cessation of suffering is a human goal, suffering too would be a human goal; because absence of a defect accounts for being a proof, the defect too would account for being a proof; because distinction from unreality, cessation of ignorance, and knowledge consisting in illumination of ignorance and the like have the nature of Brahman, unreality and the like too would have that nature; and because cessation of ignorance is liberation, ignorance too would be liberation. Nor, because ears and the like are seen to connect as qualifiers in ‘long-eared’ and the like, must the same apply here. Why should it not be as in ‘possessing variegated cows’ and the like, where they do not connect? Otherwise there is no explanation in the cited cases. Nor should one say that, if the counterpositive is an indication, difference would be known even when it is unknown, like a house known without knowing the crow. We accept the consequence, and otherwise the cited cases cannot be explained. Some, however, say that even when the counterpositive does not connect, it is still a qualifier here, like soundhood and the like in ‘Sound is impermanent’. Reply: no. We do not deduce that a cloth has the form of a pot because it enters the connection ‘Difference from a cloth is a pot’s nature’, nor merely because it determines that difference as its counterpositive. Rather, we do so because, as counterpositive, it determines a nature that is an object of cognition in apposition, like the counterpositive determining identity. Cessation of ignorance and the like are not objects of cognition in apposition. Difference, however, is an object of cognition in apposition in ‘A pot is not a cloth’. Otherwise being an object of cognition of negation in apposition would not define difference. This also rejects the verses: ‘As suffering is not included in the human goal, as ignorance is not included in Brahman, and as delusion is not included in liberation, so a pot and the like are not included in a cloth. Even if a pot and the like are incidental indicators, without apprehending them there is no cognition of difference, just as without apprehending ignorance and the like there is no apprehension of their cessation and the like.’ Moreover, if difference, whose nature is splitting, is the nature of a pot, the pot too would be split, and so would its parts. Thus even an atom would not be one, and nothingness would follow: without one, the many, consisting in a collection of ones, would also be absent. Objection: if identity, whose nature is not splitting, is Brahman’s nature, absolute Brahman would not be split even from the empirical, apparent and nonexistent, and identity with them too would follow. Nor should one say that only identity with the individual self is the nature, not identity with pots and the like. Then here too only difference from pots and the like is the nature of a cloth, not difference from itself, and the cases are equal. Reply: no. If difference is the nature and its counterpositive is known through a cognition not obstructed by cognition of itself, it necessarily splits itself. Being the nature, it must have itself as counterpositive, like identity. Among the properties of a pot, difference having a pot as counterpositive is accepted just like difference having a cloth as counterpositive. The cognition ‘A pot differs from a pot’ is as firmly established as ‘A pot differs from a cloth’. Some say that splitting from oneself would merely divide parts into something subtle, not produce nothingness: nothing has arisen from conjunction of nothing. This is incorrect. Splitting here does not mean dividing, but opposing oneness. Thus, in the absence of one, the many is all the more absent, and the result is precisely nothingness. This also rejects the following: a splitting sickle and the like split only what is related to themselves, not themselves; thus, if difference is the nature, it would not split itself. Moreover, difference does not mean a splitter, since its derivation denotes the act of splitting. A pot would therefore not be split by difference that is its nature, because operation in oneself is opposed. Since difference has the nature of division in the form of splitting, and division invariably occurs in what is divided, an infinite regress of parts leaves the consequence of nothingness unchanged. This also rejects the following: difference is not splitting in the form of division, but mutual absence, since roots have many meanings. It is said: ‘One meaning is presented in each case to indicate that roots express action; their many meanings must be followed from usage.’ Otherwise one could not call conjoined things different. Even if difference has the nature of mutual absence, difference having potsherds and the like, its support, as counterpositive has the nature of a pot and the like, which rests on that support. Thus the potsherds and the like would be loci of difference having themselves as counterpositive; their oneness would be broken, and through infinite regress of parts the result would again be nothingness. This also rejects the claim that one cannot first remove oneness by difference inhering in the same thing as plurality and then remove plurality through that oneness, since this conflicts with what must be relied upon. Without touching plurality at all, absence of unity is deduced merely from difference having oneself as counterpositive. Hence the teachers say: ‘Because difference opposes oneness, which inheres in the same thing as identity.’ The claim based on opposition to operation in oneself is incorrect. We do not accept an operation in the form of division and the like, while an operation in the form of opposing another and the like exists everywhere. Moreover, if difference were the nature, doubt and the like would not arise. When the property-bearer is known, ignorance of difference would be absent; when it is unknown, the very condition is absent. Objection: if identity is the nature, the impossibility of doubt and the like is equally yours. If it occurs because identity is unknown as identity, for me too it occurs because difference is unknown as difference. Reply: no. If difference is the nature, the reasoning entailing nothingness removes the alternatives themselves. Nor should one say that, if identity is the nature, the alternative of difference is removed on your view too. Doubt is explained by taking an imagined alternative. Nor is the alternative of a differentiating existence and the like imagined on your view too: we have said that nothingness follows. Some say: just as, although consciousness previously shines of itself, the unity and unlimited bliss identical with it do not manifest, so, although the property-bearer manifests, difference identical with it need not manifest. Moreover, if unity manifested, there would be no disagreement about it and teaching it would be pointless. This is incorrect. Although unity and the like are the self-luminous nature, that nature does not oppose ignorance and its effects, disagreement and the like. Thus, until an opposing modification concerning it arises, the stated difficulties do not occur. Nor should one say that disagreement would then arise even regarding the inward self: it is observed even there among the Cārvākas and others. Therefore ignorance does not cover manifestation of the inward self that must be relied upon as the locus of ignorance and so forth; it does cover the aspects beginning with unity, and disagreement and the like occur there. Nor should one say that here too the aspect of difference is covered through defects such as similarity. On your view, which holds that superimposition is preceded by cognition of the principal thing, this is impossible because the alternative is not presented. Some say: difference that is the nature does appear as difference, since something is generally apprehended as different from everything; otherwise doubt would concern every alternative. Many properties, such as having a pot as counterpositive, would then be unapprehended through similarity and the like and become objects of doubt. Difference, though determined by many things, need not become many because its determinants are many. The Lord’s knowledge and the like, though of that kind, and non-duality determined by many dualities are seen to be one; prior absence and destruction, though determined by one thing, are seen not to be one. This is incorrect. We do not assert difference merely through difference of determinants. Rather, difference of absences is necessary through difference of the delimitor of counterpositiveness; otherwise the four absences, destruction and the rest, having one pot as counterpositive, would be identical. Nor do those who hold absence to be the locus itself distinguish absences only through difference of loci: destruction and prior absence would become identical, and their distinct designations would not occur. Nor does this make unity impossible even in non-duality. The delimitor of counterpositiveness, being other than Brahman, is one; difference or identity among counterpositives is not decisive. Some say that knowledge of difference does not oppose error; rather, knowledge of the substratum’s properties opposed to what is superimposed and the like does so. This is incorrect: a verbal error of identity would then fail to cease through verbal knowledge of difference. Some define difference that is the nature as ‘Appearance, rooted in no defect, when there is no appearance in that nature’. A shell’s failure to appear as a shell is rooted in a defect, so the definition does not wrongly include it. Although ‘rooted in no defect’ cannot qualify the locative expression, by qualifying the qualified whole it culminates in qualifying that expression. This is incorrect. Appearance when something does not appear in that nature is common to identity too, so knowledge extending to being rooted in no defect must be stated as the cause of designating difference. But being rooted in no defect can be inferred only from the result, and so this could not be visual. Since cognition enters the definition, difference would also be absent when cognition is absent. Moreover, when a shell appears as silver, you would have no difference from silver there. Qualifying the absence with ‘rooted in no defect’ cannot prevent that failure to include the case. What is not a locus of the subject is all the more not a locus of the qualified thing: a staff-bearing man is impossible where there is no man. Nor does ‘rooted in no defect’ qualify the counterpositive, like ‘body’ in ‘not produced by a body’, in order to include what is sublated. An uncompounded word cannot connect with ‘appearance’ compounded with negation. ‘A non-Brahmin is good’ does not convey absence of a good Brahmin. And if one states absence of cognition qualified by identity rooted in no defect, the problem remains: when a shell does not appear as silver because the required conditions are absent, and does not appear as a shell either, difference from itself follows. Nor should one say that even then it appears as the shell that is appearing, by taking the Lord’s knowledge. Then there would be no state of non-appearance, and ‘appearing’ would be pointless. Nor is difference mutual-absencehood, since that has not been defined. The teachers say: ‘Because it is dependent and delimited; because, if it were the reality, non-duality would follow; because one would be absent; and because doubt would be absent, difference is not a thing’s nature.’ Moreover, if a pot is difference, only one of the two would remain. Objection: if unity, knowledge and bliss are Brahman’s nature, the consequence that only one remains is equally yours. Nor can you accept it on the ground that the thing is one, since the present case is the same. Reply: no. By the consequence that only one remains, we deduce the absence of distinct designations, ‘pot’ and ‘difference’. Nor is this explained by different grounds of application, pothood and differencehood, since differencehood cannot be defined. It is not a universal, because it is common to universals and the like. Nor is it a condition in the form of absence whose counterpositive is delimited by identity and the like. If identity is absence of difference, there is mutual dependence; if it is a distinctive property residing in the thing, the definition wrongly includes absolute absence whose counterpositive is delimited by that property. If differencehood too is the nature, a recurring designation would not occur. Nor should one say that distinct designations would likewise not occur in knowledge, bliss and the like. Imagined differences of properties explain them. Nor should one say that differencehood too should be such: you would then be beyond refutation. Moreover, if difference were the nature, cognition of it as related, ‘This is different’, ‘Its difference’, would not occur. Nor is this explained like ‘Brahman’s bliss’. Where unity is established by a means of knowledge, the designation of difference is supposed figurative, as in ‘Rahu’s head’ and the like. That is not so here, since there is no means establishing unity, and an opposing consideration exists. Nor does the impossibility of one alternative itself justify adopting another. In a hare’s horn and the like, the impossibility of either being or absence would then entail accepting the other. Nor should one say that, because both face opposing considerations, utter nonexistence explains that case: here too, because both face opposing considerations, its being due to ignorance can explain it. Objection: there is perception of identity establishing that difference is the nature. Just as in ‘A pot is clay’, in ‘A pot is not of the nature of a cloth’, difference consisting in negation of identity with a cloth shares a locus with the pot. There is also an indicative sign: whenever either a pot or its difference is apprehended, the other is invariably apprehended. Revelation too says, ‘Difference truly is the nature of things; there is no doubt here’, and the like. Reply: no. ‘A pot is not of the nature of a cloth’ and the like concern difference in the form of mutual absence, not identity with difference. Otherwise ‘A pot is blue’ and the like too would concern identity with colour. The sign is unestablished before identity is established. A general pervasion admits an exception in universals, individuals and the like known by the same consciousness; even a particular pervasion admits an exception in the counterpositive. The revelation intends absence apart from the substratum. Moreover, is difference from a cloth the form of a pot alone, or the form of everything, pots, walls and the like? On the first alternative, a wall and the like would not be difference from a cloth. On the second, since those natures do not recur, a recurring cognition of difference from a cloth would not occur. Nor should one say that, just as recurring designation in knowledge, desire and the like concerning a cloth arises through the recurring feature of having a cloth as object, so here it arises through having a cloth as counterpositive. That much would give recurrence only in the aspect of having a cloth as counterpositive, just as ‘Knowledge concerning a cloth’, ‘Desire concerning a cloth’ recur only in the aspect of having a cloth as object; it would not give recurrence in the aspect of difference too. Nor has differencehood too been said to be one. Moreover, when difference is apprehended as involving a property-bearer and counterpositive, ‘This differs from that’ or ‘Its difference from that’, there is mutual dependence. Knowledge of the property-bearer and counterpositive yields knowledge of difference; and once that exists, distinct knowledge of the property-bearer and counterpositive occurs as ‘Its’, ‘From that’. Even when apprehended as qualifying pot and cloth in ‘Pot and cloth differ’, or as qualified by them in ‘Their difference’, there is mutual dependence. Cognition of pot and cloth yields apprehension of difference as qualified by them and the like, while apprehension of difference yields cognition of pot and cloth delimited by twoness. Nor should one suspect that, since difference is the nature, cognition of the nature itself is cognition of difference; there are not two cognitions, and so the stated defect is absent. Even if cognition of the nature is not a second cognition, knowledge of the counterpositive, additional to cognition of the nature, is required as a second. Nor should one say that, since an error ‘This consists of everything’ is not observed, a thing is experienced as generally distinct from everything in ‘This does not consist of everything’, so no knowledge of a particular counterpositive is required and there is no mutual dependence. In ‘It does not consist of everything’, is everythinghood the delimitor of counterpositiveness, or is it being everything other than itself? In the first case, distinction from itself makes its own establishment impossible; in the second, mutual dependence is plain. Nor should one say that, just as ‘All this indeed is Brahman’ speaks of everything not apprehended as having Brahman’s nature, so here ‘From everything’ intends everything unknown as having its nature. Before apprehension of itself, itself too is unknown in its own nature, and would therefore become a counterpositive. Moreover, if ‘everything’ in the example is unrestricted, you do not accept it. Nor should one say that knowledge of what is actually different from the locus of difference, without its being known as identical, causes knowledge of difference as knowledge of the counterpositive, rather than as knowledge qualified by difference. Then the error of seeing two moons would not occur, since there is actually no difference. Objection: in ‘This exists; I do not know’, ‘All this indeed is Brahman’ and the like, a thing, ignorance and identity are apprehended together with time, the object and everything, established by the witness. Likewise here, distinction is apprehended together with the counterpositive established by the witness, so there is no mutual dependence. Reply: no. Even though cognition of something qualified is not produced by cognition of its qualifier, positive and negative concomitance establish that determinate cognition of the counterpositive produces cognition of absence. Without depending on a means of knowledge, the witness does not apprehend a cloth and the like, the counterpositive, as different from the property-bearer. How then can difference be apprehended through a counterpositive established by the witness? The Cintāmaṇi says: ‘Otherwise even indeterminate cognition would lead to the modification “There is no pot”.’ Nor should one say that only cognition qualified by pothood and the like, delimiting counterpositiveness, is required, rather than knowledge extending to difference from the property-bearer. Without knowledge of its difference from the delimitor of property-bearerhood, it cannot determine absence as a delimitor of counterpositiveness. And when the difference between the respective properties is known, the mutual dependence remains: apprehending specifically a pot’s difference from a post requires cognition of the post’s difference from the pot. Objection: even on your view, in the identity of original Brahman and individual selves with reflected Brahman, cognition would occur as ‘This is identical with that’, ‘Its identity with that’, or ‘Their identity’. Knowledge of the relation of property-bearer and counterpositive, and cognition delimited by twoness, depend on knowledge of difference, making the opposed knowledge of identity inappropriate. Reply: no. Knowledge of imagined difference, accounting for cognition of property-bearer, counterpositive and twoness, cannot obstruct knowledge of absolute identity. Moreover, knowledge of identity does not require knowledge of a counterpositive in the form of a property-bearer, since identity is the nature of a thing without a counterpositive. Speaking of it as having a counterpositive is due to the difference determining it having a counterpositive. This also rejects the objection that there is mutual dependence because the individual self determines identity with Brahman as counterpositive only when known as identical with it: only what is apprehended as identical with the property-bearer is a counterpositive of identity, since otherwise fire too would be a counterpositive of identity with snow. Apprehension of difference obstructs that. This also rejects the following attempted equal reply, devised by imagining the opponent’s doctrine: to prevent the qualified thing directly expressed by ‘you’ from becoming the counterpositive of identity with Brahman in ‘You are that’, apprehension of an existing identity under an aspect fit for identity, such as consciousnesshood, causes cognition of identity when no obstruction exists. In an error of difference, the defect obstructs, so cognition of identity does not arise. Similarly, on the nature-difference alternative, the differences constituting pot and cloth, actually having each other as counterpositive, when apprehended under forms such as pothood and clothhood fit for mutual counterpositiveness, produce qualified cognition of them as having each other as counterpositive if no obstruction exists. On the property-difference alternative too, apprehension of an existing difference under forms fit for difference, such as blueness and yellowness, causes cognition of difference if no obstruction exists. In trees seen from afar and the like, defects such as distance obstruct, so cognition of difference does not arise. The cases have already been shown to differ. Objection: in ‘A cow resembles a wild ox’ and the like, the existing difference of the wild ox and the like from the cow and the like causes counterpositiveness, not a known difference. Even the perceptual cognition ‘A cow resembles a wild ox’ is not experienced as invariably preceded by cognition ‘A wild ox differs from a cow’; still less is verbal cognition, since there is no word expressing difference there. So too here. Otherwise, only when Maitra’s being Caitra’s son and the like were known could Caitra’s being Maitra’s father be known; and only when a wild ox’s resemblance to a cow were known could one know ‘A cow resembles a wild ox’. Thus every meaning having a counterpositive would involve mutual dependence. Reply: no; we accept that consequence. For this very reason our established conclusion is that difference, similarity and the like are hard to state either as having or as not having a counterpositive, since an opposing consideration exists everywhere. The stated non-experience of a rule requiring prior apprehension of difference between counterpositive and property-bearer is precisely what we accept, since that itself opposes having a counterpositive. Mutual dependence is to be deduced even in perceptual apprehension of a meaning having a counterpositive. Thus the absence of a word expressing difference in verbal cognition presents no defect against us. Accordingly, mere cognition of the counterpositive does not cause cognition of difference; otherwise even indeterminate cognition of it would do so. Rather, it must be cognised as counterpositive. And not as counterpositive to something else, but to difference itself; hence mutual dependence. Nor should one object that this would apply in similarity and the like, which have counterpositives: we accept the consequence, and have said that identity has no counterpositive. Some say: where property-bearer and counterpositive are present, there is simultaneous cognition of their existence and difference, as in ‘This resembles that’. There is also simultaneous cognition of their relation as qualifier and subject, as in ‘These two resemble one another’. Through sensory contact with everything fit to be known, one cognition concerning everything simultaneously is possible. On my view, even ‘The staff-bearer’ does not depend on cognition of the staff. This has been stated. Where either the property-bearer or counterpositive is absent, sensory contact assisted by a latent impression produces cognition in the same way, as in ‘That resembles this’. Otherwise knowledge of identity too would not arise, and mutual dependence would follow. It is said: ‘If property-bearerhood, counterpositiveness and their relation are apprehended simultaneously, the qualifier, subject and their relation are likewise apprehended.’ This is incorrect. Even though a pot is known through knowability and the like, ‘Absence of a pot’ is not apprehended. The pot must first be known through pothood and the like, so simultaneous cognition of property-bearer, counterpositive and the like is unestablished. There too, the pot must first be known through pothood and the like, so simultaneous cognition of property-bearer, counterpositive and the like is unestablished. Nor should one say that the delay there arises only from delay in the conditions for knowledge of pothood and the like, while when those exist the consequence is accepted. Even so, the consequence of cognition of absence that does not concern the counterpositive cannot be avoided. Nor are the conditions for apprehending a counterpositive of that kind the cause, since apprehension of the counterpositive itself is simpler. Objection: ‘If otherness is not apprehended, how can the stated mutual dependence arise? If otherness is established, how can mutual dependence arise?’ This is a rope with nooses at both ends. Reply: no. We do not deny even a cognition of otherness capable of practical dealings. Rather, we say that it is inexplicable if not due to ignorance. Moreover, difference must be known through a relation of qualifier and subject, and cognition of each such relation is seen, in a staff and Caitra and the like, to depend on cognition of difference. Thus an infinite regress in the succession of cognitions of difference would follow. Nor should one say that the same applies to you: in ‘Brahman is identical with the individual self’, ‘The world is false’ and the like, identity and the like are qualifiers, requiring knowledge of difference and thus infinite regress, so there is no first cognition of identity and the like. Difference imagined through ignorance can account for qualification and the like even when unknown. The same does not apply to you. Difference and what is differentiated do not differ in nature, since difference is nothing beyond its locus. On the alternative that difference is a property, even if infinite regress in cognition were removed, infinite regress in objects would be hard to avoid. Nor do infinite regress and similar defects apply on the alternative of ignorance-produced difference: impossibility is an ornament there. This also rejects the objection that in ‘Brahman is identical’, identity, known as different, qualifies Brahman, making the teaching of Brahman’s identity with it inappropriate because the previous knowledge of difference obstructs it. Knowledge of indefinable difference does not obstruct knowledge of absolute identity. Moreover, on the property-difference alternative, does perception concern difference alone, or also the thing? Not the first: merely ‘Difference’ is not apprehended. On the second, does it apprehend the thing preceded by difference, difference preceded by the thing, or both simultaneously? Not the first: merely ‘Difference’ is not apprehended, and operation after an interruption is inappropriate. For the same reason, not the second. Not the third: apprehension of the thing has been established as producing apprehension of difference. Nor are both apprehended simultaneously by a qualified cognition following knowledge of the thing alone. Only what is known as counterpositive and the like causes cognition of difference; otherwise use of the ablative and the like would be inappropriate. The previously stated defect applies there. This also rejects the following: on the view that cognition of something qualified is produced by cognition of its qualifier, ‘These two differ’ can follow knowledge of ‘Their difference’; even if it is not produced by cognition of the qualifier, cognition of both simultaneously is possible. In ‘Their difference’ and the like, apprehension of difference must already be required to apprehend the relation expressed by the genitive, so infinite regress is hard to avoid. Nor can parallel alternatives be raised about perception and verbal testimony apprehending identity of original and reflection, or individual self and Brahman: do they concern identity alone, and so forth? Since identity is the thing’s nature, such alternatives have no scope. Moreover, if difference is mutual absence, identity of its counterpositives, a post and a pot, is not established by a means of knowledge, so mutual absence too would not be established. Nor should one say that, if duality and the like are not established, their absence too would not be established. On the alternative that absence is additional, we accept the consequence. On the alternative that it is not additional, being established belongs decisively to the locus itself, so even if the counterpositive is not established, absence can be established. Nor should one say that the same be accepted for mutual absence on that alternative: we have stated that, if it has the nature of its locus, nihilism and the like follow. We do not deny others’ statement that what is not established can be a counterpositive of negation. We merely say that, if negation is additional to its locus, it is not established by a means of knowledge. Objection: here identity of both pot and post is not the counterpositive of negation. Rather, identity with the post, validly known in the post, is negated as belonging to the pot. Thus the counterpositive is not unestablished. Reply: no. If identity alone were the counterpositive of negation, after sublation one would apprehend ‘These are shell and silver’, like ‘These are two trees’ after correcting the error concerning trees seen from afar. Nor is absence from the vicinity a distinguishing factor: even so, ‘The shell and its silver’ would be apprehended. Some define mutual absence and relational absence thus: where negation is apprehended by superimposing the delimitor of counterpositiveness on the locus, there is mutual absence; where negation appears by superimposing the counterpositive on the locus, there is relational absence. This is incorrect. On that view, the definition fails to include difference and relational absence beyond the senses. Moreover, in verbally produced cognition of absence, superimposition admits an exception and is therefore not a cause of cognition of absence. Further, difference from what is other than itself must be stated in difference, leading either to opposition to operation in itself or to infinite regress. Nor should one say that identity with Brahman too requires identity with itself, so operation in itself is equally present. Understand that identity accounts for itself. This is not so in difference. If the nature itself accounted for designation of difference located in difference, it would do the same in a pot, making difference on the property alternative inappropriate. Moreover, differencehood, as a condition or universal, must be stated in difference, and difference must again be stated there; otherwise differencehood would not differ from anything else. Thus mutual occurrence would entail occurrence in oneself, and that too is contradictory like occurrence in oneself. Nor should one say that identityhood too must be stated in identity, and identity again there, since otherwise it would not be identical with itself; thus the same follows there. If mutual occurrence in identity is harmless, like knowability, expressibility and the like, the same applies to difference. For us, identity alone and identityhood are identical with Brahman’s identity, so the very notion ‘mutual’ is absent, and mutual occurrence cannot even be deduced. Nor does this make Vedānta pointless, if a pot’s identity with itself or an individual self’s identity with itself is identity of the individual self and Brahman. We have said that a modification removing the error of difference is impossible without the great sentence. The claim that mutual occurrence is harmless in knowability and the like because it is validly known is incorrect. Because of defects such as self-dependence, being validly known is unestablished there too. Hence nothing is universally present. Moreover, does difference reside in what is different or in what is identical? In the first case there is self-dependence or mutual dependence; in the second, contradiction. Nor should one say that the alternatives ‘Does identity, indefinability and the like occur in what possesses it or in what lacks it?’ apply equally here. Since identity is the nature, those alternatives have no scope there. In indefinability and the like, this alternative, which accounts for indefinability, favours us. Nor is difference the nature: that has already been refuted. Nor should one say that difference occurs in what is fit to be its locus, and fitness is inferred only from the result, valid cognition. Fitness cannot be stated without difference. What is identical is never fit for it, and no other property can account for fitness without presupposing difference. Moreover, without knowing difference and identity, one cannot know the difference between the results, error and valid cognition, so fitness for difference cannot be inferred from the difference of result in the form of valid cognition. ‘Taking up difference refuted by sound replies, free from self-contradiction and distinct from futile rejoinders, identity with oneself settles down.’ Here ends the specific refutation of difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 15. 16. Defence of special distinction. Objection: for us, difference is not the mere nature, but mutual absence, and that is identical with the thing, with a special distinction. Thus identity avoids infinite regress and the like. Since special distinction, a substitute for difference, exists, synonymy and the like do not follow. Even where difference is absent, special distinction accounts for neither of the two being left alone and the like. Reply: no. If a special distinction additional to the nature is accepted as producing valid cognition of synonymy and the like, that itself is difference, so one cannot speak of difference as a distinct property. Difference of the special distinction too must be said to be identical with it, with a special distinction, and infinite regress remains unchanged. Nor, like the special distinction accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas, does it account for itself and others. There is no means of knowledge for a special distinction of this kind. Objection: even on your view, knowledge, bliss and the like conveyed by ‘Brahman is cognition and bliss’ and similar sentences cannot be accepted as different, or as both different and identical, because the meaning is undivided and because that conflicts with scripture such as ‘It is to be discerned as one alone’. A special distinction substituting for difference must therefore be accepted to explain non-synonymy and the like. Postulation itself is thus a means of knowledge. Reply: no. The conflict with scripture teaching uniformity that occurs with difference remains equally here. Non-synonymy is explained otherwise through difference of directly expressed meanings even though the implied meaning is identical; non-pointlessness is explained through difference of what is excluded. Moreover, on your view too, let non-synonymy follow simply from different grounds, knowledgehood and blisshood. What need is there for special distinction? Nor should one say that scripture such as ‘Properties thus ...’ denies difference even between those. Then, since special distinction too is dependent and is a property, its difference is also denied, and it too cannot explain the matter. Nor should one say that, since knowledgehood and blisshood consist in illuminating an object and being desired without a condition, a special distinction is necessary in their locus, illumination of an object and what is desired without a condition. Knowledgehood and blisshood are universals and do not have the stated forms. Nor should one say that ‘space’ and ‘locus of sound’ would be synonymous because their grounds of application are identical, and special distinction must be stated to prevent this. Even if synonymous, their joint use can be explained through the relation of explanation and what is explained and the like. Nor should one say that, with only one of knowledge and bliss remaining, bliss would not manifest in liberation. Since they do not differ, there is no being either one of two at all; the suffix tarap is prescribed when two are spoken of. This also rejects the following: unity is neither different from the purified meaning of ‘that’, nor both different and identical, but absolutely identical. Without accepting special distinction, unity would fail to appear when self-luminous consciousness appears; and although manifestation of consciousness does not oppose the error of difference, manifestation of unity does, while consciousness is independent and unity dependent. These cannot be explained. Everything can be explained by taking aspects imagined by the ignorance that covers. Nor should one say that, if the same shell is covered and uncovered, there must be different parts of the shell. There is no result that would justify imagining such parts. Objection: let the scripture ‘Properties thus ...’ be a means of knowledge. Here, after stating Brahman’s properties, difference is denied. Without a substitute for difference, neither the relation of property and property-bearer nor plurality of properties is appropriate. Reply: no. ‘Properties’ merely repeats what is to be negated, and there is no intention concerning propertyhood, plurality and the like. Nor should one say that Brahman’s properties are obtained from nothing other than scripture. What is due to ignorance alone is obtained as established by the witness. Objection: on the alternative that attribute and attribute-bearer are identical, special distinction must be accepted to explain failure to apprehend white colour and the like when a pot is apprehended; on the alternative of difference and identity, to explain their non-conflict; and even on the alternative of absolute difference, to explain unsublated designations such as ‘Inherence is a relation’, ‘Existence exists’, ‘Ultimate particularity is distinct’, ‘Time always exists’, and ‘Space exists everywhere’. Existence and the like in absence and the like are not different from absence and the like, since they do not fall within qualities and the other categories; otherwise the rule that there are only six categories would fail. Even without that rule, another existence in existence would produce infinite regress. Special distinction must therefore be accepted there too. Reply: no. Everything can be explained simply through a distinctive nature. Nor should one say that, by accepting special distinction, you have entered my position. ‘Distinctive nature’ means precisely each thing’s distinctive nature, and does not state your special distinction. Through their respective distinctive natures, inherence and the like account for themselves. This also rejects the claim that accounting for oneself means being both agent and object of an act of maintenance, which is contradictory in one thing, and that special distinction must be accepted to explain it. ‘Accounting for oneself’ merely means being an object of designation without depending on something else. Otherwise, since you accept special distinction as identical with the thing through fear of infinite regress, that defect would apply to it too, and the defects stated against the nature-difference alternative, only one remaining and the like, would remain unchanged. Nor should one say that, like ultimate particularity, it is established as having such a nature by the means apprehending its property-bearer and cannot be questioned. Unlike the example, in the case exemplified you yourself do not accept its being additional to the nature. Some say: special distinction is postulated only where absence of difference and an effect of difference are validly known. In pots, cloths and the like, where difference is validly known, one does not abandon difference by adopting special distinction. Pūṭīka is used when Soma is absent, not also when Soma is obtained. This is incorrect. Here there is no determinant of primacy as there is there. Since special distinction and difference both culminate in the nature, there is no scope for your way of speaking. Moreover, it would equally follow that difference should itself perform its own effect, while for identity’s effect there should be a substitute for identity. Nor is difference not conveyed as identity is in bliss and the like: in matters beyond ordinary experience, the two are alike. Objection: inference is a means of knowledge here. Thus: (1) The fact that neither knowledge nor bliss, which are Brahman’s nature and identical with Brahman, alone remains, or the fact that knowability and the like rest in themselves, is regulated by something other than difference, because it is regulated while not regulated by difference. Whatever is regulated while not regulated by something is regulated by something other than that, as in an accepted instance. (2) Or, knowledge, bliss and the like, which are Brahman’s nature, possess something other than difference accounting for neither being left alone, because, while lacking difference, they possess what requires explanation in the form of neither being left alone. Whatever lacks something while possessing what requires explanation possesses something other than that accounting for it, as in an accepted instance. (3) Or, knowability and the like resting in themselves possess something other than difference accounting for the relation of locus and what rests in it, because, while lacking difference, they possess what requires explanation in the form of that relation, as in an accepted instance. Reply: no. Something other than your intended special distinction, ignorance and the like, can regulate everywhere, so the argument establishes something else. Moreover, being regulated by ignorance-produced difference contradicts the conclusion and makes the reason unestablished. Objection: nevertheless perception is a means of knowledge here. A difference between cognitions of thread and cloth and the like and cognitions of distinct pots and the like is experienced. This does not consist in having a relation as object, since a difference from cognitions of a bowl and a jujube and the like is experienced. Nor does it consist in having a relation other than conjunction as object, since a difference is experienced even from cognitions of a pot, its knowledge and its absence. Nor does it consist in having a relation other than conjunction and connection through the thing’s own nature as object, since cognition of a pot and mutual absence having that pot as property-bearer would then fail to differ from cognition of pot and cloth. Nor does it consist in having inseparable existence as object. Inseparable existence means an invariable relation of locus and what rests in it. The relation existing then appears even in a bowl and a jujube, whereas invariability does not appear even in cognition of thread and cloth. Perception of thread and cloth does not have the form ‘Their relation will not cease, nor will they be separated’; nor does cognition of bowl and jujube have the form ‘Their relation will cease, or they will be separated’. Nor does the difference consist in having inherence as object: by the stated reasoning, neither eternity of the relation nor inseparable existence of the related things appears in the respective cases. Thus the difference must consist precisely in having identity as object. Just as a pot and the like are apprehended as identical with what is before one in ‘This is a pot’, ‘Elephants and the like are the army’, ‘The leaf itself is the earring’, so cloth is apprehended as identical with thread and the like in ‘The threads in the form of warp and weft themselves are the cloth’, and ‘The cloth is white’. Nor should one say that only clothhood and whiteness having one locus appear here. Identity of cloth and white is also included there; otherwise identity would occur nowhere. Nor would ‘A pot is not a cloth’ have difference as its object. In ‘Caitra is the staff-bearer’ and the like too, Caitra’s identity with the staff-bearer does appear. Nor should one say that in ‘The cloth is white’, precisely possession of white is apprehended. The very white in ‘White is a colour’ is apprehended here. Otherwise here too one would use the possessive form ‘śuklin’, like ‘daṇḍin’, staff-bearer. Supposing elision of the possessive suffix and the like applies to usage concerning words, not to cognition. ‘The cloth’s whiteness’ and the like do not concern difference but relation, which is possible even without difference, as in ‘Existence exists’ and the like. If cloth were other than thread, two weights would follow. Cloth would not occur in what possesses threads, since material things cannot occupy the same place. Differences of usage, practical effect and the like are appropriate, as with a leaf and earring. Therefore cognition of thread and cloth has identity alone as object. If it concerned only identity in this way, however, it would not produce appositional usage, since ‘A pot is a jar’ and the like are not used. Thus one knows that it has an additional object too. This is not difference, since one would then say ‘A pot is not white’; moreover, special distinction is necessary to prevent conflict between difference and identity. Therefore the additional object is special distinction. Reply: no. Even when identity exists, imagined difference can explain such usage, so special distinction is not established. Nor would ‘The cloth is not white’ be apprehended. Through the force of the result, imagined difference is postulated as accounting only for appositional and similar usage, and does not cause the contrary description. ‘Thus this special distinction is not an object of a means of knowledge, friend. Abandon despondency: through ignorance established on my view, everything is reconciled.’ Here ends the refutation of special distinction in the Advaita Siddhi. 16. 17. Perception regarding the fivefold difference. Since even difference obtained through perception is thus removed, what can you say about difference between individual self and Lord and the like, which has not been directly apprehended? Since the Lord is not perceived, difference having him as property-bearer or counterpositive cannot be apprehended. Objection: even though difference having the Lord as property-bearer is not perceived by the individual self, difference having oneself as property-bearer is nevertheless perceived by it, through experiences such as ‘I am not omniscient’, ‘I am not free from suffering’. Nor should one say that having a perceptible counterpositive accounts for the perceptibility of an absence. By the force of perceptual results such as ‘The post is not a spirit’, even if that applies in relational absence, in mutual absence only fitness of the locus is decisive. In fact, even in relational absence that alone is not fitness, since one would apprehend absence of perceptible earthhood in an atom of water. Rather, wherever existence of something would oppose non-apprehension, its absence there is fit to be apprehended. Thus fitness, common to all absences, is determined by the locus alone. That exists here too. Otherwise scripture teaching identity would negate what was not in question, and scripture teaching difference could not merely repeat difference established by perception, as you say. Even difference from the individual self having the Lord as property-bearer is established by perception inferred from his words, ‘I know all those; you do not know them, scorcher of foes’, ‘But the highest person is another’, and the like. Reply: no. The stated experience comprehends difference in consciousness delimited by the internal organ and the like, with consciousness not delimited by them as counterpositive. It does not comprehend difference having pure consciousness as property-bearer and what is free from suffering and the like as counterpositive. Scripture too repeats delimited difference. Scripture denying difference, however, intends to deny difference suggested by inference and the like. Nor should one say that difference is apprehended in the pure, recognised in ‘I who slept, to whom ignorance, transmigration and the like belong, am not free from suffering’, as identical with what was undelimited by the internal organ during deep sleep and with the locus of ignorance and the like. Our dispute concerns precisely difference of the support of transmigration from what is not that support, not difference of consciousness from consciousness. This much apprehends difference only in what is delimited by ignorance, not in the pure. In deep sleep, absence of delimitation by ignorance does not occur as absence of delimitation by the internal organ does. The claim that consciousness does not differ from consciousness favours us, since intrinsic identity in consciousness is precisely our essential teaching, and opposes you. You do not hold that the consciousnesses of Caitra, Maitra and the like are one. We have already explained how the meaning of ‘I’ is not the pure self. Since witness-perception is common to the superimposed and the like, merely being established by it cannot make difference unsublated. This also rejects the claim that perception is a means of knowledge for mutual difference among individual selves. ‘I am not Caitra’ and the like concern delimited difference. Perceptions such as ‘A pot is not Brahman’, ‘A pot is not a cloth’, ‘I am not a pot’ concern imagined difference and do not establish absolute difference. Therefore perception is not a means of knowledge for the fivefold difference. Here ends the refutation of perception regarding the fivefold difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 17. 18. Inferences for difference between the individual self and Brahman. Nor is inference a means of knowledge. (1) In ‘The individual self and Lord differ because they are loci of opposed properties, like fire and snow’, the reason is unestablished in itself, since suffering and the like are properties of the internal organ and the like. Freedom from suffering and possession of suffering are seen in the same thing through different delimitors, and so do not establish different property-bearers. If mere difference is to be established, the conclusion is already established; if absolute difference, the example lacks it. (2) In ‘Brahman differs absolutely from the individual self because it is omniscient, by negative concomitance like the individual self’, the qualifying term is unknown. If the property to be established is made ‘Brahman possesses difference of the same order of reality as the property-bearer’s existence’, the reason is confined to its own subject. (3) In ‘Selfhood resides in many individuals because it is a universal, like earthhood’, the reason is unestablished against one who holds the self to be one. Moreover, residence in imagined individuals already establishes the conclusion. (4) In ‘Suffering resides in a locus different from the locus of what is of the same kind under a universal subordinate to qualityhood, because it is a quality, like colour’, sound provides an exception. Moreover, suffering and the like are properties of the internal organ, so the conclusion is already established. (5) In ‘The bodies under dispute possess selves numbered by their own number, because they are bodies, like an accepted instance’, a yogi’s bodies provide an exception. (6) ‘The self possesses difference having a self as counterpositive and the same order of reality as the property-bearer’s existence, because it is a substance, like a pot.’ (7) ‘The self is plural under a universal pervaded by substancehood, because it is a locus of special qualities not heard by the ear, like a pot.’ Here too the reason is unestablished because the self is without attributes; and the argument is on a par with the fallacy ‘Caitra possesses the stated difference having Caitra as counterpositive, for the stated reason, like the stated example’. This also rejects newer inferences: (1) ‘The Lord possesses absolute difference having the individual self as counterpositive, because he is all-powerful, omniscient, the maker of every effect, or independent, by negative concomitance like the individual self.’ (2) Or, ‘The individual self possesses absolute difference having Brahman as counterpositive, because it has limited power, knowledge or agency, or because it transmigrates, by negative concomitance like Brahman.’ In these and the like, establishing possession of difference is contradicted because difference is the very nature. Nor is it explained by taking special distinction, since, being nothing beyond the nature, it brings about possession of that; moreover, an unknown qualifying term follows. Nor should one say that, since identity of the individual self and Brahman entails unwanted consequences, the property to be established can be established by a means of knowledge, like being a substance additional to the eight substances and the like, or like self-luminosity and the like established by you. Even without absolute difference, difference imagined through conditioning adjuncts can remove every unwanted consequence. Nor should one say that the property to be established is known generally through ‘The individual self or Brahman is the counterpositive of difference having some property-bearer and not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, because it is a substratum, like a shell’. Being the counterpositive of difference not sublated by knowledge of pots and the like, counterpositives of some absence, does not establish difference not sublated by knowledge of the self. If being the counterpositive of difference not sublated by knowledge of its own counterpositive is to be established, ‘own’ denotes the shell in the example and the self in the case exemplified, making apprehension of pervasion inappropriate. The claim that merely ‘Different from the individual self’ is to be established, and that proving what is already established through false difference should be rejected afterwards, is incorrect: the means of rejecting it will be rejected. Nor is the intended property merely ‘Brahman possesses difference having the individual self as counterpositive and the same order of reality as the property-bearer’s existence’. If ‘property-bearer’ denotes Brahman, the unknown qualifying term remains; if any property-bearer is denoted, the same reality as property-bearers such as pots already establishes the conclusion. Moreover, without a distinguishing feature in the form of reasoning opposing the contrary, the previously stated confinement to the subject follows. The claim ‘Brahman does not possess absolute identity having the individual self as counterpositive’ is incorrect. Even so, a non-absolute absence of absolute identity already establishes the conclusion. If absolute reality also qualifies the absence, the unknown property remains. Objection: here absolute difference having the individual self as counterpositive is mutual absence, so being unknown is not a defect. Knowledge of the property to be established is required only where absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading an absence. Here absence of the reason must be apprehended as pervading identity with the individual self, and absence of that identity is established by the reason. What need is there for prior knowledge of the property to be established, since pervasion can be apprehended without it? Nor is it required to constitute being a subject in the form of doubt. Being a subject consists in absence of the combination of a proving means and lack of a desire to prove, and does not involve doubt. Moreover, even without doubt ‘Does Brahman absolutely differ from the individual self or not?’, doubt ‘Does absolute reality exist in difference between individual self and Brahman or not?’ is possible, like doubt whether knowability is the counterpositive of an absolute absence in this. Reply: no. In that case, let known difference from the individual self be established in Brahman, just as known difference from something else is established in earth; absolute reality residing in it is not thereby established. Absence of the pervader can establish only absence of what is pervaded; otherwise excessive consequences follow. The proposed possibility that the absolute reality of difference resides in the property-bearer too is defective because the property to be established is unknown. Nor is there an inference through positive concomitance, ‘Brahman differs from the individual self because it does not experience suffering, like a pot’. In the experiencer of everything, the reason is unestablished. If qualified by ‘Residing in itself’, the individual self is an exception, since suffering resides in the internal organ. Moreover, false difference already establishes the conclusion. Nor should one say that, when difference is to be established, one cannot speak of an already established conclusion through an objectless error. Error is not devoid of a thing; this has been stated in the discussion of the indefinable. Nor should one ask how it can be false when established as authoritative through being an object of this inference. Being an object of inference is not decisive for being established by a means of knowledge. Nor would an inference of falsity and the like then prove what is already established through imagined falsity and the like. Does ‘imagined’ intend empirical status or apparent status? In the first case we accept the consequence; in the second, the reason establishes a property of the same order of reality as itself, so apparent status does not arise. This also rejects ‘Brahman possesses difference having the individual self as counterpositive and the same order of reality as the property-bearer’s existence, because it does not experience suffering, is not in error, or does not transmigrate, like a pot’; or ‘The individual self possesses such difference having Brahman as counterpositive, because it is not all-powerful and the like’. If the conditioned is the subject, even though sameness of order of reality with the property-bearer is established, absolute reality is not, and the conclusion is already established. If the purified meanings of ‘that’ and ‘you’ are the subjects, contradiction follows because they lack property-bearerhood. Nor is there a contradiction between being and not being a property-bearer: Brahman is the nature of every negation, so there is no contradiction. Nor does ‘property-bearer’ intend merely a locus. Like property-bearerhood, being a locus too is absent there. Some say that ‘property-bearer’, like ‘father’ and the like, is a relational word, so the same order of reality as some property-bearer or other does not make the conclusion already established. This is incorrect. Citing a word’s nature is useless for inference. This also rejects replacing ‘property-bearer’ with ‘self’, since its fortunes are the same as those of ‘property-bearer’. This also rejects the proposal that, in place of ‘Of the same order of reality as the property-bearer’s existence’, one should supply ‘absolute’, ‘persisting throughout the nature’, ‘not an effect of ignorance of itself’, or ‘not sublated by knowledge of itself’, because established usage makes ‘self’ refer to the respective thing mentioned with it. In the first alternative, the example also lacks the property to be established. Nor should one say that unknownness is avoided because the property is established by an inference such as ‘A pot possesses difference having the individual self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, because it is not the counterpositive of identity having the individual self as property-bearer and not sublated by knowledge of that property-bearer. Whatever is not a counterpositive of identity having something as property-bearer and not sublated by knowledge of it possesses difference having that as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of it, as one of two trees seen from afar.’ Since the relative expressions do not recur with a single meaning, pervasion cannot be apprehended in the reason belonging to the subject. If pervasion is apprehended under general aspects such as property-bearerhood and counterpositiveness, it cannot establish the particular conclusion. Nor should one ask what then happens in ‘Other than its own prior absence’ and the like. The same defect extends there too, and an inference through negative concomitance or another inference is intended. Nor should one say that the property to be established is ‘Brahman is not absolutely identical with the individual self’, and that the example cannot be suspected of lacking it, since even on your view an imagined pot lacks absolute identity with an imagined individual self, just as it lacks absolute difference. We have stated that a non-absolute absence of absolute identity already establishes the conclusion. Nor should one argue: ‘The individual self and Lord possess difference having one another as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because they are loci of opposed properties, like fire and snow.’ Opposition means being absolute absences of one another, being pervaded by such absences, or inability to share a locus even at different times. Conjunction and its absolute absence do not share a locus on either view, so their locus gives no exception. The defect concerning ‘property-bearer’ has already been stated. Moreover, loci of suffering, sound and the like, which do not pervade their loci, provide exceptions. When identity of the individual self and Brahman is established, the very opposition of independence and dependence and the like, consisting in inability to share a locus, is unestablished; thus the reason is unestablished in itself. The arrangement of imagined omniscience, non-omniscience and the like can be explained through imagined difference alone, like the arrangement of shortness, length and the like in a speech-sound, and fails to establish intrinsic difference. Nor is imagined status unestablished because scripture such as the following declares omniscience and the like intrinsic: ‘Limited power, lack of omniscience, dependence, incompleteness and subsistence on another constitute individual selfhood; lordship is their opposite. These are intrinsic to the two and never otherwise in any way.’ They are called intrinsic because they are established by beginningless ignorance and are not newly present; ‘the two’ refers only to the conditioned. Declaring them intrinsic there is not contradictory: even in the conditioned, omniscience and the like are not adventitious. Nor should one propose ‘Brahman possesses difference having the individual self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is an entity, like a pot’; or ‘Consciousnesshood occurs in something possessing difference whose counterpositiveness is delimited by individual selfhood and which is not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it occurs in every conscious being, or because it lacks non-occurrence in conscious beings, like being a word-meaning’. The failure of ‘self’ and ‘property-bearer’ to recur with one meaning remains; individual selfhood provides an exception to the final reason. Conditions such as occurring in the insentient, and absence of reasoning opposing the contrary, also make the reason fail to entail the conclusion. The consequence that Brahman transmigrates like an individual self is accepted, or an answer should be given through imagined difference. It is said: ‘Inference cannot operate in any way regarding what is not an object of knowledge. What is an object of knowledge is non-self; inference of difference is accepted there.’ The meaning is that inference does not reach pure consciousness, since it is not a locus of properties. Where it does reach, the consequence is accepted. Nor should one ask how an inference of unity is then possible, since your verse could be read ‘How then could unity be inferred?’ The unity of pure consciousness is accessible only through words, so its not being inferable there is accepted. Nor is stating an inference of unity then pointless: its result is merely to remove the error of absolute reality in difference. Therefore: ‘Because the qualifying term is unknown, and because the facts are explained otherwise, omnipotence, limited power and the like do not determine difference.’ Here ends the refutation of inferences for difference between the individual self and Brahman in the Advaita Siddhi. 18. 19. Inferences for mutual difference among individual selves. Likewise, there is no inference for mutual difference among individual selves. (1) ‘Caitra possesses difference having Maitra as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer’, or ‘Does not possess absolute identity having Maitra as counterpositive’, ‘because he does not apprehend the suffering apprehended by Maitra, does not remember everything remembered by Maitra, and does not experience everything experienced by Maitra, like a pot.’ In the first conclusion, the alternatives concerning ‘property-bearer’ apply; in the second, non-absolute difference already establishes the conclusion concerning absolute identity. If the conditioned is the subject, something else is established; if consciousness alone is the subject, the reason is unestablished. Moreover, a part of the reason, non-apprehension and the like, can be an unstated condition. (2) ‘The destruction of bondage under dispute resides in what possesses difference whose counterpositive is a locus delimited by the delimitor of its own counterpositiveness, and which is not sublated by knowledge of that counterpositive, because it is destruction of bondage, like an accepted instance.’ (3) ‘The individual self, the transmigrating being, or the support of destruction of transmigration possesses difference having an individual self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of itself; or difference having a transmigrating being as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of itself; or difference not sublated by knowledge of itself and having the locus of destruction of transmigration as counterpositive, because it is an entity, like a pot.’ ‘The bliss under dispute possesses difference not sublated by knowledge of itself and having as counterpositive something of the same kind under a property pervaded by opposition to suffering residing in itself, because it opposes suffering, like absence of suffering.’ In these and the like, destruction occurs in time and the like, which possess difference having bondage as counterpositive, so something other than the intended conclusion is established. Moreover, bondagehood common to suffering and a shackle is impossible, and ‘self’ does not recur with one meaning. The argument is also on a par with the fallacy ‘Destruction of Caitra’s bondage resides in what possesses difference having the locus of Caitra’s bondage as counterpositive, because it is destruction of bondage, like an accepted instance’; and reasoning opposing the contrary is absent. The delimitor of counterpositiveness to destruction is not bondagehood recurring in many bondages, since that destruction is not a general absence. This also rejects the following arguments for establishing absolute difference among selves by establishing the universal selfhood. (1) For difference among selves in general: ‘The self possesses difference having a self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is an entity, like a pot.’ On the view that the self is all-pervasive: (2) ‘Space differs from an all-pervasive thing possessing special qualities that are loci of difference having a self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it is a substance, like earth.’ (3) ‘Earthhood differs from a universal directly pervaded by substancehood other than waterhood, firehood, airhood and mindhood, because it is knowable, like waterhood.’ On the view that spacehood is a universal, difference from that too qualifies the universal. (4) ‘Existence differs from a universal residing in the self other than substancehood’, or ‘Substancehood differs from a universal residing in the self other than existence’, ‘because it is knowable, like a pot.’ On the view that the self is atomic: (5) ‘The self possesses a universal pervaded by substancehood, because it is a non-pervasive substance, like a pot.’ In the first, insentience is an unstated condition; replacing both occurrences of ‘self’ with ‘Caitra’ also gives a parallel fallacy. In the second, not being a locus of sound is an unstated condition. Moreover, by adding to ‘all-pervasive’ the qualifier ‘other than the self’, one would establish an all-pervasive thing possessing special qualities different from both self and space. In the inferences whose subjects are universals, even imagined differences among individuals can explain the universal; thus, in culminating in absolute difference among individuals, they establish something other than the intended conclusion. Nor should one say that a universal is impossible without difference not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, since otherwise identity of individuals could never sublate a universal. A universal necessarily has the same order of reality as difference among its individuals. Apparent difference therefore does not establish an empirical universal, and identity of individuals can accordingly sublate a universal. Here ends the refutation of inferences for difference among individual selves in the Advaita Siddhi. 19. 20. Favourable reasoning for difference among selves. Objection: if the self were one, Caitra would apprehend everyone’s suffering and the like. Reply: no. Difference due to conditioning adjuncts explains non-apprehension. Objection: apprehension is observed even where adjuncts such as hand and foot differ, so difference of adjuncts fails to entail the conclusion. Nor is difference of separated adjuncts decisive, since the child in the womb would then apprehend its mother’s pleasure and the like. Moreover, the Bhārata states apprehension even in separation: ‘Even headless trunks, their arms raised with weapons, seeing through the eyes of their fallen heads, struck down enemies in battle.’ Reply: no. We do not say that just any conditioning adjunct accounts for non-apprehension, but difference of the adjunct in the form of the internal organ, or difference of ignorance. That difference is absent in the headless trunk and in a yogi, so apprehension occurs there. It exists between Caitra and Maitra, so there is non-apprehension. This also rejects the claim that, if difference of bodily adjuncts accounts for non-apprehension, one could not remember in youth what was experienced in childhood, a person remembering former births could not remember what was experienced in a previous birth, and a yogi could not remember what was experienced in many bodies. Difference of bodies is not decisive there; the internal organ of yogis and those who remember former births is one. Nor should one say that, if consciousness is one, difference of internal organs cannot account for non-apprehension, since apprehension is observed despite difference of instruments such as the eye. Although that is observed with differences of other instruments, difference of internal organs is postulated as accounting for non-apprehension in what is subject to superimposition of identity with them. Otherwise, since scripture establishes identity with Brahman in the individual self, apprehension of everything would follow. Nor does the internal organ’s dissolution in deep sleep every day entail failure to apprehend what was experienced on the previous day. What persisted in the form of latent impressions awakens again, so there is no difference of internal organs there. Nor should one say that those in deep sleep, those dissolved and the liberated would apprehend a transmigrating being’s suffering, since the difference of internal organs accounting for non-apprehension is absent. They lack the conditions producing apprehension, in the form of superimposition of identity with the internal organ. An effect is absent not only through an obstruction, but also through absence of its conditions. Nor would the liberated person then fail to experience the bliss that is their own nature. That is unproduced and does not depend on the internal organ. Difference and identity of ignorance, the conditioning adjunct dividing individual selves, also explain apprehension and non-apprehension. Nor should one say that, like prior absence of knowledge, difference and identity of ignorance are not decisive here; and that, on the view that there are as many ignorances as cognitions, even one individual self would fail to apprehend because its ignorances concerning Brahman differ. Prior absences of knowledge and ignorances equal in number to cognitions do not divide individual selves, and therefore are not decisive for apprehension and the like. The claim that the liberated alone would apprehend the suffering of transmigration, while without apprehending differences of adjuncts in the form of ignorance the bliss of one’s own nature too would not be experienced, is incorrect. That is decisive for apprehension of object-dependent pleasure and the like; manifestation of the self-luminous nature does not depend on it. Objection: if relation to many ignorances and the harm consisting in apprehension of suffering belong to the qualified, bondage and liberation would have different loci. They must therefore be said to belong to the pure. But the very pure reality that apprehends Caitra’s suffering also apprehends Maitra’s suffering. How can apprehension and non-apprehension be distinguished? Reply: no. Even though liberation, consisting in cessation of bondage in the form of ignorance, belongs to the pure, apprehending suffering and the like occurs in the conditioned, and cannot establish difference in the pure. Nor does transmigration belonging to the pure make Brahman too a transmigrating being. Difference due to adjuncts explains the distinction between transmigration and freedom from it, as whiteness and darkness in original and reflection, delimitation and non-delimitation in pot-space and great space, and hearinghood of one and the same space in each place as delimited by the respective ear-cavity. This also rejects the consequence that, since the harm consisting in apprehension of suffering belongs to the conditioned, and that is imagined, only the bound one would cease, rather than be liberated. Even though the imagined adjunct ceases, what is conditioned by it is not imagined and cannot cease, so liberation can apply to it. Nor should one say that the examples are not accepted: a reflection, like a shadow, is another thing; space, even on your view, is a produced substance with parts; and the organs of hearing, effects of the luminous ego, differ of themselves. That a reflection is another thing will be refuted. Space’s being the organ of hearing is an example according to the opponent’s approach. Moreover, apprehension and non-apprehension can also be explained in the manner stated in the Kaumudī: scripture says, ‘The wise call the self joined with senses and mind the experiencer’; only the qualified is the experiencer, and the qualified things differ. This also rejects the following: if it belongs to pure consciousness alone, difference is not apprehended there, so even imagined difference is absent. If difference exists, then difference, performing its own effect in the form of the arrangement, is not sublated by knowledge of its property-bearer, like heat in fire; identity, failing to perform its own effect in the form of absence of arrangement, is false like absence of heat. Moreover, a liberated person lacking ignorance-produced difference would experience a transmigrating being’s suffering. An arrangement is an effect of difference of its own order of reality and does not imply difference of a higher order. Absence of arrangement is not an effect of identity in pure consciousness, so one cannot deduce falsity from failure to produce that effect. Identity of adjuncts alone is decisive there. Moreover, is apprehension deduced for the individual selves, portions imagined through adjuncts, or for Brahman, the possessor of portions? Not the first: what is delimited by the hand does not apprehend suffering and the like delimited by the foot. Nor should one say that we do not deduce confusion of the seats of experience, which would prevent ‘There is pain in my foot, pleasure in my head’, but merely apprehension, which the portions do have. Otherwise the hand would not act to remove a thorn lodged in the foot, just as Maitra does not act to remove a thorn lodged in Caitra’s body. Just as suffering delimited by the foot is not produced in what is delimited by the hand, apprehension of Caitra’s suffering and the like is not produced in Maitra. Just as the conditions producing suffering are absent in the hand, identity of the adjunct producing apprehension is absent in Maitra. Apprehension does indeed exist under delimitation by the hand, so absence of activity there does not follow. Nor the final alternative: Brahman is not an experiencer, so undergoing experience is not in question. Mere knowledge of suffering and the like is accepted in that omniscient one. Nor, because Brahman is identical with the individual self that experiences, must Brahman too be an experiencer. The arrangement is possible as with original and reflection, and apprehension, belonging to the delimited, cannot be deduced in pure Brahman. Nor does this give different loci for bondage and liberation. Bondage in the form of ignorance belongs to the pure, so a shared locus is possible. Even though the delimited apprehends, we accept apprehension in the pure through what is delimited by ignorance continuing through the three states, on the authority of scripture such as ‘Through this individual self’. Moreover, just as sound delimited by one’s own ear-cavity is apprehended while sound in another region is not, so pleasure, suffering and the like are apprehended or not apprehended. Nor should one say that, when selves differ, a regulator makes each ear-cavity belong to its respective self, whereas on the one-self view all bodies belong to oneself, so no rule of respective ownership can explain the arrangement. As difference of selves does for you, differences of delimiting knowledge and the like explain the arrangement for me. Moreover, one who asserts difference through arrangement should be asked: what is this arrangement? Not difference of properties, since pleasure and suffering are seen in one and the same thing, giving an exception. If properties in different loci are specified, mutual dependence follows. If opposed properties are specified, and opposition means non-coexistence, it is unestablished; if opposition means the relation of sublated and sublator, that can occur in one locus and does not establish difference. Nor is the arrangement apprehension and non-apprehension: we have said that these are explained through difference of adjuncts in the stated way and do not establish difference of selves. For this reason, the arrangement of bondage, liberation and the like does not establish intrinsic difference either. It is explained simply through the respective adjuncts being assumed or removed. Nor, because an adjunct too belongs to the conditioned, is there self-dependence or a similar defect. The adjunct is not a qualifier and does not require another individual, so the four defects beginning with self-dependence have no scope. This also rejects the following: if it belongs to the pure, is liberation removal of each adjunct separately, or removal of all adjuncts? Not the first: there would always be liberation alone, never bondage. Not the last: there would now be bondage alone, and no one would be liberated. On the many-individual-selves view, removal of the particular adjunct delimiting a particular consciousness is liberation in that consciousness, and the stated defects have no scope. On the one-individual-self view, removal of all adjuncts alone is liberation, and the absence of liberation now is accepted. Objection: how can an adjunct differentiate? Does it relate to one region or to the whole? In the first case, since on your view no intrinsic portions exist, those portions must themselves be due to adjuncts, producing infinite regress. In the last case, it does not differentiate, since the whole is grasped by one adjunct. Even in space and the like, without intrinsic portions there could be no relation to adjuncts such as pots. It is said: ‘If relation to an adjunct is not in one region, it pervades the whole. In one region, infinite regress follows; if throughout, it does not differentiate.’ Reply: no. We have already explained how the adjunct, false precisely because it cannot withstand all alternatives, accounts for false difference. The author of the commentary has explained at length how arrangement is impossible if all-pervasive selves differ. Here ends the refutation of reasoning favourable to difference among individual selves in the Advaita Siddhi. 20. 21. Inferences regarding the fivefold difference. Likewise there is no means of knowledge for absolute difference between the insentient and the Lord, or between the insentient and the individual self. (1) ‘Brahman or the individual self possesses difference having non-self as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it is an entity, like a pot.’ (2) ‘Brahman or the individual self possesses difference having a pot as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it is related to a time unrelated to the pot, related to a place unrelated to it, or not produced by what produces it, like a cloth.’ (3) ‘Brahman or the individual self possesses difference having the insentient as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it is not of the nature of the insentient; whatever is such is so, as one of two trees seen from afar.’ These and the like do not escape the previously stated defects. Being delimited, being insentient and being produced are unstated conditions; the reasons also fail to entail the conclusion. Moreover, they are on a par with fallacies such as ‘The individual self or Brahman is a locus of such difference having the self as counterpositive, because it is an entity’. Nor should one say that this parallel and the like are avoided by reasoning opposing the contrary: if Brahman were identical with a pot, establishment of the pot would establish Brahman, making Vedānta pointless; Brahman would become insentient, impermanent and the like; the individual self, the support of bondage sharing a locus with liberation, would cease like the insentient; and cognitions such as ‘I am fair’ would be valid. We have repeatedly said that, although Brahman is established through self-luminosity and being known in every cognition, Vedānta serves its purpose by producing knowledge that removes ignorance together with its manifestations. Even though a pot and the like do not have unimagined difference from another imagined individual, they do not thereby have the nature of that imagined individual, become apparent, cease like it upon seeing a distinctive feature, or make cognition of identity with another imagined individual valid. Likewise here, even without unimagined difference from the imagined insentient, having its nature and the like does not follow. Thus even reasoning opposing the contrary is not without scope. Likewise, there is no inference even for mutual difference among insentient things. (1) ‘A pot is not absolutely identical with a shell, because it is unrelated to a time related to the shell, and is not produced by what produces the shell, like silver superimposed there.’ Since you too accept empirical difference, there is no impropriety concerning the subject, example and the like. Otherwise identity between difference being established and not established, and between a defect and its absence, would contradict one’s own procedure. Here the property to be established is unknown because its counterpositive, absolute identity with a shell, is unknown. If ‘absolutely’ qualifies ‘not’, it is all the more unknown. Mere difference of the same order of reality as a pot and the like explains the reason, so it fails to entail the conclusion. Moreover, the opposing consideration against absolute reality of difference has been stated, so there is contradiction. (2) Some say: ‘Non-self possesses difference among its members sublated by knowledge of what is not a locus of properties occurring in it, because it is an entity, like the self.’ Against the contrary, opposing reasoning would be that perception apprehending identity of trees seen from afar or of shell and silver would reveal reality, and liberation, transmigration and the like would become confused. This is incorrect. The many pots imagined in one pot possess differences not sublated by knowledge of a pot that is not a locus of properties occurring in them, and provide an exception. If not being a locus of any one property occurring in oneself is intended, difference not sublated by knowledge of a cloth, which is not a locus of pothood, but sublated by knowledge of the self, establishes something else. If not being a locus of all properties occurring in oneself is intended, on your view even Brahman is a locus of universally present properties such as direct expressibility, and the property to be established is unknown. Since absolute identity with the imagined is absent just as absolute difference is, revelation of reality, confusion and the like do not follow in the cited cases. Some argue for absolute mutual difference among selves and between self and non-self: ‘Non-self is a locus of difference not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, having as counterpositive whatever is a locus of properties not occurring in itself and is a locus of difference not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, whose counterpositive is a locus of properties not occurring in itself, because it is an entity, like the self.’ In the subject, the self is the locus of properties not occurring in it; the conclusion is established through difference from another self different from that self. In the example, the insentient is the locus of properties not occurring in it; the property to be established exists through difference from another insentient thing different from that. This is incorrect. The meanings of ‘self’ and ‘counterpositive’ do not recur with one meaning in subject and example, so being pervaded is unestablished. Non-insentience is an unstated condition, and an inference through negative concomitance with insentience supplies a counter-inference of equal force. Some argue for real difference of the individual self from Brahman and of the insentient from the individual self: ‘Earth possesses difference not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, having as counterpositive whatever is not a locus of waterhood and the like and is a locus of difference having Brahman as counterpositive and sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, because it is a thing, like water.’ ‘Waterhood and the like’ intends, against each disputant, properties established by that disputant, residing in the insentient and different from earthhood. In the subject, the conclusion is established through difference from an individual self different from Brahman; in the example, through difference from an earthly thing different from Brahman. This is incorrect. Like not being a locus of waterhood and the like, one could add ‘Not a locus of individual selfhood’ and establish a self different from both the individual self and Brahman. Moreover, an inference through negative concomitance with being a locus of smell and the like can supply a counter-inference of equal force; and the defect based on alternatives concerning ‘property-bearer’ remains. This also rejects the modification of the preceding formulation for difference of the individual self from Brahman and other individual selves, and of the insentient from the individual self: to establish the individual self’s difference from another individual self, ‘Possessing difference among its members’ is added as a qualifier to ‘Not a locus of waterhood’. In the subject, the conclusion is established through difference from an individual self different from Brahman and from other individual selves; in the example, through difference from an earthly thing different from Brahman and from other earthly things. For difference of the individual self from Brahman and other individual selves, of the insentient from the individual self, and of Brahman from the insentient, another formulation is: ‘Earth, while possessing difference not sublated by knowledge of the counterpositive, having as counterpositive whatever is not a locus of waterhood and the like, possesses difference among its members, and is a locus of difference having Brahman as counterpositive and not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer, is also the counterpositive of difference not sublated by knowledge of the property-bearer and having as property-bearer a non-transmigrating thing that is not a locus of waterhood and the like, because it is a thing, like water.’ To establish Brahman’s difference from the insentient too, ‘A non-transmigrating thing that is not a locus of waterhood’ and the like is an additional qualifier beyond the preceding formulation. In the subject, Brahman is the non-transmigrating thing that is not a locus of waterhood and the like, and the conclusion is established through being the counterpositive of difference having that as property-bearer. In the example, an earthly thing is the non-transmigrating thing not a locus of waterhood and the like; being the counterpositive of difference having that as property-bearer should be understood. Here, adding ‘Not being a locus of individual selfhood’ as a qualifier of ‘Not a locus of waterhood’ gives a parallel fallacy as before. A counter-inference of equal force is also available through being a locus of colour produced by heating and the like, and the argument is consumed by alternatives concerning words such as ‘property’. Likewise there is no inference even for difference in general. (1) ‘Brahman does not remain without difference, or possesses difference not sublated by knowledge of itself, because it is an entity, like a pot.’ This is incorrect. Not coexisting with liberation and insentience are unstated conditions, and alternatives concerning ‘self’ consume the argument. This also rejects (2) ‘Non-self is a locus of difference not sublated by knowledge of what is other than itself, because it is an entity, like the self.’ (3) In ‘Difference from Brahman is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence residing in everything, because it is determined by Brahman, like identity with Brahman’, not occurring in what is identical with Brahman is an unstated condition. Moreover, identity with Brahman is determined by what is not Brahman, not by Brahman, so the example lacks the reason. (4) In ‘Knowledge of Brahman has as object something possessing difference not sublated by itself, because it is knowledge, like knowledge of a shell’, having ignorance and the self as objects is an unstated condition. If ‘self’ denotes knowledge of Brahman, difference not sublated by it is unknown, so the property to be established is unknown; if it denotes knowledge of a shell, the conclusion is already established. (5) In ‘A pot is the counterpositive of an absence in all three times having cloth and the like as property-bearer and counterpositiveness not delimited by relation to a pot, because it is a substance, like a cloth’, even imagined absence can occur in all three times, so the conclusion is already established. Moreover, just as ‘Not delimited by relation to a pot’ qualifies it, one could also add ‘Not delimited by identity’ and establish a fifth absence. Absence of reasoning opposing the contrary is common to both. (6) ‘Difference incapable of being sublated by knowledge contemporaneous with the prior absence of an action in the same locus is absolutely real, because, while not a locus of apparent status, it is not a locus of nonexistence; because it is directly an object of valid cognition not concerning its nonexistence; because falsity is superimposed upon it; because it lacks an imaginer; or because it exists before direct realisation concerning itself, like the self.’ (7) ‘Difference having Brahman and the individual self as counterpositives is absolutely real, because it is beginningless, like the self.’ (8) ‘Difference among pleasure, suffering and the like known by the witness is absolutely real, because it is directly an object of cognition not produced by a defect, as something that cannot be negated.’ (9) ‘Difference among merit, demerit, sacrifice, giving and the like is absolutely real, because it is the object of scripture’s intention.’ In these and the like, properties common to the self, such as consciousnesshood, are unstated conditions; insentience and the like provide counter-inferences of equal force. Moreover, the greater strength of what establishes falsity has been stated, and those means sublate these inferences. In the first of the reasons, if apparent status consists in appearance occasioned by a defect, the reason is unestablished. If being sublated by something other than knowledge of Brahman is stated, an apparent thing immediately preceding the final modification supplies an exception. In the second reason, being an object of valid cognition of that kind depends on establishing absolute reality of difference, and so culminates in not differing from the property to be established. In the third, possessing falsity sublated by something other than the final modification is an unstated condition. In the fourth, the imaginer, ignorance, exists, so the reason is unestablished. In the fifth, it is unestablished on the view that seeing is creation, and fails to entail the conclusion on the other view. Beginninglessness admits an exception in ignorance and the like. In ‘Regarding cognition not produced by a defect’ and ‘Because it is the object of scripture’s intention’, the reasons are unestablished: the modification delimiting the witness is produced by a defect, and the primary intention is absent there. Therefore the fivefold difference is not an object of inference. Here ends the refutation of inference regarding the fivefold difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 21. 22. Refutation of the merely repetitive character of scripture teaching difference. Objection: scripture such as ‘Two birds’, ‘The one who dwells in the self’, ‘The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious’, and ‘One unborn being, enjoying, lies beside her; another unborn being abandons her after enjoying her’, is a means of knowledge for the absolute reality of difference. Reply: no. In ‘Two birds’, difference is not what is known in the first half, since it is neither a word-meaning nor a sentence-meaning. If one says that, because twoness necessarily shares a locus with difference having its own locus as counterpositive, difference obtained through postulation from the twoness heard in scripture is also scriptural, no. Imagined difference too can explain it, as in ‘Two moons’, so it does not imply absolute difference. For the same reason, the latter half too does not intend absolute difference. In fact, since the Paiṅgirahasya Brāhmaṇa explains this scripture as concerning the intellect and individual self, one cannot say that it concerns difference between the individual self and Lord. The relation of support and supported in ‘The one who dwells in the self’, the specification in ‘The conscious among the conscious’, and the designation of difference in ‘Another unborn being’, can all be explained through imagined difference. Thus they do not culminate in absolute reality of difference, and other scripture opposes that interpretation. Nor should one say that, because of conflict with this scripture, that other scripture itself intends something else. Scripture teaching difference is weaker because it repeats difference established by perception. Nor should one say that difference among individual selves delimited by individual selfhood is not already obtained, so the scripture is not repetitive, like ‘One should not injure’ and the like. Difference between the individual self and Lord is established by perception. Difference having the Lord as property-bearer and delimited by individual selfhood, established because that perception is otherwise inexplicable, stands on the same level as what is established by perception. Scripture conveying it can therefore be repetitive. In ‘One should not injure’, there is not even a suspicion of repetition, since nothing determines that ‘A Brahmin must not be killed’ and the like constitute the prior statement. Nor should one say that the passage has a purpose for a particular person, like an injunctive sentence in another branch. One person cannot study many branches; and perception, being common to all people and operating first, allows meaningfulness to be stated even with respect to a particular person. Nor should one say that, like ‘They lead forth in two’, it establishes difference unsublated in all three times, which perception, grasping only the present, does not obtain. ‘Another unborn being’ and the like contain no word conveying non-sublation in all three times. Nor should one say that scripture teaching difference serves to make it firm, like the six kinds of indications of intention regarding identity. Even if it has a purpose there, repetition cannot be avoided, as in ‘Fire is a remedy for cold’. Nor does it restore what was excluded, like ‘One should say precisely twenty-six’. Being weaker than the statement excluding difference, it cannot restore it. Scripture denying difference intends denial of the absolute reality of difference, and a sentence conveying difference in its own nature cannot restore that absolute reality. Nor, if perception is invalid, can scripture fail to repeat what is established by it. Merely making known what is known explains its repetitive character. Nor should one say that, even so, as independent repetition it can be valid like the second and later cognitions in a continuous stream. Repetition as such, common to dependent and independent repetition, accounts for invalidity. The example differs, since it concerns an additional moment of time and thus an object not previously known. Nor, like an informed person’s statement, does purposeful repetition intend its own meaning. Even though conveying its own meaning, it does not intend it, since it brings about twoness. Nor is repetition for negation impossible because signs of such repetition, ‘What is that, not ...’ and the like, are absent and another predicate is heard. Although ‘what’ and ‘that’ and the like indicate repetition, they do not pervade all repetition. It can be inferred through something else too. In ‘A Brahmin must not be killed’ and the like, repetition for negation is seen even without ‘what’ and ‘that’. If another predicate exists, even though it is not repetition for negation, repetition for that predicate cannot be avoided. Nor is absolute reality a rule when repetition serves a prescription. In ‘Bring what is silver’ and the like, repetition of something established through error for another prescription is not seen to imply absolute reality. Nor should one say that even in repetition, validity in the form of correspondence to reality is not lost. That depends on absence of an opposing consideration and is impossible here. Objection: Brahman, taught by the Upanishads, is not obtained through anything other than scripture. How then can difference having it as property-bearer or counterpositive be obtained through perception and the like independently of scripture? Reply: no. Even if scripture is required to apprehend the counterpositive, perception can obtain difference, since it need not be preceded by a means of knowledge having the same object as itself. Although difference having the Lord as property-bearer is not obtained through perception, it is established because difference from the Lord having the individual self as property-bearer, established by perception, is otherwise inexplicable. It can therefore be established by perception, just as what is established by postulation from what is heard can be scriptural. Here ends the account of the repetitive character of scripture teaching difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 22. 23. Refutation of scripture teaching difference as intending empirical difference. Alternatively, even if scripture is not merely repetitive, it can be explained as intending empirical difference alone. Nor does invalidity follow: it is explicable like a commendatory sentence, and invalidity regarding the apparent meaning is accepted because of conflict with scripture teaching identity. Nor does scripture teaching identity fail to oppose difference because it concerns undivided consciousness alone. Taking the meaning that serves as its avenue, it does oppose difference. Nor can the positions be reversed, since they differ through concerning what is already obtained and what is not obtained. Nor should one say that scripture teaching unity too is invalid because it conflicts with perception, since conflict with another means of knowledge, like being obtained through another means, causes weakness. Unlike the authority required of what supplies a contradiction, the authority of what accounts for repetition is not required. Moreover, scripture teaching unity is stronger because it possesses the six kinds of indications of intention. Nor should one say that these reveal only intention, not the meaning’s being so. By making known scripture’s intention, they assist indirectly; and by establishing that scripture conflicting with it does not intend the meaning actually heard, they confer greater strength. Nor should one say that scripture teaching difference also intends that matter because it too possesses indications of intention: reasoning such as ‘It eats the sweet fruit’, ‘Not eating’, ‘The other is complete’, ‘The multitude of individual selves is incomplete’; and repetition such as ‘Difference is real, difference is real, difference is real’. ‘It eats’ and ‘Incomplete’ repeat the individual self in order to establish that it has the nature of complete Brahman, and do not provide reasoning for difference. ‘Difference is real’ does not constitute repetition of difference, since that sentence is not authoritative; or, if authoritative, on encountering sublation it culminates in identity through apposition. Objection: scripture teaching difference alone is stronger because contradiction has not arisen, because it agrees with perception and the like, and because it has no other scope. Reply: no. The opposing scripture teaching identity has arisen. Perception and the like are not authoritative here, so agreement with them does not confer strength, by the principle concerning even a hundred blind people. Moreover, empirical difference supplies another scope. Objection: this difference is not empirical, since scripture and traditional teaching establish difference even in liberation. Reply: no. That liberation is intermediate. Objection: it is empirical, since scripture and traditional teaching establish difference even in liberation. Reply: no. That liberation is intermediate. Objection: traditional teaching says: ‘Relying on this knowledge and attaining likeness to me, they are not born even at creation and are not distressed at dissolution’, thus declaring absence of creation and the like. Another passage denies māyā: ‘Where there is no māyā, much less the others; where Hari’s followers, worshipped by gods and asuras, are dark and fair, lotus-eyed, tawny-clad, radiant and beautiful.’ ‘One who knows it as lodged in the cave enjoys all desires together with wise Brahman’ declares a result of knowledge of pure Brahman. When stating the result of knowledge of the Infinite, which you too accept as concerning pure Brahman, difference is stated in ‘He has free movement in all worlds’, ‘Fivefold, sevenfold’, and the like. ‘Having attained the highest light, he manifests in his own form’, ‘There he moves about, eating, playing and enjoying’, and the like declare manifestation of one’s own nature. ‘The knower, shaking off merit and demerit, stainless, attains highest likeness’ declares destruction of action. ‘When he sees the other, the cherished Lord, and his greatness, he becomes free from sorrow’; ‘Having known the distinct self and the impeller, favoured by him, he attains immortality’, and the like declare liberation from knowledge of difference. Even on your view, in the aphorisms concerning difference, enjoyment and similar results in the last section of the chapter on results—‘Except the activity of the world’, ‘But through resolve alone, because scripture says so’, and ‘And because the indication concerns equality of enjoyment alone’—the result of the knowledge of pure Brahman already under discussion must be stated. Thus highest liberation alone is intended. Reply: no. Even for one who has reached Brahman’s world through meditation with attributes, scripture such as ‘He does not return again’ conveys non-connection with daily creation and the like. Thus it is possible even in intermediate liberation. In the traditional passage ‘Where there is no māyā’, ‘māyā’ means envy and the like; absence of root māyā is not conveyed. Otherwise dark and fair complexion and the like would conflict with it. In ‘One who knows it as lodged ...’, attainment of all desires as a result of knowledge of pure Brahman is not enjoyment of objects. Scripture says, ‘Other beings live on only a portion of this very bliss’, declaring all object-dependent pleasures included in Brahman’s bliss. That is intended, and the passage does not establish attainment of many desires as a result of pure knowledge. In stating the result of knowledge of the Infinite, free movement in all worlds, manifold becoming and similar results are stated at the opening of that teaching as results of knowledge of the vital force. Like the twelve Upasads of a multi-day rite heard in the context of the Jyotiṣṭoma, these can serve as praise of attributeless knowledge. In ‘Self-luminous’ and the like, eating and similar activities contain difference, and ‘As if eating, as if playing’ and the like intend their sublated character. Highest liberation is stated there, so the play and the like containing difference as you intend are not highest liberation. In ‘Having shaken off merit and demerit’, highest likeness is identity, so destruction of action has liberation consisting in identity as its result, not a liberation containing difference. In ‘The cherished one’, ‘other’ concerns the self distinct from body, senses and the like, not the individual self and Lord. Thus knowledge of difference as a cause of liberation is understood from this. On my view, in the topics beginning with ‘Through resolve alone, because scripture says so’ and continuing to the end of the chapter, which concern difference, enjoyment and the like, the result of knowledge with attributes is stated, not the result of knowledge of pure Brahman. Therefore, since difference does not arise in highest liberation, its empirical status is possible, and scripture teaching difference is established as intending the empirical. Here ends the justification of scripture teaching difference as intending empirical difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 23. 24. Refutation of different words and the like as establishing difference between the individual self and Lord. Objection: the very different words and other factors by which difference of rites is stated in the second chapter of the earlier system also establish difference between individual self and Lord. There are different verbal expressions formed from roots with opposed meanings, ‘He alone awakens the individual self’, ‘From this the individual self rises’; repetition in the form of a renewed statement recognised as the same, ‘The highest is eternal; the individual self is eternal’; number in ‘Two birds’ and the like; a different differentiating quality in ‘Without sound’, ‘Not eating’ and the like; a different context in ‘From which words turn back’ and the like; and two names, ‘Individual self’ and ‘Lord’. Reply: no. Even though different words and the like distinguish on the same level as perception and the like, they do not oppose absolute identity. Moreover, you are an unprecedented Mīmāṃsaka, postulating different words and the like as means of knowledge for difference among conscious beings when they are established as authoritative for difference among rites or scriptural prescriptions. What accounts for difference in one thing does not thereby account for difference in another. Difference of qualifiers, although accounting for difference among qualified things, would then differentiate the subjects too. Different agents would follow even in ‘Devadatta rises, teaches a pupil, sacrifices, gives, offers an oblation’, and the like. Different words do not differentiate agents. Here ends the account of different words and the like not differentiating selves in the Advaita Siddhi. 24. 25. The six indicators of intention in scripture teaching difference. Objection: how can difference be non-absolute when accessible through scripture possessing the six indicators of intention? In the Atharvan text, ‘Two birds’ is the opening; ‘He attains highest likeness’ is the conclusion; ‘Of the two, one’, ‘The other, not eating’, and ‘The other Lord’ provide repetition; difference from the Lord, accessible only through scripture and unsublated in all three times, cannot be obtained without scripture, providing novelty; ‘Having shaken off merit and demerit’ is the result; ‘His greatness’ is a commendatory statement in the form of praise; and ‘Eats’, ‘Not eating’ provide reasoning. Here the word ‘two’ itself expresses difference, as in ‘This duality is merely māyā’, or implies it; or the number two itself opposes unity. Thus the opening concerns difference. Likeness to something is possession of many properties belonging to it, qualified by being different from it, not merely the subject alone. ‘This is not that, but resembles it’, ‘This does not resemble that, but is that very thing’ negate one of likeness and identity in order to establish the other. ‘Space is like space’ and the like intend to deny another thing resembling it, or intend resemblance between one part of space and another. Thus the conclusion too concerns difference. For repetition, sameness in respect of meaning is decisive, not sameness of words, which would lead too far. In ‘The other Lord’, the individual self already under discussion in ‘Sees’ is connected as counterpositive to otherness belonging to the Lord, by the Padi rule. Thus repetition too is possible. Reply: not so. In the first Muṇḍaka of the Atharvan text, after Śaunaka’s question ‘Venerable sir, what being known makes all this known?’, two kinds of knowledge are introduced in ‘Two knowledges are to be known’. The lower, characterised by the Rigveda and the rest, is stated, and then ‘Now the higher, by which that imperishable is attained; that which is invisible, ungraspable, without lineage or colour’, and the like present the imperishable, the object of higher knowledge, in accordance with the question. Thus identity alone is introduced; otherwise this would not answer the question. In the second Muṇḍaka, ‘The person alone is this universe’, ‘All this is Brahman, the highest’, refer to it in the middle. At the end of the third Muṇḍaka, ‘All become one in the highest imperishable’, ‘One who knows that highest Brahman becomes Brahman itself’, conclude with a result consisting in identity. Thus the Upanishad, consisting of three Muṇḍakas, is established as intending identity. By the principle ‘What is not connected is determined from context’, an intermediate sentence such as ‘Two birds’ can conform to that intention, like stepping forward and similar acts. Hence it does not introduce difference through postulation of an opposite intention conflicting with the larger context. ‘He attains highest likeness’ intends identity by the reasoning already stated, and does not conclude in difference. Thus ‘Not eating’ and the like do not repeat absolute difference. Nor is difference having the Lord as counterpositive or property-bearer novel because the Lord is accessible through scripture. Although scripture is required for knowledge of the Lord alone, both differences are obtained through perception and a means on the same level as perception. The result and commendatory statement you mention are possible on the identity alternative too, and so are not indications distinctive of difference. ‘Not eating’ and the like can be explained through imagined difference and do not provide reasoning for absolute difference. Objection: the Inner Controller Brāhmaṇa, possessing the six indicators of intention, is a means of knowledge for difference. ‘Do you know that inner controller, Kāpya?’ is the opening; ‘This is your self, the inner controller’ is the conclusion; ‘This is your self’ and the like are repeated twenty-one times; inner controllership is not otherwise obtained, providing novelty; ‘He is the knower of Brahman’ and the like are the result; ‘If, Yājñavalkya, without knowing that thread and that inner controller, you drive away the cows awarded for knowledge of Brahman, your head will fall off’ is a commendatory statement in the form of censure; and ‘Whose body is earth, whom earth does not know’ and the like provide reasoning. Reply: not so. In the four-chapter exposition of knowledge of Brahman summarised in ‘One should know it only as the self’, the promise of knowledge of all through knowledge of one thing, ‘For through this one knows all this’, is followed by the opening in identity: ‘In the beginning this was Brahman. It knew itself alone, “I am Brahman”; therefore it became all.’ At the end of the sixth chapter, the concluding Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa likewise ends in identity through ‘But when everything has become the self for him, then by what would he see what?’ and the like. Thus all four chapters are established as intending identity. The passage within them, concerning the thread-self within Brahman’s world and conducive to apprehension of Brahman without adjuncts, the innermost of all, taught by the following Brāhmaṇa, must conform to the larger context. It cannot intend difference opposed to that. Even if the indications you cite determine an intention concerning difference, they concern imagined difference and do not oppose absolute identity. Hence there is no conflict with the aphorism ‘Nor the embodied one, for both recensions study it as different’, nor contradiction of its commentary. Here ends the refutation of the six indicators of intention in scripture teaching difference in the Advaita Siddhi. 25. 26. Refutation of the nature of unity. Objection: is unity (1) the self’s nature, or (2) something else? Not the first: only one of the two would remain and the like; dependent unity cannot be the independent self. Not the last: if real, non-duality is lost; if false, ‘You are that’ and the like would not convey reality. Reply: no. The first alternative alone is unobjectionable. Just as, even though knowledge and bliss are one with the self, only one remaining and similar consequences do not follow through imagined properties such as blisshood, the same is possible here. Unity’s being known has already been stated; it too is independent, so there is no conflict with its being the independent self’s nature. Even though unity is the self’s nature appearing as the substratum of ignorance and the like, transmigration is possible because the particular modification concerning unity that removes ignorance is not presently present. The defects in the last alternative criticise only something not stated. This also rejects the following claims concerning an additional unity: it is not the number one, nor possession of every property residing in the thing, nor possession of a distinctive property residing in it, since these are absent in propertyless Brahman; nor absence of difference, since difference is absence of unity and mutual dependence follows; nor not being a locus of properties that do not occur in it, since even the void would then be one with Brahman. Identity is the nature indicated by not being a locus of properties that do not occur in it. The void has no nature, so the void does not have the form of unity. Nor should one say that negating properties not occurring in it entails prescribing properties occurring in it, since denial of particulars has permission of the remainder as its result. Its prescribing the remainder is not accepted everywhere. Otherwise ‘Air has no blue colour’ would prescribe white colour. Objection: do identityhood, absolute reality, distinction from non-being and the like really exist in identity, or not? In the first case a second thing follows; in the second, identityhood and the like are lost. Reply: no. Since those are truly its very nature, identity’s form and non-duality can remain intact. Nor should one say that, when identity culminates in the unsublated self’s nature, and others too accept that nature, it is not an object of your teaching. Others do not accept the self’s nature indicated by not being a locus of properties absent from the individual self. Thus scripture such as ‘You are that’ and ‘This self indeed is Brahman’ is the means of knowledge for the identity of individual self and Brahman stated in this way. Here ends the justification of the form of unity in the Advaita Siddhi. 26. 27. Scripture teaching unity and sublation of what it depends upon. Objection: how can the cited scripture convey unity between things qualified by omniscience and non-omniscience and the like, when incompatibility defeats it? Reply: no. As in ‘This is that man’ and the like, it conveys unity in the pure aspect by abandoning opposed aspects. Objection: are opposed aspects abandoned merely through not intending them, through their impermanence, or through their falsity? Not the first: even if not intended, an opposed aspect does not disappear. Through scripture such as ‘In the beginning this was non-being’ and ‘All this indeed is Brahman’, one cannot readily assert Brahman’s unity with the void and the insentient merely by not intending existence and nothingness, or consciousness and insentience, here. Not the second: one would have to say ‘You will become that’, making the present-tense ‘You are’ inappropriate. Difference and identity would exist in different states, which even you do not accept; and independence, dependence and the like in individual self and Lord are eternal. Not the third: opposed properties established by faultless scripture and the witness cannot be false. Reply: no. Opposed aspects are abandoned precisely through not intending them. Abandonment is not being an object of experience of Brahman, not disappearance, which is achieved through final direct realisation. Thus omniscience and non-omniscience, though not removed, do not oppose identity of their locus, just as thatness and thisness do not. Not intending them serves the principal object to be known. Nor should one say that thatness and thisness are not abandoned in ‘This is that man’, since their occurrence successively in one thing is not opposed. Because the sentence intends identity, identity of the qualifiers would follow, so abandoning them is necessary even though they occur successively in one thing. In ‘In the beginning this was non-being’, ‘All this indeed is Brahman’, and the like, identity with the void or the insentient does not follow. Once opposed aspects are abandoned, there is no continuing aspect in the void and existence, or in consciousness and the insentient, as there is in individual self and Brahman. The nonexistent has no nature, and the insentient has a sublatable nature. Here ends the means of knowledge for identity of the individual self and Brahman in the Advaita Siddhi. Objection: scripture teaching unity must either repeat the individual self established by perception and convey its being Brahman, repeat Brahman established by scripture and convey its being the individual self, or repeat both and predicate identity. In every case, conflict with what must be relied upon prevents authority regarding unity. Perception establishes the individual self as different from Brahman; scripture apprehending Brahman as possessing omniscience and the like makes Brahman known as different from the individual self experienced as lacking them. Nor can inference present Brahman instead. It too makes Brahman its object through omniscience and the like, so conflict with what must be relied upon remains. Reply: no. Although the two are relied upon in apprehending expressive power and the like, they are not relied upon regarding this sentence’s own object of knowledge. Vācaspati’s work says: ‘What is relied upon is not sublated; what is sublated is not relied upon.’ If any dependence in any way made something what must be relied upon, even ‘This is silver’ would have that status in ‘This is not silver’. Objection: what something depends upon, and whose sublation would entail its own sublation, is what it must rely upon. Here what apprehends the property-bearer and the like also apprehends its own validity; if that were sublated, it too would be sublated. This is not so where what is to be negated is presented. Invalidity of knowledge of what is negated does not make the negating knowledge invalid, as invalidity of knowledge of the property-bearer, Brahman’s nature, would make knowledge of unity invalid. Otherwise teachings of negation would disappear. Reply: true. But the property-bearer is not what is qualified by omniscience and the like; it is Brahman’s nature alone. Validity of knowledge of a qualified property-bearer is not required for validity of knowledge of unity, but only validity of knowledge of the nature. Otherwise, since ‘This is silver’ too is knowledge of the property-bearer and must be relied upon, validity of cognition of ‘this’ qualified by silverhood would be required for validity of the negating cognition. Just as qualification by silverhood does not account for property-bearerhood, so qualification by omniscience and the like does not account for it here either. Objection: if Brahman is not the subject under delimitation by distinctive properties such as omniscience, it must be the subject through a common property or through its nature. In the first case, we accept the consequence, since we too accept unity of common properties such as consciousnesshood. In the second, unity with Brahman is unestablished, since only a common nature is designated as subject. Reply: no. If by ‘Brahman’ in ‘Unity with Brahman is unestablished’ you intend what is qualified by omniscience and the like, we accept the consequence. We have already explained that only the meanings implied by ‘that’ and ‘you’ are cognised as one. This also rejects the claim that, since words cannot designate Brahman’s distinctive nature as subject without a distinctive property, conflict with what must be relied upon remains. The distinctive property serves as an indication in presenting the subject. Nor should one say that, without a delimitor of being indicated, what is indicated is unestablished, and that taking consciousnesshood as that delimitor proves what is already established. An indication of the nature does not require a delimitor of being indicated. The claim that unity through consciousnesshood is already established is incorrect. Although you accept unity of consciousnesshood, you do not accept unity of its locus; if you did, there would be no dispute. This also rejects the following: in ‘He winnows the husks with the potsherd for the sacrificial cake’, implication of the supporting base establishes the desired, otherwise unobtained prescription of winnowing husks. Here implication does not establish anything desired, so there should be no implication. Although unity of consciousnesshood is obtained, unity of its locus is not obtained and can be supplied by implication. The same account must necessarily be given in ‘This is that man’. Nor should one say that what is qualified by thatness is the subject there: thatness can be a qualifier because a qualifier is what must be known as possessed before cognition of the relevant connection arises. An answer has been given. Objection: then there would be no conflict with what must be relied upon even in ‘An atom has parts’, ‘The Lord is not omniscient’, ‘The sun is the sacrificial post’, and the like. Nor would an injunction of a quality belonging to an already enjoined rite conflict with the sentence enjoining the rite together with its quality. There too one can easily say that what is qualified by atomhood and the like is not the property-bearer, but the nature alone. Reply: no. If an atom and the like, even in their own nature, are property-bearers for possession of parts and the like, atomhood and the like would not have the same order of reality as their property-bearers in those atoms and the like. Their having that order of reality depends on the greater strength of what conveys possession of parts; but no inference establishes that strength. Rather, as an erroneous sentence it is weak. In ‘The sun is the sacrificial post’, identity is not what is to be known. Through praise, the statement is subordinate to something else; and, when praise is possible even through qualities not opposed to perception, one cannot postulate a meaning opposed to perception. In an injunction of a quality belonging to an already enjoined rite, if a word such as ‘curds’ in the sentence enjoining the rite concerned substance in general, that word would be pointless. By the principle that ‘The injunction of sacrifice concerns substance, deity and action through the pronoun “its” contained in the meaning of the derivative suffix’, an injunction of sacrifice alone already supplies substance in general. Here, however, the sentence is strong because it is not subordinate to anything else, and it is a valid sentence. Since it conveys identity opposed to the qualified meanings, implication of the nature is entirely appropriate. Objection: although what presents silver, which is to be negated, is weak because, despite being required, it has not been examined, and mere dependence does not confer strength, here scripture teaching difference, presenting what is to be negated, and witness-perception are faultless, and therefore also examined and strong. How can the sentence intend identity in conflict with them? Reply: no. Even faultless scripture does not intend difference, so conflict with it is impossible for scripture teaching identity. Scripture cannot intend a meaning devoid of the six indications of intention beginning with the opening, since there is no determinant of that, and otherwise excessive consequences follow. Nor is the witness examined merely through faultlessness. Otherwise even pleasure and the like superimposed upon absence of suffering would be established by a means of knowledge. On my view, what is established by the witness as merely apparent is false. We have also said that, even though the witness is coloured by a modification born without defect, its being unsublated is unestablished. The distinction between a means of knowledge and what is not one, regarding the apparent and empirical, also depends on being or not being occasioned by a defect connected with the instrument. The empirical is occasioned by the defect ignorance residing in consciousness alone. Therefore there is no conflict with what must be relied upon. Rather, scripture teaching identity itself, as principal to everything, is what scripture teaching difference must rely upon. Since scripture teaching difference conflicts with it, it must be interpreted in conformity with it. Thus sentences such as ‘You are that’ are free from every conflict and intend unity. This is established. Here ends the absence of conflict between scripture teaching unity and what it must rely upon. 27. 28. The meaning of sentences such as ‘You are that’. Objection: on this account both words would operate through implication. One should instead adopt my view and accept implication in only one word. In ‘Two birds, joined companions’ and the like, the individual self is said to accompany Brahman, and is designated ‘that’ through accompanying it. In discussing the rule ‘After “spring” and the like, the suffix ṭhak’, the Mahābhāṣya states the use of ‘spring’ for study accompanying spring. The continuation ‘Beings are rooted in existence, have existence as their abode’ and the like also supports this. Or it is designated ‘that’ because it is known to depend on that. In the rule ‘Word-operation concerns connected words’, the Mahābhāṣya states use of ‘connected’ for the word-operation because it depends on connected words. The continuation ‘All these beings, dear one, are rooted in existence’ supports this. Or ‘that’ is used because it is known to be born from that, as in ‘The Brahmin was his mouth’. In ‘The vowels i, u, ṛ and ḷ replacing the semivowels are saṃprasāraṇa’, the commentary says that the sound born from saṃprasāraṇa is called saṃprasāraṇa. Or ‘that’ is used because it is under its control: the continuation ‘The mind, dear one, is bound to the vital force’ declares the individual self’s dependence on the Lord, as ‘grain’ is used of rice in the mantra ‘You are grain; nourish’. Or ‘that’ is used through resemblance. In the Jaimini aphorism ‘Because of similarity of form’, ‘The sun is the sacrificial post’ and the like are said to be due to resemblance. The Brahma aphorism ‘But because it has that quality as its essence, it is designated as that, as with the intelligent one’ is said to apply the designation to the individual self through its possessing Brahman’s qualities. The Mahābhāṣya too, on the rule beginning ‘Many, a group ...’, says that even without vati the sense of vati is understood, as in ‘Like a numeral’: ‘Someone calls a person who is not Brahmadatta “Brahmadatta”; from this we understand that he is like Brahmadatta.’ Reply: no. Once intention concerning identity is determined, a plurality of implications accounting for it is no defect. Intention is not abandoned to preserve a single implication. The Nyāyacintāmaṇi says: ‘Semantic operation follows intention, not intention semantic operation.’ Moreover, where the principal meaning is possible through implication that both abandons and retains the meaning, it is inappropriate to postulate a meaning such as what accompanies it. We have already explained how intending identity does not make conveyance impossible. ‘Two birds, joined companions’ and the like do not state the individual self’s companionship with Brahman, but with the internal organ; thus companionship with Brahman is not even established by that passage. Nor do ‘Beings are rooted in existence’ and the like establish the individual self’s dependence on it. ‘Beings’ denotes what is born and does not convey the eternal individual self. For the same reason, ‘that’ is not used because the individual self is produced by it. The traditional verse ‘Just as the Brahmin is properly called the mouth because he is born from the mouth, so the individual self may be called Brahman’ is no traditional teaching at all, because it conflicts with scripture. The claim that ‘Because it has that quality as its essence’ and the like state that the individual self possesses Brahman’s qualities is incorrect. The aphorism intends that, through possession of the intellect’s quality of subtlety, there is subtlety in the individual self as in Brahman. This also rejects the following: as the moon near a branch is called ‘branch’, ‘you’ is used of Brahman near the individual self because it is the individual self’s inner controller, on the authority of ‘The one who dwells in the self’, like ‘The Brahmin indeed is all the deities’ and the like; or Brahman is called ‘you’ because it is the support of the individual self; or, because Brahman makes everything, through the individual self being accomplished by it, as in ‘The sacrificer is the grass-bundle’. Objection: implication that both abandons and retains the meaning accepts again something previously in the mind as part of the directly expressed meaning but abandoned because of an opposing consideration. Implication abandoning the meaning entirely accepts only what was not previously in mind and has not been abandoned. Accepting what was not in mind is preferable to accepting what was abandoned. Reply: no. Although impossibility causes the qualifier to be abandoned, the subject-aspect is not abandoned. This also rejects the following: by ‘Of nominal endings, su and elision ...’ and similar rules, a nominative singular can replace, or elision can remove, an instrumental or other case-ending following ‘that’. The meaning would then be ‘Through that you remain’, ‘From that you are born’, ‘You belong to that’, or ‘You are in that’, in accordance with continuations such as ‘Supported through this individual self, drinking repeatedly and rejoicing, he remains’, ‘All these beings, dear one, are rooted in existence’, and ‘All this has that as its self’. The Mīmāṃsakas similarly explain ‘When they press, then they recite the kindling verses’, taking the nominatives of ‘when’ and ‘then’ in a locative sense: ‘Where they press, standing there in the oblation-cart enclosure, one should recite the kindling verses.’ It is reasonable to depart from the natural meaning of one principal case-ending, which has another scope through denoting number, to preserve the natural meaning of several principal nominal stems with no other scope. This is rejected. Just as in ‘Of the Udgātṛs’ the nominal stem is interpreted otherwise to preserve the natural meaning of the ending, here too the nominal stem itself can be interpreted otherwise. Nor should one say that, unlike the nominative singular, the genitive plural is not prescribed elsewhere and cannot be interpreted otherwise, so the nominal stem is taken through implication as the Prastotṛ and other Sāma-chanting priests in accordance with the plural. An alternative interpretation is possible, as in ‘He offers ground meal’. Moreover, the nominal expression is not without another scope: it has scope in the subject-aspect, as the ending does in number. Nor is it principal: the suffix expressing the principal meaning is itself principal. It is said: ‘Base and suffix state a meaning together; of the two, the suffix does so principally.’ Nor is plurality of nominal stems decisive for preserving natural meaning: in ‘On the deep river’ and the like, despite plurality, departure from natural meaning is seen. If you say that this follows from intention’s force, the present case is equal. As for ‘He pours clarified butter over the oblations with the remainder of the preliminary offerings’, where the remainder is poured into the oblations and the instrumental’s natural meaning is departed from, and ‘He offers ground meal’, where the accusative’s natural meaning is departed from, these occur because there is no alternative. In ‘With the remainder of the preliminary offerings’ and the like, no way is possible other than preparing what has already been used; in ‘Ground meal’ and the like, no past or future use makes it something to be prepared. This also rejects taking tat-tvam as a compound meaning ‘You belong to that’. A non-compound explains the passage without implication of a genitive meaning and the like, so a genitive compound is unjustified. Otherwise the topic concerning Sthapati would be contradicted. Objection: in ‘All this has this as its self; that is real; that is the self; you are that’, ‘that’ does not refer to the self, but to etadātmya, since it is neuter. Etadātmya means: ‘This is also the self’, hence etadātman; ‘What belongs to it’ is etadātmya. Thus the meaning is ‘You are a thing belonging to this’, not identity. If the meaning were ‘What has this as its self’, the abstract suffix would be pointless. It is therefore preferable to adopt another meaning, since it is said, ‘The course of derivative suffixes is manifold’. Traditional teaching too says: ‘He is the creator and withdrawer, the controller and protector, Hari. All this is pervaded by him; therefore they know it as etadātmya.’ Reply: no. The suffix ṣyañ is not prescribed in the sense ‘This belongs to that’, nor is such usage seen. Usage in its own meaning is seen, as in saukhya, happiness. Thus everything whose self is this existence is etadātman, and the state of that is etadātmya. Apposition is explained either by the suffix retaining the word’s own meaning or by figuratively identifying a state with what possesses it, as in ‘What is the Infinite is happiness’. The traditional explanation of etadātmya through being pervaded by this is inappropriate, since it conflicts with the promise of knowing everything through knowing one thing. Objection: words such as ‘god’ and ‘human’, expressing bodies, are seen to extend to what possesses the body. Likewise ‘you’, expressing the individual self that is Brahman’s body, extends to Brahman. The designation ‘You are that’ is therefore based on the relation of body and embodied, on the authority of ‘Whose body is the self’ and similar scripture. On our view both words thus operate in their primary sense. Reply: no. Does extending to the embodied mean implying it, possessing expressive power for it too, or conveying it through the very operation concerning the body? Not the first: that does not establish primary expression. Not the second: calling them distinctively words expressing bodies would be inappropriate, and we have said that universals such as humanity, the grounds of application, do not occur in the embodied. Not the third: an operation concerning one thing does not serve to convey another. This usage must therefore be based on identity of body and embodied established by beginningless error. Here too, then, usage is based precisely on identity; the only distinction is that here identity is absolute because there is no opposing consideration. The claim that ‘You are that’ serves meditation on Brahmanhood in the individual self, like ‘The sun is Brahman’, is incorrect. It occurs outside a meditation context and so differs from the example; moreover, where it can concern the reality of the thing in the stated way, abandoning that is inappropriate. Objection: in ‘That is the self; you are that’, the words should be divided as ‘You are not that’. Just as ‘Sound is impermanent’ is divided with ‘impermanent’ in accordance with the example of a pot, here too the examples of bird and string and the like support that division. In the first section, bird and string, stated in ‘As a bird bound by a string’, are not identical; in the sixth, salt and water stated in ‘This salt, this water’ and the like are not identical; in the seventh, the man and the Gandhāra country stated in ‘A man, dear one, from Gandhāra’ and the like are not identical; and in the ninth, thief and stolen property stated in ‘He has carried it off; he has committed theft’ and the like are not identical. The example of thief and stolen property clearly shows harm for one who cognises identity: the thief claims another’s Brahmanhood as his own, rather than being ignorant of an existing Brahmanhood. Reply: no. Although difference exists in the examples of bird and string and the like, it does not account for dividing the expression as ‘not that’, since those examples are explained without that division. The example of a pot, however, cannot be explained through permanence; thus the cases differ. The bird and string illustrate this meaning: as someone afflicted by fever and similar illness rests in health on release from it, so the individual self remains in its own nature as the deity in order to remove fatigue produced by the activity of instruments during waking and dream. Thus another explanation is possible, in accordance with ‘He has reached his own self’. Objection: ‘own’ applied to Brahman does not intend identity with the individual self, but ownership and the like, or independence, since revelation says ‘It is called “own” because of independence’. ‘Has reached’ likewise means only ‘Having become concealed, he is attained’, not identity. The prefix apa has the established sense of covering, the root i that of going, and the participial suffix that of an agent; neither derivation nor convention gives the sense of unity. Reply: no. Since ‘own’ is primary in the sense of one’s nature, intending another meaning would require either figurative usage or implication. Even if derivation and convention do not give identity directly, consideration of prefix, root and suffix yields the meaning of reaching one’s own nature, which culminates in identity. This also rejects the objection that, on the unity meaning, ‘has reached’ and ‘becomes’ would be intransitive, making the heard accusative inappropriate and requiring an unheard instrumental to be supplied. This also rejects the appeal to another scripture concerning deep sleep, giving the example of a distinct hawk and nest: ‘As a hawk or eagle, having flown about in this space and grown weary, folds its wings and is directed precisely towards settling, so is this person.’ Similarity in every respect is not decisive for being an example. Nor should one say that this conflicts with scripture teaching difference in deep sleep, ‘Embraced by the intelligent self’; with the aphorism ‘Because of difference in deep sleep and departure’, which even on your view concerns difference; and with your acceptance of ignorance-produced difference between individual self and Brahman in deep sleep as in waking. Reaching one’s own nature is stated with the intention that the very clear projection present in waking and dream is absent, not with the intention of absolute identity. Otherwise deep sleep and liberation would not differ. When the question is ‘If existence is the world’s root, why is it not apprehended?’, the salt-water example makes clear that even an existing thing is not apprehended, but is apprehended in another way. Thus it too has another explanation. If the question is then ‘Even though existence, the world’s root, is not apprehended by the senses like salt, can it be apprehended through another means, and what is that means?’, the Gandhāra-man example states the means, ‘One who has a teacher knows’. Thus it too has another explanation. When the question is ‘By what sequence is the learned person with a teacher connected with existence?’, the thief and non-thief example states that one intent on truth attains the desired object, while one intent on untruth attains harm. Thus it too has another explanation. Nor is ‘He has carried it off; he has committed theft’ inappropriate as an example because the examples of truth and untruth suffice. It accounts for those and is not a separate example. Objection: one cannot state unity among the juices of many trees mentioned in the ninth section, ‘The juices of trees of many kinds’, or between rivers and ocean mentioned in the tenth, ‘These rivers, dear one’. The juices of many trees do not abandon mutual difference and become one with previously existing honey. Nor are they first objects of an error of difference and later no longer such objects. Rather, remaining mutually different, they produce previously nonexistent honey, like threads producing cloth; this does not suit the case exemplified. In the river-ocean example too, is there unity of river and ocean as wholes, unity of their constituent water-atoms, or production of another substance? Not the first two: like black gram and its parts thrown into a heap of black gram, or water and its parts poured into milk, even when mixed together what differed before cannot become identical afterwards. On the third alternative, difference alone remains, and the example does not suit what it exemplifies. Reply: no. The examples are adopted with the intention of absence of clear difference through absence of a clear delimitor. They are indifferent to real difference or identity in the example, so your array of objections is not to be counted. This also rejects the claim that the example concerns only ignorance of an existing difference, since it is indifferent to whether difference exists. Nor, because it concerns unclear difference, is it useless for absolute identity. It can assist by producing an understanding of possibility: just as what is delimited by a subtle adjunct is one with what is delimited by a large adjunct, so even what is delimited by that adjunct is one with the undelimited when that adjunct dissolves. This also rejects the following: in ‘They go from the ocean to the ocean alone; it becomes the ocean alone’, if becoming the ocean were predicated of the rivers under discussion, it would say ‘They become the ocean alone’, as in ‘Gold becomes an earring’. Hence the meaning must be that rivers go from the ocean, an indeterminate mass of water, and enter it, while the ocean remains itself and the rivers do not become the ocean; or that the ocean alone does not become a river. Both examples concern only ignorance of an existing mutual difference. Hence, in the case exemplified by the many juices, ‘Just so, dear one, all these beings, having merged into existence, do not know, “We shall merge into existence”; whatever they are here, a tiger or ...’, and in the case exemplified by river and ocean, ‘Having come from existence, they do not know, “We come from existence”; whatever they are here, a tiger or ...’, harm is stated precisely through ignorance of difference from existence. This is rejected because the examples intend absence of clear difference as an object. The claim that scripture intends harm in the form of becoming a tiger and the like due to ignorance of difference is incorrect. Since ‘Having merged into existence’ is nearest, ‘They do not know’ states ignorance of merging into existence, not ignorance of difference. Thus the intention is that, because merging into existence is not preceded by knowledge, through their respective latent tendencies they become the respective things, tigers and the like. ‘Therefore, since these excellent examples do not intend difference, it is clear that following them does not justify dividing the expression as “not that”.’ Objection: in the eighth section, ‘Understand for me, dear one, the end of sleep’ illustrates deep sleep, where independence cannot be suspected. In the eleventh, ‘When the individual self abandons one branch of this’ and the like state positive and negative concomitance. In the fifteenth, ‘A man, dear one, afflicted by heat’ and the like illustrate death, where independence cannot be suspected. These state dependence on the Lord, so dividing the expression as ‘not that’ alone is appropriate. Reply: no. Uddālaka introduces ‘The end of sleep’ and the like with the intention ‘Precisely in deep sleep I shall show your own nature as the deity, free from individual selfhood’; it does not intend dependence on the Lord. Waves, billows, foam and bubbles rising from water are seen to perish on returning to its nature. The question is how individual selves, returning to their own nature every day, do not perish, nor at death and dissolution. The tree-branch illustration, stated to remove that doubt, intends that a body presided over by an individual self lives and, abandoned by it, dies, while the individual self does not die. The continuation says, ‘This indeed dies when abandoned by the individual self; the individual self does not die’. ‘As a man, dear one, afflicted by heat’ and the like, in response to the question ‘By what sequence does the learned person who has a teacher merge into existence?’, likewise intend to show that sequence, not dependence on the Lord. The claim that in the eleventh section, ‘Supported by the individual self, drinking repeatedly and rejoicing, it remains’, ‘individual self’ means the Lord because the transmigrating being is mentioned separately as rejoicing, is incorrect. ‘Rejoicing’ qualifies the tree introduced as an example, not a transmigrating being, so there is no justification for abandoning the heard meaning of ‘individual self’. Some say that in the twelfth section, ‘From this subtle essence alone, dear one, this great banyan stands’, ‘subtle essence’ means the subtle Lord, since the same scripture applies it to the Lord in ‘That is the subtle essence; all this has that as its self’. It does not mean the seeds. In ‘What do you see in it? These seeds are as if minute’, they are designated by ‘minute’ without an abstract suffix, in the feminine plural, headed by ‘as if’, and therefore cannot be designated by ‘subtle essence’, which has the opposite characteristics. Reply: no. In ‘This minute self’, the Lord is an object of usage without an abstract suffix, yet one sees the expression ‘This subtle essence’ applied to him. The same can therefore be said of seeds. Nor does this make the stated invisibility in ‘You do not perceive’ inappropriate. Its intention is: in the very seed experienced, the great banyan stands, but you do not know it because it is unmanifest. Objection: if the fifteenth section intends only the knower’s attainment of Brahman, the sentence should run only from ‘His speech merges into mind’ to ‘The heat into the highest deity’. ‘As long as speech has not merged into mind’ and the like would be pointless. Reply: no. The sequence of merging into existence in ordinary death is the same for the knower; the difference comes from knowledge or ignorance. To convey this, the example states the sequence through positive and negative concomitance, so there is no pointlessness. Nor should one say that in ‘That is real; that is the self’, ‘self’ denotes only the Lord referred to by ‘subtle essence’, not the individual self, because it is said: ‘Because it reaches, takes, and consumes objects here, and because its being is continuous, it is called self.’ ‘Self’ is well known of the individual self in ‘Which is the self?’ and the like, and consuming objects, stated in the verse, is possible precisely in the individual self, making that interpretation appropriate. The established conclusion concerning ‘Know that one alone as the self’, that the individual self is not intended because no word expresses it there, does not mean that ‘self’ is non-primary in the individual self; rather, it concerns primordial matter and the like. Though an individual self is self, it is excluded because, being delimited, it cannot create the world. Otherwise apposition in ‘Through the individual self as the self’ would be inappropriate. Nor does ‘individual self’ denote the Lord alone: there is no cause for abandoning the established conventional meaning, and ‘For I am called the individual self’ and the like are possible even on the identity view. Nor is sustaining the vital forces exclusive to the Lord: it is common to the individual self. Nor is differentiation of name and form preceded by triplication impossible for an individual self. Although impossible for us and the like, Hiraṇyagarbha, identifying with the subtle body formed from untriplicated elements, can differentiate the world consisting of name and form. Nor should one say that stating entry again through the individual self is inappropriate, since consciousness has already been established in ‘That fire saw’, ‘Those waters saw’, and ‘These three deities’. The intention is that, unlike the direct causation of creation of the unmanifest elements, causation of the universe and the like is not direct but through an individual self identical with Brahman. Moreover, because the opening is ‘One alone, without a second’, dividing the expression as ‘not that’ according to examples such as the hawk is inappropriate. It conflicts with the promise of knowing everything through knowing one thing, and identity of Brahman and individual self is not otherwise in question, making its negation inappropriate. Nor should one say that unity is suggested through misunderstanding scripture’s intention, as in ‘Thinking sacrifice and charitable works highest’; through beginningless erroneous teaching, as in ‘Some say that in the beginning this was non-being alone’; or through perception, since everyone considers lordship in the form of independence regarding body, senses and the like to belong to themselves. Intention concerning unity is validly known and its status as sound teaching has been established, so one cannot say that it is obtained through misunderstanding intention or erroneous teaching. If unity is suggested by a sign of unity that is not merely imagined, it cannot then be negated. Since body, senses and the like are superimposed as identical with the individual self, one cannot assert a universal presumption of independence regarding them; and independence regarding just anything is not a definition of the Lord. This also rejects the following: the six indicators of intention concern difference alone, because ‘One alone, without a second’ opens with absence of an equal or superior; etadātmya concludes with that same absence; ‘You are not that’ is repeated nine times; difference from the Lord accessible only through scripture is not suggested without scripture, providing novelty; ‘Then he will merge’ states the result; ‘Through which the unheard becomes heard’ provides commendation; and examples such as bird and string provide reasoning. In ‘One alone’, mere absence of an equal or superior does not introduce difference, since it is possible even in identity and would conflict with the promise of knowing all through knowing one thing. Only absence of a second is introduced. Hence repetition and conclusion too do not concern difference. We have said how novelty occurs regarding identity. The result, commendation and reasoning are possible in identity alone. Likewise, statements of identity in other branches that occur in meditation contexts intend meditation and do not conflict with statements intending identity. Here ends the determination of the meaning of the sentence ‘You are that’. 28. 29. The meaning of scripture such as ‘I am Brahman’. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka sentence ‘In the beginning this was Brahman; it knew itself alone, “I am Brahman”’, occurring outside a meditation context, establishes identity alone. Nor does it conflict with a continuation intending difference, ‘Whoever among the gods awakened to this became that; likewise among seers and humans’. There too, specifying the awakened person among gods and the like, ‘He became that’ intends identity with Brahman, not difference. Nor should one suspect that, because Brahman alone is the topic in this sentence, it does not establish unity of individual self and Brahman. In accordance with the continuation ‘Whoever among the gods’, referring to an individual self, ‘Brahman’ concerns Brahman as effect. If it concerned pure Brahman, stating the result, being the self of all, ‘Therefore it became all’, as occasioned by awakening would be inappropriate. Nor should one suspect that, since ‘One should meditate on name as Brahman’, ‘The sun is Brahman: such is the instruction’, and the like are headed by ‘as’, there is no identity with name and the like, and here too, being headed by ‘as’, there is absence of difference from Brahman. Since this occurs outside a meditation context, one cannot say that identity is not intended, as in ‘Name is Brahman’. Nor is ‘as’ pointless. As in ‘One should know it only as the self’, it serves to exclude the natural transitivity that would attach to words and knowledge. Some say: ‘I’ primarily denotes the individual self’s inner controller, since ‘I became Manu and the sun’ uses ‘I’ for the inner controller, and because it is said: ‘Vishnu, the inner controller of all, is expressed by all pronouns—this one, I, you, that one—not because he is the nature of everything.’ This is incorrect. By the principle ‘But the instruction is through scriptural insight, as with Vāmadeva’, being the sun and the like is stated of the consciousness of the individual self Vāmadeva because it is actually identical with Brahman, not because the inner controller is intended. The preceding sentence ‘Whoever among the gods awakened to this became that’ introduces becoming Brahman through knowledge of reality. Thus ‘Seeing, he realised’ and the like too concern becoming Brahman through awakening, not the inner controller. The traditional passage too must be understood thus: expressive power in each respective distinctive self is necessary; through association with it, ‘This one’, ‘I’ and the like are used of the inner controller, not because he is the nature of all. The denial rests on absence of identity between the conditioned things, so there is no conflict. This also rejects the claim that Vāmadeva, as qualified consciousness, cannot become Manu, the sun and the like as qualified consciousness. The statement is made through scriptural insight. Nor is the first person ‘I became’ inappropriate regarding pure consciousness: it is possible through reference to its former designation. Nor are ‘I gave the earth to the Ārya’ and the like inappropriate because consciousness alone does not give land. These are explained by taking conditioned consciousness. ‘It came to have the name “I”’, ‘Its secret name is “I”’, and the like intend meditation of that kind and do not determine expressive power. Therefore this scripture does not intend identity of inner controllers; difference among inner controllers is not in question. Nor is it suggested through the infinity of what is controlled and the like. Even one individual self is seen to control many limbs, and even one king controls many countries. ‘The one here in the person and the one there in the sun are one’ likewise does not intend unity of inner controllers. Pure Brahman is the topic through ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ and the like. When absolute reality is suggested for difference produced by adjuncts in it, teaching unity appropriately removes that. Nor does this conflict with the later sentence intending difference in the Chāndogya, ‘The person seen in the sun, I am he’, followed by ‘He alone leads them to Brahman’. That occurs in a meditation context and concerns meditation identifying oneself with its object, so there is no conflict. Nor should one suspect that, because a sentence in a meditation context does not establish unity, a sentence outside a meditation context also fails to establish it. Subordination to something else, which causes that failure, is absent. The following sentence ‘Now one who worships another deity’ condemns knowledge of difference, so the preceding sentence cannot, in accordance with it, intend meditation. Some say that ‘Brahman’ here means expansion, and so unity with the highest Brahman is not established. Otherwise, since ‘It knew itself alone, “I”’ in the preceding sentence would itself establish knowledge ‘Brahman’, ‘I am Brahman’ would be pointless. This is incorrect. ‘Self’ repeats the individual self’s consciousness, and the sentence serves its purpose by establishing its identity with Brahman-consciousness indicated by expansion and the like. Thus traditional passages such as ‘I am Hari; all this is Janārdana’ also accord with it. The claim that ‘Now one who worships another deity, thinking “He is one, I am another”, does not know; he is like an animal’ condemns knowledge of difference among inner controllers is incorrect. The inner controller is not the topic, and implication in both words and the like is obtained in accordance with the intention. Some interpret it as: ‘Whoever is another individual self worships a distinct deity, thinking “That other highest self am I”, does not know; he is like an animal.’ This is worthless because of the defect of remote connection: ‘another’, adjacent to ‘I’, is carried back to ‘whoever’. Nor should one suspect that compatibility is stronger than proximity by the principle ‘Whatever has a meaning-connection with something’. Even with the meaning-connection as it stands, compatibility exists in the stated manner. Nor does this scripture deny another’s existence merely as independent: no word presents independence in the counterpositive of otherness. Some say that, because ‘worships’ is heard, only meditation, a different modification from knowledge produced through effort, is denied, not knowledge. This is incorrect. In the preceding sentence ‘Whoever among the gods awakened to this’, and in the censure ‘He does not know’, knowing itself is stated. Thus ‘worship’ between them too concerns knowledge. Likewise, the Muṇḍaka sentence ‘One who knows that highest Brahman becomes Brahman itself’ intends identity alone. Nor should one say that the second ‘Brahman’ concerns only the individual self, since the word has many meanings—a class, the individual self, lotus-seated Brahma and the like—and can be used of an individual self in ‘Two Brahmans’ and the like. The meaning would be ‘One who knows the highest Brahman becomes only an individual self, not the highest Brahman’; hence the first ‘Brahman’ is qualified as highest. Even though ‘Brahman’ can be used of the individual self, here taking the highest Brahman is appropriate. Being an individual self and not being Brahman are already established and cannot be accomplished through knowledge of Brahman. Thus, by the sense, becoming the second-mentioned Brahman too is qualified by highestness. Some say ‘Becomes Brahman’ means becoming possessed of Brahmanhood in the form of expansion, like ‘Having devotedly honoured a Brahmin, even a Śūdra would become a Brahmin’. The Śūdra does not become the Brahmin individual honoured, but comes to possess the universal Brahminhood. This is incorrect. By the reasoning stated earlier, identity of the individual itself is possible here, so the example differs. Nor is it appropriate to say, from the continuation ‘His greatness’, that only attainment of his greatness is intended, not becoming him. The intention is that one who knows what is distinct from the world of body, senses and the like, and knows the world as its manifestation, becomes free from sorrow. Nor should one say that stating the example of distinct rivers and ocean in ‘As flowing rivers’ is inappropriate. We have said that the example is explained as concerning merely dissolution of clear difference. ‘He attains the divine person higher than the higher’ does not state attainment of Brahman located elsewhere. That would be the result of meditation with attributes, not of knowledge of Brahman; the passage concerns attainment of Brahman as one’s own nature. Nor should one say that, on the non-dual view, stating a new becoming-Brahman is inappropriate for one eternally Brahman. A result in the form of attaining what is already attained is seen through mere removal of error, as with gold already around one’s neck. Nor is removal of superimposition non-verbal. It is accessible through postulation from what is heard and can therefore be verbal. ‘Being Brahman indeed, one attains Brahman’ also intends unity. Nor, unless the first ‘Brahman’ denotes the individual self, does the relation of agent and object conflict. Such designation is explained by taking adjunct-produced difference existing before direct realisation. ‘All become one in the highest imperishable’ is also a means of knowledge for identity. Nor should one say that this is figurative unity through the same grounds seen in cows, kings, a worm and a wasp: ‘Cows become one in the cowshed at evening’; ‘All the kings, united, showered arrows upon the son of Pandu’; ‘The worm became one with the wasp’—unity based on one place, one intention or resemblance. When the primary meaning is possible, a figurative meaning is inappropriate. Since the statement concerns only unity with Brahman and is uttered once, there is not even a suspicion of many intended meanings. Nor is the suffix cvi, expressing becoming what one was not, inappropriate because unity is already established. Though existent, it is covered and is thus like something not existent, as with an unknown treasure deposited in one’s own house; the suffix is therefore appropriate. Nor should one say that the heard locative in ‘In the highest imperishable’ is abandoned and an unheard instrumental supplied. In accordance with other scripture, the locative need not be followed. Nor is there conflict with the preceding and following sentences ‘He attains highest likeness’, ‘He attains the person higher than the higher’; that has already been rejected. Likewise the sentence in the Inner Controller context, ‘There is no other seer than this’, and the sentence in the Imperishable context, ‘There is nothing else that sees than this’, are means of knowledge for unity. Nor should one say that ‘than this’ refers to the controller of all under discussion, so ‘There is no other seer’ denies only another seer controlling him, not seers in general. In ‘He alone controls everyone in this village; no other person exists’, ‘other’ is learned as another like the one under discussion; and in ‘The other is the same as the hawk’, ‘other’ is said to concern what resembles the previously indicated thing. To explain the promised knowledge of all through knowledge of one, ‘For through this one knows all this’, the passage conveys identity with the individual self apprehended as another. The insentient class is also negated by ‘What is other than this is afflicted’ and ‘Not this, not this’. Thus identity of individual self and Brahman alone is the sentence’s object of knowledge. In the example, identity is not intended, so there is no obstacle to adopting your account. Nor should one say that the Inner Controller passage here too conflicts with the preceding ‘The one within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self from within’, and the following ‘This is your self, the inner controller, immortal; what is other than this is afflicted’. Another conscious being apart from the highest self is accepted there, and its being afflicted states only its lack of independence. The preceding sentence is explained through adjunct-produced difference alone. The following sentence does not prescribe affliction of another conscious being. Rather, ‘This inner controller is your self’ conveys that everything apart from the inner controller, the individual self’s own nature, is afflicted, perishable or false, so there is no suspicion of conflict. This also rejects conflict, in the Imperishable passage, with the preceding ‘Under the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, sun and moon remain held in place’ and the like. Moreover, identity alone is accessible through the Upanishads because difference is censured as causing fear in ‘Fear indeed arises from a second’. Nor should one say that this means only that fear arises from an equal opposed to oneself, since in ordinary life fear arises only from such a one, so it repeats what is ordinarily established; and the preceding text says ‘Therefore one alone fears’, while the following says ‘Therefore one alone does not delight’. Scripture says, ‘Since nothing other than me exists, why do I not fear? From that very consideration his fear departed.’ Merely seeing a second in general causes fear, so a particular restriction cannot be postulated. The preceding ‘One alone fears’ concerns someone without vision of absolute reality, for whom fear occasioned by that ignorance is possible. The following ‘Therefore one alone does not delight’ says that delight is absent in one alone because delight produced by union with something desired is absent there. The middle sentence concerns a knower of reality and serves its purpose by conveying its own meaning. It cannot be made to intend an opposed meaning in conformity with the stated sentences concerning one who does not know reality. Identity is also established through censure of difference in ‘When he makes even a small interval in this, then fear arises for him’. Nor should one suspect that, because ‘in this’ is heard, this denies internal difference, not difference generally. The natural force of ara as ‘small’, of ut as ‘even’, and the absence of reference to this as a counterpositive make it intend denial of difference generally; one cannot postulate denial of only a particular difference. Likewise scripture such as ‘The one god hidden in all beings’ is a means of knowledge for unity here. Nor should one say that this intends unity of inner controllers, since ‘beings’ means conscious beings as in ‘From which these beings are born’. The example is not accepted: birth and the like are impossible for the conscious. As in statements prohibiting injury to beings, ‘being’ expresses the vital body and the like presided over by consciousness. This also explains traditional teaching such as ‘The self of beings is indeed one alone, established in each being’. Likewise traditional verses state: ‘Difference between the individual self and the highest exists only as long as delusion. Thereafter there is no difference, because the cause of difference is absent’; ‘When ignorance producing division has been utterly destroyed, who will make a nonexistent difference between the self and Brahman?’ Since difference is apprehended as due to ignorance, identity alone is understood as absolute. Nor does ‘difference’ mean disagreement here, as in ‘Division among friends’ and the like. That would require implication. Mutual absence and the like are the primary meanings, and abandoning the meaning heard is unjustified. ‘Know me also as the knower of the field in all fields, Arjuna’ and similar traditional teaching is also a means of knowledge here. Nor should one say that it means ‘Know me, the omniscient knower of fields, in all fields’. After stating ‘The great elements, the ego’ and the like, ‘This field, together with its modifications, has been stated in brief’ calls the whole consisting of conscious and unconscious the field, which scripture such as ‘Whose body is earth’ calls the Lord’s body. Since relation to every field as controller of all is already established, repetition would follow. It is more appropriate to intend identity with the individual self expressed by ‘knower of the field’ as presiding over each respective field. Hence, even though ‘knower of the field’ means the omniscient inner controller of all in traditional verses such as ‘The self of yoga knows fields, bodies, auspicious and inauspicious seeds, and what is heard; therefore he is called knower of the field’, and ‘They call the seer of nature and its modifications, not consisting of qualities, the knower of the field; but the agent covered by qualities is the individual self’, that interpretation is impossible here. The term is also well known of the individual self. Nor does the principle ‘Or the meaning established in scripture’ apply, since it concerns a case where one of the two meanings is non-scriptural. Other sentences too should be applied to unity as appropriate. Therefore revelation is a means of knowledge for unity. Here ends the explanation of many scriptural and traditional passages, beginning with ‘I am Brahman’, in the Advaita Siddhi. 29. 30. Refutation of the inference of unity. Likewise inference too is a means of knowledge here: individual selves do not absolutely differ from the highest self, because they are selves, like the highest self. Objection: the reason here is the universal selfhood, and destruction of the reason in identity itself supplies opposing reasoning. Reply: no. Even with absolute identity, empirical difference alone can explain the continued existence of an empirical universal. Being a knower is also a reason here. It is not unestablished in the individual self, what receives conditioning, since it occurs there as conditioned by the internal organ. Not depending on knowledge different from oneself for designation is a reason. Even on your view, the individual self is an object of unsublated designation through eternal knowledge not different from itself. Not being sublated is also a reason here. Nor is the insentient an exception: it is sublated and lacks the reason. Absolute difference is absent everywhere, so there is no scope for an exception. Nor should one say that absence even of empirical difference between individual self and highest self should be established in the same way. Conflict with perception itself opposes that. Moreover, support from scripture leaves no scope for a parallel fallacy or failure to entail the conclusion. This also rejects the proposed parallel fallacy in these inferences: for unity among individual selves, ‘The individual selves under dispute do not absolutely differ from Caitra, because they are individual selves, like Caitra’; and for unity of Brahman and individual selves, ‘The individual selves under dispute do not really differ from Brahman, because they are things, like Brahman’. One cannot similarly establish that they do not differ even empirically. Likewise: the bodies under dispute are presided over by Caitra, because they are bodies, like an accepted instance. Nor should one say that this does not establish unity among individual selves, since being presided over by Caitra is compatible with being presided over by another; and, if being presided over by Caitra alone is intended, the example lacks the property to be established because the inner controller presides over it. Being presided over by Caitra alone as the transmigrating being is to be established; alternatively, being seats of experience for Caitra alone is to be established. Nor should one say that this is contradicted: the experiencer is what is qualified by the internal organ, which differs in every body, while the one pure consciousness is not an experiencer. Even though experience occurs in what is qualified, it does not cease to occur in the subject. Nor is this parallel to ‘The bodies under dispute are connected with Caitra’s mind alone’. If the mind too were one, the arrangement would be wholly impossible. The cases also differ through being or not being supported by scripture; and on the view that seeing is creation, unity of mind is accepted. The self is not plural under a universal subordinate to substancehood, because it is all-pervasive, like space. Nor should one say that the example lacks the property to be established because space differs in each cosmic age, and lacks the reason because it is delimited; and that even if selfhood, like atomhood and the like, is not a universal, difference among selves can be established, so something else is established. The intention is: ‘The locus of selfhood is not plural at one time under a universal subordinate to substancehood, because it is conjoined with every material thing existing at the same time, like space.’ Through the force of the subject’s qualification, something else is not established. The difference under dispute is false, or imagined in one consciousness, because it is difference or because it is an object of cognition, like difference between moons; or imagined in one consciousness, because it is difference or because it is an object of cognition, like difference between moons; or like difference imagined in one consciousness by a momentarist. Falsity is as defined earlier. Nor is differencehood common to the imagined unestablished: rather, non-imagined status in difference is itself unestablished. This also rejects the objections that the example lacks the property to be established because the moon’s difference from an imagined second moon is real, and that difference of liberation from transmigration and Brahman from unreality provides exceptions. Nor is ‘Identity is false because it is identity, like identity of body and self’ and the like readily established: we have stated the consequence of nihilism. Likewise, the cognition of difference under dispute is false because it is cognition of difference, like cognition of difference between moons. Nor are cognitions of difference between Brahman and unreality and the like exceptions, since they too stand on the same footing as the subject. A parallel fallacy is rejected precisely through the impossibility of being cognisable if absolutely real. Hence the verse: ‘What is under dispute is free from absolute difference within itself, because it has great magnitude. Whatever is such is so, as space is; this is such, and therefore so.’ Space’s possession of parts does not make the example lack the property to be established, because ‘within itself’ denotes what is other than its own parts. Likewise, consciousness is without intrinsic difference among its own members, because difference is not made manifest without a conditioning adjunct, like space. Nor does the example lack the property to be established: it is stated according to the Naiyāyika approach. Nor should one say that desires and the like provide exceptions, since their differences too are made manifest through differences of adjuncts such as pots and cloths. Desires and the like are transformations of one internal organ, so the property to be established exists there too. The difference under dispute, whose counterpositiveness is not delimited by a property that fails to pervade its locus, is the counterpositive of an absolute absence sharing its locus, because it is difference, like difference from something conjoined. The difference under dispute is the counterpositive of a universally present absolute absence, because it is an entity, like an eternal substance. We have already explained how being the counterpositive of an absolute absence in its own form does not mean utter nonexistence, and how being the counterpositive of an absolute absence under the aspect of absolute reality does not establish something else, since its having that form is possible, as with Brahman. The inference ‘Mutual-absencehood occurs in what is the counterpositive of an absolute absence sharing its locus, because, while occurring in an absence present in all three times, it is directly pervaded by absencehood, like absolute-absencehood’ establishes the previously stated example, difference whose counterpositive is conjoined. Nor does superimposed difference of a shell from itself already establish the conclusion. You, holding that error presents something nonexistent as something else, do not accept it, so it is to be established. Nor does occurrence in all three times make falsity impossible. Time is the relation of māyā and consciousness, so persistence throughout all time does not oppose falsity. Nor does being the counterpositive of an absolute absence sharing its locus establish something else through not pervading its locus, as with conjunction and the like. Through the force of the subject’s qualifier, not pervading its locus is impossible and cannot explain it. Disorder of apprehension and the like has already been rejected. Failure to entail the conclusion, parallel fallacies, counter-inferences of equal force, unstated conditions and the like should be rejected as with the previously stated inference of the world’s falsity. Likewise one should understand ‘Selfhood is pervaded by oneness, because it occurs only in selves, like Caitrahood’, and the like. Here ends the inference of identity of the individual self and Brahman in the Advaita Siddhi. 30. 31. Refutation of failure to establish unity through partness. Identity of individual self and Brahman is established also through designation as a part in the scripture ‘All beings are one quarter of him’ and the traditional passage ‘An eternal part of me alone, becoming an individual self in the world of individual selves’. The individual self’s being a part in relation to Brahman is not being a constituent cause, since Brahman is beginningless. Nor is it being a fragment, since Brahman cannot be cut. Nor is it being a member of an aggregate: since the aggregate is not other than its members, even empirically there would be no pure Brahman other than the transmigrating beings. Nor is it being a substance both different and identical, which is not accepted. Nor is it being a region, like a piece of cloth in relation to cloth: without imagining, this is impossible in regionless Brahman. Nevertheless, on the delimitation view, the individual self can be a part as an imagined region, like pot-space in relation to great space. We have explained earlier how a part due to an adjunct is possible even in what of itself has no parts. Partness is not being inferior to something while similar to it, since a fine cloth too would then be a part of a coarse cloth. ‘Part’ is primary in a region of a thing; applying it to an imagined region even in what of itself has no parts is preferable to postulating use in another meaning. Moreover, in the aphorism ‘A part, because of varied designation, and also otherwise; some study its being fishermen, gamblers and the like’, designations of difference are exemplified by ‘It is to be sought, it is to be known’, ‘Knowing it thus, one becomes a sage’, ‘The one who dwells in the self’, and the like; designation of identity is exemplified by the Atharvan mantra ‘Brahman is the fishermen, Brahman the servants, Brahman these gamblers too’. Thus adopting the stated meaning is appropriate. Adopting another meaning containing absolute difference would conflict with this aphorism. Merely because another use occurs somewhere, postulating that meaning everywhere would produce widespread disorder. This also rejects the following: does ‘One quarter of him’ teach the individual self as a part of pure consciousness or as a part of the Lord? Not the first. In ‘All beings are one quarter of him’, the pronoun refers to the Lord under discussion, qualified by having a thousand heads and the like; in ‘A part of me alone’, the first-person word used by the Lord denotes the Lord alone. Not the last: on your view the Lord too is conditioned, so the individual self cannot be his part, any more than jar-space is a part of pot-space. Nor should one say that consciousness delimited by the Lord’s adjunct is again delimited by the individual self’s adjunct, like a pot placed within house-space. Then the liberated would not be pure Brahman. Thus on your view too, partness is neither primary nor explicable through an adjunct, and only my stated interpretation should be accepted. This is rejected. The conflict in adopting another meaning has been stated. The pronouns in scripture and traditional teaching refer to consciousness indicated by having a thousand heads and the like, so the stated objections have no scope. Therefore, although identity of the individual self and Brahman is validly known from scripture such as ‘You are woman, you are man; you are the boy and also the girl; grown old, you walk with a staff; you are born, facing everywhere’, and ‘The wise one, having fashioned all forms and made names, abides uttering them’, imagined partness, to account for designations of difference such as thinker and what is thought, is contradicted by scripture and traditional teaching; through their force too identity is understood. This is established. Here ends the establishment of unity even through partness in the Advaita Siddhi. 31. 32. Refutation of identity of original and reflection. Likewise identity of individual self and Brahman should be understood also because they have the forms of original and reflection, like face and reflected face. Objection: identity is not agreed upon in the example. Someone standing nearby apprehends ‘Caitra and his reflection differ’, just as ‘Caitra and his shadow differ’; oneself too apprehends ‘My hand and its reflection differ’. Reply: no. Even though difference is apprehended initially, perception accompanied by reasoning establishes unity of original and reflection, making the example appropriate. Although someone ignorant of the identifying mark errs about difference, once Caitra outside is apprehended through his distinctive mark, when the person in the house appears in that way, the cognition arises ‘This is Caitra himself’. Likewise, having apprehended the face on the neck through its distinctive mark, one determines that what is in the mirror is also such. The cognition ‘This is that very face’, ‘This is that very hand’, common to oneself and others, is established by experience. Nor should one say that recognition is unestablished because, even when a mere image of the face appears in somewhat clear copper and the like, its particular shape is not apprehended. Even if it is not apprehended everywhere, its establishment in a clean mirror and the like establishes the example. Objection: how can one recognise one’s own eyeballs and the like when there has been no prior cognition of them? Reply: no. The eye-rays striking the mirror connect through delimitation at their tips, so ordinary cognition of one’s own eyeballs and the like is possible at the immediately preceding moment. Some say that, because there is no recognition in a mock sun appearing beside the sun, there is none here either. This is incorrect. There, unlike here, the adjunct is not apprehended and dependence on an adjunct is not determined. Knowledge that it depends on an adjunct and knowledge of its identifying mark together constitute the conditions for direct realisation of identity. When those exist, absence of the experience ‘My face is fixed in the mirror’ itself would contradict experience. Some say this conflicts with the contrary experience ‘Caitra’s reflection was seen, not Caitra; Caitra was inferred through it’. This is incorrect. Even when actual identity is known, the apprehension ‘What is delimited by an adjunct was seen; what is undelimited was inferred’ is consistent, like inferring the Ganges in the rainy season through the Ganges in autumn. Nor should one say that, when a reflected face is seen facing towards one and so forth, such cognition of one’s own face would be absent, while children would not mistake their own reflections for another child. Both depend on ignorance of the distinctive identifying mark. Hence sometimes cognition and designation ‘My face’ occur even regarding the reflected face. Nor is this designation figurative because preceded by knowledge of difference, like calling one’s footprint on the road ‘my foot’. When its distinctive mark is known, knowledge of difference is as good as absent. Objection: there would be no dispute if difference were directly realised; otherwise what would even you call erroneous? Nor is someone directly realising difference and its differentiator seen directly realising identity. Reply: through the power of an adjunct, someone directly realising identity is accepted as directly realising difference, like directly seeing yellow while directly realising conchhood, which is pervaded by whiteness. Experience is hard to deny. Nor does error become impossible because its material cause, ignorance of unity, ceases through knowledge of unity. Absence of the adjunct also assists its cessation. Nor should one say that, since ‘I do not know it’ is not experienced when knowledge of it exists, that knowledge removes ignorance without depending on anything else, as it removes its own prior absence. Even though the aspect of ignorance accounting for ‘I do not know’ ceases, error is experienced. The adjunct itself obstructs cessation of the aspect supplying its material cause, like already-begun action in liberation while living; thus dependence on absence of that adjunct is necessary. This also rejects the following: if this error of difference has root ignorance as material cause, it would be empirical; if ignorance is not its material cause, the established doctrine is contradicted and difference between original and reflection would be real. The stated reasoning explains it, and even empirical status produces no impropriety. Inference too is a means of knowledge for their unity. Although extreme dissimilarity here admits an exception in left and right hands and the like, nevertheless a reflection is identical with its original, because it possesses the original’s distinctive properties, is not a locus of properties opposed to it, and is not produced by what does not produce the original. Nor is the second reason unestablished. Opposed properties such as facing towards one arise through an adjunct, so absence of intrinsically opposed properties exists. Nor is the third reason unestablished in a reflection born after its original. Against one holding unity, its being later than the original itself is unestablished. Objection: to account for a distinct effect, a distinct cause must be postulated here too, as in a halo, rainbow, shadow, mock sun and the like. A reflection too is a kind of shadow. An echo heard after the sound has ceased is not denied to be another sound merely because the established cause, striking a drum and the like, is absent. Reply: no. A reflection can occur even in light, which opposes shadow, so its being a kind of shadow is unestablished. An echo occurs at another time, so its difference does not assist here. Difference of causes, postulated only after difference of effects is established, cannot be stated first; and through the established cause’s presence, the effect itself is present. Perception stands equally for difference and identity, while reasoning gives greater strength to identity alone. Hence the Vivaraṇa says: ‘In a mirror and the like there is no other individual face, because there is nothing producing it, like a horn on a hare’s head.’ Thus cognition of identity is explained and is stronger. The claim that this cognition itself is absent because no cause of another individual exists was rejected earlier. Nor should one say that cognition of difference is supported because another cause can be postulated as with a shadow, and that, since the reflection does not fall within the established substances, it is simply another substance like darkness. Mutual dependence follows. When difference is supported, another substance and another cause are postulated; once these exist, difference is supported. Hence the traditional expression ‘Neither coloured nor situated in water’ is primary, not figurative like ‘A painted lion’, ‘A wooden woman’, or ‘A leather deer’. Nor should one say that, even on your view, ‘Situated in water’ is not primary, since no other sun is in the water, and the sun in the sky cannot be in the water. The whole sun presented as situated in water is negated. Objection: the sun itself is presented as situated in water, but identity of the two is neither established by perception nor reasonable. Difference is established through smaller or larger size, motion, conjunction or non-conjunction with an adjunct, accessibility or inaccessibility to touch and the like, facing towards one or not, and, in musk and its reflection, fragrance or absence of fragrance. Reply: no. Through smaller size, fragrance and the like, difference of what is situated in the adjunct is to be established. But being situated in the adjunct is imagined in the original, making subject and reason unestablished. There is no dispute if an imagined reason and the like establish a property of the same order of reality as themselves. Nor should difference be asserted through scripture: ‘As this shadow is in a person, in this that is extended. As a shadow is seen resembling a person and dependent on the person, so are all, Brahma and the rest, of the highest self’s nature.’ Imagined difference alone explains resemblance; scripture does not intend its absolute reality, and many scriptures teaching unity oppose that. Objection: since precisely what has the original’s distinctive mark is superimposed as situated in the mirror, something possessing its smell and the like should also appear as situated in the mirror, just as something possessing its colour and the like does. Reply: no. Although it is superimposed as possessing its distinctive mark, it is not accepted as superimposed with every distinctive mark, so appearance of smell and the like cannot be deduced. Objection: if the face is not in the mirror, how can an adjunct favouring the reflection explain arrangements such as transmigration and non-transmigration in individual self and Brahman, like whiteness and darkness in face and reflected face? Reply: no. Grime and similar properties of the mirror are possible in the reflection qualified by superimposed location in the mirror. Nor should one say that, since location in the adjunct is itself superimposed, it cannot delimit being a locus of grime, because one thing is not superimposed on what is qualified by another superimposition. Only possession of a property apprehended before superimposition is required for the locus of what is superimposed, not that property’s reality too. Thus defects depending on the opponent’s procedure have no scope. Nor should one say that experience places the reflected face, not the face, in the mirror, so reflectionhood cannot contain being situated there. As what is conditioned by ignorance can rest in ignorance, what is conditioned by a mirror can rest in the mirror. This also rejects the claim that transmigration, corresponding to grime, occurs in the qualified and cannot share a locus with liberation resting in the pure. Transmigration occurs in the conditioned, and by taking the component that receives conditioning, a shared locus is possible. Thus grime in the face is delimited by relation to the mirror, as the tree’s being a locus of conjunction with a monkey is delimited by its tip. The only difference is that conjunction with a monkey is natural in the tree, while grime in the face is due to an adjunct. Hence cognition of grime concerns only the face conditioned and delimited by the adjunct. This also rejects the consequences that, if the mirror’s grime belongs to the face, transmigration too would belong to the pure; that one would apprehend ‘The face is dirty’, like ‘The tree is conjoined’; and that this conflicts with ‘The face is not dirty, but the reflected face is’. Objection: how can a reflection of musk and the like be identical with its original when the distinctive mark does not continue in it? Mere possession of its form does not make it that thing; shadows, seals and images would also be that thing. Moreover, differentiating features such as facing towards one are present here too. Nor is cognition of facing towards one erroneous, since one never experiences ‘The reflection does not face the original’. Reply: no. Identity with the original is established in a mirror and similar reflections through continuity of the distinctive mark. It is then postulated precisely under delimitation by reflectionhood. In shadows and the like, such a distinctive mark is never observed, so the cases are not equal. Nor do facing towards one and the like differentiate: like grime, they arise through an adjunct. Hence that cognition is erroneous, like apprehension of redness in a hibiscus flower. The eye striking the mirror turns towards oneself; because it has the capacity to apprehend as facing itself, even a face and the like facing another direction can be apprehended in that way. It is said: ‘Sight struck by the mirror turns back and pervades one’s own face; through facing it, it displays the face reversed.’ Nor should one say that, if sight turns back and apprehends only one’s own face, someone standing nearby could not apprehend two faces. The restriction to one’s own face is unestablished; whatever is near the adjunct is apprehended in that way. Nor should one say that, since a mirror and the like exhaust their function merely in striking sight back, different mirrors would not produce apprehension of many faces, just as one mirror does not. The examples differ: many striking surfaces give sight many tips, each tip apprehending the face delimited by its respective striking surface. Nor should one ask how apprehension of many faces of opposed forms in a jewel, mirror, sword and the like is then appropriate. Understand it as depending on the strength of adjuncts established by positive and negative concomitance. Nor is this account of sight turning back impossible in the individual self, Brahman’s reflection. It has been explained only for reflections accessible to the eye. Nor, if water with loosely arranged parts strikes sight back, would stones and the like within the water fail to be apprehended. The striking does not occur under every delimitation, so sight can enter within as well. Nor should one say that, because the distant sun overhead is apprehended, even something behind one, though intervened upon, would be apprehended. Sight’s going out and returning distinguish the cases. To assert apprehension of the distant sun is not to say that sight pierces a wall behind one and goes through it. Nor should one say that sight striking a stone too should turn back and apprehend the face. On your view too, the consequence would be that a reflection should arise there. The answer through lack of clarity is the same for us: you accept that a reflection arises only in a clear surface, and I that sight turns back only from such a surface. Nor does seeing a reflection entail the pleasure, merit and the like produced by seeing the original. Where these arise from seeing it alone and not from anything else, the consequence is accepted. Where they arise specifically from knowledge free of an adjunct, the basis for the deduction is absent. Nor would the reflected sun be as difficult to look at as the sun. Direct exposure of the eyeball to the sun’s brilliance, which accounts for difficulty of seeing, is absent when apprehending the reflected sun. Nor should one say that in a clear mirror and in somewhat clear copper and the like the face’s particular shape would equally be apprehended. Grime and the like in the adjunct, accounting for absence of extreme clarity, obstruct it there. Otherwise you too would find it hard to explain why a reflection possessing that particular shape does not arise there. Objection: your statement contradicts itself: although doubled occurrence is impossible on the delimitation view, it is possible on the reflection view, and hence there is inner controllership. Nor can you say that the adjunct favours the reflection. Reply: no. Being delimited by all adjuncts, being delimited by a particular adjunct, and difference imagined through an adjunct explain the absence of contradiction in our statement. Hence only ‘The face is not in the mirror’ negates it as connected with an adjunct; it is not negated in its nature as ‘This is not the face’, like ‘This is not silver’. Objection: one does not experience ‘No image of a face exists here’. Rather, one experiences ‘There was a reflected face here for so long’, like ‘There was a mock sun here’. Traditional teaching too says ‘Like a reflection in a mirror’. Thus even location in the mirror is not sublated in a reflected face. Merely saying ‘There is no cloud on the ground’ does not sublate the cloud’s shadow there. Reply: no. Identity of face and reflected face is established because they have one distinctive mark. Thus negating the face’s being there can negate the reflected face’s existence there. Cloud-shadows, mock suns and the like are not such, so negating clouds and the like does not negate their shadows and the like. The traditional passage supplies an example taking the apparent meaning. Nor does this abolish inference of an original from a reflection because it does not differ from what is to be established: difference imagined through an adjunct explains the distinction. This also rejects the consequences that ‘One should not look at the rising sun’ would prohibit seeing its rising reflection too; that prohibition of seeing the sun in water would also prohibit seeing the sun in the sky; and that merely seeing a reflection would fulfil the scriptural instruction ‘Having seen it, one should bathe’. Imagined difference itself explains the scriptural arrangement. Nor should one say that something not made of udumbara wood, but known as such, would then fulfil ‘The sacrificial post is to be of udumbara wood’; or that hearing about a body known as the self would fulfil ‘The self is to be heard about’. Where valid cognition can explain fulfilment, explaining it through error is inappropriate. Objection: the beginningless individual self is not a reflection dependent on an adjunct. Rather, reflectionhood means resembling something while dependent on it, and that is pervaded by difference, so your reason is contradictory. The author of the aphorisms says, ‘For this very reason, the comparison is as with a reflected sun and the like.’ Reply: no. Dependence on an adjunct means existing only when the adjunct exists. That does not oppose beginninglessness and is possible even for a beginningless individual self. Hence taking ‘reflection’ to mean difference and resemblance, and declaring the reason contradictory on that basis, is inappropriate. Thus: ‘When identity of the reflection with its original is established, unity with Brahman is established for the whole class of individual selves, because they are its reflections.’ Here ends the establishment of unity through the reasoning of original and reflection in the Advaita Siddhi. 32. 33. Explanation of the individual self’s atomic size. Objection: since the individual self is atomic, how can it be identical with the all-pervasive Lord? Reply: no. Its not being atomic is established by scripture such as ‘Eternal, present everywhere’, ‘This indeed is the great, unborn self’; and by inferences such as ‘The individual self is not atomic, because it is the locus of perceptible qualities and because it is perceived, like a pot’, and ‘Because it is a self and is not a material element, like the Lord’. Against the contrary stands the consequence that pleasure, knowledge and the like pervading the body would not be apprehended. Nor should one say that the individual self is atomic through scripture: ‘Atomic indeed is this self, whom these two, merit and demerit, bind’; ‘A part of a hundredth part of a hair-tip, divided a hundredfold, is to be known as the individual self; and it is capable of infinitude.’ Because of conflict with many scriptural passages conveying all-pervasiveness, these intend difficulty of knowing it. Apprehension of qualities pervading the body cannot be explained away. This also rejects ‘The individual self is not all-pervasive, because it departs, travels and acts, like a bird’s body’, with destruction of the reasons as an opposing consequence: the reasons are unestablished. Nor should one say that the reasons are established through scripture such as ‘Departing from this body, he attains that world; from that he comes to this world’, and traditional teaching such as ‘There the yogi, attaining the lunar light, returns’. Scripture attributes departure and the like belonging to the intellect to what is conditioned by it. Nor should one ask how movement can belong to the intellect when scripture such as ‘Having experienced merit on heaven’s height, they enter this world or a lower one’, ‘Having experienced evil, they return’, declares movement as sharing a locus with experience of pleasure, suffering and the like. Even experience of pleasure and suffering in the self is conditioned by the intellect. Its sharing a locus with movement does not establish that movement is intrinsic. Objection: how are the reasons unestablished when scripture such as ‘He leads them to Brahman’, and traditional teaching such as ‘Departing there, knowers of Brahman go to Brahman’, state that movement shares a locus with liberation? Reply: no. Only what is non-pervasive moves towards what is non-pervasive. Brahman is all-pervasive, so movement towards it is impossible. ‘Going’ therefore intends freedom from difference produced by adjuncts and does not convey movement as sharing a locus with liberation. Objection: the reason is not unestablished, since ‘Through that illumination alone this self departs’ teaches departure as belonging to the self. Otherwise liberation and the like too would belong only to the intellect. Nor can scripture concern movement and the like conditioned by the intellect, since it gives the example of a cart, a locus of intrinsic movement: ‘As a heavily loaded cart goes creaking, so this embodied self, mounted by the intelligent self, goes creaking.’ Reply: no. ‘This’ refers only to what is conditioned by the intellect and does not state movement as belonging to the pure self. Liberation differs: when the intellect ceases, it cannot belong to the intellect. Similarity in every respect is not decisive for being an example, and the example’s force does not establish intrinsic movement. Nor should one say that, in ‘As he departs, the vital force departs after him’, scripture states movement in the individual self before movement of the intellect called vital force, so it cannot be explained through the intellect’s movement. Even though its aspect called vital force, endowed with the power of action, moves later, departure through another aspect can occur first. This also rejects the objection that, in ‘The mind departed; he remains as though with closed eyes, eating and drinking’, even when the mind departs, the self is heard not to depart, so its movement cannot come from the mind’s movement. Movement through an adjunct belongs to the conditioned; its absence in what is unconditioned by the intellect does not conflict with that. Nor should one ask how movement can be due to adjuncts when scripture such as ‘The knower, freed from name and form, attains the divine person higher than the higher’ states movement even after release from name and form. The highest person is present everywhere, making movement towards him impossible, so ‘attains’ likewise intends another meaning, as before. Hence ‘Having attained the highest light, he manifests in his own form; he is the highest; there he moves about’ and similar scripture also do not intend movement. Objection: does movement and the like in the intellect produce movement and the like in the self delimited by it, is only the intellect’s movement superimposed, or is it figuratively attributed? Not the first: a pot’s movement is not seen to produce another movement in the space delimited by it. Otherwise, at the place from which pot or intellect moves, space or the self would have a gap, and it would occur doubled elsewhere. Nor should one say that this defect is absent on the reflection view. Even if absent on the view that a reflection is another thing, on your view sight struck by a mirror turns back and apprehends one’s own face. The adjunct’s movement produces no movement in the original, so movement is impossible in the reflection too. Not the final two alternatives: if the agent, this delimited region of the self, does not attain the world that is the seat of experience, but only another region delimited by the moving intellect does, loss of what has been done and the like follow. The delimited agent and experiencer differ; or, if identical and undelimited, agency and the like are absent. Reply: no. Through movement of an adjunct, movement is attributed to the conditioned precisely figuratively. Nor does loss of what has been done and the like follow. Whatever was done by a particular self delimited by a particular intellect produces experience in that very self delimited by that intellect. The partless self has no region. The stated difference between delimited agent and experiencer is incorrect. When the self delimited and the intellect delimiting it are one, difference in the delimited cannot be stated. Nor is ‘Selfhood resides in atoms, because it is a universal directly pervaded by substancehood, like earthhood’ a valid inference. Not occurring in the all-pervasive is an unstated condition; moreover, sharing a locus with touch and the like could be established in the same way. In ‘The individual self is not all-pervasive, because, while other than an element and not a locus of the non-inherent cause of remoteness, it is not omniscient; because it is a locus of impermanent special qualities other than sound; and because it is a locus of latent impressions, like a mat’, non-selfhood is an unstated condition. The reasons are also unestablished because impermanent special qualities, latent impressions and the like occur in an adjunct. Great magnitude too can readily be established in this way. In ‘The individual self is atomic, because it is a locus of conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of knowledge, like the mind’, the example is not accepted, since the mind has intermediate size. Insentience is also an unstated condition. Everywhere here, apprehension of pervading pleasure, knowledge and the like supplies opposing reasoning. There is also conflict with simultaneous experiences such as ‘There is pleasure in my foot, pain in my head’, since one atom cannot be delimited by two separated places at one time. Nor should one say that, even if the bearer of qualities is atomic, the qualities’ pervasion prevents the inference from pervading pleasure and knowledge. A quality cannot occur apart from its bearer. Otherwise a pot’s colour could occur apart from the pot. Radiance, though seen elsewhere than the lamp, is not a quality of the lamp but another substance whose touch is unmanifest. Nor should one say that a quality can be apprehended elsewhere than the intellect here, as universals, inherence and the like occur elsewhere than their property-bearer. Then all-pervasiveness would follow here too, as with universals and inherence, since, if it remained apart from its property-bearer, there would be no regulator. Nor does a restriction of causes regulate it: if the restriction follows merely from the restriction of the immediate inherent cause, confinement to the atom’s place is unavoidable. Nor should one say that a fire’s heat would not be apprehended outside it, and that, if this belonged to nearby light with unmanifest colour, heat in the fire itself would not be established. Even though another light is postulated nearby when an opposing consideration exists, no such consideration opposes the hot touch experienced in the visible fire, so another light cannot be postulated there. This also rejects the following: because fragrance is experienced around a ketakī and the like, qualities are independent of their bearers. Nor can those fragrances belong to parts of the ketakī spreading around it, since the substance would then diminish. Nor is its non-diminution explained by entry of other parts: there is no evidence for postulating entry of other parts in musk and the like kept in a crystal casket. If an effect were independent of an inherent cause, it would be without a support. If another cause based on proximity to that support were also removed, it would cease to be an effect. Avoiding that loss itself supplies evidence for the postulation there. Some divide ‘Eternal, all-pervading, stable’ as ‘Situated in the all-pervading, and atomic’, in accordance with the traditional passage ‘In eternal, all-pervading Vishnu the atomic individual self is established’. This is incorrect. Only the meaning conforming to scripture such as ‘All-pervading like space, and eternal’, ‘This indeed is the great, unborn self’, is appropriate. Dividing it with ‘atomic’ conflicts with that. The claim that an atom alone is called all-pervading through successive connection with many bodies is incorrect: there is no means for restricting ‘all’, which expresses everything. The proposal to establish non-pervasiveness through perceptibility and the like is also incorrect. Opposing reasoning has been stated, and that same reasoning favours establishing all-pervasiveness, preventing failure to entail the conclusion. Objection: if the self is all-pervasive, all bodies would be seats of experience for every self, since all bodies, senses and the like are always conjoined with every self. Actions too, performed through common bodies and the like, could not be particular; and superimposition of I-hood and the like could not be restricted without a regulating root relation and the like. Reply: no. On your view too the Lord is all-pervasive, so all bodies would equally produce his experience. Nor should one say that, even though conjoined with him, they do not produce experience in him because they are not produced by his unseen potency: then the same applies here. Nor should one ask how actions themselves are particular. They are produced by that self’s previous actions, and so the series is beginningless. Otherwise you too have no explanation regarding the Lord’s self. A sprout and the like producing Caitra’s experience are produced by his unseen potency. Since unseen potency inhering in the self has no direct relation to the sprout, a relation through the self must be stated, and that requires the self’s all-pervasiveness. Nor should one say that even a sprout and the like not causing Caitra’s experience, though not related to unseen potency through the self, are not produced by it, so that relation is not decisive. Contact through the self determined by the productive unseen potency is decisive and leads to no excessive consequence. Causality of unseen potency is inferred only from the result. When the account is possible in this way, there is no evidence for accepting another relation between unseen potency and its effect, any more than between counterpositive and absence, expressed meaning and expression, knowledge and what is known, and the like. The claim that the unseen potency of the Kārīrī rite has a relation with rain in the form of being produced by an action enjoined for that purpose and the like is incorrect. There too conjunction-inherence through the sacrificer’s self alone accounts for the falling of water and the like. All this has been stated according to the opponent’s approach. On our own view, the arrangement has already been stated. Thus scripture says, ‘Through the intellect’s quality and the self’s quality, it is seen as merely the point of an awl, and as lower’. Since being merely an awl-point is stated through the intellect’s quality, all-pervasiveness alone is intrinsic. Nor should one reverse the connections here, assigning being merely an awl-point to the self’s quality and being lower to the intellect’s quality, in accordance with ‘As light from the minute eye spreads out, so this person’s light spreads out; this person indeed is minute’. Because of conflict with many scriptures conveying all-pervasiveness, and in accordance with ‘Through the intellect’s quality’, this passage itself intends atomic size due to an adjunct. The genitive ‘Of the person’ has a figurative meaning, like ‘Rahu’s head’. Thus the connections are not reversed, and atomic size does not differentiate the self. Here ends the refutation of atomic size in the self in the Advaita Siddhi. 33. ‘What is set down in the texts has been openly taught by teachers. Neither merit nor fault is mine as I repeat others’ words. Yet this is the fruit of my labour here: through my own understanding I have grasped the purport of scriptures, reasonings and teachers’ sayings.’ 1.